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Investigation into Earning Management Practices and the Role of 
Corporate Governance and External Audit in Emerging Markets: Empirical 
Evidence from Saudi listed Companies  
 
Abstract  
Agency theory predicts that corporate governance mechanisms and external audit play an important role 
in enhancing financial reporting, while institutional theory views these mechanisms as practices or 
regulations which result from coercion by legislators who impose certain practices in order to improve 
organizational effectiveness, or as a result of imitation. In terms of earnings management practices, both 
theories provide an appropriate theoretical framework. Taking agency theory and institutional theory as 
points of departure, the primary purpose of this study is to: (1) investigate the motivations and techniques 
of earnings management and; (2) to what extent corporate governance and external audit can affect 
earnings management practices in Saudi Arabia. 
 
To achieve this aim, the questionnaire survey is mainly used to explore the motivations and techniques of 
earnings management in Saudi Arabia by obtaining the different perceptions of respondents. In terms of 
the role of corporate governance and external audit in reducing earnings management practices, two 
models are constructed and a set of hypotheses are formulated. These models are examined, by a logistic 
regression, using a sample consisting of all companies listed on the Saudi Stock Exchange with the 
exception of financial and insurance companies which have different practices. In addition, semi-
structured interviews are employed in order to provide a better understanding of the research questions, 
confirming and elaborating on the questionnaire survey and models’ findings and supporting the 
development of the hypotheses. They were subsequently undertaken, after the questionnaire survey, with 
15 individuals including board members, audit committee members, external auditors and academic staff.  
Although there were significant differences among respondents, the findings reveal that the four main 
incentives for Saudi managers to manage earnings are ‘to increase the amount of remuneration’, ‘to report 
a reasonable profit and avoid loss’, ‘to obtain a bank loan’ and ‘to increase share prices’. The findings 
also indicate that only seven statements relating to earnings management that received support from 
respondents were techniques of earnings management in Saudi companies. Agency and institutional 
theory may provide a sensible explanation for previous earnings management practices in Saudi Arabia.  
Moreover, the expectation of beneficial corporate governance practices and external audit constraining 
opportunistic earnings management activities was, to a large extent, found to be inaccurate in Saudi 
Arabia. That is, no internal corporate governance variables, apart from outside director, board size and 
board meetings, examined in this research are shown to have any significant effect on earnings 
management. With the exception of auditor opinion, none of the external audit factors and ownership 
structure affects earnings management. Moreover, the interview survey shows many issues and 
interesting findings related to previous investigation such as nepotism, illegal competition, and lack of 
independence. Generally, the findings are not consistent with agency theory that ownership concentration, 
audit committee, and external audit might mitigate agency problems leading to reduced agency cost by 
aligning the interests of controlling owners with those of the company. However, previous finding can be 
interpreted by Institutional theory which views these mechanisms as practices or regulations resulting 
from coercion by legislators who impose certain practices in order to improve organizational 
effectiveness, or as a result of imitation.  
It should be noted that the findings established in this study could be useful to external auditors and 
regulators and legislators in their attempts to constrain the incidence of earnings management and 
enhance the quality of monitoring mechanisms.  
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Chapter One: 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 PREAMBLE  
During the last ten years, the financial scandals in developed countries, such as the UK and 
the USA, have brought about a major awareness of the need for more transparency and 
credibility in order to protect shareholders and stakeholders alike (Glaum et al, 2004; 
Fearnley et al., 2005). Earnings management (EM), as a phenomenon of previous scandals 
(Goncharov, 2005) which has received considerable attention, is one of the most important 
challenges confronting corporate governance (CG) mechanisms which endeavour to resolve 
the negative impact of earnings management on financial reporting (Jaggi and Tsui, 2007). 
Academic research has concluded that managers engage in earnings management to 
accomplish certain objectives such as avoiding loss, meeting market expectations, avoiding 
debt covenant violations etc. Whatever the motivation, it is documented that earnings 
management harms earnings quality (Jaggi and Tsui, 2007) and misleads financial reporting 
users. Even in developed countries the practice of adopting international accounting and 
auditing standards has failed to provide sufficient assurances that financial reports are free 
from earnings management (Pornupatham, 2006). According to Al-Khabash and Al-
Thuneibat (2009), based on Lo’s (2007) argument, EM has many victims such as equity 
investors, creditors, suppliers, regulators and customers.  
        
Investors’ confidence depends mainly on the strength of the capital market associated with 
different monitoring mechanisms (Chang and Sun, 2009) such as internal corporate 
governance (CG) which has recently received significant attention in numerous developing 
countries. The significance of internal CG ensues from the vital role it can play in helping 
firms and economies to attract investment and provide reasonable credibility in financial 
reporting. Accordingly, prior studies have concluded that internal CG mechanisms have a 
substantial effect on earnings management practices (Cornett et al., 2008). However, some of 
the literature shows that the impact of internal CG varies from country to country according to 
the nature of the ownership structure and various factors. In other words, concentrated 
ownership may offer extra monitoring mechanisms by affecting the formation of the board of 
directors and its committees. For example, Wei (2007) and Fledmann and Schwarzkopf (2003) 
attribute the differences in CG practices between countries to different ownership structures 
playing a pivotal role in enhancing CG practices. In Saudi Arabia, the Capital Market 
Authority (CMA) has issued CG guidelines to regulate and develop the Saudi capital market 
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and to respond to rapid economic growth. However, the market crisis in Saudi Arabia has 
exposed a worryingly serious weakness in terms of non-compliance with regulations and a 
lack of transparency, disclosure and accountability (Saudi Accountancy Journal, 2008). 
 
On the other hand, external auditing, as external monitoring mechanism, has become a 
fundamental requirement in the business environment and has been established as a regulated 
activity in most industrialized countries (Piot, 2001) due to its important role in offering more 
confidence and transparency in financial reporting. Recent financial scandals have increased 
the question of whether an external audit is effective in constraining earnings management and 
the wave of audit failure in the capital market has also increased concerns about audit quality 
(Velury, 2005).   
 
However, few investigations have been conducted on CG, EM and external audit attributes in 
the context of a developing country; therefore, the current research may help to fill the gap by 
illustrating findings from Saudi Arabia which is a developing country with an emerging capital 
market. Unlike dispersed shareholding of the Anglo-Saxon world, the Saudi market is 
characterized by having concentrated shareholding such as family ownership and state 
ownership. The purpose of this research is twofold: firstly, due to the lack of studies regarding 
EM in developing countries and notably in Saudi Arabia, this thesis aims to present evidence 
concerning EM motivations and techniques by adopting a questionnaire survey and semi-
structured interviews together. Secondly, it attempts to investigate the effectiveness of 
corporate governance and external audit attributes on constraining earnings management by 
using mainly database survey on the one side and questionnaires and semi-structured 
interviews survey as collaboration tools on the other. Generally, this study will contribute to 
the literature by using combined methods (quantitative and qualitative) which may not have 
been adopted previously and will attempt to examine new characteristics of monitoring 
mechanisms.  
                         
1.2 RESEARCH MOTIVATION AND PROBLEM  
Post-2006, perceptible changes have been witnessed in the Saudi business environment with 
the issuing of more rules and standards to regulate and develop the Saudi Stock Exchange. 
Moreover, some guidelines, in terms of professional ethics and accounting and auditing, aimed 
at increasing performance, have been introduced to all corporations. Therefore, the 
reformation of the auditing and accounting profession and implementation of corporate 
governance mechanisms are expected to enhance the monitoring mechanisms and reduce the 
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issues related to information asymmetry and opacity. There is, however, no evidence to date as 
to whether or not such mechanisms and reforms have influenced the Saudi Stock Exchange. 
Financial crises and companies scandals which occurred between 2006 and 2008 and damaged 
investors’ trust, have evidently raised questions and increased concerns about the role of such 
mechanisms and to what extent they can be accommodated in the Saudi environment 
(Alrehaily, 2008). Furthermore, the last five years has seen a strong emergence of insider 
trading in Saudi Arabia which occurs when a buyer with inside information attempts to buy 
some shares, knowing that the stock price is likely to rise as soon as inside information 
becomes public. Jaggi and Tsui, (2007) found a positive relationship between insider trading 
and earnings management; thus, it may be that Saudi managers have maximized their benefit 
from insider trading. A study conducted by Al-Moghaiwli (2010) argues that Saudi listed 
companies are largely dominated by a high percentage of foreign employees who may tend to 
manage earnings for their own private benefit. The increased incidences of such issues and 
questions have generated considerable calls for review and for the assessment of monitoring 
mechanisms to develop other professional regulations and has put pressure on legislators and 
academics to find a means of enhancing monitoring mechanisms (Saudi Accountancy Journal, 
2009). Consequently, investigation into earning management practices on the one hand and the 
role of monitoring mechanisms in constraining aggressive earnings management on the other 
is worthwhile and will contribute to the existing literature, particularly when the evidence 
comes from a developing country such as Saudi Arabia which has different aspects of 
regulations and culture. 
 
Fundamentally, this research is motivated by several considerations in addition to the above-
mentioned. First, in spite of the effects of internal corporate governance in developing 
countries, Saudi corporate governance mechanisms may be less effective due to several factors 
which characterise the Saudi environment, such as insufficient independence of directors and 
duality of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and ownership concentration. Second, Saudi Arabia 
also has similar factors to other developing countries as classified by Leuz et al. (2003) who 
concluded that developing countries that have weakening economies show low investor rights, 
inactive regulations and opacity of higher-level earnings management. Finally, previous 
studies have investigated earnings management practices and examined monitoring 
mechanisms in different legal environments and economies; however, despite Saudi Arabia’s 
vital role in the global economy as the largest exporter of petroleum in the world, the Saudi 
environment has not yet been the subject of academic studies which would inevitably play a 
significant role in improving internal and external monitoring mechanisms. Thus, the main 
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interest of this research is to explore the main motivations and techniques for manipulation as 
well as to indicate whether internal and external monitoring mechanisms can protect 
shareholders' rights in Saudi Arabia.  
 
1.3 RESEARCH AIM AND OBJECTIVES  
The main aim of the current research is to explore and identify empirically earnings 
management practices including motivations and techniques as well as to determine to what 
extent corporate governance mechanisms and external auditing can safeguard firms from 
aggressive earnings management in Saudi Arabia.  
To fulfil these aims, the following objectives are determined: 
 To identify common motivations and techniques for the use of earnings management 
from different perspectives in Saudi Arabia. 
 To examine the role of corporate governance mechanisms and external audit in 
constraining earnings management in Saudi Arabia.  
Primarily, this study will consider the indications of the findings for enhancing monitoring 
mechanisms and mitigating aggressive earnings management; thus, in order to achieve that, 
primary objectives are addressed to provide clearer information. 
 
1.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
From the defined aims and objectives, the main research questions this study sets out to 
answer are: 
 What are the common motivations and techniques for earnings management in Saudi 
Arabia? 
 Do corporate governance mechanisms and external audit constrain earnings 
management practices in Saudi Arabia?    
Since this study follows a deductive methodology, primary hypotheses are formulated to 
answer the research questions as follows: 
   
H1: There is a significant difference among respondents according to earnings 
management motivations in Saudi Arabia. 
H2: There is a significant difference among respondents according to earnings 
management techniques in Saudi Arabia.   
H3: Corporate governance mechanisms and external audit attributes are expected to 
constrain earnings management practices in Saudi Arabia. 
 
1.5 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This study was undertaken in two phases: (1) a self-administrated questionnaire survey 
combined with semi-structured interviews, and (2) secondary analysis of data. The 
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questionnaire survey is mainly used to explore the motivations and techniques of earnings 
management in Saudi Arabia by obtaining the different perceptions of respondents. Of the 
280 distributed questionnaires only 124 were used in the analysis, with a response rate of 
44.2%. Most of the questionnaires were delivered by hand to each respondent and 
collected later: a number of them were emailed to respondents and returned by email. 
Since some respondents may not have understood how to answer the questions or may not 
have been certain of the meaning of some of the questions or been unfamiliar with the 
questionnaire tool, this method enabled the researcher to ensure that each question was 
answered correctly by clarifying any points of confusion and explaining the questionnaire 
to respondents. Semi-structured interviews were employed in order to provide better 
understanding of the research questions, confirming and elaborating on the questionnaire 
survey and models findings and supporting the hypotheses development. They were 
subsequently undertaken with 15 individuals including board members, audit committee 
members, external auditors and academic staff. Interviews were undertaken after the 
questionnaire survey to reinforce the research findings. 
Second, to obtain an overview of the role of corporate governance and external audit in 
reducing earnings management practices, two models were constructed and a set of 
hypotheses formulated. These models were examined, by logistic regression, employing a 
sample including of all firms listed on the Saudi Stock Exchange, with the exception of 
financial and insurance companies that have different practices. Earnings management is 
measured using the magnitude of discretionary accruals as estimated by the Modified Jones 
model (Dechow et al., 1995). The corporate governance attributes were organized into three 
categories: 1) Board Characteristics; 2) Audit Committee Characteristics; 3) Ownership 
Structures. The external audit factors comprise audit quality and auditor independence. (See 
table 1.1)  
                          Table: (1.1) The Link between Research Questions, Objectives and Methods  
Research questions Objective Methods 
 
1-What are the common motivations and 
techniques for earnings management in Saudi 
Arabia? 
To identify the common incentives and 
techniques for the use of earnings 
management practices. 
Main: questionnaire survey 
Support: interviews survey 
2-Do corporate governance mechanisms and 
external audit factors  reduce earnings 
management in Saudi Arabia? 
To examine the role of corporate 
governance and external audit factors in 
constraining earnings management 
practices.  
Main: Database analysis 
Support: questionnaire and 
interviews survey  
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1.6 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH AND EXPECTED CONTRIBUTION 
This research attempts to explore earnings management practices and investigate the role of 
monitoring mechanisms in constraining manipulation in Saudi Arabia. A large number of 
studies concerned with earnings management and corporate governance have been conducted 
using US and UK data; however, studies based on data from Middle Eastern countries, are 
relatively limited in comparison with those in developed and Asian countries. Moreover, to the 
best of my knowledge, Saudi Arabia has not yet been the focus of any study regarding 
earnings management practices or the role of monitoring mechanisms; thus, a different 
perspective could be obtained from developing countries such as Saudi Arabia, which in 
numerous respects are different, and this might enhance the concept of corporate governance 
and earnings management practices. Therefore, the current study could provide interesting, 
new primary evidence from a country that has a different business environment and 
regulations and is considered to be representative of Middle Eastern and Arabic countries. 
                                                         
Furthermore, corporate governance mechanisms are in an early, transitional phase in the 
country as it begins to develop seriously after the financial crisis. A comprehension of 
monitoring mechanisms and earnings management in Saudi Arabia could elucidate issues and 
potential implications of external and internal monitoring in prior research. Additionally, the 
research will improve awareness of the significant role of  internal corporate governance and 
auditing in monitoring the transparency and credibility of financial reporting. Accordingly, the 
findings of the current study could be fruitful for external auditors, regulators and legislators in 
their attempts to constrain the incidence of earnings management and enhance the quality of 
monitoring mechanisms.     
 
A number of studies such as Geiger and Smith (2010) encourage modern research to use 
various research methods to examine earnings management practices. Thus, this study will use 
multiple empirical research methods (quantitative and qualitative) in order to answer the 
research questions. Employing mixed methods will provide reliable findings and help the 
researcher to interpret the results obtained mainly from logistic regression by providing logical 
reasons rather than theoretical reasons.      
   
To the best of my knowledge, the uniqueness of this research over other studies is that 
remuneration and nomination committee characteristics in relation to earnings management 
have not been examined in the past by prior research. Moreover, this study will examine a 
new variable - members of the royal family on the board - and use modern characteristics for 
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external audit, such as timeliness and auditor change. This research is also interested in 
examining the existence of CEO on remuneration and nomination committees, which has only 
been paid scant attention in previous literature.  
                                                        
Finally, most of the literature has selected only one or two years to explain the effect and this 
has not provided a beneficial explanation. However, using a longer period of time, as this 
research will, may help to provide a more in-depth explanation which could lead to more 
accurate findings.     
 
1.7 RESEARCH SCOPE  
As discussed above, this study aims to investigate the motivations and techniques of earnings 
management and to what extent corporate governance and external audit can affect earnings 
management practices in Saudi Arabia. The rationale behind selecting the board of directors 
and its sub-committees from internal corporate regulations is that boards of directors and their 
committees are both considered as the first line of defence against incompetent management. 
Secondly, the effect of concentrated ownership is considered as an extra internal or external 
monitoring mechanism which can protect shareholders and stakeholders alike. External 
auditing is one of the most important external mechanisms in the protection of shareholders’ 
rights.  
 
Moreover, this study selects boards of directors, sub-committee members and external auditors 
in order to obtain their perceptions since they are considered to be at the core of monitoring 
mechanisms and to have sufficient experience and knowledge in the current study objectives. 
Furthermore, they might be less inclined toward earnings management than the firms' 
managers. Academics also play a significant role in developing monitoring mechanisms and 
mitigating earnings management by providing astute thoughts and productive investigation via 
their research. 
 
This study will not involve non-listed companies, financial companies and insurance 
companies because they have different practices and operations from other companies. Also, 
this study covers the period from 2006 to 2009 which was the beginning of the implementation 
of corporate governance and reforms in Saudi Arabia. 
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1.8 THESIS STRUCTURE 
This thesis consists of nine chapters. The current chapter has presented an overview of the 
study as well as summarising the other chapters. Chapter Two provides a background of 
different aspects of Saudi Arabia such as historical background, the legal system, monitoring 
bodies, important regulations and laws, the development of corporate governance, ownership 
structure, the accounting and auditing profession and potential earnings management 
practices. An understanding of these domains offers an insight into the research background, 
research objectives, research questions and development of hypotheses. 
  
Chapter Three provides a summary of the literature in relation to earnings management 
practices. It focuses mainly on the definition of earnings management, earnings management 
incentives and earnings management techniques. Moreover, it discusses models for detecting 
earnings management using discretionary accruals, such as the Jones model and the modified 
Jones model, which are employed in the current study since they are more powerful than 
others since it gives rise to all change in credit sales in the event period as manipulation of 
credit sales recognition might be more straightforward than that of cash flow  
 
Chapter Four highlights the literature concerning monitoring mechanisms in relation to 
earnings management including internal corporate governance, ownership structure, and 
external auditing. The proxies for each mechanism are presented with professional attributes 
and characteristics and the gap in the literature is discussed.                       
 
Chapter Five sets out the theoretical framework. It comprises the theories of corporate 
governance and attempts to provide justifiable reasons for employing agency theory and 
institutional theory as the primary and alternative theories for the current study. 
 
Chapter Six details and justifies the research methodology, conducted employing two 
approaches (quantitative as the primary tool and qualitative as the support tool). Moreover, 
this study adopts a hypothetico-deductive methodological approach which fits with examining 
the employed theory by establishing a set of research hypotheses. Data collection methods 
and the process of data analysis for each approach are discussed.      
 
Chapters Seven and Eight report the survey findings and secondary analysis of the data 
respectively. Chapter Seven presents the findings concerned primarily with answering the first 
and second research questions and also illustrates the significant results obtained from the 
semi-structured interviews and both tools attempt to clarify the role of monitoring 
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mechanisms in constraining earnings management. Chapter Eight provides the findings 
regarding the role of internal corporate governance and ownership structure, and external 
audit factors in constraining EM by using logistic regression.  
 
Chapter Nine reveals the findings of the study, its limitations, conclusions, interpretations and 
identifies areas for future studies. 
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Chapter Two: 
OVERVIEW OF SAUDI ARABIA 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION  
The previous chapter discussed the overall structure of this study including the research 
problem, research objectives, research questions, and the importance of the study, scope of 
study, brief methodology, and thesis structure. This chapter aims to present an overview of 
Saudi Arabia in order to reveal insight into (1) Saudi’s background, the country’s legal 
system, corporate governance practices, the accounting and auditing profession, and earnings 
management practices. An understanding of the fundamental underlying issues in Saudi 
Arabia helps the research to employ some determinants and measurements; then the focus of 
this research is to obtain an understanding regarding earnings management practices and the 
role of monitoring mechanisms in mitigating manipulation. After this introductory section, 
Section 2.2 presents a simple background of Saudi Arabia, while Section 2.3 provides a clear 
vision of the development of the country’s legal system. Section 2.4 sheds light on important 
monitoring bodies. Section 2.5 reveals the development of regulations in Saudi Arabia 
including corporate governance mechanisms. Section 2.6 offers a brief historical view of the 
accounting and auditing profession, while Section 2.7 depicts the nature of ownership 
structure. Section 2.8 sheds light on earnings management practices in Saudi Arabia while 
Section 2.9 provides a brief summary of the chapter.   
,  
2.2 BACKGROUND OF SAUDI ARABIA 
Saudi Arabia is a developing country in Asia, and Riyadh is the capital city. The modern state 
of Saudi Arabia dates back to 1932 when King AbdulAziz (1880-1953) announced the 
foundation of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Al-Angari, 2004; Al-Turaiqi, 2008). The country 
constitutes the largest country in the Middle East. It is 95% desert, including the Rub' Al 
Khali, the biggest mass of sand on the planet (Ministry of Economy and Planning , 2007) 
Figure (2.1) Map of Kingdom of Saudi Arabia  
 
                                         Source: Ministry of Economy and Planning  (2007) 
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As Figure 2.1 shows, Saudi Arabia is situated in the South West of Asia, having an area of 
about 2,100,000 SKM (868,730 SM), with a population estimated at more than 25 million 
(Ministry of Economy and Planning , 2007). The local currency is the Saudi Riyal and 6.1  
Riyals is equivalent to one UK Pound (2011- December). Arabic is the official language, 
while English is used as the business language. 
 
Saudi Arabia is governed by a monarchy that is restricted to the male descendants of King 
Abdulaziz. The monarchy system in Saudi Arabia is centralized which gives the King wide-
reaching authority, including the management of internal and external affairs. Moreover, all 
important positions, such as internal affairs, foreign affairs, and the defence ministry are 
limited to male descendants of King Abdulaziz. The Consultative Council, established in 
1991, has a limited role in the legislative system of Saudi Arabia. It acts as an advisory body 
to the King and any decisions can only be applied once final approval has been received from 
him. 
    
Saudi Arabia has never been invaded by another country and it has therefore developed its 
own culture, language, society and economy. Before 1937, Saudi Arabia was a poor country 
which mainly relied on agriculture. In 1937, a large quantity of oil was discovered and today 
the country is the world's largest producer and exporter of oil. The discovery of oil has 
brought about gradual changes to the social and economic life and the political position of the 
country in the Middle East. Saudi’s economy, which is primarily based on petroleum exports, 
is considered as the main source of national income and constitutes roughly 90-95% of the 
total national income and 35-40% of GDP. According to the Ministry of Economy and 
Planning (2007), Saudi Arabia is thought to hold approximately one quarter of the world's 
proven petroleum reserves and will continue to be the largest producer of petroleum for the 
foreseeable future (Falgi, 2009, P:45). Furthermore, it dominates a large percentage of 
petroleum production among OPEC members with 34% of the total output which gives it a 
leading role in affecting petroleum prices in the world (OPEC, 2009). According to the 
Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources, Saudi Arabia has huge reserves estimated at 
260 billion barrels and is capable of producing petroleum for more than 100 years to come 
(Cordesman, 2003). (See table 2.1).  
 
Saudi Arabia has recently witnessed many reforms, including its political systems, social life 
and business. For example, after long negotiations, it became a member of the World Trade 
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Organization (WTO) after adopting numerous regulations to its legal system in 2005 
(Ministry of Commerce and Industry, 2006). 
 
Table (2.1): Saudi Proven Crude Oil and Natural Gas Reserves 
 CRUDE OIL NATURAL GAS  
(Billion Barrels) (Billion Cubic Feet) 
Year ARAMCO  CO. Others TOTAL ARAMCO  CO. Others TOTAL 
2001 259.27 3.43 262.70 224179  3767  227,946 
2002 259.40 3.39 262.79 230623  4050  234,673 
2003 259.43 3.30 262.73 234470  4022  238,492 
2004 259.70 4.61 264.31 237010  4313  241,323 
2005 259.78 4.43 264.21 239475  4173  243,648 
2006 259.92 4.33 264.25 248452  4155  252,607 
2007 259.94 4.27 264.21 253789  4165  257,954 
2008 259.96 4.10 264.06 262969  4342  267311  
2009 260.07 4.52 264.59 275177  4493  279670  
         Sources: Ministry of Petroleum & Mineral Resources, Saudi Aramco annual reports and ASB,OPEC. 
 
In addition, one of these reforms established the Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority 
(2000) which aims to enhance the investment environment and attract local and foreign 
investors by eliminating obstacles and tackling shortcomings (Falgi, 2009). Overall, the Saudi 
business environment has recently witnessed gradual development which has contributed to 
reinforcing Saudi’s economy, such as enhancement of regulations including the Saudi Stock 
Exchange and the accounting and auditing profession. However, many consider the reforms to 
be very slow and believe it cannot cope with the changes being witnessed in the international 
business environment (Saudi Journal of Accountancy, 2009, p.13).    
  
2.3 THE LEGAL SYSTEM 
A country’s legal system plays an important role in effecting its regulations and practices.  The 
Saudi Arabian constitution is based on the Holy Quran and the guidelines laid down in the 
Traditions of the Prophet Mohammed (Sunnah) and other sources associated with Islamic law 
(Sharīah) which is the code of conduct or religious law. Accordingly, Saudi Arabia is an 
Islamic state in terms of its legal system and in general terms, and adheres to Islamic 
regulations (Al-Harkan, 2005). Saudi Arabia holds a special position among Arabic and 
Islamic countries since it is the home of the holiest Muslim sites of Mecca (the direction of 
prayer and pilgrimage for more than one billion Muslims) and Medina, where the Prophet 
Mohammed emigrated and was buried (Falgi, 2009). All aspects of life in Saudi Arabia are 
influenced by Islam, including the constitution and social behaviour. In other words, Islam 
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affects business life and operations, placing huge emphasis on high ethical standards, strong 
belief, and human equality (Moustafa, 1985). Thus, when Saudi Arabia adopts particular 
standards, such as accounting and auditing standards, or corporate governance practices, it 
always attempts to alter these standards or practices in accordance with the Saudi environment 
and Islamic law (Al-Harkan, 2005). In terms of social behaviour, Saudi Arabia is a tribal 
society based on Arabic traditions and this maintains a considerable degree of impact over 
local and national events. 
 
Equally, the legitimate Saudi framework has mainly been affected by Islam, upon which the 
country’s constitution is based. Since Saudi Arabia has a strong historical relationship with 
the US and Britain, the business environment has been greatly influenced by a large number 
of those countries’ legislations in terms of accounting practices, such as company law 
systems, accounting standards, auditing standards and auditor independence standards (Al-
Angari, 2004). Although these regulations are national standards, they were originally 
borrowed from the US and Britain.     
All banks and financial companies are subject to international accounting standards; however, 
companies listed on the Saudi Stock Market are required to follow and apply the national 
accounting standards (IFRSs, 2011). King Saud University has played an important role in 
developing accounting standards by holding a series of symposiums on accounting 
development methods in Saudi Arabia, in order to reach appropriate recommendations for 
resolving any obstacles that could hinder the development of accounting standards. Moreover, 
it established an Academic Board in order to develop accountancy thoughts, exchange of 
ideas and academic productions, consultation and to carry out research.  
Overall, the aspect of the Saudi legal system that relates to the business environment is a 
mixture of rules and regulations from American, British and other countries’ legislations, 
controlled and influenced by an Islamic framework. In other words, derived or borrowed 
regulations have to be in accordance with Islamic regulations and the character of the Saudi 
environment.   
2.4 MONITORING BODIES  
2.4.1 The Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MCI) 
The Ministry of Commerce and Industry, which was known as the Ministry of Commerce 
before its integration with the Ministry of Industry, is considered as the main body monitoring 
Saudi companies. Regulating, supervising and registering are some of the most important 
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responsibilities of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry to ensure that Saudi companies 
comply with national regulations. Moreover, the Ministry indirectly performs a supervisory 
role to many monitoring devices such as the Saudi Capital Market Authority, the Saudi Stock 
Exchange, and the Saudi Organization for Certified Public Accountants. 
  
2.4.2 The Saudi Capital Market Authority (CMA) 
The Capital Market Authority is newly founded in Saudi Arabia and reports directly to the 
Prime Minister. It began as an unofficial organization in 1950s and proceeded to perform 
successfully until the Saudi government founded its basic regulations in the Eighties (CMA, 
2007). However, it did not officially come into existence until 2004 when it obtained full 
independence with a direct link to the Prime Minister. The role of the CMA is to regulate and 
develop Saudi companies by providing appropriate rules and regulations that contribute to 
increasing investment and enhancing transparency and disclosure standards, and furthermore 
to protect investors and dealers from illegal activities in the market (CMA, 2007). Since the 
Capital Market Authority has a legal and financial aspect and administrative autonomy, it is 
managed by a board that includes five members appointed by the Prime Minister. Moreover, 
these members are not allowed to engage in any commercial activities or have special 
interests in any profitable projects. Corporate governance practice is one of the most 
important regulations to have been issued by the board of the Capital Market Authority in 
2006, beginning as a recommended regulation and became a compulsory regulation in 2010.  
 
The Saudi Capital Market authority is the agency in charge of issuing regulations and 
instructions and ensuring that all regulations and instructions are implemented properly. To 
accomplish these objectives, the duties of the CMA can be summarised as follows:  
 To develop and regulate the Saudi Stock Market (Tadawul) and enhance appropriate 
standards and transactions. 
 To create greater security by protecting investors and the public from unfair and 
unsound practices which include fraud and manipulation, or which violate Saudi Law.      
 To increase the efficiency of the market and transparency in transactions of securities.     
 To reduce the risks of transactions by developing suitable measures and standards.  
 To monitor the commitment of Saudi listed companies to required disclosure of 
information.  
 To monitor all activities and transactions on the Saudi Market.  
 To enhance and monitor the issuance of securities and under-trading transactions.  
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Overall, the Saudi Capital Market plays a pivotal role in developing and regulating the Saudi 
Stock Exchange by issuing the necessary regulations and instructions to enable companies to 
improve their performance. Moreover, protecting investors is one of the most important 
priorities for the Authority and leads to the creation of stability and security in the Saudi 
market. However, a large number of investors view that the role of this device was negative 
particularly in financial crises that occurred recently in Saudi market and this raised the 
question of its power in protecting investors and constraining illegal activates.                          
          
2.4.3 The Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul)                                                                 
Tadawul is an Arabic term that refers to exchange of stocks in the market. The Saudi Stock 
Exchange (Tadawul) is deemed to be a necessary prerequisite for the accomplishment of a 
significant growth rate in the Saudi economy and it needs to be well-established and well-
organized in order to play its required pivotal role. The Stock Exchange (Tadawul) is 
currently a self-regulated authority and is governed by a board which includes nine members 
nominated by the Saudi Capital Authority and appointed by the Prime Minister. The board 
comprises members who are representative of different governmental organizations such as 
the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry and the Saudi Arabian 
Monetary Agency. Moreover, the board also consists of two members from listed companies 
and four representatives of licensed brokerage firms (Saudi Stock Exchange Law, 2009).                  
     
Saudi listed companies commenced their operations in the mid-1930s when the Arab 
Automobile Company was the first joint stock company on the Saudi Stock Exchange (Saudi 
Stock Exchange Law, 2009). In 1975 the rapid growth of Saudi’s economy coincided with an 
increase in oil price and Saudisation (buying shares from foreign investors) of a part of 
foreign banks’ capital contributed to an increase in the number of large companies and joint 
stock banks. At that time, although there was a perceptible improvement the Saudi Market 
remained informal and unorganized. During the 1980s, the Saudi government launched 
trading regulations, together with the required systems. In 1984, they attempted to regulate the 
market by forming a committee that included the Ministry of Commerce and the Saudi 
Arabian Monetary Agency. This committee was a government body charged with regulating 
and controlling market activities until the Capital Market Authority emerged in 2004 with the 
responsibility of issuing the required regulations and rules.  
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Over the last few years, privatization has increased rapidly in the Saudi market because of the 
Saudi government’s announcement of a scheme to privatize many of its vital economic 
sectors which led to a large number of private and family companies going public. Thus, 
Saudi listed companies increased dramatically from 81 companies in 2005 to 144 in 2010 
(Saudi Stock Exchange Law, 2009). Nowadays, there are 144 more listed companies 
distributed among different industries in the Saudi market with various percentages of 
ownership. The Saudi market has become more attractive to many foreign investors since it 
has become more stable and secure. The Stock Market is considered to be the sole entity 
authorized to conduct trading in securities in the Kingdom. Thus, the Stock Market has many 
duties and objectives as follows:  
 To increase and ensure fair and efficient activities in the market.   
 To ensure market integrity, quality, and fairness 
  To support investor education and awareness efforts  
 To develop and enhance excellence of service for customers including brokers, 
issuers, investors, vendors, etc.   
 To improve the exchange’s capabilities and competencies. 
 To issue and enforce professional standards for brokers and their agents  
Table  (2.2): Share Market Indicators for last 10 years 
End of 
Period 
Number of 
Companies 
Number of 
Shares 
Traded 
Value of 
Shares 
Traded 
Market Value 
of Shares 
Number of 
Transactions 
General 
Index 
2001 64 692 83,602 275 605,035 2,430.11 
2002 68 1,736 133,787 281 1,033,669 2,518.08 
2003 70 5,566 596,510 590 3,763,403 4,437.58 
2004 73 10,298 1,773,858 1,149 13,319,523 8,206.23 
2005 77 12,281 4,138,695 2,438 46,607,951 16,712.64 
2006 86 68,515* 5,261,851 1,226 96,095,920 7,933.29 
2007 111 57,829 2,557,712 1,946 65,665,500 11,038.66 
2008 117 58,727 1,962,945 925 52,135,929 4,802.99 
2009 144 56,685 1,264,012 1,196 36,458,326 6,121.76 
                                                                 Source: Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency  
 
2.4.4 The Saudi Organization for Certified Public Accountants (SOCPA)  
The Saudi Organization for Certified Public Accountants (SOCPA) is a professional 
organization set up in 1991 under the supervision of the Ministry of Commerce. It is managed 
by a number of members and is responsible for promoting and enhancing the accounting and 
auditing profession’s practices and all matters that may reinforce the development of the 
profession and upgrade its status (SOCPA, 2006). Generally, SOCPA plays a pivotal role in 
developing the accounting and auditing profession in many ways as follows:  
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 Reviewing and developing accounting and auditing standards. 
 Monitoring the performance of certified public accountants to ensure compliance with 
CPA regulations and standards. 
 Preparing and establishing SOCPA fellowship examination rules and managing CPE 
courses. 
 Undertaking research regarding the accounting and auditing profession and other 
related subjects. 
 Holding and managing accounting conferences and attracting professional expertise 
and academics. 
 Encouraging accounting researchers to carry out studies in the accounting and auditing 
profession by funding or reward incentives. 
 Publishing accounting and auditing standards and hot topics by releasing journals and 
books. 
2.5 IMPORTANT REGULATIONS AND LAWS IN THE SAUDI BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT 
Saudi Arabia has an emerging market as a developing country that has grown in recent 
decades. Accordingly, the Saudi market may not be active in corporate control and may suffer 
from greater information deficits in comparison with established markets such as the US and 
the UK. The Saudi government is endeavouring to develop and enhance regulations that could 
contribute to increasing corporate control and the transparency of information. Although there 
are many regulations in Saudi Arabia, this section will attempt to shed light on the important 
regulations and laws that play a significant role in regulating Saudi companies’ operations and 
structures and are related to the current study.  
 
2.5.1 Companies Law (1965) and Company Structure.  
The Companies Law is considered to be the most important regulation and the first organised 
attempt to regulate Saudi companies. It was derived from the British Companies Law. This 
law was issued by Royal Decree in 1965 as a basic system at that time for all Saudi 
companies which were required to comply with its instructions and rules. Although the law 
has been modified in order to keep up with the rapid development in Saudi companies, many 
consider it to be quite ancient and believe it does not fulfil modern requirements (Al-ghamdi 
and Alangri, 2005). 
 
On the other hand, company structure plays a key role in determining the legal shape and 
organisational system of a company. Generally, each company in its foundation stage sets out 
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a number of simple regulations such as the appointment of directors to the board, termination, 
and the rights of shareholders. However, company structure should be in accordance with the 
Saudi Companies Law.  
                  
2.5.2 Accounting and Auditing Standards  
Saudi Arabia issued national accounting and auditing standards in 1986 that were originally 
derived from American standards. Although the banking sector and financial companies apply 
international accounting standards, most Saudi listed companies adopt Saudi national 
accounting standards (IFRSs, 2010). As mentioned earlier, the Accounting Standards 
Committee of the Saudi Organization for Certified Public Accountants (SOCPA) is 
responsible for developing and reviewing accounting and auditing standards in Saudi Arabia. 
Recently, there has been an attempt by SOCPA to converge the national standards with 
international financial reporting standards (IFRSs). As a result, most banks and financial 
companies have begun to apply international financial reporting standards. The last report 
issued by SOCPA contends that “ongoing efforts to identify hindrances to the convergence 
process, as well as in identifying opportunities to further enable the implementation of IFRSs” 
SOCPA, 2010, P:7). However, SOCPA may face some obstacles that constrain the 
application, although there has been no real statement by SOCPA to identify the potential 
hindrances. 
 
Overall, national accounting standards play a pivotal role in the Saudi environment in 
developing disclosure and financial transaction treatments. National accounting standards 
consist of 23 standards such as disclosure requirements, revenues standard, inventory 
standard, etc. In addition, national auditing standards play a key role in increasing the 
competence of external auditors and enhancing audit quality. These standards also consist of 
17 standards that are often associated with auditor competence, independence, audit plan, 
audit report etc.  
               
2.5.3 The Development of CG in Saudi Arabia 
Corporate governance issues are quite important in emerging markets because these markets 
do not have features such as long-established financial institution infrastructures to cope with 
corporate governance issues (McGee, 2010). Corporate governance as a framework should 
ensure that timely and specific disclosures have been made of all material matters concerning 
the company, including performance, financial position, ownership and management.  
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For a long time corporate governance mechanisms were ignored as a matter of significance 
for Saudi Arabia. This remained the case until 2005 when the Saudi Capital Market Authority 
drew attention to the problems regarding companies’ performance. Moreover, the 2006 
market crisis in Saudi Arabia indicated serious issues and revealed significant weaknesses in 
financial reporting, namely a lack of transparency, disclosure, and accountability (Saudi 
Journal of Accountancy, 2006).  As a consequence, corporate governance has received 
substantial support from the Saudi government and academics. Nowadays, however, corporate 
governance is becoming a pivotal subject in the Saudi business environment, and the debate 
on the enhancement of the corporate governance system is of significant interest. In Saudi 
Arabia, corporate governance mechanisms have included essential rules and standards such as 
the rights of shareholders, disclosure, transparency, and board composition, which regulate 
the management of joint stock companies listed on the Exchange. This ensures compliance 
with the best practices that protect the rights of the shareholders and stakeholders.  
 
The prime laws governing the legal framework which affects the notion of corporate 
governance in Saudi Arabia can be divided into three groups: Firstly, the company law 
system, which was derived from British Companies Law, as regulator of the Saudi market, 
which regulates joint stock companies; Secondly, the Saudi Organization for Certified Public 
Accountants and the Saudi Capital Market Authority.  
 
Corporate governance was established by the Board of Capital Market Authority in 2006 and 
amended in 2010 in order to regulate and develop the Saudi capital market and increase the 
credibility and transparency of financial reporting. Despite the fact that the most Code was a 
guideline and did not become a mandatory regulation until the beginning of 2010, Saudi listed 
companies were required to disclose, in the annual report, the provisions that had been 
implemented and those which had not been implemented and to explain the reasons for non-
compliance. The Code includes five main parts: The first part is preliminary provisions and 
explains and defines some terms associated with regulation such as ‘independent member’, 
‘non-executive’ and ‘shareholders’. The second part highlights the rights of shareholders and 
the General Assembly. The third part reveals the disclosure and transparency related to a 
company’s policy such as the board’s report. The fourth part introduces the board of director’s 
functions and responsibilities. The final part includes publication and coming into force and 
involves implementation (the Code of Corporate Governance, 2006).  
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Among corporate governance regulations, the board of directors and its committees are both 
considered as the first line of defence against incompetent management. Thus, this study 
attempts to investigate the role of the board of directors and its committees as the core of 
corporate governance mechanisms. The following section will demonstrate the role of the 
board of directors and sub-committees according to the Saudi Code of Corporate Governance.    
 
2.5.3.1 Board of directors: 
Functions 
According to the Code, the board of directors should carry out many functions as follows: 
approving the strategic scheme and the main aim of the firm and supervising their 
implementation, this includes: comprehensive strategy, plans, policies, capital structure, 
financial objectives, annual budget, performance, risks, organizational and functional 
structure, settling any possible cases of conflict, ensuring the integrity of financial 
transactions, reviewing the effectiveness of internal control systems and monitoring. 
Moreover, it ensures the implementation of regulations, such as full disclosure and corporate 
governance.  
 
Responsibilities of the Board 
The board of directors represents the shareholders, so the ultimate responsibility for the firm 
rests with the board of directors, even if a company sets up committees or delegates some of 
its powers to a third party such committees. The Code of corporate governance attempts to 
explain the main responsibilities of the board of directors; however, the company system 
plays an important role in determining the board’s responsibilities toward shareholders and 
others investors. Generally, the board of directors is responsible for the integrity of financial 
reporting and the company’s performance. 
 
Formation of the board  
Formation of the board of directors is subject to the following criteria: 
1- The board of directors should contain at least three members and no more than eleven 
members.  
2- The majority of the board of directors (one-third) should be non-executive. 
3- It is not allowed for the position of the Chairman of the board of directors to be 
conjoined with any executive position such as Chief Executive Officer (CEO).  
4- One-third of the members should be fully independent. 
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5- A member of the board of directors should not act as a member of the board of 
directors of more than five joint stock companies at the same time.   
Moreover, the code introduces some articles related to termination of membership regarding 
members. Moreover, the Code only focuses on the importance of board meetings without 
specifying the annual number of meetings.       
  
2.5.3.2 Board committees  
A suitable number of committees should be formed in accordance with the company’s 
requirements and circumstances in order to help the board of directors to perform its duties in 
an effective manner. Recently, the Code of corporate governance has mandated the formation 
of an audit committee and nomination and remuneration committee. These committees are 
subject to certain criteria as follows: 
  
Audit Committee  
According to the Code, the board of directors should form an audit committee which includes 
at least three non-executive members, with at least one of them having expertise in financial 
and accounting affairs. This committee has several important roles: to supervise and review 
the firm’s internal and external audit procedure, control system, account ing policy, the 
integrity of financial reporting, disclosure, monitoring management, the recommendation of 
auditor selection and to remedy conflicts between management and external auditor.  
 
A few years ago, because no other committees such as remuneration and nomination 
committees and executive committees existed in firms, the audit committee was the only 
committee delegated by the board of directors to perform certain duties (Al-Moataz, 2003). 
This meant that it had to perform a large number of functions which led to an impairment of 
its performance of those functions. In 2007, SOCPA formed a committee to evaluate the role 
of audit committees in Saudi Arabia and concluded that there was a lack of clarity regarding 
the functions and duties of audit committees and that their members were not aware of the 
purpose of such committees (Falgi, 2009).   
 
Nomination and Remuneration Committee 
Although this committee was initially not a mandatory committee, most Saudi listed 
companies took the initiative to set one up. By 2010, Saudi listed companies were mandated 
to establish a nomination and remuneration committee responsible for: providing 
recommendations to the board concerning the appointment of members to the board and 
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reviewing and ensuring the requirements of appropriate skills for membership of the board 
including qualifications, experience, and independence and, finally, to establish clear policies 
regarding indemnities and remunerations of board members and top executives.  
 
This committee could play a vital role in developing the structure of the board of directors and 
enhance the board’s performance in Saudi listed companies by drawing up clear policies in 
the future. However, the Saudi legislator has ignored the legal formation of this committee, 
such as its independence, which may lead to impairing its role in developing and enhancing 
board structure. Moreover, the CEO may take a part of its role by using his power in 
decisions, making the committee useless.  
    
Since corporate governance is a modern concept, a number of studies have attempted to 
evaluate its role in Saudi Arabia; for example, a study conducted by Al-Harkan (2005) 
explores the perceptions regarding the role of corporate governance and finds that corporate 
governance is a useful mechanism for protecting shareholders and stakeholder alike. 
Moreover, Al-Rehaily (2008) highlights the fact that the corporate governance mechanisms 
will contribute to enhancing the integrity of financial reporting and reinforcing companies’ 
performance. However, the case of collapse of  the Saudi Market have brought about more 
concerns and fears regarding the potential failure of the role of corporate governance and low 
audit quality in Saudi Arabia. For example, a study conducted by Falgi (2009) using semi-
structured interviews, concluded that corporate governance in Saudi Arabia suffers from a 
lack of accountability, a weak legal framework, and poor protection of shareholders. In 
addition, based on a questionnaire survey, Al-Moataz and Basfar (2010) reveal that audit 
committees play an ineffective role in corporate governance. Alghamdi and Alangari (2005) 
show that there are serious violations of accounting standards in the professional environment 
which raises questions regarding the role of external auditing. Generally, many consider 
internal corporate governance to be less effective in developing countries as a result of 
insufficient independence regarding directors (Pornupatham, 2006). This thesis differs from 
previous Saudi studies in that it provides statistical findings based on regression combined 
with perceptions obtained from specific participants conceived to be a core of corporate 
governance mechanisms, which will lead to more reliable findings.           
    
2.6 THE ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING PROFESSION IN SAUDI ARABIA 
The accounting and auditing profession in Saudi Arabia is relatively young in comparison 
with those of developed countries that have a rich history of professional application and 
practice (Falgi, 2009). The accounting and auditing profession has witnessed various 
transitional phases in Saudi Arabia. It was known for its simple practices based on the income 
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tax law issued in 1950 (Jad Alha, 1993). Since no audit firms existed at that time, this attempt 
was the first to regulate the accounting and auditing profession.  
 
In 1965, the emergence of the Companies Law gave the profession a legal set of regulations 
and instructions concerning the organization of accounting and auditing profession practices. 
For example, according to this law companies were required to have audited financial 
statements; however, the law was unable to meet the minimum criteria regarding the 
profession such as accounting standards and the exercise of due professional care (Alangri, 
2004). Although the period from 1950 to 1965 suffered from a lack of domestic auditors and 
professionals and the absence of accounting education (Falgi, 2009), it could be seen as the 
time of the birth of the profession in Saudi Arabia which witnessed the issuing of a number of 
licences in Saudi Arabia (Alghamdi and Alangari, 2005).  
   
Until 1991 there were feeble attempts to develop accounting and auditing profession practices 
which did not exceed a set of decisions issued by the Minister of Commerce. On the other 
hand, there were beneficial attempts made by King Saud University which played an 
important role in developing accounting and auditing profession practices by holding a series 
of symposiums that contributed to enhancing practices in the profession. These attempts 
resulted in the foundation of the Saudi Accounting Association which contributed to its 
development and prompted accounting studies concerning the profession’s practices.  
      
The year 1991 was a significant transitional time in accounting and auditing profession 
practices which coincided with the establishment of the Saudi Organization for Certified 
Public Accountants (SOCPA). This organization has played a significant role in developing 
accounting and auditing standards and developing the profession by hosting international 
conferences, attracting experts and academic researchers and conducting necessary studies.  
 
Nowadays SOCPA has significantly contributed to the recovery of the profession by 
developing educational and professional standards that reinforce the practices in Saudi 
Arabia. It is composed of more than 127 audit firms that are allowed to practise accounting 
and auditing. Of these firms, many of them are affiliated to international audit firms such as 
Doloitt, Pricewaterhouse, Ernst and Young, and KPMG. Moreover, more than 188 Saudi 
auditors are allowed to practise accounting and auditing profession.  
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Despite the previous achievements, the accounting and auditing profession in Saudi Arabia 
still suffers from serious issues such as the reduction of audit fees, illegal competence, and 
monopoly of services. These issues threaten the accounting and auditing profession and 
impair the audit quality. For example, Alghamdi and Alangari (2005) show that there are 
serious violations of accounting standards in the professional environment which raises 
questions regarding the role of external auditing. Moreover, the role of audit committees that 
are linked directly to external auditing is still absent in the shadow of difficult circumstances 
and challenges facing the accounting and auditing profession (Al-Moataz, and Basfar, 2010). 
    
2.7 OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE IN SAUDI ARABIA 
Ownership structure is an important determinant of corporate governance practices. Shleifer 
and Vishny (1997) state that ownership structure plays a key role in reducing agency costs by 
aligning the interests of managers with those of shareholders. Prior to 2005 only two 
investigations attempted to explore the nature of ownership structure in Saudi Arabia. The 
first study, conducted by Al-Tonsi (2003), revealed that although Saudi Arabia had a free 
market economy the Saudi market was dominated by family ownership (approximately 75%) 
and the Saudi government dominated the primary public utilities and services. The second 
investigation was by the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency and concluded that the Saudi 
market was dominated by family ownership and state-ownership (Al-Harkan, 2005).        
 
However, since 2005 Saudi Arabia has witnessed many reforms such as becoming a member 
of the (WTO), the implementation of corporate governance practices in 2006, globalization of 
the world market and the privatization programme. During the last five years Saudi listed 
companies have increased dramatically from 81 to 144 companies, therefore these actions 
may have contributed considerably to enhancing the distribution of ownership structure in 
Saudi Arabia that was previously confined to governmental and family sectors.   
     
Prior to 2005 there had been no attempt to explore the nature of ownership structure in Saudi 
Arabia following its many reforms. Most listed companies in Saudi Arabia usually have four 
groups of shareholders, the state, institutional, family, and blockholders. The regulations in 
Saudi Arabia mandate the disclosure of ownership that is more than 5% in a company as 
well as board ownership. This study aims to investigate the relationship between 
ownership structure and earnings management; therefore, the descriptive analysis will 
provide information regarding ownership structure in Saudi Arabia that can be useful 
for future research.  
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2.8 EARNINGS MANAGEMENT IN SAUDI ARABIA 
Aggressive earnings management is quite a modern topic in accounting research, which 
attempts to investigate the incentives of this practice and how the role of monitoring 
mechanisms can affect it. The Middle East, and particularly Saudi Arabia, has not received 
attention from prior studies on earnings management which may explore important findings 
contributing to enhancing monitoring mechanisms. However, some studies have investigated 
earnings management in developing countries; for example, Leuz et al (2003) divided a 
number of countries into three groups and attempted to make a comparative study regarding 
investor protection and earnings management. The first group consisted of countries with a 
large stock market, dispersed ownership, and strong investor rights. The second group 
included countries with less-developed stock markets, concentrated ownership, weak investor 
rights, but strong legal enforcement. The third group included insider economies with weak 
legal enforcement. The third group contained some developing countries such as Indonesia 
and the Philippines which have concentrated ownership and weak legal enforcement. They 
found that the third group showed less investor protection and a higher level of aggressive 
earnings management. 
 
Saudi Arabia, as a developing country, has concentrated ownership, less investor protection, 
and weak legal enforcement; therefore, the potential incidence of earnings management is 
higher. Moreover, a study conducted by Alghamdi and Alangri (2005) investigating external 
auditors’ perceptions, revealed that there is serious violation of national accounting standards 
and less commitment of required disclosure by Saudi companies. The importance of internal 
corporate governance stems from the 2006 market crisis in Saudi Arabia which revealed 
serious weaknesses in financial reporting, namely a lack of transparency, disclosure, and 
accountability. Moreover, the great pressure by monitoring devices that coincided with the 
implementation of many regulations may have motivated Saudi companies to manage their 
earnings.   
         
Furthermore, over the last five years there has been a strong emergence of insider trading in 
Saudi Arabia which occurs when a buyer with inside information attempts to buys shares, 
knowing that the stock price is likely to rise as soon as the information becomes public. Some 
studies, such as McGee, (2010), consider this issue an agency problem which was harmful for 
a large number of Saudi investors who expressed their concerns regarding the credibility of 
financial reporting in Saudi Arabia. This study will contribute to the literature by eliciting 
perceptions regarding the motivations and techniques of earnings management in Saudi 
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Arabia as well as the role of monitoring mechanisms in mitigating earnings management 
mechanisms by employing different approaches.   
    
2.9 SUMMARY  
Saudi Arabia has quite a short history compared to other countries, and its society and 
economy developed from agriculture to become a powerful country in the Middle East with a 
free economy after the discovery of its petroleum. Islam, as a framework, plays a key role in 
its social life and its business environment. Saudi Arabia is governed by a monarchy system 
that restricts the ruler to male descendants of King Abdulaziz. Although the legal system is 
managed by Islamic law (Sharia), Saudi Arabia has adopted many regulations and rules that 
have been derived from developed countries such as British Companies Law and American 
Accounting Standards.  
 
Recently, privatization has played a vital role in the re-distribution of the structure of 
ownership in Saudi Arabia. For example, state-owned and family-owned companies 
dominated the ownership structure in Saudi Arabia by a higher percentage (75%) (Al-Harkan, 
2005). Nowadays, although state-owned and family-owned companies exist in the Saudi 
market, the percentage is not as high as in previous times. 
 
Moreover, this chapter has shed light on the main monitoring devices which play a significant 
role in regulating and developing the Saudi business environment. In addition, important 
regulations, such as Companies Law and Accounting and Auditing Standards are discussed 
and their roles revealed. Although these reforms are helpful and useful to the Saudi market, 
they have been borrowed from the U.S. and other capitalist nations. In other words, these 
reforms did not stem from a need but from a form of imitation of developed countries. 
Moreover, monitoring devices cannot effectively play a key role unless they are given more 
independence and authority.         
 
In terms of the development of corporate governance, this chapter has attempted to provide 
information regarding regulation and to present Saudi studies which have paid attention to the 
development. Their findings indicate that corporate governance in Saudi Arabia is in its early 
phase and suffers from a lack of accountability, a weak legal framework and poor protection 
of shareholders. Moreover, audit committees and boards of directors play an ineffective role 
in corporate governance. 
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In relation to external auditing, this chapter has also attempted to offer an historical view of 
the development of the accounting and auditing profession and the important events it has 
undergone. Some attempts by Saudi researchers indicate that the profession of accounting and 
auditing faces serious inherited issues such as reduction of audit fees, illegal competition, and 
monopoly of audit services by a few audit firms. 
 
As a result of previous issues and a weak protection of investors, earning management 
practices may high likely exist in Saudi Arabia for different reasons and various techniques. 
For example, there are many indications such as insider trading imply that Saudi companies 
may manipulate earnings in  order to obtain a higher share price 
 
Overall, this chapter has aimed to provide a concise view of the background of Saudi 
Arabia’s, legal system, important regulations and monitoring devices related to research and 
the important events in the Saudi environment. The following chapter will discuss the 
literature in relation to earnings management practices concerning the first and second 
research questions.          
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Chapter Three: 
A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON EARNINGS MANAGEMENT 
PRACTICES 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter illustrated a brief background of the Saudi Arabia environment, 
regarding the legal system, regulations and development of corporate governance 
mechanisms, and provided precise information in respect of the nature of ownership structure 
and the audit profession market. As noted, the aim of this thesis is to understand the practise 
of earnings management, and the role of monitoring mechanisms in reducing the manipulation 
of financial reporting in Saudi Arabia. Based on these objectives, this chapter is allocated to 
reviewing the literature related to earnings management practises, while the role of internal 
and external corporate governance in mitigating earnings management will be discussed in the 
next chapter. Thus, this chapter is organised as follows: Section 3.2 presents the definition of 
earnings management. Section 3.3 illustrates earnings management motivations. Section 3.4 
presents earnings management techniques. Section 3.5 provides accounting literature 
concerned with the earnings management measurement. Section 3.6 provides a summary and 
identifies the gap in the literature.                                  
 
3.2 DEFINITION OF EARNINGS MANAGEMENT 
Financial reporting plays a significant role in communicating financial information to users in 
a right time and credible conduct (Xiong, 2006). Based on agency theory, the issues related to 
the separation between ownership and management might lead managers to collude against 
owners to increase their own personal wealth (Abdul Rahman and Ali, 2006). Institutional 
theory (North, 1990) also provides an appropriate theoretical framework for managerial 
behaviour. Institutions in a society provide the rules of the game that monitor the interplay 
between organizations, which are the players in the game, who attempt to exploit the 
opportunities created by the institutions to increase their welfare (Li, 2004). In other words, 
society may create many formal constraints, such as public laws and government regulations, 
or informal ones, such as social customs and conventions collectively known as culture (Li et 
al, 2008). These constraints may create incentives for managers to manipulate earnings.    
 
Thus, opportunities are given for managers to practise their discretion regarding business in 
order to enhance the effectiveness of financial reporting as a means of communicating with 
investors and creditors. In other words, current accounting standards offer management a 
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wide choice of alternative ways to treat the same financial transaction or event (Al-Khabash 
and Al-Thuneibat, 2009). Different accounting methods may be chosen according to their 
objectives.  
 
Earnings management has been considered as one of the most crucial ethical financial 
reporting issues, which accountants confront in everyday practices around the world 
(Armstrong, 1993). In general, since earnings management is a difficult concept to define and 
measure, it seems that there is no universally-accepted definition. However, earnings 
management is generally attributed to the process by which financial information is 
manipulated to provide a firm’s financial stance and performance. This may involve 
numerous accounting treatments that are not accommodated within Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (GAAP) and are considered as either aggressive or conservative 
accounting treatments which mislead users of financial reporting (Xiong, 2006). 
           Generally, the distinctions of the definitions provided by prior studies rely on their own 
assumptions, the motivations behind earnings management and their perceptions in respect of 
behaviour, which can vary from one researcher to another since depending on numerous 
factors such as culture. For example, Louis and Sun (2008) support the theory that cultural 
differences play a vital role in defining types of earnings management and motivations. 
Similarly, Geiger et al. (2006) argue that motivation for and practice of earnings management 
is not perceived similarly in all countries due to a numbers of factors, one of the most 
important being culture, which is divided into a number of dimensions. A study conducted by 
Noronha et al (2008) showed that another factor, the nature of earnings management 
motivations or techniques, might be affected by the size and ownership of companies; in 
China, for example public ownership companies have a strong motive for manipulating 
earnings management.   
For the above reasons, accounting literature cannot accomplish consensus on the definition of 
earnings management; however, numerous attempts have been made by current studies to 
understand earnings management practices. For example, Healy and Wahlen (1999, P:7)  
suggest that “earnings management takes place when management (executives) use their 
discretion in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to change financial reports in 
order to mislead some stakeholders regarding underlying economic performance of a firm or 
to affect contractual outcomes relying on reported accounting practices”. Davidson et al. 
(1987) cited in Noronha et al, (2008, p. 369) define earnings management as “the process of 
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taking deliberate steps within the constraints of generally accepted accounting principles to 
bring about a desired level of reported earnings”. In the same vein, Roychowdhury (2006) 
defines earnings management as “departures from normal operational practice, motivated by 
managers’ desire to mislead at least some stakeholders into believing certain financial 
reporting goals have been met in the normal course of operations”. In addition, Schipper 
(1989) defines earnings management as a way of using opportunities provided by the 
accounting system to engage earnings by adopting accounting methods for a specific purpose. 
Likewise, Smith (1993) defines earnings management as techniques that comprise financial 
reporting decisions, such as the selecting of accounting methods and timing of expenses and 
revenue reporting.  
   
Under GAAP, managers have discretion in reporting earnings (Othman and Zeghal, 2006) 
therefore, they might employ various methods to report earnings for different incentives. 
Generally, the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting categorises earnings 
management practices as an illegal activity and a serious action, which will mislead financial-
statement users (Merchant and Rockness, 1994). Moreover, many concerns have been raised 
by the chairman of SEC who comments that “management abuses of ‘big bath’ restructuring 
charge, premature revenue recognition, ‘cookie jar’ reserves, writeoffs of purchases in process 
are threatening the credibility of financial reporting” (Healy and Wahlen, 1999, p:7).  
 
Providing numerous definitions of EM may help this study to employ some determinants and 
measurements, as the focus of this research is to obtain an understanding regarding earnings 
management practices. From the preceding definitions, it is observed that earnings may be 
manipulated in two main ways: accounting choices and discretionary accruals. In other words, 
managers may exploit or abuse the flexibility of accounting standards by choosing specific 
methods such as revenue recognition methods or FIFO to LIFO in inventory to manipulate 
earnings or violating accounting standards. Thus, this study attempts to define earnings 
management as a way of using various methods of violating accounting methods by managers 
who employ their experience and knowledge in business to alter the figures of financial 
reporting with various motivations.  
 
Although most previous studies suggest that earnings management is considered a type of 
fraud when these practices are managed beyond GAAP boundaries, there is no full agreement 
on this concept. For example, Jiraporn et al. (2008) adopt agency theory as a framework to 
distinguish between the opportunistic and beneficial uses of earnings management, argue that 
earnings management play a superior role in enhancing the information value interested the 
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users of financial reporting. In other words, earnings management may be used as a tool for 
attracting new investors and reinforcing the confidence of the market. On the other hand, Lo 
(2007) claims that there are many victims of earnings management practices, such as equity 
investors, creditors, regulators, unions, suppliers and customers. Therefore, the answer to the 
question of whether earnings management practices are opportunistic or beneficial is still 
contentious.  
 
3.3 EARNINGS MANAGEMENT MOTIVATIONS  
According to positive theory developed by Watts and Zimmerman (1986), there are three 
primary hypotheses regarding earnings management motivations: the bonus plan hypothesis, 
the debt covenant hypothesis, and the political cost hypothesis. Current research of earnings 
management has, however, shifted its focus away from positive theory and back again to 
capital market motivations as interpretations of the opportunistic behaviour of managers 
(Xiong, 2006). On the other hand, agency theory, as an economic model of behaviour, expects 
that, as long as the objectives of the principal and agent are aligned, the agent will attempt to 
maximize the objectives of the principal; however, when their objectives are conflicted, the 
view of agency theory is that the agent will attempt to maximize his/her self-interest over the 
principal’s interests. Accordingly, the motivation for manipulating earnings begins when 
alignment is conflicted. According to institutional theory, earnings management incentives 
may be effected by formal or informal pressure, and change may be created by an 
organisation in order to model itself on other organisations. Kury (2007) views that 
institutional theory provides the best perspective for examining earnings management 
practices. He offers the institutional argument for explaining earnings management, which is 
helpful to complete the view of agency theory and suggests that insights for earnings 
management comprise the blending of agency and institutional theory perspectives to obtain a 
more complete understanding of the behaviour and the positing of a continuum of earnings 
management.  
        
Overall, a large body of literature has spawned different evidence investigating various 
aspects of managers’ motivations to manipulate earnings management. For example, Gaa and 
Dunmore (2007) suggest that earnings management is engaged in order to affect stakeholders’ 
beliefs and behaviour or to affect how contracts are carried out. Accordingly, this section 
provides different motivations for manipulation which are grouped into five categories 
according to prior studies (1) Capital market motivations (2) Management compensation 
contract motivations (3) Lending contract motivations (4) Regulatory motivations (5) Political 
cost motivations.   
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 3.3.1 Capital Market Expectations   
Capital market expectations are the investor’s expectations regarding the risk and return 
related to firm’s performance. The usage of financial information in affecting stock prices 
inspired a number of studies to argue that the affecting of stock prices may be one reason for 
manipulating earnings that can be opportunistic behaviour. Accordingly, a number of studies 
have been conducted in this domain, investigating the practice of earnings management in 
different cultures. For example, a study undertaken by Burgstahler and Dichcv (1997) using 
data from Zacks Investment Research and overall population of firms expected managers to 
engage in earnings to avoid possible losses and decrease in earnings. Their results show that 
an earnings decrease is an incentive for manipulating; however, avoiding possible losses was 
not. 
   
Furthermore, using a sample of 15,00 firms over the period 1992-2005, research conducted by 
Daniel et al. (2007) indicates that firms employ earnings management to meet expected 
dividends levels. Their findings suggest that this incentive is explicit only in companies with 
positive debt and was more aggressive prior to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.     
 
Detailed examination of earnings management practices by Peek (2004) shows that Dutch 
managers use their discretion for manipulating in order to engage in big bath behaviour, 
conditional to their anticipation of next year's earnings. He uses a sample of 134 non-financial 
firms listed on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange between 1989 and 2000, and finds that Dutch 
firms engage in earnings management before extraordinary items in order to reveal superior 
performance.      
 
Moreover, a comparative study by Glaum et al. (2004), which identifies earnings management 
motivations by using a sample of 38,714 of U.S firms and a sample of 3.524 of German firms, 
suggests that both American and German companies manipulate earnings to avoid losses and 
decrease in earnings. However, the most surprising matter in this study is that avoiding losses 
and decrease in earnings is more prevalent in U.S. firms than in German firms. Moreover, 
they find that capital market pressure and management-compensation are also incentives for 
manipulation.             
 
According to another study conducted by Nelson et al. (2003) which was based on a 
questionnaire survey and included 253 external auditors from USA offices, managers are 
motivated to manage earnings by numerous incentives such as meeting analysts’ estimates, 
affecting the stock market, meeting objectives regarding management-compensation, 
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enhancing future income for various goals. Moreover, Athanasakou et al. (2009) found that, 
based on data collected for all UK (dead and live) listed companies from Datastream for the 
period 1994 to 2002, UK companies are more likely to manipulate their earnings in order to 
meet analyst earnings expectations and avoid negative earnings surprises.  
 
By using an in-depth interviews survey which includes financial executives from public 
companies in US firms, and using descriptive statistics and correlation analysis, Graham et al. 
(2005) stress that managers are concerned with meeting earnings benchmarks and engage in 
earnings management to maintain or increase share prices, to enhance managers’ reputations 
and to secure future growth prospects.  In other words, 82.2% and 86.3% of respondents agree 
that meeting earnings benchmarks enables them to ‘improve credibility with the capital 
market’ and ‘enhances or maintains share price’ respectively. 
 
Based on a sample of US firms from 1990 to 2001, Madhogarhia et al. (2009) examine the 
earnings management practices of upturn versus value firms. They found that upturn firms 
have a tendency to engage their earnings, both upward and downward, more aggressively than 
value firms.   
 
Using a sample of real estate investment trusts (REITs) from the database during 1990-2006, 
Ambrose and Bian (2010) discovered a link between stock price movement and REIT 
earnings management. They found that share price can be a motivation for manipulating 
earnings management. 
    
Martinez (2005) provides evidence from Brazilian public companies investigating earnings 
management practices. He uses a multiple regression model to estimate discretionary accruals 
documents to show that Brazilian companies are likely to manage earnings in order to avoid 
reporting losses, sustain recent performance and maintain stable earnings.        
 
Evidence based on data collected via questionnaires (464) and interview surveys (16) in Egypt 
(Kamel and Elbanna 2010) highlights that the main incentives for managing earnings are: to 
increase the prospect of obtaining a loan, to sustain the previous year’s profit performance, to 
report a good income and avoid reporting losses and to accomplish high-stock valuation.  
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3.3.2 Management compensation contract  
An agent attempts to transfer wealth from the principal to their own benefit; thus, a 
compensation contract between principal and agent, may motivate managers to manipulate 
earnings. In other words, managers are motivated to employ earnings management in order to 
enhance or increase their own compensation or bonus plan which is often associated with a 
firm’s performance. Aljifri (2007) argues that the majority of new managers would take 
positive action to criticise previous managers and at the same time reinforce their own 
position for the future. A number of studies have examined the impact of accounting choices 
on compensation which attempt to elicit the perceptions in this way. For example, Dye (1988) 
suggests that employing accounting numbers in compensation contracts is one of most 
important internal motivations for manipulating earnings. Likewise, Healy (1985) who used 
the first model for detecting earnings management highlights that increasing a bonus plan can 
be a motivation for earnings management. In other words, he finds a strong relationship 
between discretionary accruals and bonus plans  
        
Based on an examination of 138 Australian firms announcing on-market buybacks over the 
period 1996–2003, Balachandran et al. (2008) investigated the relationship between earnings 
management and exercisable option holdings for buyback firms to determine whether 
earnings management in the pre-buyback period is a motivation for companies with equity to 
increase stock prices. They found that Australian firms tend to use buyback policy in order to 
increase share price and enhance compensation.  
 
According to a sample from the Wall Street Journal annual compensation survey, Baker et al. 
(2003) note that the compensation option produces opportunistic motivations for managers to 
time the release of good and bad news to the market. In other words, managers who obtain 
large option awards seem to report income-decreasing accrual choices as a means of 
decreasing the exercise price of their awards.   
Moreover, DeAngelo (1988) posits that managers systematically tend to manage reported 
earnings during proxy contests to obtain the approval of shareholders in order to keep their 
jobs. In other words, reported earnings are used as an indication of managerial efficiency, so 
inferior performance may cost a manager their job. This is consistent with the common notion 
that managers are motivated to manage earnings in order to retain their job by convincing 
shareholders that they are performing efficiently.        
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3.3.3 Lending contracts motivations 
The third strand of previous research related to debt covenant hypothesis is that restrictions 
are often imposed by creditors regarding payment of dividends, share buybacks and the 
issuing of additional debt in respect of reported accounting numbers and ratios, in order to 
ensure the repayment of the firm’s borrowings.  
 
A sample was drawn from Spanish firms; Perez and Hemmen (2010) employed the panel-
estimation method to estimate discretionary accruals (DAC) and to present a better 
understanding of the nature of the relation between debt and earnings management. They 
indicate that marginal increases in debt produce the motivations for managers to manage 
earnings.   
 
Kanagaretnam et al. (2003) investigated the incentives of American bank managers in making 
judgment over loan loss provisions to manipulate earnings selecting a sample of 4,166. They 
found that managers tend to save income in case a good performance is followed by a future 
bad performance, by reducing current income through loan loss provisions as well as reducing 
the cost of borrowing.  
 
Based on a sample of 92 firms determined by the SEC to overstate earnings adopting 
parametric test (t-test), Dechow et al. (1996) found that managers tend to manipulate earnings 
in order to raise external financing at a low cost as well as to avoid debt covenant restrictions. 
However, they do not support the notion that the desire for manipulation stems from obtaining 
high bonuses or that managers may manage earnings to sell their stockholdings at inflated 
prices.        
 
Likewise, Jaggi and Lee (2000) highlight that managers of companies which are in financial 
distress manipulate earnings if they are able to gain waivers for debt covenant violations and 
debt restructuring takes place or debts are renegotiated because waivers are denied. 
 
Othman and Zeghal (2006) who attempted to develop a model based on panel-estimation 
techniques of 1,674 Canadian and 1,470 French firm-year observations which show that 
earnings management practices in both countries are notably associated with contractual debt 
and influential tax rates motivations. Interestingly, they also find that market-related 
motivations such as initial and subsequent public equity offer strong motivations in Canada 
reflecting a dynamic capital market. 
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3.3.4 Regulatory motivations 
Listed companies are usually monitored for compliance with regulations, and at the 
same time are subjected to numerous regulations linked to accounting figures and 
ratios. This creates pressure for managers to manipulate earnings to show their 
compliance with regulations. A good example of this is presented by Lim and Matolcsy 
(1999) who found that Australian companies tend to manipulate earnings management when 
they are going public as well as to control share price. However, their findings are limited by 
the small sample that includes only 32 firms.  
     
Chrisensen and Hoyr (1999) claim that one incentive for managers to manipulate earnings 
management is to meet regulatory standards and the informativeness of earnings. Their study 
overcomes the limitation of Collins and DeAngelo's study and responds to one conducted by 
Imhoff and Lobo (1992) that calls for an examination of the effects of managers' incentives to 
engage in earnings management on the informativeness of earnings while controlling for ex 
ante uncertainty about earnings prospects. 
 
Another study conducted by Navissi (1999) shows that New Zealand manufacturing firms are 
likely to engage in earnings management in order to present evidence of financial hardship 
caused by the introduction of a price freeze regulation. In other words, since price freeze 
regulations (PFR) were established by the New Zealand government in 1970, the motivation 
for manipulating earnings increased due to the introduction of the 1971 and 1972 regulatory 
changes that allowed companies to gain price-increasing approval if they provide evidence of 
financial hardship. 
 
Using a sample of American companies, Vafeas et al. (2003) found no evidence to support the 
notion that management uses share repurchases in order to exploit shareholders via earnings 
management; however, they suggest that earnings are manipulated upward when a company is 
going public in order to attract investors to the firm. 
     
3.4.5 Political cost motivations  
Companies may also manage earnings to show less profit in order to diminish political risk. In 
other words, the political cost that is proposed by Watts and Zimmerman (1986) predicts that 
incentives for firms to manage earnings result from political pressure to decrease prices or 
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face the penalties that may arise from the investigation of firms which are suspected of 
breaching anti‐trust rules or otherwise taking advantage of the general public.   
 
Interestingly, Hang and Wang (1998) who examined the situation after Iraq’s attack on 
Kuwait in 1991 (Gulf Crisis) suggest that oil companies are motivated to decrease their 
reported earnings for the third and fourth quarters in order to reduce political costs generated 
by potential adverse political actions such as regulations, antitrust and government. More 
evidence in an Australian study by Monem (2003) using a variant of the modified Jones 
model, reveals that Australian firms were motivated to engage in earnings management in 
order to reduce political costs during the period from June 1985 to May 1988.  
    
Another incentive comes from Russian firms studied by Gonchanalyze and Zimmermann 
(2006) who investigated the effects of tax legislation on earnings management. Using a 
sample of 197 firms including both private and public, they conclude that Russian firms tend 
to manipulate earnings management by reporting small profits. Their findings are consistent 
with the common notion that companies engage in earnings management in order to reduce 
tax expenses.   
              Coppens and Peek (2005), who focused on eight European countries, i.e., Belgium, Denmark, 
France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and the U.K, investigated whether private 
European firms manage earnings or not. They found that, in the absence of capital market 
pressures, firms are still motivated to engage in earnings management, as they document that 
private firms avoid reporting small losses and that tax incentives affect earnings management 
practices.  
                                             Figure (3.1) Earnings Management Motivations   
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3.4  EARNINGS  MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES  
The previous section presented a review of the literature in relation to earnings management 
motivations. This section attempts to provide information on how earnings management can 
be manipulated, also in relation to the previous literature. The technique of earnings 
management can be defined as a method or a way of selecting or violating accounting 
standards in order to affect financial events. Previous studies suggest that earnings may be 
manipulated in two main ways: accounting choices and discretionary accruals (Aljifri 2007). 
As mentioned earlier, managers may exploit or abuse the flexibility of accounting standards 
by selecting appropriate methods such as revenue recognition methods or FIFO to LIFO in 
inventory to manipulate earnings or violating accounting standards. 
    
Various techniques have been illustrated to explain the methods of manipulation. Hang and 
Wang (1998) conclude that oil companies use inventory and special items to manipulate 
earnings management. For example, there is an incentive for American companies to 
manipulate earnings in order to reduce political costs by using inventory and special items as 
techniques of manipulation.  
 
An interesting examination was made by Burgstahler and Dichcv (1997) using data from 
Zacks Investment Research between 1986 and 1996; they concluded that managers 
manipulate earnings before extraordinary, nonrecurring, and special items. Likewise, Chen et 
al (2005) presented evidence based on data collected on reversal information from annual 
reports over four years from 2003 to 2006 which showed that Chinese firms reverse asset 
impairments to decrease or avoid the potentiality of trading suspension or de-listing due to 
profitability- based regulation. Moreover, they found that the firms motivated by regulatory 
incentives provided larger amounts of other nonrecurring items, and they seemed to use 
impairment reversals as the main earnings management instrument in comparison with other 
nonrecurring earnings or accruals. 
    
On the other hand, numerous prior studies have attempted to join hypotheses that are involved 
in empirical testing of whether assets sales are an incentive for earnings manipulation. For 
example, Poitras et al. (2002), who examined Singaporean companies using a sample of 44 
public firms, demonstrate that some companies use flexibility of accounting methods to 
manipulate earnings via sales and depreciation of assets as a way of manipulation 
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Based on interview surveys including financial executives from public companies in US firms 
and using descriptive statistics and correlation analysis, Graham et al. (2005) document that 
earnings is manipulated via real economic actions: for example, delaying advertising 
expenditures, as opposed to manipulation by adopting accounting discretion within GAAP as 
employing accrual management.  
Interestingly, a study conducted by Roychowdhury (2006) comprising a sample of 4,252 US 
firms demonstrates that firms change reported earnings by employing price discounts to 
temporarily improve sales, by managing overproduction to report lower costs of goods sold, 
and by decreasing discretionary expenditures to enhance margins.  
 
Employing case study and using a sample of 50 of the largest British companies, Breton and 
Taffler (1995) claim that earnings management is practised via taxation, pension contribution, 
holidays, extraordinary items, creating profit via asset disposals, merger accounting, 
subsidiaries, non-capitalization of leased assets, concealed interest charges, and non-
consolidated subsidiaries. 
   
According to data collected adopting the quantitative method (questionnaire survey) including 
100 auditors and 100 senior auditors in Greece, Baralexis (2004) suggests that most 
respondents confirm that earnings management is not only committed by using features of the 
flexibility of the GAAP, but also by contravening it. Moreover, large firms were found to 
have overstated profit as a motive for raising external financing, while small firms attempted 
to understate the profit to avoid paying more tax.         
Amat et al. (2003) who examined audit reports of 35 listed companies in the Spanish Stock 
Exchange, conclude that numerous techniques are used by Spanish managers in order to 
practise earnings management. These techniques include expenses charged to reserves instead 
of including them in the income statement, expense capitalization, altering the inventory, 
accelerated depreciation methods, extraordinary fees for pension plans, and reduction of 
earnings because of future losses. 
 
Aljifri (2007) divides the managing of earnings management into two approaches: (1) 
accruals accounting choices including the timing of expenses and revenue recognition, which 
is easier to manage, cheaper, and difficult to detect by external auditors. (2) accounting 
method changes (FIFO to LIFO) which are expensive, observable, and easier to detect by 
external auditors. Both methods may be employed to decrease or increase earnings 
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management; however, most previous studies focus on the former approach, while the latter is 
still not evident. Defond and Park (1997) highlight that managers tend to shift earnings from 
good years to bad years; for example, if present earnings are "good" and expected earnings 
are "bad", managers would transfer some earnings from the good year to the bad year in order 
to even them out.  
           
FIFO and LIFO are the most commonly-used methods for manipulating inventory. For 
example, when a company adopts or selects FIFO and LIFO, it might lead to a change in the 
firm’s cash flow because of the effect of such inventory cost methods on taxable earnings; 
however, which one they choose depends on their motivation or objective. In other words, 
when a firm wishes to increase reported earnings, it may use FIFO when prices go up (Aljifri, 
2007).  
 
Gunny (2010) carried out a study, consisting of all firms with available financial data from 
COMPUSTAT industrial covering the years from 1988 to 2002. He found that firms manage 
earnings to meet benchmarks by cutting discretionary investment of R&D and SG&A to 
decrease expenses.   
 
Based on a questionnaire survey and data collected from Jordanian auditors, Al-Khabash and 
Al-Thuneibat (2009) found that perceptions are different between external and internal 
auditors. They concluded that external auditors believe that both income decreasing and 
income increasing are used in order to manipulate earnings; however, internal auditors believe 
that income increasing is only used for manipulating. Moreover, based on data collected via 
questionnaires (464) and interview survey (16) in Egypt, Kamel and Elbanna (2010) found 
that the main techniques for manipulating earnings involved making inadequate provision; 
capitalising rather than expensing expenditure; and evaluating inventory.      
 
Based on a sample of Italian listed companies for the year 2003 with all firms whose data was 
collected from Datastream, Markarian et al (2008) investigated the relationship between the 
choice of R&D cost accounting and earnings management motivations. Their findings 
indicate that Italian firms use research development costs as a tool of manipulation. In other 
words, firms with low performance tend to capitalize R&D cost expenditures, while firms 
with superior performance are more likely to expense.       
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A study conducted by Nigrini et al (2005) indicates that Enron’s report was reviewed to show 
a manipulation of revenue and a strong tendency toward making financial thresholds. In 
others words, earnings reports announced in 2001 and 2002 were analysed and show that 
revenue numbers were used to manipulate earnings management upwards. One accounting 
method used as a technique for earnings management practices provided by Rutledge (1995) 
found that after foreign currency translation issued in 1981 by FASB was applied to USA 
firms, a number of companies manipulated earnings by abusing the resolution.       
 
Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) confirm that cash flow can be manipulated by assuming a 
higher or lower rate of depreciation which affects reported earnings. In addition, they state 
that another technique for manipulating earnings is to abuse expenses that are not reasonably 
expected to generate future cash flow and label them as investment expenditure.     
 
A study conducted by Nelson et al. (2003) whose data is based on a questionnaire survey 
including 253 external auditors from USA offices indicates that earnings manipulation is 
managed by numerous techniques such as revenue recognition, business combinations, 
intangibles, fixed assets, investments, and leases and a frequently-employed technique was 
reserves.  
 
Overall, the techniques of earnings management can be categorized into different groups, 
such as smoothing income, big bath, financial slack, big bet on the future, flushing, throw out 
(a problem child), change GAAP, amortization, depreciation, sale, asset exchange, operating 
versus non-operating income, early retirement of debt, use of derivatives, shrink the ship. 
There is also another division according to Pornupatham (2006) presented below.   
 
                                                  Figure (3.2) Earnings Management Techniques    
 
 
 
           
 
Earnings Management Techniques   
Income Smoothing  Accounting Choice and 
another accounting 
Manipulation 
Big Bath 
Accounting 
Off Balance Sheet 
Liabilities 
Discretionary 
Accruals   
 42 
 
3.5 EARNINGS MANAGEMENT MEASUREMENT  
Earnings management is characterized as being intangible or invisible and can be deemed 
successful solely if it goes undiscovered. Accordingly, studies of earnings management 
endeavour to find a simple way of measuring earnings management employing statistical 
methods. As a result, a number of techniques have emerged in accounting literature such as 
specific accruals or single accruals (McNichols and Wilson, 1988), aggregate accruals (Jones, 
1991; Dechow et al., 1995), statistical distribution of earnings changes and earnings 
(Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997), comprising determination of thresholds (Degeorge et al., 
1999). On the other hand, some studies have attempted to employ different methodology such 
as using questionnaire surveys or interviews.  
 
McNichols (2000) presents and argues the research designs of the three main commonly-used 
approaches in the earnings management literature: specific accruals, total accruals, and the 
distribution of earnings. Specific accruals assume that profit includes cash flow and total 
accruals and the manipulation of profit numbers may point to manipulation of accruals. 
However, specific accruals are very limited in their concentration since they only detect the 
relationship with other accruals in business transactions and the accounting process. Total 
accruals include across-time and across-firms and provide the opportunity to seek other 
explanatory variables such as auditors and corporate governance mechanisms. The third 
method developed by Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and Degeorge et al. (1999), attempts to 
test the statistical properties of earnings to explore behaviour that influences earnings. In 
addition to the discussion presented by McNichols (2000), another approach of earnings 
management investigation has emerged in order to elicit the professionals' perceptions on 
earnings management. For example, Nelson et al. (2003); Kamel and Elbanna (2010); 
Baralexis (2004); Al-Khabash and Al-Thuneibat (2009) and Graham et al. (2005) provide 
evidence as to how and why managers attempt to manipulate earnings management.                  
              
3.5.1 Total Accruals Models   
The usual starting technique for the measurement of discretionary accruals is aggregate 
accruals which is the most common approach employed by the accounting literature to 
measure earnings management (Dechow et al.1995). Total accruals consist of discretionary 
accruals, which are representative of earnings management, and non-discretionary accruals, 
which managers cannot determine since they are economically determined. In other words, 
managers find a way to use discretionary accruals in order to exercise their discretion over 
accounting choices and estimates that enable them to practise earnings management and this 
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way is supported by prior studies, such as Bartov et al. (2001), Dechow et al. (1995), 
Holthausen et al. (1995), Warfield et al. (1995) and Jones (1991).  
 
As noted previously, discretionary accruals as a representative of earnings manipulation may 
be either positive (income-increasing) or negative (income-decreasing) based on the 
underlying motivation of each companies. Positive earnings management reflects numerous 
types of motivation such as raising stock prices for seasoned equity offering or attempting to 
meet analysts' forecasts; however, negative earnings management implies other motivations 
such as avoiding regulatory costs. Thus, most prior studies such as Becker et al. (1998); 
Jiambalvo et al. (2002); and Warfield et al. (1995) propose the use of the absolute number of 
discretionary accruals since manipulation can be either income-increasing or income-
decreasing. In Saudi Arabia, the discretionary accruals of firms may also be positive or 
negative, depending on the underlying motivations of each company.  
 
Total accruals should first be collocated in order to estimate discretionary accruals. Therefore, 
previous studies have presented two approaches for estimating total accruals. The first 
approach represents the balance sheet method employed by a large number of studies such as 
Healy (1985), Jones (1991), Dechow et al. (1995) and Kothari (2005). The balance sheet 
approach is computed as follows:  
 
TACt = ΔCAt - ΔCasht - ΔCLt + ΔDCLt - DEPt 
where: 
ΔCAt    =  Change in current assets in year t 
ΔCasht   =  Change in cash and cash equivalents in year t 
ΔCLt     = Change in current liabilities in year t 
ΔDCLt   = Change in debt included in current liabilities in year t. 
DEPt     = Depreciation and amortization expense in year t 
         
The second approach is the cash flow method used by other studies such as DeFond and 
Subramanyam (1998), Becker et al. (1998), Klein (2002), Xie et al. (2003), Abdul Rahman 
(2006); Huang et al. (2007) and Jaggi et al. (2009). Under the cash flow approach, total 
accruals are measured as follows: 
  
TAC t = Income t – Cash Flow t 
Where: 
 44 
 
Income       =  Earnings before extraordinary and abnormal items in year t 
Cash Flow t = Operating cash flow in year t 
 
The differential aspects between the two approaches are investigated by Collins and Hribar 
(2002) who find that the cash flow approach is better than the balance sheet approach when 
companies experience mergers or acquisitions. In other words, some non-articulation events, 
such as mergers and acquisitions, may break down the association between changes in 
balance sheet working capital accounts and accrued revenues and expenses on the income 
statement (Habbash, 2010). In addition, the balance sheet approach is biased in estimating 
accruals for firms with discontinuing operations that may be deemed discretionary items. As a 
result, the study employ Cash flow method to compute TA.    
  
3.5.2 Models for Capturing Earnings Management   
Numerous accrual-based models for detecting earnings management are proposed by different 
studies such as the Healy Model (1985), the DeAngelo Model (1986), the Industry Model, the 
Jones Model (1991), the modified Jones Model (1995), and the Margin Model, Kothari et al. 
Model (2005) and recently the Stubben Model (2010) . Among these models, the Jones Model 
(1991) and the modified Jones Model still attract attention in studies of earnings management, 
since they are the most powerful test of earnings management and the best in terms of 
robustness according to most of the prior studies. On the other hand, the Kothari et al. Model 
(2005) has recently become the focus of accounting researchers and is characterized by 
controlling for the prior performance of the company. The development of measuring 
earnings management began with total accruals, then others models were presented in the 
accounting literature as follows:               
     
3.5.2.1 The Healy Model (1985) 
The Healy Model (1985) attempts to measure earnings management by employing mean 
aggregate accruals (measured by lagged total assets) in the computing period as the measure 
of nondiscretionary accruals. This model was the first attempt to measure manipulation. 
Healy’s argument was that systematic earnings management takes place in every period; thus, 
accruals were defined as the difference between reported earnings and cash flow from 
operations. Measuring discretionary accruals as total accruals for the period as follows: 
EDA it = TA it / A it -1 
Where: 
 
EDAit = Measured discretionary accruals for the period; 
TAit    = Aggregate accruals for the period; 
Ait-1   = Overall assets at the beginning of the period 
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3.5.2.2 The DeAngelo Model (1986) 
The second attempt was provided by DeAngelo (1986) who avoided the shortcomings of the 
Healy Model (1995) by ignoring a benchmark for what expected accruals may be (Aljifri, 
2007). According to this model, discretionary accruals are measured by calculating the 
difference between total accruals in the current period and total accruals in the previous 
period. This model is presented below:   
    EDAit = (TAit – TAit-1 ) / Ait-1 
 
Where: 
EDAit   = Estimated discretionary accruals for the period; 
TAit       = Total accruals for the current period; 
TAit-1    = Total accruals for the prior period; 
Ait-1       = Total assets for the prior period. 
                       
However, this model was criticized for misclassifying non-discretionary accruals as 
discretionary accruals, and the prior year, which could be employed as a benchmark for what 
anticipated accruals should be, could comprise earnings manipulation (Aljifri, 2007). 
 
3.5.2.3 The Jones Model (1991) 
A more influential model was presented by Jones (1991) and measures non-discretionary 
accruals including plant, property and equipment variables in order to control any change in 
non-discretionary accruals stemming from depreciation and arising from changes in business 
activities of the company.   
 
TAC it = α (1 / TA it -1) + β1 (Δ REV it / TA it -1) + β 2 (PPE it / TA it -1) + ε it                  
Where: 
      TAC it  = aggregate  accruals. 
      TA it -1 = the book value of total assets of firm i at the end of year t -1,  
      Δ REVit / TA it -1 = sales revenues of firm i in year t less revenues in year t – 1  
      scaled by TA it -1, 
PPE it / TA it -1 = gross property, plant and equipment of firm i at the end of year t 
scaled by TA it -1,  
α β1 β 2   = estimated parameters. 
      ε it         = the residual 
 
The Jones model has attracted a large number of studies such as Subramanyam (1996) and 
Guay et al. (1996) which suggest that the Jones Model is more powerful than others models 
(the DeAngelo Model and the Healy Model) since they produce discretionary accruals that are 
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consistent with the opportunistic accruals and measure performance hypotheses. Moreover, it 
has been found that using the Jones Model with cross-section provides more control than 
using it with time series. In addition Dechow et al (1995) find that the Jones Model is 
considered the most effective model for detecting earnings management. However, Aljifri 
(2007) claims that this model ignores the manipulation of sales because it assumes that all 
sales in the period are nondiscretionary and estimates are stationary and, over time, may 
generate a survivorship bias.  
  
3.5.2.4 The Modified Jones Model (1995) 
The shortcomings of the Jones Model (1991) was a focus of Dechow et al. (1995) who 
presented a more effective model than the Jones Model for detecting earnings management. 
Dechow et al. (1995) believe that the Jones Model (1995) disregards the potentiality of 
revenues manipulation, which is considered as non-discretionary according to the Jones 
Model. Therefore, the modified Jones Model takes into consideration property, plant, and 
equipment and the change in revenues are adjusted for changes in receivables. In other words, 
the modified Jones Model regresses aggregate accruals on gross property, plant, and 
equipment and changes in cash revenues to present coefficients that are then employed to 
measure unmanaged accruals as follows: 
 
TAC it /A it = γ0 (1/A it-1) + γ1 ((ΔREV it - ΔREC it)/A it-1) + γ 2 (PPE it /A it-1) + ε it                  
Where: 
TAC it                       = Aggregate accruals. 
TA it -1                      = the book value of total assets of firm i at the end of year t -1,  
Δ REV it / TA it -1 = sales revenues of firm i in year t less revenues in year t – 1 scaled by 
 TA it -1, 
Δ REC it             = the change in accounts receivables. 
PPE it / TA it -1     = gross property, plant and equipment of firm i at the end of year t scaled  
by TA it -1,  
α β1 β 2               = estimated parameters. 
      ε it                                   =The residual 
 
Numerous studies have investigated the performance of discretionary accrual models and 
suggest that the Jones Model and the modified Jones Model are the most effective models for 
detecting earnings management (Habbash, 2010). Although the two models were presented as 
time series, many studies such as Subramanyam (1996) and Bartov et al. (2001) who compare 
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these models in terms of cross-sectional and time series, document that the Jones and 
modified Jones Models are more powerful in cross-sectional than in time-series at detecting 
earnings management. In other words, the cross-sectional Jones Model controls for year- and 
industry-specific influence; thus, the cross-sectional model is estimated by year and industry. 
Moreover, the cross-sectional model is characterized by having larger samples and more 
observations and does not presume the stationarity of the discretionary accrual models 
(Subramanyam 1996; Peasnell et al. 2000b). One drawback is the suggestion made by the 
cross-sectional model that the discretionary accrual model is similar for every firm in an 
industry, regardless of its operating strategy or the phase in its product life cycle. This is, if 
companies in an industry are not homogeneous, the measured discretionary accrual model 
may involve measurement errors (Dechow et al. (1995).  
    
3.5.2.5 Performance Matched Discretionary Accruals 
Numerous studies have raised the importance of performance when earnings management is 
computed. For example, Dechow et al. (1995) and Kasznik (1999) suggest that the findings 
estimated by the Jones Model imply that discretionary accruals are significantly positively 
associated with the return on assets (ROA). To solve this issue of performance associated 
with misspecification, a number of studies conducted by Kasznik (1999), Bartov et al. (2001) 
and Kothari et al. (2005) exclude the possible influences of this correlation between 
discretionary accruals and earnings performance by using a matched-firm or portfolio method 
to adjust the discretionary accruals. 
 
The pioneer study among accounting literature which discusses this issue is that of Kothari et 
al. (2005) who argue that discretionary accruals, as measured by both the Jones and the 
modified Jones Models, might involve severe measurement error in discretionary accruals 
since these models disregard the performance of the firm. Thus, the discretionary accruals are 
measured by the residuals of the following cross-sectional model: 
 
TAC it = ά (1 / TA it -1) + β1 (Δ REV it   - Δ REC it) / TA it -1 + β 2    (PPE it / TA it -1) + β 3   ROA 
it -1 + ε it                       
 
3.5.2.6 Discretionary Revenues Model (2010) 
Stubben (2010) presented the discretionary revenues model which tests the capability of 
revenue and accrual models to reveal simulated and actual earnings management. He claims 
that revenue models are, well-developed, less biased, and better than the commonly-used 
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accrual models, since the estimates from revenue models can be appropriate as an estimate of 
revenue management or as a proxy for earnings management. However, one disadvantage of 
this model is that it cannot detect the manipulation of expenses.  
     
3.6 SUMMARY AND GAP IN LITERATURE   
A review of the literature shows that most studies identify the motivations and techniques of 
earnings management in one way. In other words, they often attempt to test an appropriate 
sample of firms, and so tend to adopt statistical methods of earnings management that may 
not be very effective in identifying earnings management practices in all cases. For example, 
Choi et al. (1999) use different methods of discretionary accruals and samples (re-examining 
studies by different methods) to confirm that the motivations to manage earnings are less 
effective than initially speculated among studies. Interestingly, Geiger and Smith (2010) 
suggest that there is a need for further studies linking perceptions to reported earnings 
management practice. In addition, although the measurement of earnings management has 
been employed by a large number of studies, they still suffer from numerous weaknesses that 
imply various findings in the same culture and country. Therefore, the current study aims to 
investigate earnings management practices by obtaining the perceptions of practitioners who 
observe cases of earnings management on a regular basis and are capable of providing useful 
information due to their wide knowledge and experience. 
  
It is hoped that this study will present a better understanding of managerial motivations, and 
earnings management techniques. So far there has been a great deal of research into earnings 
management motivations and techniques using statistical methods; however, few studies have 
offered a critical understanding of these problems through a survey such as interviews or 
questionnaires and understanding the nature and problems of earning management practices is 
crucial for regulators to put an accurate interpretation on such findings. Moreover, a review of 
the previous literature shows that the Middle East region has not been given attention 
regarding the earnings management practices. By doing this, the quality of information 
available to the public may be improved, and thus, users of financial reporting might be better 
served. Overall, one of the objectives of this thesis is to increase the understanding of 
differences in perceptions concerning the practices of earnings management “motivations and 
techniques” by different national cultures. Thus, this study contributes to the existing 
literature by eliciting perceptions in Saudi Arabia characterized by its different culture, 
ownership structure, and regulations.            
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Chapter Four: 
A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON THE ROLE OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS AND EXTERNAL AUDIT IN CONSTRAINING 
EARNINGS MANAGEMNT 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter discussed the accounting studies that have looked at earnings 
management practices. It attempted to provide an overview of the definition of earnings 
management, earnings management incentives, earnings management techniques, and the 
attempts at measuring earnings management. This chapter aims to identify how monitoring 
mechanisms, whether corporate governance and external audit, constrain earnings 
management by reviewing the findings of previous studies. In other words, this chapter 
presents the literature concerned with the role of internal corporate governance, ownership 
structure, and external audit factors on mitigating earnings management. The chapter is 
structured as follows: Section 4.2 presents studies concerning the role of internal corporate 
governance on earnings management. Section 4.3 provides studies concerning the role of 
ownership structure on mitigating earnings management. Section 4.4 illustrates the role of 
external audit factors on reducing earnings management and Section 4.5 provides a brief 
summary of the chapter.      
                    
4.2 THE ROLE OF INTERNAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE  
Since the financial crisis that occurred in 2008 affecting a large number of countries, 
corporate governance has been considered a mainstream concern - a staple of debate in 
companies boardrooms, among academics, legislators, and throughout the business world. In 
addition, technological progress, liberalization, opening up of financial markets, trade 
liberalization, and the mobilization of capital have increased the importance of corporate 
governance as an important framework for corporations (Claessens, 2000).   
    
Although many attempts have been made to define corporate governance, there is no 
consensus regarding its meaning since it involves numerous factors which can differ from 
region to region, such as objectives and the mechanisms of implementation. One of the most 
popular and implicit definitions of corporate governance is that introduced by Adrian 
Cadbury, who was a pioneer in raising the awareness and presenting the debate on corporate 
governance reforms, in the Cadbury Report, “Corporate governance is the system by which 
companies are directed and controlled” (Cadbury Committee, 1992). Moreover, MacAvoy 
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and Millstein (2003) define corporate governance as a set of structures specifying authority 
and responsibility for the conduct of an organisation and its management. Parkinson (1994) 
defines corporate governance as the process of supervision and control aimed at ensuring that 
a firm's managers act for the benefit of shareholders.  
   
The concept of internal corporate governance can be attributed to Berle and Means in 1932 
who debated the separation of corporate control and ownership (Colarossi et al., 2008). 
Jensen and Meckling, (1976) highlight that managers (the agent) act on behalf of the 
shareholders (the principal), who are the real owners of the company. However, based on 
agency theory, the issues related to the separation of ownership and management might boost 
executives to collude against owners in order to increase their own personal wealth (Rahman 
and Ali, 2006). Several factors, including job security, may be a catalyst for managers to 
manipulate reported earnings. Jiraporn et al. (2008) argue that firms that are more 
informationally complicated might utilise earnings management since a higher degree of 
asymmetric information makes it more opaque for shareholders to monitor managers. Thus, in 
the absence of effective monitoring procedures within a company, managers are more likely 
to take actions that deviate from the benefit of shareholders, such as managing earnings, 
which leads to increased agency costs.    
  
According to agency theory, owners can structure monitoring (corporate governance) systems 
from different perspectives. Fama and Jensen (1983) suggest that a system that can separate 
decision management from decision control is needed to limit agency costs. Core et al. (1999) 
suggest that there are greater agency issues in listed US firms with weaker governance 
mechanisms; therefore, corporate governance can introduce a desirable system that may limit 
the power of managers to disregard the interests of shareholders, thereby decreasing agency 
costs. Accordingly, a large number of studies such as Fama, (1980), Fama and Jensen, (1983) 
and Williamson (1988) argue that corporate governance mechanisms constrain managerial 
opportunism. According to institutional theory, companies might adopt practices or 
regulations as a result of coercion from a legislator who imposes some practices by force in 
order to improve organizational effectiveness. On the other hand, companies may 
accommodate themselves on similar organizations in their field which they perceive to be 
more legitimate or successful (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).  However, there is no prediction 
that the adoption of these regulations will improve organizational effectiveness.  
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Over the last two decades, more attention has been paid to the role of different corporate 
governance characteristics as monitoring mechanisms which provide more reassurance, 
notably for investors and regulators; these include mechanisms such as independent board and 
sub-committees that are likely to protect the shareholders. For instance, the former SEC 
chairperson (Levitt, 1998) suggests that corporate governance plays a significant role; thus, 
the SEC should pay more attention to these mechanisms. The reforms of corporate 
governance practice have brought about an increase in the appointment of independent or 
non-executive directors on corporate boards and sub-committees. These reforms include a 
number of regulations established to enhance the role of corporate governance, mainly that 
related to disclosure. For instance, the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (2002) was a reform of the 
disclosure of corporate governance information, which was presented following accounting 
scandals concerning a number of firms such as Enron, Tyco International, Adelphia, Peregrine 
Systems and WorldCom. According to Chang and Sun (2009) SOX has had a significant 
effect on corporate governance practices. They stress that there has been a negative 
relationship between earnings management and board and audit committee independence after 
SOX which was not seen in the pre-SOX period. In addition, the Saudi Arabia government 
has recently issued many reforms regarding corporate governance, such as the mandatory 
establishment of sub-committees, a majority of non-executives on boards and the disclosure 
of corporate governance implementation; however, these reforms have not yet been examined 
by academic researcher.          
  
Agency theory anticipates that boards will enhance the integrity of their financial reporting 
through monitoring management (Peasnell et al, 2005). In terms of audit committee, agency 
theory assumes that the role of the audit committee is to monitor and oversee the integrity of 
financial reporting. Much emphasis has been placed on the fact that the audit committee’s role 
attempts to prevent fraudulent accounting statements (Klein, 2002). 
  
In general, the previous academic literature has reached some significant conclusions about 
the relationship between earnings management and internal corporate governance. For 
example, Shen and Chih (2007) and Cornett et al. (2008) show that companies with beneficial 
corporate governance tend to alleviate their earnings management. However, Ali Shah et al. 
(2009) declare a positive relationship between corporate governance and earnings 
management. Accordingly, this section aims to review the literature that attempts to determine 
a relationship between internal corporate governance mechanisms and earnings management.  
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4.2.1 Effectiveness of Board Characteristics  
As mentioned above, agency theory anticipates that boards will enhance the integrity of their 
financial reporting by monitoring management. Corporate boards are responsible for 
monitoring managerial actions, notably those related to performance, financial disclosure, and 
tasks delegated to sub-committees (Vafeas, 2005). The following section presents an 
overview of the relationship between board characteristics and earnings management.          
 
4.2.1.1 Board independence  
According to Agency theory, Zahra and Pearce (1989) suggest that the presence of outside 
directors may affect the quality of directors’ information and the decisions they take, which 
may lead to enhanced performance. Overall, a large number of studies Peasnell et al. (2005); 
Bedard et al. (2004); Klein (2002); Xie et al. (2003); Benkel, et al. (2006); Niu (2006) and 
Osma (2008) have documented a negative relationship between the presence of outside 
directors and earnings management, thereby supporting agency theory.     
                  
Based on a sample of US firms collected between 1992 to 1994, and using the Jones 1991 
model to measure discretionary accruals, Xie et al. (2003) found that where there is a large 
percentage of independent directors there is less likely to be earnings management. However, 
this study uses only two control variables (size and year) and disregards other control 
variables such as managerial ownership, leverage, cash flow that are considered important in 
the model. a study conducted by Klein (2002) using data from 1991 to 1993 from a sample of 
687 U.S. firms, uses many control variables such as firm size, growth, performance, leverage 
and managerial ownership. She documents a statistically negative association between 
earnings management (measured by the Jones model) and the percentage of independent 
directors on the board.  
 
Peasnell et al. (2000a) used information from UK firms to investigate the relationship 
between earnings management and corporate governance. They found that firms with a higher 
percentage of non-executives is associated with income-increasing accruals when earnings 
fall beneath the threshold. Interestingly, they also investigate whether the relationship 
between board characteristics and earnings management differs between the pre- and post-
Cadbury periods and reveal that managers only managed earnings downward in the post-
Cadbury period; however, both techniques of earnings management (downward and upward) 
were found in the pre-Cadbury periods.       
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Park and Shin (2004) investigated the influence of board characteristics on the level of 
discretionary accruals in a sample of 539 firm-years in Canada. Adopting the modified Jones 
model, they assert that the presence of non-executives does not reduce earnings management; 
however, non-executives from financial intermediaries and active institutional shareholders 
do constrain earnings management. Moreover, manipulation is found to be constrained by 
officers of financial intermediaries on the board and the tenure of non-executives. Likewise, 
based on a sample of Canadian firms in the years 2001-2004, Niu (2006) who applied the 
Kothari et al. (2005) model as a measurement of earnings management to investigate the 
relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and earnings quality, found that the 
level of independence of board composition is negatively associated with the level of 
abnormal accruals. The findings of Niu’s (2006) study is characterized as having more 
reliability since it came after reforms presented by the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (2002) which has 
had a beneficial influence on corporate governance practices.  
 
A sample of 666 Australian firm-year observations for the fiscal years 2001, 2002 and 2003 
used the DeAngelo (1986) model as measure of earnings management, Benkel, et al. (2006). 
investigated whether boards of directors and audit committees with a large percentage of 
independent members are associated with the incidence of earnings management. They 
conclude that a higher percentage of outside directors on the boards and audit committees is 
related to low levels of earnings management. 
 
A study undertaken by Abdul Rahman and Ali (2006) which employed the cross-sectional 
modified version of the Jones model, based on a sample of 97 Malaysian listed firms over the 
period 2002-2003, claims that there is insignificant relationship between board independence 
and the incidence of earnings management. Their explanation for the insignificant association 
is that the role of the board of directors is conceived as inefficient in performing their 
monitoring duties due to management dominance over board matters. Likewise, based on a 
sample of 144 Indonesian firms using various measures of earnings management, Siregar and 
Utama (2008) examined the influence of ownership structure, firm size and corporate 
governance practices on earnings management, using firms listed on the Jakarta Stock 
Exchange. Their findings do not provide evidence that a firm with a high proportion of 
outside directors on the board is less likely to engage in informative earnings management. 
Unlike previous Asian studies, using evidence from Hong Kong, Jaggi et al. (2009) relying on 
a sample of 770 firm-year observations and employing the Kothari et al. model (2005) as a 
measure of earnings management, found that the presence of outside directors on the board 
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provides influential monitoring of earnings management. However, their findings are 
moderated in family-controlled companies, as it was seen that increasing the percentage of 
outside directors to raise board monitoring is unlikely to be inefficient in family-controlled 
firms. A discrepancy in the findings can be observed among Asian studies, which may be due 
to a number of reasons, notably the size of sample, control variables used, earnings 
management proxies, and ownership structure. 
 
Based on a sample of 155 Spanish listed firms during the period 1999–2001, a study by Osma 
and Noguer (2007) investigated whether board characteristics are effective in reducing 
earnings management. They employed the Jones (1991) model and the Marginal model 
(Peasnell et al. 2000b) concluding that the appointment of institutional directors is important 
for restraining earnings management. However, their investigation covered the period prior to 
the reforms in corporate governance. Moreover, Dimitropoulos and Asteriou (2010) who 
investigated the impact of board independence on earnings management using a sample of 97 
non-financial firms listed on the Athens Stock Exchange in Greece, show that board 
independence is negatively associated with earnings management practices. 
 
Overall, a large number of previous empirical results have concluded that boards with a high 
percentage of independent outside directors reinforce the integrity of the financial reporting 
process and provide greater assurance to shareholders on the quality of reported earnings. 
However, a few studies have shown peculiar findings, such as that conducted in Asian 
countries, declaring that board independence may not be effective in mitigating earnings 
management. Their findings may be due to their sample, control variables used, and the nature 
of ownership structure and the corporate governance practices. This study argues that more 
outside directors on the board is more likely to constrain earnings management in Saudi 
Arabia.       
 
4.2.1.2 Board size (number of board members)  
Board size is deemed another pivotal element in board characteristics which may influence 
earnings management practice. According to the Saudi Code of corporate governance, the 
number of board members should be no less than three and no more than eleven members. 
There is disagreement regarding the effect of board size. For example, Goodstein et al. 
(1994); Jensen (1993) and Yermack (1996) claim that smaller boards, between four to six 
members, may have the ability to make beneficial decisions and monitor CEO’s behaviour. 
The other view argues that small boards may not be effective in monitoring the behaviour of 
top management (Zahra and Pearce, 1989). However, the majority of prior studies argue that 
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larger boards with varied expertise are capable of developing the synergetic monitoring of the 
board to mitigate the incidence of earnings management (Xie et al. 2003; Peasnell et al. 
2005). A plausible explanation of this view is that smaller boards are expected to be 
dominated by blockholders or executives while larger boards have a variety of members from 
different positions.   
 
Based on a sample collected from 282 US firms for the years 1992, 1994 and 1996, and 
employing the Jones model (1991), Xie et al. (2003) investigated the effect of board size on 
earnings management. They found that earnings management practices may not occur with 
firms that have larger boards. Likewise, Yu (2008) suggests that small boards are less likely 
to be helpful in detecting earnings management. A study conducted by Habbash (2010) who 
used a sample of 471 UK firms covering the period between 2003 and 2006 confirmed that a 
large board is more likely to constrain earnings management. His findings reinforce the 
argument of John and Senbet (1998) that an increase in board size increases the board’s 
monitoring capacity.       
 
Opponents of large boards argue that they provide a lack of coordination and communication 
between members. For example, based on samples of 97 and 1,097 Malaysian firms 
respectively, Abdul Rahman and Ali (2006) and Kao and Chen (2004) examined the 
effectiveness of board size on the level of earnings management. Both studies found that there 
is a positive relationship between board size and level of earnings management. 
    
The various findings found regarding board size, whether positive or negative association 
with earnings management, do not need to be criticised since both effects are justified by the 
previous studies and are logically acceptable. However, the second view that argues that 
larger board are more effective may be more appropriate than the first because this view 
assumes that a large board has diversity of experience and more independent members. 
Moreover, a large board is expected to reach more astute decisions than a small one. 
Accordingly, this study argues that large Saudi boards may constrain earnings management.                    
 
4.2.1.3  Board Meetings 
While no specific number of meetings is mandated by the Saudi Code of corporate 
governance, members of boards of directors should meet at least four times a year in order to 
endorse the quarterly financial statements. The number of meetings has been employed in 
prior studies as an indicator of a board’s diligence, since inactive boards are less likely to 
monitor management effectively. It is argued that directors on boards that meet frequently are 
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more likely to discharge their duties in line with shareholders’ interests since more time can 
be devoted to controlling issues such as earnings management, conflicts of interest and 
monitoring management (Habbash, 2010).  
 
A study undertaken by Xie et al. (2003), employing a sample of 282 firm-year observations, 
highlights that a board that meets frequently may have time to look at issues such as earnings 
management. Their findings conclude that earnings management is significantly negatively 
associated with the number of board meetings. Moreover, Vafeas (1999) found a positive 
relationship between board meetings and performance.   
 
However, most studies found an insignificant relationship between board meetings and 
earnings management. For example, Ebrahim (2007) and Habbash (2010) who used a 
different sample and period found that the number of meetings may not restrict earnings 
management practices.  Habbash (2010) justified his finding by stating that frequent meetings 
may not always be a characteristic of an active board of directors. Adams et al. (2009) carried 
out a large survey to determine the roles of outside directors as advisors and monitors of 
management. He claims that directors who mainly control management perceive that they 
participate less in boardroom discussions than other directors and that the CEO often asks 
them for advice.  
 
It is worth pointing out that the studies conducted to investigate board meetings and earnings 
management have been low-key, thus their claims cannot to be generalised. Therefore, further 
investigation is needed in order to determine whether this element is effective or not. This 
study aims to conduct an investigation into the effect of board meetings on earnings 
management practices. Accordingly, this study argues that fewer meetings by board members 
may provide an incentive for managers to act opportunistically in order to increase their 
wealth.  
 
4.2.1.4  CEO Duality 
The Saudi Code of Corporate Governance mandates the separation of the role of chairman of 
board of directors and any executive position in a company. This may be helpful in ensuring 
that the CEO will not hold excessive power to handle daily business operations. In other 
words, CEO duality is an opportunity for concentration of executive power that can lead to 
management indiscretion; thus, a separate CEO may provide more effective monitoring 
(Cornett et al., 2008). Under agency theory, the chair of the board should be independent, 
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since a CEO with excessive power can easily manipulate earnings management (Abdul 
Rahman and Ali, 2006).  
 
In Saudi Arabia, most companies are family companies which grow and become public 
companies; thus, the separation may exist in accordance with the Saudi Code of corporate 
governance; however, a blood relationship between the CEO and the chairman is often a trait 
in some companies which leads to an impairment of the power of the chairman toward 
accountability. This issue is often found in countries that have weak investor protection. For 
example, Rashid (2009) states that in Bangladesh outside directors have a close relationship 
with inside board members which leads to an impairment of their independence. 
 
Prior studies have documented that firms with duality function may not be able to discharge 
their operations properly and are expected to be subjected to accounting enforcement actions 
by the SEC for infringement of GAAP (Abdul Rahman and Ali, 2006). Klein (2002) using a 
sample of 687 U.S firms and the Jones model (1991) found that the aggregate of discretionary 
accruals is positively associated with a CEO who holds a position on the board’s nominating 
and compensation committee. His findings suggest that a CEO with too much power over 
board responsibilities can easily manage earnings. Furthermore, based on a sample of 27 
Turkish banks operating in the market in the period 2001-2004, Kaymak and Bektas (2008) 
found that duality and board tenure are negatively associated with performance. Their 
findings support the view of agency theory that the board chair should be independent, since a 
CEO with excessive power can easily manipulate earnings management (Abdul Rahman and 
Ali, 2006). 
   
Using a sample of 384 listed companies in the manufacturing sector in the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange over the period 2005-2007, Murhadi (2009) investigated the role of good corporate 
governance in reducing earnings management. He highlights only two variables as having a 
significant effect on earnings management and one of them is duality. In other words, his 
findings indicate that a higher rate of duality is associated with high earnings management 
practices. Abdul Rahman and Ali (2006) used a sample of 97 Malaysian firms employing the 
cross-sectional modified Jones model to determine the effectiveness of monitoring functions 
of boards of directors, audit committees and concentrated ownership in constraining earnings 
management. They found that there is an insignificant relationship between duality and 
earnings management.  
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The examination of the effect of duality on earnings management may be limited since most 
companies in the USA and the UK separate the role of the two positions which causes studies 
to pay less attention to this than to other characteristics. According to agency theory, this 
study argues that the separation of the positions of CEO and chairman will lead to 
constraining earnings management in Saudi companies.  
  
4.2.1.5 The number of Saudi royal family members on the board of directors:  
Accounting literature has for many years concentrated on the effect of cultural factors on the 
development of accounting practices. Of course, culture, environment and political system are 
huge factors in accounting practices and corporate governance. Abdul Rahman and Ali (2006) 
assert that previous studies have shown evidence confirming that accounting practices and 
disclosure are a function of the nation’s cultural values and cultural heritage which influence 
attitudes towards business-related fraud. Although Abdul Rahman and Ali (2006) did not find 
any effect of Malay directors’ characteristics on earnings management, they argue that the 
existence of Malay directors on the board of a company and on audit committees may restrain 
opportunistic earnings management. 
 
This study argues that there may be situations where several people are more powerful than 
others, so that people who have a greater power influence the behaviour of others to get things 
done as Clark (2004) argued. Many members of the royal family are appointed as directors of 
boards and serve on boards as managerial members; therefore, they may monitor the 
management closely, thereby decreasing possible mismanagement and wrongdoing. Agency 
theory suggests that high ownership on the board provides a better corporate governance 
structure, which leads to high quality financial reporting (Sanchez and Meca, 2005; Muth and 
Donaldson 1998). Thus, it is argued that the presence of royal family directors on the board of 
a company may deter opportunistic earnings management.  
 
4.2.1.6 Nomination and remuneration committees  
Nomination and remuneration committees have not been given as much attention by prior 
studies as audit committees because most studies consider them to have no direct effect on the 
quality of financial reporting or performance. However, the principal cause of earnings 
manipulation ensues from the fact that managers seek to increase their compensation and 
private benefits from disclosing false earnings by manipulating expenses of shareholders. On 
the other hand, serious problems may arise when insiders serve on remuneration or 
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nomination committees as this can lead to more interventions in the design of committee 
structure.  
 
For example, Xie et al. (2003) found that compensation committees may affect the market 
perception of golden parachute adoption. Also, concerns increased in particular when CEOs 
or executives served on remuneration committees as this led to agency problems between 
management and shareholders (Anderson and Bizjak, 2003). In Saudi Arabia, nomination and 
remuneration committees are integrated and designed to review the terms and conditions of 
employment of managers and boards of directors. Perhaps the existence of a CEO or 
executive serving on nomination and remuneration committees might be an incentive to act 
opportunistically by obtaining high levels of compensation or exploit his position to make the 
decisions for the management’s benefit. Some prior studies have mentioned the role of such 
committees; for example, Xi et al. (2003) also observe that executive committees might not 
play a direct role, whereas audit or finance committees might have a more direct impact on 
controlling earnings management. Laux's (2008) implication is that there is a relationship 
between the structure of board committees and earnings management. In addition, Sun et al. 
(2009) suggest that intelligent compensation committees are capable of generating strong 
monitoring which leads to preventing management from controlling earnings management. 
Petra and Dorata (2008) suggest that independent directors of remuneration committees are 
better able to accomplish their duties objectively. Moreover, Dahya and McConnell (2007) 
also found that more outside directors sitting on committees leads to better performance as a 
result of independence.  
 
Based on prior results by Klein (1998, 2000) that there is a negative association between 
board independence and whether the CEO sits on the board’s nomination committee; a study 
also conducted by Klein (2002), who employs a dummy variable, found a positive 
relationship between the presence of the CEO on the nomination committee and earnings 
management. In other words, the independence of this committee is measured by the presence 
of the CEO which leads to an impairment of its role due to less independence. Based on a 
sample of 155 Spanish firms, contradicting agency theory, Osma and Noguer (2007) 
investigated the role of boards’ committees in constraining earnings management and found 
that an independent nomination committee has a positive significant association with earnings 
management. 
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Indeed, to date there has been little research into the role of remuneration and nomination 
committees in general and only one study explores the effect of the presence of the CEO on 
the remuneration committee on the incidence of earnings management. Accordingly, this 
thesis aims to extend the literature regarding the impact of remuneration and nomination 
committees on earnings management.     
 
4.2.2 Effectiveness of Audit Committee Characteristics  
The recent financial crises of many companies resulting notably from accounting 
manipulation has raised questions about the role of audit committees which are expected to 
protect investors’ interests and monitor opportunistic managerial behaviour (Ebrahim, 2007). 
Audit committees might be responsible for alleviating the agency problem between the firm 
and the outside shareholders by monitoring its financial reporting. In other words, agency 
theory expects the audit committee to monitor and oversee the integrity of financial reporting. 
Thus, much emphasis has been placed on the fact that the audit committee's role is to prevent 
irregular fraudulent accounting statements (Klein, 2002). In Saudi Arabia, the audit 
committee is a committee appointed by a company which includes three members or more, at 
least one of whom should be a specialist in financial affairs. The pivotal role of the audit 
committee is to enhance communication and mitigate the conflict between the external auditor 
and management. Moreover, it is expected to constrain potential manipulation by monitoring 
managerial behaviour and providing the external auditor with the necessary information. The 
following section discusses how existing studies view the effectiveness of audit committees in 
reducing earnings management practices.   
 
4.2.2.1 Audit committee independence  
Independence of audit committee members has been the focus of most previous studies since 
the popular theme is that independent audit committee members would provide better 
financial reporting and this is generally confirmed by existing empirical studies (Lin et al. 
2006). Specifically, a study conducted by Klein (2002) using a sample of 692 US firms 
showed a negative association between earnings management and the proportion of 
independent directors on the audit committee. Moreover, using a sample of 300 US firms for 
the year 1996, Bedard et al. (2004) studied the role of audit committee characteristics, namely 
expertise, independence and activity, on the extent of earnings management. They employed 
signed earnings management which includes the level of income-increasing and income-
decreasing discretionary accruals using the modified Jones (1995) cross-sectional model. 
Their findings reveal that aggressive earnings management is negatively associated with fully 
independent audit committees. However, they only adopt one measure of earnings 
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management and use signed earnings management which would make their result quite 
biased.  
 
Despite selecting a sample of 106 publicly-held corporations in the USA, Lin et al. (2006), 
who examined the relationship between certain characteristics of audit committees that were 
recommended by the BRC in 1999, such as independence, failed to find evidence supporting 
the theory that independent audit committees can reduce earnings management. Their findings 
could be criticized as their measure of earnings management was not underlined in 
discretionary accruals as a measure for earnings quality and their sample only included one 
year, which cannot be reliable. Likewise, using a sample of 282 US firms for the years 1992, 
1994 and 1996, Xie et al. (2003) investigated the effectiveness of a number of characteristics 
of the audit committee on constraining aggressive earnings management. They adopted the 
Jones (1991) model to estimate earnings management and their findings indicate that audit 
committee independence is not significantly associated with reduced levels of earnings 
management. 
  
European countries, such as the UK and France, have also been given attention in this 
investigation; for example, a study conducted by Piot and Janin (2007) examined the SBF 120 
Index of French firms between 1999 and 2001 and found that the existence of audit 
committees and their independence have a great effect on constraining the level of earnings 
management. On the other hand, a study by Peasnell, et al. (2005) showed no strong evidence 
to reinforce the view that the existence of an audit committee influences the extent of income-
increasing manipulations to meet or exceed earnings management thresholds. Likewise, 
evidence by Osma and Noguer (2007) investigating the influence of the presence of an audit 
committee in reducing earnings manipulation for Spanish firms suggest that the presence of 
an audit committee does not play a vital role in constraining earnings management.    
 
Evidence from Asian countries provided by Bradbury (2006) who investigated the 
relationship between audit committee composition and accounting quality, as estimated by 
discretionary accruals, selected a sample of 139 firms from Singapore and 113 firms from 
Malaysia. His findings reveal that audit committee independence is associated with higher 
earnings quality; however, the association showed only when the discretionary accruals were 
income-increasing, indicating that audit committees are influential in the financial reporting 
process by constraining the level of income-increasing earnings management. Furthermore, 
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Abdul Rahman and Ali (2006) examined the effectiveness of audit committees in constraining 
earnings management using a sample of 97 Malaysian firms and found an insignificant 
relationship between independent audit committees and earnings management. Likewise, 
Siregar and Utama (2008) explored the effectiveness of many corporate governance practices 
on earnings management selecting Indonesian firms on the Jakarta Stock Exchange. Although 
their sample included 144 firms and covered the periods 1995–1996, and 1999–2002, they 
failed to detect a relationship between audit committees’ independence and earnings 
management. 
 
From another region, using a sample of 666 Australian firms covering the period 2001, 2002 
and 2003, Benkel, et al. (2006) confirmed that the level of aggressive earnings management 
can be reduced by a high proportion of audit committee independence. Likewise, Davidson et 
al. (2005) examined the effectiveness of governance structure in restraining the level of 
earnings management by employing a cross-sectional sample of 434 listed Australian firms. 
Their findings are consistent and reinforce the expectation that independent audit committees 
are capable of constraining earnings management. 
      
The contradictory findings of previous studies are not surprising since there are many factors 
which may affect the audit committees’ role, such as ownership structure or the existence of 
an audit committee, which, without taking into account its independence and competence, 
cannot ensure the competence of the monitoring process or its efficiency to detect and 
constrain manipulation. This study argues that an independent audit committee is capable of 
constraining earnings management in Saudi companies.    
 
4.2.2.2 Audit committee size 
Saudi listed companies have been required to establish an audit committee that should include 
at least three members. The size of audit committee is employed as an indication of resources 
available (Habbash, 2010) which may reflect the importance of better communication and 
coordination. Previous studies have investigated the effect of size of the audit committee on 
mitigating earnings management. For example, based on a sample of 106 US firms, Lin at al. 
(2006) investigated the relationship between certain characteristics of audit committees that 
were recommended by the BRC in 1999, such as size, independence, financial expertise, 
activity, and stock ownership. They found a negative association between audit committee 
size and earnings restatement.       
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However, using a sample of 282 US firms covering the period between 1992 and 1994 Xie et 
al. (2003) found no potential effect or relationship between audit committee size and the level 
of earnings management. Likewise, Bedard et al. (2004), using a sample of 300 US firms in 
the year 1996, found no significant relationship between audit committee size and aggressive 
earnings management. Moreover, Baxter and Cotter (2009) using a sample collected from 
Australian listed companies in 2001, studied whether the size of audit committees is related to 
earnings quality. Their findings maintain that there is no relationship between audit committee 
size and earnings quality in either measure. By also using financial restatements and a small 
sample (41 firms), a study conducted by Abbott et al. (2004) which investigated the 
relationship between audit committee size and financial reporting quality, contended that 
audit committee size had no significant impact on financial reporting quality.  
  
Up to now there has been no study investigating the relationship between audit committee 
size and earnings management in Asian countries other than one undertaken by Abdul 
Rahman and Ali (2006) to examine the competence of audit committee members in 
constraining aggressive earnings management among 97 Malaysian listed firms over the 
period 2002-2003. They found no significant relationship between the competence of audit 
committee members and earnings management. Therefore, this study may be the first to 
examine audit committee size and earnings management in Asian countries.   
                                                 
4.2.2.3 Audit committee meetings  
An independent and intelligent audit committee will play a more active, effective and efficient 
monitoring role (Abdul Rahman and Ali, 2006). It is recommended that a minimum of three 
or four meetings a year, or special meetings when necessary, should be held by audit 
committees (Yang and Krishnan, 2005) since this would provide crucial monitoring leading to 
constraining potential manipulation. A study conducted by Song and Windram (2004) 
assessed the audit committee recommendations of the Cadbury Committee (1992) in the UK 
and Blue Ribbon Committee (1999) in the US; they investigated the role of the audit 
committee in enhancing financial reporting. Their findings indicate that the frequency of audit 
committee meetings increases the quality of financial reporting. Likewise, a sample of 282 US 
companies collected during the period 1992, 1994 and 1996, by Xie et al. (2003) suggests that 
frequent meetings of audit committees can constrain the levels of discretionary current 
accruals and anticipated that more diligence audit committees are more effective. Moreover, 
selecting a sample of US manufacturing firms for the years 1999 and 2000, Ebrahim (2007) 
studied the association between earnings management and the activity of the audit committee. 
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He found that audit committees that hold frequent meetings are more active and stronger. 
Moreover, study undertaken by Abbott et al. (2004) using a sample of 78 found a relationship 
between audit committee activity and EM. They highlight a negative relationship between 
audit committee meetings and corporate fraud and financial reporting restatements.  
 
Although the previous studies show a relationship between audit committee meetings and 
aggressive earnings management practices, numerous studies were unable to detect any 
relation between an active audit committee and earnings quality. For example, a study by 
Beasley, et al. (2000) which investigated the relationship between frequency of audit 
committee meetings and likelihood of financial statement fraud, found that the manipulation 
of financial reporting is not necessarily associated with audit committee meetings. Likewise, 
Lin et al. (2006) who examined the effectiveness of audit committee characteristics by 
selecting a sample of 106 publicly-held corporations covering one year, found no implicit 
evidence to indicate that frequent audit committee meetings will restrain fraud or earnings 
restatement. Prior to the mandatory implementation of audit committee requirements in 2003, 
a study by Baxter and Cotter (2009) attempted to examine the effect of audit committee 
characteristics on earnings quality during 2001. It found that a greater number of audit 
committee meetings are not necessary to constrain earnings management or to enhance 
earnings quality measures. Also, in the Australian context, Davidson et al. (2005) used a 
sample of 434 listed Australian firms and found that diligent audit committees are not 
associated with lower earnings management.  
  
The fact that previous studies were unable to find a relationship between audit committee 
meetings and earnings management or earnings quality may be attributed to their small 
samples (one year) or small size not reflecting reliable results. Moreover, most of them were 
undertaken before the issuing of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) which has played a vital part 
in enhancing the role of audit committees. This study argues that in Saudi Arabia frequent 
meetings by audit committee members may be helpful in constraining earnings management 
in Saudi companies.           
 
4.2.2.4 Audit committee expertise 
The Saudi Code of Corporate Governance requires that audit committees appoint at least one 
member with financial expertise. According to a survey by Raghunandan et al. (2001), audit 
committees that comprise at least one financial expert have greater interplay with their 
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internal and external auditors. Abbott et al. (2004), using a sample of 41 firms and covering 
the period 1991-1999, stress a significant positive relationship between audit committees that 
lack a member with financial expertise and the incidence of financial reporting restatements.  
 
By evaluating the recommendations of the Cadbury Committee (1992) in the UK and the Blue 
Ribbon Committee (1999) in the US, Song and Windram (2004) investigated the effect of UK 
audit committees on controlling financial reporting. Their findings support the theory that 
audit committees which include a financial expert or financial literacy are able to monitor the 
quality of financial reporting. They also demonstrate that financial literacy is one of the most 
important characteristics of the audit committee. Based on a sample of 300 US companies in 
the year 1996, Bedard et al. (2004) studied the influence of audit committee characteristics, 
notably expertise, independence and activity, on the incidence of earnings management. They 
employed the level of income-increasing and income-decreasing discretionary accruals using 
the modified Jones (1995) cross-sectional model.  Their findings report statistically that audit 
committees which include at least financial expertise are negatively associated with 
discretionary accruals.  
 
A study conducted by Xie et al. (2003) was actuated by the SEC Panel Report's 
recommendation that audit committee members should appoint a financial expert; it 
investigated the role of audit committee in restraining manipulation. Their findings showed 
that audit committee members which comprise at least one member with a corporate or 
financial background are related to fewer earnings management practices.  
 
However, based on data collected from the 97 top firms for the two years 2002-2003, Abdul 
Rahman and Ali (2006) found insufficient evidence to support the claim that the presence of 
financial experts on audit committees mitigates earnings management. Their findings may be 
due to the weak role played by audit committees in Malaysia.  Moreover, their sample may be 
very small in comparison with other studies and make the finding unreliable and biased. 
Likewise, based on an investigation of the effect of audit committees characteristics, Lin et al. 
(2006) maintain that, based on a sample of 106 publicly-held corporations in the USA (2000), 
there is no negative relationship between audit committee expertise and earnings restatements. 
Their findings may also be unreliable since their sample only looks at one year and a small 
sample. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, Lin’s study selected a sample for 2000 before the 
passage of SOX which developed and enhanced the role of audit committees. Therefore, this 
 66 
 
study argues that the presence of financial expertise on an audit committee will enhance its 
role and the interplay with external auditors will lead to reduced potential manipulation. 
      
4.2.3 Internal Corporate Governance Measurements 
Corporate governance is a means of monitoring managerial performance, opportunistic 
behaviour and financial disclosures. Most studies attempt to adopt underlying statistical 
methods in regression analysis in order to explore the effective role of internal corporate 
governance. Therefore, prior studies have suggested several measures, such as numbers, 
percentage and dummy variables in order to measure the characteristics of internal corporate 
governance. For example, to measure board size, just calculate the number of members or to 
measure board independence, just divide the total number of board members by outside 
directors. When studying internal corporate governance, most studies have focused on board 
characteristics and sub-committees since they are considered the most powerful 
characteristics in internal corporate governance. 
 
4.3 THE ROLE OF OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE  
Corporate ownership may be a critical instrument in the influence of overseeing mechanisms 
used to constrain the likelihood of manipulation. Many studies such as Wei (2007) have 
attributed the differences in corporate governance practices among countries to different 
ownership structures playing a pivotal role of enhancing corporate governance practices. In 
other words, concentrated ownership contributes to increasing the quality of corporate 
governance practices. For example, Fledmann and Schwarzkopf (2003) highlight a positive 
relationship between the proportion of concentrated institutional ownership and outsiders on a 
board and audit committee. It is also argued that an effective mechanism for restraining 
manipulation is the development of an appropriate ownership structure (Habbash, 2010). Prior 
studies have also argued that agency problems occur in two ways: vertical agency problems 
that occur between owners and managers, and horizontal agency problems that occur between 
majority and minority owners (Shliefer and Vishny, 1997). 
 
Most studies in finance and economics have highlighted that corporate ownership structure 
decisions reflect attempts to reduce agency problems between different stakeholders (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976). In other words, corporate ownership is set to increase firm value, 
accounting for potential conflicts of interest between a controlling shareholder and minority 
shareholders. Gogineni et al. (2010) found that agency costs arises as firms move from a 
single owner/single manager ownership structure to more complicated ownership structures 
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and suggest that agency costs are significantly higher when firms are not managed by owners. 
This idea is consistent with Holderness (2007) who argues that as the number and kinds of 
shareholders increase the motivation for any shareholder to sustain all of the monitoring costs 
decreases, since the benefits related to monitoring are proportional to the shareholder’s 
ownership stake. Moreover, Li (1994) found that ownership structure has a significant 
influence over corporate governance practices. Henry (2010) suggests that good internal 
governance structure lowers the level of agency costs and that internal governance and 
external shareholding effects are substitute agency-mitigating mechanisms. Pagano and Roell 
(1998) state that optimal dispersion of share ownership can be accomplished by going public 
which leads to large external shareholders who may monitor management closely. McKnight 
and Weir (2009) found that ownership structure helps to reduce agency cost.  
 
Agency theory may be suitable for developed countries; however, ownership structure theory 
is probably appropriate for developing countries in terms of explaining a firm’s agency cost, 
where family ownership is highly concentrated (Pornuptham, 2006). This theory explains the 
percentage of equity held among relevant parties (i. e. outside shareholders, debtholders, and 
managers) and associated with the extent and direction of EM (Dempsey et al., 1993).   
 
Overall, ownership structure is considered as an internal or external mechanism which 
contributes to mitigating agency problems and reducing agency costs; thus, examinations of 
potential relations between corporate ownership and aggressive earnings management are 
necessary to provide a more complete view of the role of corporate governance practices. As 
mentioned earlier, most Saudi companies usually have four groups of shareholders: state, 
institutional, family and blockholders however, the percentage of each group varies from one 
company to another. Thus, this section presents various types of ownership that could be 
effective mechanisms in preventing opportunistic behaviour in Saudi Arabia and each type 
will be discussed with relevant studies that draw attention to earnings management practices. 
 
4. 3.1 Managerial ownership  
The need for board monitoring underlines the extent to which management’s interests align 
with those of shareholders and other investors. Most prior studies presumed that shares owned 
by managers would lead to appropriate alignment of interests (Peasnell et al. 2005). This 
argument can be explained by agency theory which argues that high managerial ownership 
provides better corporate governance structure, which leads to a high quality of financial 
reporting (Sanchez and Meca, 2005). According to Peasnell et al. (2005) US studies have 
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found that managerial ownership is related to low earnings management. However, Habbash 
(2010) claims that the vast majority of the literature detects a positive association between 
insider ownership and manipulation. 
 
Warfield et al. (1995) using a sample of US firms collected from 1988-1990, argue that the 
informativeness of earnings data and the magnitude of discretionary accounting accrual can 
be affected by the level of managerial ownership. Their findings were consistent with their 
assumption and revealed that the amount of accounting accrual adjustments is significantly 
higher when managerial ownership is low.  In other words, the absolute value of accrual 
adjustments is twice as high when managerial ownership is under five percent than when 
managerial ownership is above 45 percent. This study could be criticised for not controlling 
for institutional ownership in its model since Rajgopal et al. (1999) emphasise that studies 
attempting to examine managerial ownership should control for institutional ownership and 
vice-versa. Moreover, Klein (2002) using a sample of 687 US firms, studied the effectiveness 
of board and audit committee composition on earnings manipulation, controlling for CEO 
ownership. Although she employed the modified Jones (1995) cross-sectional model, she 
found a positive relationship between CEO ownership and earnings management.  
 
A study conducted by Peasnell et al (2005) studied two aspects of board monitoring: the role 
of outside directors on the board and audit committees. Based on a sample of UK firms and 
using the modified Jones model, they found no evidence to support the theory that managerial 
ownership is associated with the level of earnings management. However, their findings 
showed that the board of directors plays a pivotal role in the integrity of financial reporting as 
argued by agency theory.  
 
Based on a sample of 107 firm-year observations from 1993 to 1997, Koh (2003) used 
Australian data to scrutinize the relationship between managerial ownership and the incidence 
of earnings management practice. According to the income-decreasing accruals test, their 
findings imply a positive relationship, with a smaller amount of income-decreasing accruals 
for all specifications, in line with the theme that high managerial ownership encourages 
managerial accruals discretion. Using both techniques (short-term and long-term institutional 
ownership) Hsu and Koh (2005), examined the effect of both on the extent of earnings 
management in Australia.  Based on a sample of 201 firms during 1993 and 1997 and 
employing signed earnings management (income-increasing and income-decreasing), they 
suggest that managerial ownership is positively related to income-decreasing discretionary 
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accruals but negatively related to income-increasing accruals. By investigating the influence 
of managerial ownership on earnings management using discretionary accruals, Teshima and 
Shuto (2008) using a sample of 18,790 Japanese firms emphasised that there is a positive 
association between managerial ownership and discretionary accruals. 
 
4.3.2 Family ownership 
There is a heated debate among studies concerning the effect of ownership control by family. 
Two different views emerge as a result of this dichotomy. The first view argues that a 
founding family that has a long-term interest in the firm will constrain the capability of 
managers to manipulate earnings. However, opponents of this view argue that family control 
may lead to expropriation of the minority shareholders’ interests (Jaggi et al., 2009). In other 
words, a family-controlled firm is more likely to confront agency problems stemming from 
the conflict between majority and minority shareholders (Ali et al., 2007). The first view can 
be explained by agency theory which argues that concentrated ownership leads to mitigated 
agency problems (Tosi and Gomez-Mejia, 1989). Prior studies based on US firms have found 
that family firms are less likely to manipulate earnings (Ali et al., 2007; Wang, 2006). 
However, some studies indicate that family firms may extract private benefits at the cost of 
minority shareholders. (Morck et al., 1988; Jaggi et al., 2009).  
Based on a sample consisting of 770 firm-year observations collected from the Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange, Jaggi et al. (2009) found that the monitoring effectiveness of corporate 
boards is moderated in family-controlled firms, either via ownership concentration or the 
presence of family members on corporate boards. This study used the Jones (1991) and 
modified cross-sectional Jones model (1995) to measure earnings management. Using 
multiple regressions and based on a sample of 144 Indonesian firms for the years 1995 to 
1996 and 1999 to 2002, Siregar and Utama (2009) found that family-controlled firms have a 
significant effect on the level of earnings management. In other words, firms with a high 
percentage of family ownership and non-business groups are more inclined to select efficient 
earnings. A study by Claessens et al. (1999) found that family control is a vital factor beyond 
the negative association between control rights and market valuation. Moreover, based on a 
sample of 249 Italian listed companies, Yosef and Prencipe (2009) suggest that family-
controlled firms are more likely, in the long term, to affect both top executives and board 
members leading to constraining the extent of earnings management.       
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Based on a sample collected from Malaysian firms in 2001/2002, Nordin and Hussin (2009) 
examined the association between board corporate transparency by distinguishing between the 
two kinds of nonexecutive directors: primary independent and affiliated directors. They found 
that family firms are more likely to disclose all the required items for the primary basis of 
segment reporting than non-family firms. Likewise, a study by Chau and Gray (2010) 
investigated the relationship between the extent of voluntary disclosure and levels of family 
ownership using a sample of 273 listed firms in Hong Kong for the year 2002. They suggest 
that firms with a high percentage of family ownership (more than 25%) are associated with 
higher voluntary disclosure.   
 
4.3.3 State-ownership  
Although there is a shortage of studies on the effect of state-ownership on earnings 
management, the current study adapts the theme of agency theory to suggest that lower 
opportunistic earnings management is associated with the existence of large shareholders 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The argument is that the proportion of state-ownership is 
negatively associated with earnings management. A number of studies have investigated the 
effect of government ownership on earnings management. For example, a study conducted by 
Xianhui and Liansheng (2009) investigated the corporate governance characteristics of state-
owned controlling and institutional investors and their interactive influence from the 
perspective of manipulation in China. They highlighted the level of upward earnings 
management as being higher in non-stated companies than in state-owned companies, and 
upward earnings management as being negatively related to institutional ownership and the 
negative association with non-stated firms. 
 
Arvind et al. (2009), using the modified Jones model to measure the magnitude and direction 
of earnings management, attempted to detect earnings management patterns in public 
companies and state--owned enterprises (SOEs) in Fiji. They found that state owned 
companies have higher negative earnings management while private companies have higher 
positive earnings management. However, their sample was very small, including just 16 
companies on the South Pacific Stock Exchange. In addition, a study carried out by Yen et al., 
(2007) selecting a sample from secondary data of publicly-listed companies, studied the 
prevalence of earnings management between government-linked companies and Chinese 
family-linked companies. They found that state owned companies are more likely to manage 
their earnings upward while family companies seem to manage their earnings management 
downward. 
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Furthermore, a study undertaken by Chen et al. (2010) using a sample of 3,310 firm-year 
observations with sufficient data on the China Securities Markets, found that the effect of 
audit quality on reducing earnings management is greater for non-state-owned enterprises 
than for state-owned enterprises. Aivazian et al. (2005), using a sample of Chinese firms, 
suggest that corporate governance reform is potentially an effective way of enhancing the 
performance of state-owned firms. 
  
On the other hand, based on a sample of all published CSRC enforcement actions from 1999 
to 2003, Chen et al. (2006) investigated whether ownership structure and board characteristics 
have an influence on corporate financial fraud in China. They suggest that board 
characteristics are a factor in explaining manipulation, while ownership patterns, even in 
state-ownership, seem to be unimportant. Moreover, Bozec et al. (2002) argue that there is no 
relationship between state-ownership and performance and suggest that it is not a question of 
who owns the firm but the goals pursued by the firm. Interestingly, Wei (2007) stresses that 
state-owned shareholding and corporate performance is not linear. In other words, when state-
ownership is relatively small, no relationship is observed, but when the percentage is above 
50%, state-owned shareholdings have a significant negative effect on a firm’s performance. 
 
4.3.4 Blockholder ownership 
Blockholding, owning large number of shares of a company, is another type of ownership 
structure that comprises different forms, such as individual investors, pension funds, mutual 
funds, corporations, private equity firms, fund managers, banks and trusts (Habbash, 2010). 
The United States and the United Kingdom are characterized as having a wide-spread 
ownership structure that cannot be found in developing countries (Siregar and Utama, 2008). 
Although there are no sufficient studies regarding the structure of ownership, blockholding 
may be a common type of ownership structure in Saudi Arabia. Prior studies have found 
blockholder ownership to be an effective mechanism in monitoring managers’ behaviour. In 
other words, blockholders are characterized as having the ability to monitor closely and 
influence board composition via their voting rights (Persons, 2006). 
 
However, within the debate of prior studies there are two views: the first idea argues that 
concentration of ownership may create more monitoring mechanisms leading to the restricting 
of opportunistic behaviour, while the second suggests that the majority of shareholders may 
collude with executives against the minority and stakeholders in order to increase their wealth 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Moreover, the concentrated ownership may be an incentive for 
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blockholders to employ accounting information to their own advantage, for example via 
income–decreasing devices, in order to reduce the other shareholders’ residual claims 
(Claessens et al. 2000). Indeed, neither view can be generalised. For example, the first view 
may be a phenomenon in developed countries as a result of rigorous regulation and investors’ 
protection; however, in developing countries the second view may be justified for many 
reasons such as weak regulation, poor governance practice, poor accounting disclosure and 
investors protection.  
      
According to agency theory, Zhong et al. (2007) divide blockholders into small and large and 
attempt to explain how they act in different situations. They suggest that small blockholders 
tend to sell their shares when the performance of a company is not satisfactory. However, 
blockholders may face difficulties in selling their shares, thus certain forms of monitoring can 
be adopted such as a long-term strategy to monitor managers and produce more benefits from 
their equity ownership. In other words, the presence of large blockholders creates more 
pressure on managers to provide a glowing financial performance and constitutes another 
threat of intervention for underperforming management (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).   
    
Based on a sample of 5,475 firms, Zhong et al. (2007) used the modified Jones model and 
pooled cross-sectional data investigating the two themes on the influence of blockholders on 
earnings management. They found a positive association between blockholder ownership and 
earnings management. A study by Klein (2002) attempted to determine the influence of 
corporate governance on earnings management by selecting a sample of 687 U.S. firms and 
using the modified Jones (1995) cross-sectional model to measure discretionary accruals. 
They found a negative relationship between 5% blockholders sitting on audit committees and 
earnings management. Although this result is consistent with the common view they may not 
have been driven by blockholder ownership; the independence of the directors on the audit 
committees may have been the main reason.   
      
Cheng and Reitenga (2009) found that, based on data for S&P 500 firms and examining the 
influence of institutional non-blockholders and active institutional blockholders on earnings 
management, active institutional blockholders attempt to increase their monitoring only when 
there is pressure to increase earnings. In other words, active institutional blockholders are able 
to constrain upward earnings management rather than downward earnings management. 
Moreover, Dempsey et al. (1993) provide evidence, by dividing their sample of owner-
controlled firms into two types (owner-managed firms and externally-controlled-firms), that 
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owner-managed firms implement less income-increasing earnings management in comparison 
with externally-controlled firms, indicating that insider blockholders have more ability to 
mitigate earnings management than outside or external blockholders. This study is limited by 
using a type of accounting choice, mainly extraordinary item reporting, which cannot reflect 
the nature of manipulation that can be shown by diversity of techniques. By using a different 
percentage of blockholders (10%) Wang (2006) examines the association between the 
presence of blockholders and the level of fraud. She stresses that larger blockholder 
ownership is related to a higher likelihood of fraud detection and a tendency to commit fraud.  
     
In the UK context, numerous studies controlled for blockholders in their investigation of 
corporate governance and earnings management. For example, Dechow et al. (1996) highlight 
a negative relationship between outside blockholders and earnings overstatements that violate 
GAAP. A study conducted by Peasnell et al. (2005) shows that there is no relationship 
between earnings management and blockholders. Moreover, Yu (2008) and Bethel et al. 
(1998) found a positive relationship between blockholders and the incidence of earnings 
management.    
 
4.3.5 Institutional ownership 
Institutional investors given attention by prior studies can be deemed as knowledgeable 
shareholders regarding the business, leading to an increase in the monitoring mechanisms and 
mitigation of opportunistic behaviour. It is argued that institutional investors can play a 
pivotal role in monitoring managers’ behaviour, which is considered as complementary to 
internal corporate governance. A study undertaken by Ferreira (2007) aimed to determine the 
role of institutional investors around the world by adopting a comprehensive data set of equity 
collected from 27 regions. It found that companies with a higher percentage of shares owned 
by foreign and independent institutions (unlike other institutions) have superior performance, 
higher firm value, and lower capital expenditures. Institutional investors have been divided 
into two main groups by recent studies: firstly, long-term institutional investors who invest in 
companies with the intention of keeping their ownership share over a long period and 
secondly, short-term oriented institutional shareholders who invest in companies with the 
intention of keeping their ownership share over a short period (Habbash, 2010). The first 
group has a strong catalyst for monitoring managers while the second group may be interested 
mainly in current earnings rather than long-term earnings in determining stock prices (Bushee, 
2001).    
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Acceding to this division, past studies investigated the effectiveness of institutional investors 
on earnings management and found that short-term and long-term institutional holdings have 
influence earnings management differently. Long-term institutional holdings have a 
significant negative influence on the incidence of earnings management, while short-term 
institutional holdings have a positive influence (Habbash, 2010). Based on a sample of 859 
U.S. companies during the period 1986–2004, Charitou et al. (2007) looked at the earnings 
behaviour of managers during bankruptcy. They point out that the management of distressed 
companies with lower (higher) institutional ownership have greater (lesser) propensity to 
manipulate earnings downwards. Moreover, differential influences of institutional non-
blockholders and active institutional blockholders were investigated by Bushee (2001) who 
suggests that institutional non-blockholders are more concerned with short-run performance 
than are institutional blockholders and that this interest may put pressure on management to 
announce high earnings. 
 
In Australia, a study by Koh (2003) was undertaken to determine the relationship between 
institutional ownership and aggressive earnings management, based on a sample of 107 firms 
between 1993 and 1997. He provides evidence that there is a positive relationship between 
lower levels of institutional ownership and aggressive earnings management, and a negative 
relationship when the levels of institutional ownership are higher. Furthermore, Hsu and Koh 
(2005), based on a sample of 201 firm-year observations of years between 1993 and 1997, 
scrutinized the effectiveness of both short-term and long-term institutional ownership on 
levels of earnings management. They highlighted the fact that managerial ownership is 
statistically significant for all linear specifications but insignificant for non-linear models and 
concluded that short-term institutions are associated with income increasing while long-term 
institutional investors have a differential effect that restrains this activity.  
    
In the context of Spain, Osma and Noguer (2007) used a sample of 155 firm-year 
observations over the period 1999–2001 to examine whether corporate governance 
characteristics are effective in reducing earnings management using the Jones (1991) model to 
estimate earnings management. Unlike the UK and US where independent directors play an 
important role, they show that institutional directors play an important role in constraining 
earnings management.  
 
A study by Chung et al (2002) looked at the association between institutional ownership and 
earnings management practice and showed no relationship between institutional investors and 
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earnings management. This study used the Jones model (1995) to measure earnings 
management and this time employed signed earnings management (positive and negative).  
Overall, it can be observed that the strength of institutional shareholders underlines the 
magnitude of ownership stake playing a key role in monitoring and mitigating opportunistic 
management behaviour such as earnings management practices. In other words, a large 
percentage of institutional investors may be effective but this is not the case when the 
institutional ownership stake is low (Warfield et al, 2005). 
 
4.3.6 Ownership structure measurement  
Ownership structure is a type of monitoring mechanism employed by prior studies to 
investigate its effect on earnings management. The level of ownership structure is measured 
by different percentage and dummy variables. For example, some studies attempted to divide 
the percentage of ownership structure into a number of groups such as 3%, 5%, and 10% 
while other studies used dummy variables as control variables. However, the measurement of 
ownership structure shows contradictory findings that led some studies to seek another 
method such as non-linear analysis.        
 
4.4 EXTERNAL AUDITING FACTORS  
The previous sections have illustrated internal corporate governance and ownership structure 
as determinants of earnings management, while this section attempts to shed light on the role 
of external audit, as another determinant, in earnings management. Agency theory problems 
are concerned with the separation of ownership and control, along with information 
asymmetry between management and absentee owners, creating a demand for external 
auditing (Lin and Hwang, 2010). In other words, the external auditor plays an important role 
in verifying that financial reporting is fairly stated in conformity with GAAP and that this 
financial reporting also reflects the ‘true’ economic condition and operating findings of the 
entity. However, the quality of external audit is subjected to numerous guidelines and 
measures, such as the commitment of auditing standards, independence, competence, and 
exercise of due professional care. 
 
Recent financial scandals have increased the question of whether an external audit is effective 
in constraining earnings management and the wave of audit failure in the Capital Market has 
also increased concerns about audit quality (Velury, 2005). An external audit is an important 
instrument for shareholders, to ensure the transparency and credibility of financial reporting. 
Audit services may not ensure that falsified materials have been detected; however, the 
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amount of manipulation discovered depends on the quality of audit services. In addition, the 
quality of audit services depends on the experience of the auditor, their knowledge of the 
industry, and their independence. Such knowledge and experience will help the auditor to 
diagnose the complex issues in specific industries. According to agency theory, Gul et al. 
(2009) state that higher quality audits can restrain insiders' from abusing accounting-based 
contractual constraints and manipulating earnings as a result of the separation of ownership 
and control. The following sections will provide an overview of the literature that explains 
how external auditing can affect earnings management by using different factors or 
dimensions. 
 
4.4.1 Brand name and earnings management  
There is a growing body of research that has provided evidence for the use of auditor size 
(Big4) as a proxy for audit quality, including DeAngelo (1981), Hoitash et al (2007), Chen et 
al. (2005) and Dye (1993). More evidence has recently been revealed in the world that Big 
audit firms constitute a constraint on earnings management. For example, Lin and Hwang 
(2010) using various factors for audit quality (auditor size, industry specialist auditor, audit 
fees, auditor tenure), found that only Big4 auditors and industry specialist auditors have a 
significant negative relationship with earnings management. Moreover, Charles et al. (2010) 
investigated whether audit quality, as proxied by auditor size, can constrain earnings 
management practices in the US. They stressed that the manipulation of earnings is less likely 
to be managed with firms audited by Big4 auditors while clients with non-Big4 auditors show 
signs of manipulation.     
 
A study by Chen et al. (2005) adopting Big5 (now Big4) audit firms and industry specialist 
auditors for audit quality used a sample of Taiwan IPO firms from 1996-1998. They found 
that high audit quality plays a pivotal role in constraining earnings management and that Big5 
auditors provide high audit quality leading to the constraint of earnings management. 
However, the study could be criticized for not controlling ownership structure. Chan et al. 
(2007) tested agency theory and concluded that ownership structure plays an important role in 
affecting audit quality.  
 
Becker et al. (1998) using the Jones model as proxy for earnings management and Big6 
auditors (now Big4) as proxy for audit quality, collected a sample of 10,379 Big6 and 2,179 
non-Big6 firm years. They reported that companies audited by non-Big6 audit firms have 
higher discretionary accruals than companies audited by Big6 audit firms. Moreover, Behn et 
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al. (2008) looked at whether audit quality is related to the predictability of accounting 
earnings by concentrating on analyst earnings forecast properties and found that earnings 
forecast accuracy is more credible and forecast dispersion is smaller for companies audited by 
Big5 auditors and industry specialist auditors. 
 
Based on a sample consisting of all firms in the 1999 COMPUSTAT PC-Plus Active and 
research files during the 1983-1998 period, Kim et al. (2003) looked at whether, and how, 
audit effectiveness differentiation between Big6 and non-Big6 auditors is affected by a 
conflict or convergence of reporting incentives. They found that Big6 auditors are more 
effective in constraining income increasing than non-Big6 auditors.      
   
However, some studies indicate different findings regarding brand name. For example, using 
different data from the UK, France, and Germany, Maijoor and Vanstraelen (2006) indicate 
because of the differences of audit environment regimes across the European countries, the 
quality of international Big-4 may vary from country to other. Accordingly, this study argues 
that Saudi companies audited by Big4 are less likely to have higher discretionary accruals. 
 
4.4.2 Industry specialist auditors and earnings management  
 
Most prior studies suggest that industry specialist auditors play a pivotal role in providing 
high audit quality; therefore, the use of specialist auditors has increased recently in the 
business environment as a proxy for audit quality, since a specialist auditor should have 
practical experience acquired from auditing in a particular industry in addition to distinctive 
knowledge (Lowensohn et al. 2007). Healy and Lys (1986), Lennox (1999) and Colbert and 
Murray (1999) suggest that the variations between Big8 (now Big4) and non-Big8 audit firms 
lie in differences in specialization of services and in reputation. Moreover, Lim and Tan 
(2007) suggest that specialist auditors are more likely to be concerned with reputation losses 
and litigation exposure than non- specialists. Accordingly, the accounting literature attempts 
to investigate the relationship between industry specialist auditors and earnings management.        
Based on a sample of 4,422 clients audited by Big6 auditors from 1989 to 1998, Krishnan 
(2003) investigated the effect of industry specialist auditors on the level of earnings 
management. He stresses that absolute discretionary accruals are higher with firms audited by 
non-specialist audit firms than firms audited by specialist audit firms. A study conducted by 
Balsam et al. (2003) used a sample of 50,000 firm-year observations over the period between 
1991 and 1999 and measured earnings management by the modified Jones model. They 
concluded that firms dealing with industry specialist auditors have lower manipulation than 
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firms dealing with non-specialist auditors. Moreover, Chen et al. (2006) used a sample of 
Taiwan firms and found that industry specialist auditors reduce income-increasing earnings 
management. Based on a sample of 250 public firms that announced financial statement 
restatements, Bloomfield and Shackman (2008) investigated the association between industry 
specialist auditors and the incidence of financial statement restatements. It was observed that 
industry specialist auditors were associated with low incidences of financial statement 
restatements. In contrast, a study by Johl et al. (2007) found no significant relationship 
between auditor industry specialisation and abnormal accruals.  
     
It is noteworthy that prior studies have used two approaches to measure industry specialist 
auditors: the market share approach and the portfolio share approach. The market share 
approach describes an industry specialist as an audit firm that has a larger market share in 
comparison with other competitors in a particular industry. Therefore, a firm with the largest 
market share has enhanced its knowledge in a specific industry as well as reflecting important 
investment by developing that industry in particular audit technologies (Neal and Riley 2004; 
Lowensohn, et al. 2007). In addition, Mayhew and Wilkins (2003) confirm that large market 
share firms are capable of enhancing more industry-specific knowledge and expertise which 
leads to a higher quality service than small market share firms. Audit firms are considered as 
specialists in industry when they have the largest market share based on clients’ sales or the 
number of clients audited by the firm. The justification for the market share approach is that 
the largest market share audit firm can develop its knowledge in an industry and enhance its 
understanding of sensitive issues relating to that industry. The portfolio share approach 
emerged after market share and is based on the relative distribution of audit services and is 
related to audit fees; therefore, this approach gives consideration to an audit firm’s share of 
audit fees in an industry (Neal and Riley, 2003). This means that the approach view audit firm 
specializes in those industries which generate the most fees (revenues) relative to its practices 
(Lowensohn, et al. 2007). Market share is the appropriate approach for this study since the 
alternative cannot be used because of lack of disclosure in Saudi Arabia regarding audit fees. 
Thus, this study argues that companies using specialist auditors are less likely to have higher 
discretionary accruals.   
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4.4.3 Auditor opinion and earnings management   
An auditor report aims to express an independent opinion verifying that financial reporting is 
fairly stated in conformity with GAAP and that this financial reporting also reflects the ‘true’ 
economic condition and operating findings of the entity. Thus, the auditor report is considered 
as the final phase or outcome of an audit examination that the auditor uses to convey a 
message regarding a company’s stance (Porter et al., 2003). According to Saudi auditing 
standards, the auditor issues an unqualified report when they consider the audited financial 
statements to provide a true and fair view in line with the financial reporting framework. 
However, the auditor will issue a modified report depending on the circumstances and the 
effect of materiality. 
 
Past studies on auditors’ reports have focused on the association between auditor opinion and 
the incidence of earnings management. In other words, they investigate the effect of 
unqualified and qualified opinion on discretionary accruals. For example, based on data 
collected from the Chinese stock market, a study undertaken by Chen at al. (2001) concluded 
that firms with modified auditor opinion have a tendency to manage earnings. Likewise, 
Bartov et al. (2001) suggest that modified auditor opinion is associated with the level of 
absolute abnormal accruals. Moreover, Bradshaw et al. (2001) indicate that there is a 
relationship between modified auditor opinion and discretionary accruals. Herbohn and 
Ragunathan (2008) used a sample of all Australian companies over the period 1999-2003 and 
found a negative relationship between accruals and opinion modifications.   
 
In contrast, a number of studies have shown there to be no association between auditor 
opinion and level of earnings management. For example, Butler et al. (2004) claim that 
discretionary accruals or earnings management is not associated with modified auditor 
opinion. His explanation is that the auditor expresses his opinion with modified report 
according to circumstances such as scope limitation, material uncertainty, and disagreement 
with managers, rather than the incidence of earnings management. Moreover, they suggest 
that large negative accruals may stem from financial problems rather than an intention to 
manipulate earnings. Accordingly, this study argues that companies with an unqualified 
auditor opinion are less likely to have high discretionary accruals. 
 
4.4.4 Auditor change and earnings management  
Change in auditor has been paid considerable attention by both regulators and academics. The 
regulators’ concern has increased since management might change auditors for opportunistic 
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reasons which will enable them to accomplish their objective (Davidson et al 2006). 
Theoretically, Francis and Wilson (1988) argue that agency costs may sometimes lead to a 
decision to switch auditor and be affected by different factors. According to DeFond and 
Jiambalvo (1993), most cases of auditor change occur as a result of disagreement when the 
auditor insists on applying specific accounting methods. Kluger and Shields (1991) state that 
managers may attempt to change auditor in order to delay or suppress the announcement of 
unfavourable information. They conclude that most companies that have financial problems 
have changed auditors to obtain a more cooperative auditor. Accordingly, auditor change has 
been used as an indicator for audit quality. In other words, previous studies suggest that 
changing auditors signifies a lower quality audit and a greater likelihood of earnings 
management (Habbash, 2010). 
 
Based on a sample of 1,132 auditor changes from 1993 to 1997, Davidson et al (2006) 
highlight the fact that incidences of earnings management are greater for firms that switch 
from Big6 auditors to non-Big 6 auditors following the receipt of a modified audit opinion 
from their primary auditor. A study conducted by Kluger and Shields (1991) stresses that 
companies have a propensity to change auditor prior to going bankrupt because they are not 
able to suppress unfavourable information. Even in cases in which the change can be 
conceived as a type of improvement of audit quality, Romanus et al. (2008) conclude that 
switching from a non-specialist auditor to a specialist auditor raises the likelihood of 
restatement and vice versa despite their findings supporting the first prediction that using a 
specialist auditor is more likely to reduce the likelihood of restatement. Based on a sample 
collected from 403 firms which changed their auditors during the period from 1990 to 1993, 
DeFond and Subramanyam (1998) reported that earnings management was higher during the 
last year with the first auditor.  
 
In general, auditor change is also an effective factor of audit quality and is used as proxy for 
audit quality. For example, DeAngelo (1981) states that a change of auditor is associated with 
low audit fees. The current study argues that managers may switch auditors to enable them to 
manage opportunistic behaviour by abusing the unfamiliarity of the new auditor with the 
firm's business. Accordingly, auditor change may be associated with high earnings 
management.    
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4.4.5 Timeliness and earnings management  
Timeliness is measured by the number of days from the end of the fiscal year to the audit 
report date; an inordinate period, which is defined as audit delay, reflects the quality of 
financial reporting by not presenting timely information to shareholders. Givoly and Palmon 
(1982) highlight that audit lag is the single most pivotal determinant of timeliness in earnings 
announcement, which in turn, determines the market reaction to earnings announcement. 
Knechel and Payne (2001) assert that lower quality information may stem from an unexpected 
reporting lag. 
 
Based on a sample of 628 Malaysian companies in 2002, Mohamed-Naimi et al. (2010) found 
that active and large audit committees are able to shorten audit lag, which leads to enhancing 
communications with auditors and financial reporting. Likewise, a study conducted by Tanyi 
et al. (2010) found that companies that change their auditors have a higher audit report lag. 
Habib and Bhuiyan (2011) using regression analysis with two different definitions of industry 
specialization found that audit lag is shorter with firms audited by specialist auditors.. 
Therefore, this study argues that long audit lag may stem from disagreement or argument 
between managers and auditors arising from earnings management.  
 
4.4.6 Measurement of external audit factors  
As audit quality is unobserved and influenced by a number of factors, it is not surprising that 
prior studies have employed different measures to proxy for the performance of external 
audit. Overall, researchers have used different proxies for audit quality such as auditor brand 
name (auditor size), industry specialization, auditor tenure, audit fees, and provision of 
services related to auditor’s job such as audit time or related to financial reporting such as 
audit report (Lin and Hwang, 2010). Since many of the above proxies fail to report findings, 
many studies attempt to find beneficial proxies for audit quality. 
 
4.5 SUMMARY AND GAP IN LITERATURE  
This chapter has provided a brief discussion of the literature on monitoring mechanisms, both 
external and internal, in relation to earnings management. The agency theory presents a basis 
for the governance of firms via different internal and external mechanisms. These 
mechanisms are designed to ensure agent-principal interest alignment, protect shareholder 
interests and thus reduce agency cost.  
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Internal corporate governance may be attributed to ownership structure and board and sub-
committees composition. In order to understand such mechanisms, previous studies have 
viewed the board as the main body of monitoring mechanisms because the board of directors 
is responsible for monitoring managerial actions, particularly those related to performance, 
financial disclosure, and tasks delegated to sub-committees. Moreover, audit committees and 
other committees are in charge with ensuring of the integrity of financial reporting, internal 
control, and external audits.  On the other hand, previous studies have depicted ownership as 
entrenchment of internal corporate governance because it constitutes a proportion of equity 
held among the relevant parties. Accordingly, a highly-concentrated ownership structure may 
mitigate the agency problem since ownership structure is proved to have influence over board 
and sub-committees’ composition. Generally, internal corporate governance may be proactive 
if firms have strong support from regulators and superior accounting standards, but if not 
corporate governance may be meaningless. 
 
In addition, the external audit constitutes external mechanisms since it is characterized as 
having expertise and independence to report on companies' status. Since audit quality is 
unobserved, prior studies have used effective detriments of the external audit to measure audit 
quality such as Big firm auditors, industry specialization, auditor tenure, audit time, audit 
fees, audit delay, and auditor change. Evidence has recently been revealed that Big audit firms 
constitute a constraint on earnings management. Moreover, prior studies have suggested that 
industry specialist auditors play a pivotal role in providing high audit quality therefore the use 
of specialist auditors has increased recently in the business environment as a proxy for audit 
quality since a specialist auditor should have practical experience acquired from auditing in a 
particular industry, in addition to distinctive knowledge. In terms of audit opinion, prior 
studies have suggested that firms with modified auditor opinion have a tendency to manage 
earnings. Change in auditor has been paid considerable attention by both regulators and 
academics. Regulators are concerned as management might change auditor for opportunistic 
reasons which will enable them to accomplish their objective. Finally, timeliness is measured 
by the number of days from the end of the fiscal year to the audit report date; an inordinate 
period, which is defined as audit delay, reflects the quality of financial reporting by not 
presenting timely information to shareholders.  
 
In general, a review of the previous literature shows that the Middle East region has not been 
given attention regarding the effect of internal corporate governance on earnings 
management. Although prior studies have focused on board and audit committee 
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characteristics, little is known about the effect of remuneration and nomination committees on 
earnings management. Even less is known about the effects which have not directly been 
examined. As has been observed, the examination of the role of internal corporate governance 
shows that quantitative methods, such as the regression method, only provide results in terms 
of positive or negative relationship but do not provide appropriate solutions that can be 
obtained from qualitative methods. Moreover, the accuracy of measuring earnings 
management is still being debated; for example, Butler et al. (2004) suggest that large 
negative accruals may stem from financial problems rather than an intention to manipulate 
earnings. Thus, this study will also contribute to the literature by providing a perception of the 
role of internal corporate governance in mitigating earnings management. 
      
Despite extensive studies, there is little consensus on how ownership structure affects 
earnings management. Moreover, the literature review shows that, to the best of my 
knowledge, to date no study has attempted to investigate the impact of ownership structure on 
earnings management in the Middle East. In addition, this thesis is characterized as having a 
qualitative method that has not been applied by previous research in order to investigate the 
effect of ownership structure on earnings management.  
 
Furthermore, a large number of studies have examined the effect of using different proxies for 
audit quality on earnings management. However, from the review of the literature, it is clear 
that the Middle East region has not received attention. This study will also contribute to the 
literature by examining the effect of audit lag on earnings management. Some criticism of the 
use of proxies of audit quality and earnings management has emerged in some of the studies. 
For example, Balsam et al., (2003) stress that audit quality is multidimensional and inherently 
unobservable and no single auditor characteristic can be used to proxy for it. Moreover, 
Francis (2004, p.360) who criticizes most proxies for audit quality states that “we do not 
know if the US evidence on audit quality generalizes to audits in other countries that have 
different legal systems and particularly to non-common-law countries with weaker investor 
protection and less ability to sue auditors for negligence and misconduct”. In terms of 
earnings management, Butler et al. (2004) suggest that large negative accruals may stem from 
financial problems rather than an intention to manipulate earnings. Accordingly, in addition to 
the database, this study will contribute to the literature using questionnaires and interviews to 
obtain a deep understanding of the role of the external audit on constraining earnings 
management .           
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                                                       Chapter Five: 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION:      
 
Chapter two presented background information about Saudi Arabia and the corporate 
governance framework in the Kingdom; in addition, it attempted to provide a clear overview 
of the nature of the professional audit market and the regulations that regulate the stock 
exchange. Accordingly, it appears that the development of corporate governance is another 
intricate area associated with several factors such as regulation, culture, religion, ownership 
structure and as Mallin (2007, p: 263) suggested. Notwithstanding the fact that corporate 
governance was established to regulate and develop the Saudi capital market in order to 
increase the credibility and transparency of financial reporting, the interplay between 
principals and agents is an intricate balance of agency, empowerment, stewardship and 
responsibilities. Theoretically, agents are motivated by the nature of their relationship with 
principals and that plays a significant role in improving performance. However, several 
factors may lead to manipulation, regardless of the kind of relationship between principals 
and their agents, such as pressure, opportunity and ethics (Albrecht et al. 2004). Therefore, 
the kind of relationship between principals and their agents may reduce manipulation but 
cannot eradicate it.  
  
The theoretical framework of the current study enables the researcher and the reader to see 
how the findings are accurately related to the research questions and hypotheses. In other 
words, it plays a significant role in the explanation or justification of the link between what 
the researcher expected, and the findings. However, the theory used may be refined, modified 
or even rejected based on the results produced (Champers, 1996). Corporate governance is 
considered to be the heart of the current study; thus, this chapter aims to explain potential 
theories related to corporate governance and earnings management practices. However, this 
study will rely on the agency theory-institutional theory which fits with the nature and scope 
of the empirical work. This chapter is organised as follows: Section 5.2 illustrates theories of 
corporate governance. Section 5.3 explains the positive theory and capital market efficiency. 
Section 5.4 provides the conclusion. 
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5.2 THEORIES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE     
 
On the subject of corporate governance as an accounting topic, a number of theories have 
been used in the literature to explain its role. Certain theories offering a relevant framework to 
explain the effect of corporate governance might be more appropriate and relevant to some 
environments than others and can vary from country to country (Mallin, 2007). Generally, the 
prime theories employed by prior studies and dominant theories which have mainly 
influenced the advancement of corporate governance are: agency theory, stakeholder theory, 
stewardship theory and institutional theory (Mallin, 2007) and the evident distinction between 
the perspectives of these theories lies in two elements: property rights and corporations’ 
objectives (Hoque, 2006).  
 
Agency theory concentrates on the relationship between the principal (owners) and agents 
(management) who are given the authority to manage the principal’s interests and make 
beneficial decisions. Stewardship theory is designed as an alternative theory for researchers to 
investigate situations where management as stewards are motivated to act in the best interests 
of owners (Clark, 2004). According to stakeholder theory, society expects corporations to 
behave in a manner which is beneficial in terms of their social or economic role, while 
institutional theory is designed to obtain perceptions in organizational change and accounting 
practices. Moreover, Mallin (2007), who is concerned with corporate governance studies, 
summarises, according to her view, how the potential theories affect corporate governance, 
including agency, institutional, stakeholder, class hegemony, and managerial hegemony.  
        
Managerial hegemony contradicts agency theory on the grounds that the board of directors is 
ineffective in performing its monitoring duties since the management dominates board matters 
(Abdul Rahman and Ali (2006). Mallin (2007) highlights that “management of a company, 
with its knowledge of day to day operations, may effectively dominate the directors and hence 
weaken the influence of directors”.  
 
In terms of class hegemony theory, directors see themselves as the elite at the top of the firm 
and will recruit or promote new directors according to how well new appointments might fit 
into the elite (Mallin, 2007). Additionally, Corbetta and Salvato (2004) argue that, according 
to class hegemony “board role will be increasingly to perpetuate elite and class power, rather 
than to provide genuinely diverse resources and insights”. 
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Resource dependency theory, similar to institutional theory, is concerned with the relationship 
between an organization and a set of actors in the environment (Sherer and Lee, 2002). In 
addition, it assumes that organizational choice is limited by multiple external pressures and 
that organizations are interested in building legitimacy and acceptance vis-a-vis external 
stakeholders (Sherer and Lee, 2002). Moreover, resource dependency theory concentrates on 
a firm’s need to access resources from other actors in the environment and explain how 
shortages of resources force them to pursue new innovations that adapt alternative 
organizations resources (Hessels and Terjesen, 2008). 
 
Despite the fact that a review of previous studies in the Literature chapter pointed out that 
there is no consensus in the literature regarding theoretical base for research on corporate 
governance, the literature debate indicates that a large number of studies have employed 
agency theory in their examination of the relationship between corporate governance 
mechanisms, earnings management and external auditing. The rationale of this domination is 
that corporate governance mechanisms, earnings management and external audit represent 
types of agency cost that take various forms such as monitoring cost, bonding cost and 
residual cost.  
 
Based on the above discussion, a number of theories have affected the development of 
corporate governance; Figure (5.1) summarises the theories that may be associated with the 
development of corporate governance. However, the main theories that have affected the 
development of corporate governance and the relevant theories adopted in the current study 
will be discussed in the following section. 
  
Figure (5.1) Summary of common theories affecting corporate governance   
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5.2.1 Agency Theory 
Agency theory has been widely employed by scholars in various academic areas such as 
accounting, economics, finance, marketing, political science and sociology (Clark, 2004). 
Primarily, an agency relationship originates from the separation between ownership and 
management or control, when one or more principals engage another person as their agent to 
perform services on their behalf (ICAEW, 2005). Thus, the emergence of the agency theory 
approach has been utilized to describe the relationship within organizations. The theory 
concentrates on the relationship between the principal (owners) and agents (management) 
who are given the authority to manage the principal’s interests and make beneficial decisions. 
 
On the other hand, the principal requires information which is used to evaluate the 
performance. This can result in problems of information asymmetry, which leads to agency 
problems such as: moral hazard and adverse selection (Hoque, 2006), which stems from the 
fact that managers may act in their own interests to maximize their personal wealth. This may 
be because they have personal goals that compete with those of shareholders (Davidson et al., 
2004). 
 
Jensen (1993) suggests that moral hazard is caused by different factors such as firm size and 
its complexity leading to difficulty in monitoring which increases agency costs. Furthermore, 
the agents may also be affected by factors such as financial rewards, labour market 
opportunities, and their relationship with other parties who are not related to the owners’ 
interests (Shapiro, 2005). This leads to the creation of a conflict of interests between the 
principals and their agents. 
 
However, principals can protect their interests by establishing appropriate incentives for the 
agents and by incurring monitoring costs designed to limit the irregular activities of agents. 
Establishing other devices, such as corporate governance mechanisms and external auditing, 
which monitor management behaviour, leads to agency costs which originate from many 
sources such as the costs of employment, consultations, controlling systems and monitoring, 
moral risks, shirking, stealing (earnings management), bonding, and providing incentives, 
since principals are not able to observe agent behaviour (Shapiro, 2005). Therefore, these 
mechanisms might lead an agent to change his behaviour in order to appear of good character. 
Additionally, according to this theory, greater ownership is considered a type of mechanism 
that can assist the board in increasing its mentoring effectiveness (Yen et al., 2007).      
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The separation between ownership and management does not come without costs (Depken, 
2006). In Saudi Arabia, the agency costs of listed companies may result from conflicts 
between owner-manager relationships. However, the agency costs may also come from the 
conflict between the minority and the majority of shareholders. In fact, there is no clear 
evidence concerning the issues of agency relationship in the Saudi environment because of the 
shortage of studies in this area and because of the modern emergence of corporate 
governance. It could be argued that conflicts of agency relationship may be fewer and weaker 
in developing countries such as  Saudi Arabia between the principals and agents. According to 
Clark (2004) collectivism is a dimension of the relationship between principals and agents in 
Asia, South America and Southern Europe. However, the conflict between the majority of 
shareholders and the minority can be made stronger.  
 
In summing up, agency problems are mitigated by a number of actions that include 
monitoring behaviour or even supplying a catalyst to boost the behaviour toward owners’ 
interest. Hoque (2006) highlights that these actions are defined by agency cost which is 
divided into three categories: 
 
1- Monitoring costs: A number of studies such as Denis et al (1997) and Deegan (2000) 
define monitoring cost as the costs which stem from the agent’s monitoring behaviour, 
such as corporate governance structure cost, external auditing cost or any action which 
might curb opportunistic behaviour. 
2- Bonding costs: The costs which are associated with aligning the agent’s interest with 
the principal’s interest, such as compensation or any reward structure that mitigates 
opportunistic behaviour. In other words, managers are bonding themselves to prepare 
financial reporting.  
3- Residual costs: These are defined as all costs incurred as a result of dispute between 
agent and principal’s interest apart from bonding and monitoring cost. Cleary, the 
residual costs stem from inequality between the monitoring cost and bonding cost 
(Iskander, 2008).           
                                                         
Earnings management is defined as the exploitation of the flexibility of accounting principles 
to affect the reported earnings by making them appear greater or smaller (Davidson, et al. 
2004). On the other hand, it is believed that management discretions are related to agency 
problems which can occur when managers are not capable of operating the company for the 
shareholders. For instance, the Enron and WorldCom scandals show the importance of the 
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discretion of management who could cause harm to shareholders by abusing their position. 
(Davidson et al. 2004). Jiraporn et al., (2008) found that management manipulates earnings in 
firms when agency costs are lower. Davidson et al. (2004) also confirm that earnings 
management might be a type of agency cost if the management provides financial reporting 
that does not present accurate information. Even though several prior studies have classified 
earnings management as a type of agency cost, there is no evidence up to now to explain 
earnings management as a type of agency cost. However, these might be residual costs.                  
   
The corporate finance literature shows many techniques by which agency conflict can be cut 
in order to reduce agency costs. These techniques might be identified between internal 
mechanisms such as compensation contracts, bonding costs, monitoring activities and external 
mechanisms such as monitoring activities by a capital market authority, regulator or external 
audit (Shapiro, 2005). The main objective of these mechanisms is to align the goals of owners 
with the goals of management. Corporate governance is an internal mechanism strategy used 
to monitor management and reduce agency costs. McKnight and Weir (2009) confirm that 
corporate governance mechanisms reduce agency costs. On the other hand, auditing is a vital 
mechanism that plays a significant role in serving the interests of shareholders and the public 
to strengthen accountability and bolster trust and confidence in financial reporting (ICAEW, 
2005). Principals will hire external auditors who are engaged as agents under contract and are 
expected to be independent of agents who manage the company. According to agency theory,  
monitoring should be neutral (independent) and not have any conflict of benefit with the 
corporation or its management (Culpan and Trussel, 2005). The role of external auditing is to 
reduce agency costs; more explicitly this role is to cut information asymmetry in financial 
reporting (Piot, 2001). Watts and Zimmerman (1983) confirm that successful external 
auditing will undermine the opportunistic behaviour cost (agency cost) generated by 
management. In general, agency theory recognizes auditing as the most important monitoring 
mechanism that regulates conflict of interest and reduces agency costs. For example, Shapiro 
(2005) believes that regulators may create mechanisms which monitor the agency relationship 
between principals and their agents, such as corporate governance mechanisms and external 
auditing, which lead to agency costs. As a result of monitoring, good corporate governance 
mechanisms and high audit quality can decrease opportunities for managers to pursue self-
interest at the expense of owners and therefore principals will obtain beneficial returns. 
 
In terms of ownership structure, Gogineni et al. (2010) found that agency costs increase as 
firms move from a single owner/single manager ownership structure to more complicated 
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ownership structures and suggest that agency costs are significantly higher when firms are not 
managed by owners. This idea is consistent with Holderness (2007) who states that as the 
number and types of shareholders increase the incentive for any shareholder to sustain all of 
the monitoring costs decreases since the benefits associated with monitoring are proportional 
to the shareholder’s ownership stake. Moreover, Li (1994) found that ownership structure has 
a significant influence over corporate governance practices. Henry (2010) suggests that good 
internal governance structure lowers the level of agency costs and that internal governance 
and external shareholding effects are substitute agency-mitigating mechanisms. Pagano and 
Roell (1998) state that optimal dispersion of share ownership can be accomplished by going 
public which leads to large external shareholders who may monitor management closely. 
McKnight and Weir (2009) found that board ownership helps to reduce agency cost.  
 
Agency theory may be suitable for developed countries; however, ownership structure theory 
is probably appropriate for developing countries in terms of explaining a firm’s agency cost, 
where family ownership is highly concentrated (Pornuptham, 2006). This theory explains the 
proportion of equity held among relevant parties (i.e. outside shareholders, debtholders, and 
managers) and is associated with the extent and direction of EM (Dempsey et al., 1993).   
 
Figure (5.2) Theoretical Explanation of Interaction of CG, EA, and EM 
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opportunism. The effect of agency theory on corporate governance studies can be observed in 
prior studies which provide contradictory results in the examination of the relationship 
between corporate governance mechanisms, earnings management, and audit quality. 
Therefore, using agency theory as a framework to explain how corporate governances and 
external auditing reduce earnings management is an appropriate approach for the current 
study. Figure 5.2 shows how agency theory can be applied to understand and interpret the 
relationship between corporate governance, external auditing and earnings management. The 
use of this theory in interpreting earnings management practices has been employed by prior 
studies; however, it may not cover all earnings management incentives.     
 
5.2.2 Stewardship Theory: 
In comparison with agency theory, stewardship theory, based on psychology and sociology 
literature, maintains that the interests of corporate executives as stewards are aligned with the 
organization and its owners (Albrecht et al. 2004). It is designed for researchers to investigate 
situations where management, as stewards, are motivated to act in the best interests of owners 
(Clark, 2004). Clearly, the behaviour of stewardship is collective since the steward aims to 
achieve the objectives of the organization. Generally, there is a relationship between the 
success of an organization and the owners' satisfaction and the role of the steward to balance 
between personal needs and the organization’s objectives given that management (stewards) 
will increase their interests as they attain organizational, rather than self-serving objectives.  
 
Under this theory the management which is not opportunistic wishes to perform a beneficial 
role as that of a good company steward. In addition, this theory predicts that there are no 
inherent issues of executive motivation (Donaldson and Davis, 1991). Primarily, the notion is 
that insider directors are better at increasing shareholders’ wealth since they have adequate 
acquaintance and explicit understanding of the business. According to this theory, the board 
of directors is considered as a means of assistance to a steward CEO rather than a controlling 
means (Albrecht et al. 2004). Although management is less likely to manipulate earnings, the 
problem lies in to what extent the management aspires to attain a good corporate performance. 
Moreover, management will not act to align their interests with shareholders in all cases. 
Choo and Tan (2007) claim that, psychologically, a board’s lack of executive experience 
might be a catalyst for managers to commit fraud. Albrecht et al. (2004) also highlight the 
fact that a relationship between principal and agent that is based on stewardship may provide 
opportunities for management to commit fraud.  
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Despite the differences between stewardship theory and agency theory, several studies have 
suggested that there is a need for both stewardship theory and agency theory in the 
explanation of management (Clark, 2004). For example, Muth and Donaldson, (1998) 
confirm that stewardship theory is used as an alternative to agency theory which expresses an 
opposing view of the structure of corporate governance mechanisms. Moreover, Lam and Lee, 
(2008) suggest that using agency theory or stewardship theory alone in the examination of 
duality and performance does not adequately explain the effect.   
 
In conclusion, stewardship theory attempts to find the explanation and solutions to the 
principal-agent relationships since the perception of agency might not apply in all situations. 
Stewardship theory is a substitute model of managerial behaviour and motivation that comes 
from psychology and sociological pattern (Clark, 2004). Common distinctions between 
agency theory and stewardship theory which lie in several factors such as motivation, 
identification, and use of power, are presented by Clark, (2004).  
      
Table (5.1) Differences between Stewardship Theory and Agency Theory 
  
Agency theory Stewardship theory 
Behaviour Individual Collective 
Motivation  Extrinsic value Intrinsic value 
Governance Monitoring Trust 
Time frame  Short term Long term 
Power  High power Low power  
 
 
 
5.2.3 Stakeholder Theory 
Corporate scandals have increased the need for a range of theoretical perspectives to 
understand the complexity of corporate governance mechanisms and the role of audit quality 
as well as the motivations for earnings management.  In comparison with agency–stewardship 
theory, which solely focuses on the relationship between shareholders (principal) and 
management (agent), stakeholder theory, which is not less important than owners’ rights, is 
interested in a wider group of constituents rather than concentrating on one group (Mallin, 
2004; Nasi, 1995). The concept of this theory is that society expects beneficial behaviour of 
corporations in terms of their social or economic role. Thus, firms with weaker stakeholder 
performance may face difficulties in gaining important support and resources for their 
business (Hoque, 2006). Historically, the shift away from the framework of shareholder to 
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stakeholder model was identified in the late 20
th
 century and used in the 1930s by General 
Electric Company which promoted stakeholders’ benefits in order to find a way of surviving 
the financial crisis (Letza et al., 2004).                                                                                   
 
Back in the 1930s, the new concept of this theory was presented as a separate company theory 
(Hoque, 2006) since a numbers of questions were raised about it in terms of how to define a 
stakeholder, how to align their interests and how to define the firm’s objectives from its 
stakeholders’ perspective (Sternberg, 1997). On the whole, the common criticism of this 
theory was that it was difficult to align the conflict of the stakeholder with the difficulties 
resulting from how to administer different stakeholders with various needs and demands and 
how to treat all stakeholders equally (Hoque, 2006).                                                                                                          
   
Numerous attempts have been made by prior studies to identify stakeholder groups. For 
instance, Clarkson (1995) divided stakeholders into two groups: the primary group, which 
includes customers, employees, creditors, providers and government, which is given priority 
because of its intrinsic role of organisation. The secondary group, which is not considered 
crucial for organization comprises media, environmentalists and the consumer. Mitchell et al 
(1997) divided stakeholders in terms of power, urgency, perspective and legitimacy. This 
model ranks stakeholders into eight groups according to the importance of each group. 
Benson and Davidson (2009), who divided the stakeholder theory into two approaches: 
strategic approach and moral approach, suggest that the issue of this theory is how the 
stakeholder can be identified, and resources can be allocated. Moreover, if a firm provides 
more resources to stakeholders, the shareholder may suffer. Donaldson and Preston (1995) 
also examined the three types of stakeholder theory and found that they are mutually 
supportive and the normative base of theory has fundamentally been a modern theory of 
property rights.                                                                                                                  
     
The proponents of this theory argue that the rationale of paying attention to these groups is 
twofold: first, it can be argued that their demands have vital value; therefore, the firm has an 
important role to fulfil its responsibilities toward their legitimate claims. Second, the 
profitability of a firm can be improved by recognizing the stakeholders’ interests (Ayuso, 
2009).                                                                                                   
      
Proponents of this approach also conceive that it can contribute to extending the scope of 
accountability (Gray et al., 1997). They also argue that whether the company is small or large 
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it can ignore the reality of dealing within economic or social activities involving the public. 
Lee (1998) describes weak management who avoid the public aspects of the operation of 
firms further, stating that recent scandals have not just affected single shareholders, but rather 
every single stakeholder has suffered. Thus, different corporate governance structures and 
monitoring mechanisms may be favoured by stakeholders. This means that stakeholders may 
play a significant role in affecting monitoring mechanisms by being outside directors (Mallin, 
2007). 
                                                         .                                                                                                                                                                    
Alpaslan et al. (2009) suggests that crises can be contained when a firm has a robust 
relationship with its stakeholders; hence, the stakeholder model may be a more beneficial 
corporate governance model for a firm not just in difficult situations but also in more complex 
crises. Therefore, corporations should take into account all stakeholders’ interests and treat 
them equally.                                                                                        
 
On the one hand, stakeholder theory has been censured by proponents of agency theory based 
on several points. Sternberg (1997) suggests that the stakeholder approach, which is 
incompatible with intrinsic objectives, is not fundamentally able to provide better corporate 
governance and financial corporate performance. She argues that balancing stakeholder 
interests is not likely to be successful and its accountability is unjustified. Moreover, 
stakeholder theory vitiates property rights and accountability. However, his criticisms do not 
mean that there is no legitimacy for employing the concept of stakeholder theory. Moreover, 
Etzioni (1998) suggests that it is not likely for all stakeholders to be effectively represented in 
corporate governance; if they were the welfare of the company could be undermined.                                                                              
   
According to agency and stakeholder theories, the behaviour of managers, as agents, should 
be in the interest of the principal: either shareholders or stakeholders. Thus, unbiased authors, 
such as Hill and Jones (1992), have attempted to reconcile agency theory and stakeholder 
theory by constructing a paradigm called stakeholders-agency theory. This paradigm is 
considered as a modification of agency theory, combining efficiency of market and power 
differential between managers and stakeholders. Additionally it concentrates on the conflict 
between managers and stakeholders. Culpan and Trussel (2005) confirm that agency theory is 
beneficial in clarifying the dimensions of unethical practices in accounting and financial 
issues, while stakeholder theory is useful in explaining the unethical practices which damage 
employees, creditors, investors, government and society.                                                        
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The link between stakeholder theory and earnings management is presented by Hoque (2006) 
who illustrates that managers may manipulate earnings in order to improve their private 
interests at the expense of shareholders and other stakeholders. Thus, agency theory and 
stakeholder theory offer a beneficial foundation for research into the connection between 
earnings management and corporate social responsibility. He also states that under the 
agency–stakeholder approach stakeholders can monitor managers by offering their resources 
in order to fulfil needs. Mattingly et al. (2009) also found that good corporate governance; 
earnings quality and low earnings management are associated with an organisation’s 
stakeholder management.  However, in terms of audit quality, Baker et al. (1992) concluded 
that the role of external auditing as a monitoring mechanism should be increased, not only for 
shareholders’ benefit but also for the interests of all stakeholders and society.   
                                                                                                 
In summary, the integration of agency and stakeholder theory highlights the special role of 
management towards all stakeholders. Moreover, information asymmetry between 
management and other stakeholders increases the manager’s role to comprise responsibility of 
safeguarding the welfare of multiple stakeholders to accomplish this aim.      
 
                                                                                                                                   
 
Table (5.2) Differences between Stakeholder Theory and Agency Theory 
 
Agency theory Stakeholder theory 
Objective Maximizing shareholder 
wealth 
Multiplying objectives of 
parties with different interest 
Governance structure Managers are agent of 
shareholders 
Team production model 
Governance Monitoring Coordination, cooperation 
and conflict resolution 
Performance metrics Shareholder value sufficient 
to maintain investors’ 
commitment 
Fair distribution of value 
created to maintain 
commitment of multiple 
stakeholders 
Residual hazard holder Shareholders All Stakeholders 
Source: Ayuso (2009) 
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5.2.4 Institutional Theory 
Institutional theory which has been developed within management studies is a common theory 
applied generally in social science studies and notably in accounting literature (Scott, 1995). 
Institutional theory is interested in working on an economic phenomenon within its entire 
surrounding environment that comprises social, political, cultural, religious, civilization and 
technological factors. Recently, different types of institutional theory (old institutional 
economics (OIE), new institutional (NIE) or transaction cost economics and new institutional 
sociology (NIS) have been utilized to obtain perceptions in organizational change and 
accounting practices. In respect of this research, it might be helpful to summarize the nature 
of two types of institutional theory that are conceived to be relevant to the research topic.                    
                                                                                            
5.2.4. 1 New institutional sociology (NIS)                                                
As mentioned earlier, institutional theory has been used frequently in management accounting 
and is relevant to researchers who seek voluntary corporate reporting practices since it has a 
role in providing a complementary approach to both stakeholder theory and legitimacy theory 
(Clark, 2004). It is concerned with explaining mechanisms by which organizations may seek 
to align perceptions of their practices and characteristics with social and cultural values in 
order to obtain legitimacy (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). These mechanisms, which 
encompass a wide range of legitimacy mechanisms, may be proposed by both stakeholder 
theory and legitimacy theory (Clark, 2004).                                                                                                                                     
                                                                       
According to new institutional sociology theory, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) established 
three different isomorphics and suggested that firms embrace various rules or practices 
because of “coercive”, “mimetic” or “normative” isomorphism. Coercive isomorphism occurs 
when organizations change their institutional practices solely due to pressure from 
stakeholders (Meyer and Rowan, 1977).The second isomorphism process presented by 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) is mimetic isomorphism. This involves organizations 
endeavouring to imitate or enhance the institutional practices of other organizations for 
reasons such as competitive advantage in terms of legitimacy. The final isomorphism is 
normative isomorphism which is related to the pressure from group norms to adopt notable 
institutional practices (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Clark, 2004). In this case, professional 
expectation that accounts will comply with accounting standards acts as a form of normative 
isomorphism for the organization shaped by accounting standards.             
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According to this theory, corporate governance is viewed as change in organizational 
processes over time and how governance structures “fulfil ritualistic roles that help legitimize 
the interactions between the various actors within the corporate governance mosaic” (Cohen 
et al. 2007). It comprises pressures implemented to adhere to corporate governance 
regulations by regulators or stock exchanges. This leads some organizations to implement 
corporate governance recommendations, such as a more independent board and the 
establishment of an audit committee.       
   
The primary aim of corporate governance is to confirm that a corporation is bound to an 
environment by elucidating and defining its goals which should accommodate the 
expectations of the environment (Judge et al., 1985). Therefore, according to institutional 
theory, corporate governance should entail defining the organizational aims of the corporation 
in the context of an existing value system within the firm. 
 
Institutional theory argues that historical, social and political problems that are relevant to 
understanding organizational changes should be addressed for the adoption or rejection of a 
new system or regulation (Cohen et al. 2007). Thus, corporate governance as a new system 
will succeed to the extent that there is broad congruence between the new rules and existing 
routines in the corporation (Yazdifar, 2003).                               
 
Stedham, and Beekun (2000) assert that, according to institutional theory, the board of 
directors has two primary roles: linkage and administration. In the linkage role, the board of 
directors is interested in establishing a relationship between the corporation and the external 
environment; however, in the administrative role, the board of directors is concerned with 
overseeing the performance of top management, in particular the CEO.  
 
On the other hand, institutional pressure leads organizations to adopt similar processes 
through the need to manage in a way that is similar to other organizations in the same 
environment (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Therefore, these characteristics can be defined as 
structures and management practices deemed legitimate and socially acceptable by other 
organizations, regardless of their actual effectiveness (Saudagaran, 1997).   
 
Therefore, when organizations attempt to apply a new system considered to be legitimate and 
successful that other organizations have applied, mimetic isomorphism is a term which 
expresses imitated change. In this case, corporate governance practices may become more 
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similar over time (Braiotta and Zhou, 2006; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), as organizations 
are obliged to harmonize with new regulations or select “best practices,” or mimic other 
organizations to reinforce their legitimacy (Cohen et al. 2007).                                                                                                                                     
                                                                                                                  
Mimetic change arises when organizations perceive that certain corporate governance 
attributes contribute to the governance structure within successful organizations and follow 
similar accounting treatments and choices, and this will increase compliance with accounting 
standards and corporate governance recommendations over time (Hoque, 2006).                                                                                                                                     
                                                                                                        
Stedham and Beekun (2000) suggest that institutional theory and agency theory are 
complementary to corporate governance effectiveness, therefore the use of both structures as a 
framework might be helpful in deepening the understanding of corporate governance and 
board functions.  
 
According to institutional theory, earnings management incentives may be affected by formal 
or informal pressure, and change may be created by an organisation in order to model itself on 
other organisations. Kury (2007) views that institutional provides the best perspective for 
examining earnings management practices. He provides the institutional argument to explain 
that earnings management is helpful to complete the view of agency theory and suggests that 
insights for earnings management comprise the blending of agency and institutional theory 
perspectives to obtain a more complete understanding of the behaviour and the positing of a 
continuum of earnings management.  
                                                                            
To sum up, organizations are subject to a number of rules and regulations in order to ensure 
legitimacy and thus have access to resources and ensure their survival (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983). However, these rules and regulations do not necessarily guarantee that organisations 
will continue to operate efficiently (Meyer and Rowan, 1977).                   
 
5.2.4.2 Transaction cost economics theory (TCE):                                                 
In 1973, Coase is considered an originator of transaction cost economics theory (TCE) which 
attempts to explain the framework of a company in terms of the optimal selection between 
market and hierarchal provision (Clark, 2004). However, the concept of transaction cost 
economics theory was incomplete until Williamson (1988) developed it in the most 
significant attempt to develop economic theory to take the structure of firms seriously. The 
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notion of TCE was explained by Hardt (2009) as a move from treating the firm as an avoider 
of negative costs towards conceptualizing the firm as a creator of positive knowledge.  
Williamson (1988) concludes two human factors and two sources that lead to transaction 
costs. Human factors are bounded rationality which explain how most transactions occur with 
little information; however, opportunism is defined as the incomplete disclosure of 
information. On the other hand, he also summarises two characteristics related to transaction 
costs: frequency, which refers to how often an asset is used and asset specificity, which is 
related to the extent to which assets deployed are customized.  
 
Spekle (2001) confirms that transaction cost theory is a beneficial approach to controlling 
management because it offers a practicable method of addressing control structure 
effectiveness. However, he believes that it neglects much understanding of human agency. 
Geyskens et al. (2006) conclude that transaction cost theory, is well established and 
empirically supported and can explore the variety and complexity of organizational forms. 
However, they claim that two obstacles might constrain researchers who attempt to build on 
the existing transaction cost studies; one of them is the depth of transaction cost which 
constitutes the issue.                                                                                                     
                                  Figure (5.3) Types of Institutional Theory  
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5.3 POSITIVE THEORY, CAPITAL MARKET EFFICIENCY AND EM   
Positive theory has contributed to explaining earnings management practice since a study 
conducted by Watts and Zimmerman (1978) who developed this theory as an alternative 
explanation for the problems of accounting choices (Xiong, 2006). This theory expects non-
capital market motivations for managers to engage in earnings and is concerned with internal 
contractual motivations which lead to the use of different accounting choices.                
              
Watts and Zimmerman (1986) proposed three primary assumptions for earnings management 
practice: bonus plan, debt covenant hypothesis, and political cost. In terms of bonus plan, 
managers are motivated to choose accounting methods and use their discretion in accounting 
estimates to increase their compensation or their benefit. Early studies suggest that this has 
been used as a means for managers to implement income-decreasing as an incentive for 
compensation. Healy (1985) and Dechow and Sloan (1991) found that managers use income-
increasing techniques in order to increase their compensations and bonuses.                                                                                                                              
 
According to debt covenant hypothesis, there is often pressure on creditors to provide 
assurance that, repayments and interests will be made on time. Therefore, this pressure 
encourages firms with high debt to equity ratios to select accounting methods and policies that 
increase reported earnings to avoid being in technical default of debt covenants (Xiong, 
2006). DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) and Sweeney (1994) suggest that since managers 
attempt to defer violating lending covenants for as long as possible they use income-
increasing accruals in the year prior to covenant violation.               
 
The final positive theory premise is related to the political cost hypothesis. Governments often 
impose specific regulations that assert pressure and increase costs, as advantages to the public 
and to make excessive profits. Under such circumstance, managers have an incentive to 
manipulate earnings downward by selecting accounting methods. Hang and Wang (1998) who 
examined the situation after Iraq’s attack on Kuwait in 1991 (the Gulf Crisis) suggest that oil 
companies are motivated to decrease the reported earnings for the third and fourth quarters in 
order to reduce political costs generated from potential adverse political actions such as 
regulations, antitrust and government. Further evidence from an Australian, study by Monem 
(2003), using a variant of the modified Jones model, revealed that Australian firms were 
motivated to engage in earnings management in order to diminish political costs during the 
period from June 1985 to May 1988.                             
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To sum up, positive theory presents three primary motivations for earnings management: the 
bonus plan incentive, the debt covenant incentive and the political cost incentive. These 
motivations come from the existence of fixed contracts using accounting numbers. In other 
words, positive theory changed the way from testing capital market motivations to 
concentrating on firms’ internal contractual reasons for cosmetic accounting changes. Current 
research on earnings management has, however, shifted the focus away from positive theory 
and back again to capital market motivations as an interpretation of the opportunistic 
behaviour of managers. 
 
According to capital market, current studies test the potential for managers to intentionally 
mislead investors about the underlying value of their firms. Notably, the testing is concerned 
with managers’ attempts to affect equity offers by overstating earnings or to affect their short-
term share performance by engaging in earnings to meet financial analysts’ expectations 
(Xiong, 2006; Kasznik, 1999). In other words, generally, most evidence provided by prior 
studies shows that earnings management seems to be a common practice among companies 
and has been an important matter for the SEC (Levitt, 1998). The motivations for earnings 
management can be classified into many: to encourage investment in a firm by offering 
shares, to meet expectations of financial analysts or to affect the expectations of specific types 
of investors, etc.                                                                
   
              Figure (5.4) Motivations for Earnings Management According to Theory                 
 
   
                
 
 
 
 
5.4 CONCLUSION  
This chapter has discussed the relevance of various theories in corporate governance research. 
The debate has revealed that there is no one specific theory which can elucidate corporate 
governance practices. However, the theories which have been employed in examining 
corporate governance mechanisms are agency theory, stewardship theory, stakeholder theory 
and institutional theory (Mallin, 2004). Importantly, the type of relationship between 
principals and agents is still ambiguous in Saudi Arabia because of the shortage of research in 
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this domain. Despite the fact that Clark (2004) states that collectivism is a dimension of the 
relationship between principals and agents in Asia, South America and Southern Europe, it is 
difficult to generalise this concept to Saudi Arabia due to numerous factors including culture 
and the Islamic framework. Moreover, Benkel et al. (2006) suggest that the findings of prior 
studies do not necessarily apply to some countries since corporate governance practices may 
vary between countries as result of the above-mentioned differences.                                        .                                              
.                                                                                                              
It can be concluded  that agency theory is the most relevant theory to the research questions of 
this study. The literature related to the effectiveness of corporate governance on earnings 
management indicates that the board of directors is the apex of internal corporate governance 
and the main means of decreasing agency problems by aligning the interests of shareholders 
with managers’ interests. Agency theory predicts that the board of directors and its 
committees will enhance the integrity of their financial reporting by monitoring management 
(Peasnell et al, 2005). As result of this conclusion by previous studies, the argument need to 
be tested empirically.                                                            
 
Given that Saudi listed companies are characterised as having family, state-owned and 
blockholder governance structures, this concentration may be a means of reducing agency 
problems. Agency theory expects that such a concentration might mitigate agency problems 
leading to a reduction in agency cost by aligning the interests of controlling owners with those 
of the company. Agency theory may be suitable for developed countries; however, ownership 
structure theory is probably appropriate for developing countries in terms of explaining firms’ 
agency cost, where family ownership is highly concentrated (Pornuptham, 2006). This theory 
explains the proportion of equity held by relevant parties (i.e. outside shareholders, 
debtholders, and managers) and is associated with the extent and direction of EM (Dempsey 
et al., 1993).   
 
Since corporate governance in Saudi Arabia is at a preliminary phase, institutional theory will 
be used as an alternative theory in interpreting the findings when necessary. Institutional 
theory suggests that companies might adopt practices or regulations as a result of coercion 
from legislators who impose certain practices in order to improve organizational 
effectiveness. Stedham and Beekun (2000) suggest that institutional theory and agency theory 
are complementary approaches to corporate governance effectiveness, so using both as a 
framework might be helpful in deepening the understanding of corporate governance and 
board functions. Accordingly, hypotheses will be formulated based on agency theory; 
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however, institutional theory will be used in the interpretation of finding if they are necessary 
as complementary.  
     
In terms of earnings management practices, numerous theories have been employed to 
investigate earnings management motivations and techniques, such as agency theory, positive 
theory, capital market, and institutional theory. Agency theory is the most used theory in 
exploring earnings management practices however, agency theory alone may not be capable 
of adequately describing or justifying the motivations and techniques of earnings 
management; thus, convergence between agency theory and institutional theory may be 
helpful since institutional theory also provides a precise interpretation of earnings 
management practices. Figure (5.5) attempts to show the theory used in the current research. 
  
        
Figure (5.5) Explanation of potential theories which could be used in this study 
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Chapter Six:  
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
After shedding light on the theoretical framework in the preceding chapter, which presented 
the theories relevant to this study, this chapter addresses the methodology adopted in this 
research and the methods of collecting the primary and secondary data. As mentioned 
previously, this study aims to obtain an insight into respondents’ perceptions of the 
motivations and techniques of earnings management and to examine the effectiveness of 
internal and external corporate governance mechanisms on reducing earnings management in 
Saudi Arabia. Hence, the chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.2 presents the research 
methodology related to assumptions with respect to the nature of social science, and 
assumptions regarding the nature of society. Section 6.3 explains the research paradigms 
while Section 6.4 provides data collection methods including the questionnaire survey, 
secondary data, and semi-structured interviews. Section 6.5 presents a brief summary of the 
chapter. 
  
6.2 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
It is worth pointing out that the research philosophy adopted by the researcher is an important 
stage which reflects how accurately the researcher understands the phenomena and that he is 
able to choose the appropriate research tools. Anyone who conducts a study in any domain 
should be able to come to grips with the main issues in his/her pursuit of knowledge and often 
the essential issue in social science is ‘how do we know, what we know, and how do we gain 
knowledge’ (Goles and Hirschheim, 2000). The concept of research philosophy which began 
in the UK gives importance to social science research, notably research methodology. Burrell 
and Morgan (1979), who produced a classification of organizational research, presented their 
assumptions regarding the nature of social science and their various philosophical stances. 
Likewise, Hopper and Powell (1985) provided further explanations associated with the 
various aspects of social science which consist of distinct elements regarding ontology, 
epistemology, human nature, and methodology.  
 
6.2.1 Assumptions about the Nature of Social Science 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) address four assumptions associated with the nature of Social 
Science: ontology, human nature, epistemology, and methodology. These four sets of 
assumptions have philosophical positions related to their subjective-objective dimension. The 
objective dimension comprises: realism, positivism, determinism and the nomothetic 
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approach (quantitative) while, nominalism, anti-positivism, voluntarism and the ideographic 
approach (qualitative) are subsumed in subjectivism. (See figure 6.1). The selection of an 
appropriate research methodology cannot be made in isolation from the consideration of 
previous assumptions that reinforce the research in question (Ryan et al., 2002). Accordingly, 
these dimensions will assist the researcher to identify the current research stance from these 
assumptions.    
Figures (6.1) Assumptions Regarding the Nature of Social Science 
        Subjetivism Approach                                                     Objectivism Approach  
  
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Burrell and Morgan (1979) (p. 3). 
6.2.2 Objectivism Approach Versus Subjectivism Approach 
Objectivism is an ontological stance which argues that social phenomena and their meanings 
have presences which are independent of social actors and implies that the social phenomena 
and categories that are used frequently in discourse have an existence which are independent 
or separate from actors (Bryman, 2004, p.16-18). However, according to the subjectivism 
approach, social phenomena and their meanings are not independent, but are achieved by their 
social actors, which are not produced via social interplay but are in a constant state of revision 
(Bryman, 2004). In other words, social phenomena are considered to be created from 
perceptions and consequent actions of social actors (Saunders et al. 2007). Social entities are 
viewed as objective entities which obtain a reality external to social actors according to the 
objectivism approach, while the subjectivism approach views social entities as social 
constructions which belong to social actors' perceptions and actions (Bryman, 2004).  
 
Figure 6.1 shows that the term ontology defines what the nature of reality is. The world 
should either be considered objective and external to the researcher or socially constructed 
and understood solely by looking at the perceptions of the human actors, whereas 
epistemology is interested in seeking knowledge and what we accept as the researcher and 
what is being researched (Hussey and Hussey, 1997). Explicitly, the key difference between 
Epistemology Anti-positivism Positivism 
    Determinism 
Ideographic 
Human nature Voluntarism 
Methodology Nomothetic  
Nominalism Ontology Realism 
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ontology and epistemology lies in the fact that ontology focuses on understanding ‘what is’ 
while, epistemology seeks to understand ‘what it means to know’ as well as assisting in the 
process in selecting ‘what types of knowledge are legitimate and sufficient’ (Gray, 2004).   
 
Epistemology branches into two perspectives: positivism and anti-positivism (interpretivism); 
positivism refers to the philosophical position of natural scientists coping with the observation 
of social reality so the end product of such research can be law-like generalisations like those 
created by the physical and natural scientists (Saunders et al., 2007). Therefore, the main aim 
of the theory is to create hypotheses which can be tested (Bryman and Bell, 2003). Hussey 
and Hussey, (1997) define positivism as follows: ‘[the] researcher is independent from that 
being researched and value-free and unbiased’. In terms of an anti-positivist perspective, the 
researcher usually adopts specific methods such as participant observation and interviews and 
does not look for laws or underlying regularities of social affairs as in science. Generally, this 
perspective reflects the stance of the reality and claims that generalisation is not a 
fundamental matter (Saunders et al., 2007).  
 
Human nature is the third assumption concerning the nature of Social Science, and takes into 
account the relationship between human beings and the environment. In other words, human 
activities should be understood to produce assumptions regarding human nature and provide 
the reality concerning whether human life is the subject or object of enquiry (Burrell and 
Morgan, 1979). Generally, there are two perspectives of the role of human beings in social 
life: Firstly, determinism views human beings and their experience as products of the 
environment, whereas voluntarism looks at man soundly as autonomous and free-willed 
(Burrell and Morgan, 1979).  
      
In terms of methodological assumption, it is interested in the process of research that specifies 
the appropriate paradigm to be adopted (Hussey and Hussey, 1997). The nomothetic approach 
is a methodological assumption which seeks associations or causality and the researcher 
generally uses a large sample and investigates a topic that comprises the concept of 
intelligence and wants to find a way of measuring a specific aspect of intelligence in which he 
is interested. Hence, the researcher focuses on what he observes and formulates hypotheses 
(Hussey and Hussey, 1997). Regarding the ideographic approach, the researcher examines a 
small sample and, using different research methods to gain different perceptions of the 
phenomena and the analysis, will seek to understand ‘what is happening’ (Hussey and 
Hussey, 1997; Saunders et al., 2007).  
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As regards to this research, it benefits both from the objectivism and subjectivism in terms of 
the nature of data collected and analysed, as this research collected primary data through a 
questionnaire and interview survey and secondary data through the annual reports.  The 
former constitutes the subjectivism, as participants expressed, by definition and nature, their 
own understandings of the social reality.  In other words, the respondents provides their 
opinion and understanding on the issues concerned and questioned through the questionnaire.  
This refers to the subjectivist nature of the society. Furthermore, the data collected through 
interviews also is considered to be subjective by definition, due to the same reasons. 
However, the data collected through the annual reports are considered as unobtrusive and 
objective.  Thus, these study benefits two different data sets produced through two different 
approaches.   
 
The same multi-approaches can also be seen in the case of data analysis.  While objectivism 
based statistical analysis was used to analyse data related questionnaires and annual reports, 
interview data was analysed through interpretative method.  It should also be mentioned that 
interpretative method shaped the general discussion as well.  
 
6.2.3 Assumptions about the Nature of Society  
Two different types of approach of sociology have been identified by Dahrendorf (1959) and 
Lockwood (1956) who claim that one focuses on the nature of social order and equilibrium 
whereas the other is concerned with issues of change, dispute, and coercion in social structure. 
The differences between the two approaches can be observed in Table 6.1 as presented by 
Burrell and Morgan (1979). 
 
Figures (6.2) The Order-Conflict Theories 
The (Order) or (Integrationist) 
View of Social Emphasis 
The Conflict and Coercion 
View of Society Emphasis 
Stability 
Integration 
Functional co-ordination 
Consensus 
Change 
Conflict 
Disintegration  
Coercion 
                                                               Source: Burrell and Morgan (1979) (p.13).   
 108 
 
However, order-conflict differences have received a great deal of criticism. Cohen (1968) 
considers treating order and conflict as being entirely separate to be a mistake and believes 
that theories should entail elements of order and conflict in their models. Moreover, since the 
subjectivist movements were more important, the debate related to order-conflict has settled 
down to involve only the effect of issues concerning philosophy and methods of Social 
Science (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). 
 
One of the pioneering studies to discuss the order-conflict distinction was that of Burrell and 
Morgan (1979) who argued that this issue is problematic and highlighted that regulation and 
radical change are replacement notions that have two dimensions. Firstly, regulation is 
interested in the explanation of a society emphasising its underlying unity and cohesiveness. 
Secondly, the sociology of radical change is concerned with explanations of radical change, 
deep-rooted structural conflict, modes of domination and structural contradiction. 
 
 
6.3 RESEARCH PARADIGM  
The paradigm is a helpful way of understanding and explaining social phenomena based on 
the ontological and epistemology positions (Saunders et al., 2007). Moreover, Corbetta and 
Patrick (2003) illustrating the importance of this paradigm, claims that scientific research that 
is done without paradigm lacks orientation and criteria for selection, so that all issues, 
methods and techniques are equally legitimate. Likewise, Bryman (2004) confirms that 
paradigm means how a study should be conducted and how its results should be interpreted. 
 
 
Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) study is considered a pioneer study in research methodology 
which made a magnificent contribution by presenting its four paradigm model which helps 
researchers to elucidate their research assumptions in order to design their research and to 
provide a beneficial understanding of their work (Jackson and Carter, 1991; Falgi, 2009). 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) present their four paradigm model (See figure 6.2) radical change, 
regulation (vertical axis), subjectivist and objectivist (horizontal axis). 
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                                          Figures (6.3) Social Research Paradigm 
                                              The sociology of radical change  
 
                    
      
      Subjective Objective 
 
 
                                    
                                           The Sociology of Regulation   
                                                               Source: Burrell and Morgan (1979) (p.13).  
  
The subjectivist and objectivist paradigms are discussed early in the research philosophy 
section, where they provide the ontological stances. Radical change is interested in providing 
a theme concerning the procedures that should be undertaken in an organisation's affairs and 
provides proposals to make important changes to their usual stance. However, the regulation 
position aims to depict current practice and how an organisation's affairs are regulated and 
then to offer suggestions for improvement consistent with the current stance (Falgi, 2009).  
  
The radical humanist paradigm which is located within the subjectivist and radical change 
dimensions “seeks to change, emancipate and potentiate the status quo and to overcome all 
barriers facing this emancipation (such as ideology, power, psychological compulsions and 
social constraints” (Falgi, 2009).  However, the radical structuralist paradigm, which takes a 
different ontological stance, aims to accomplish fundamental change and concentrates on 
organisational structure and then analyses organisational phenomena such as power 
relationships and patterns of conflict (Saunders et al, 2007). 
 
Interpretive paradigm refers to the fact that “everyday life is accorded the status of miraculous 
achievement” (Burrell and Morgan, 1979: P.31). This would not necessitate the researcher 
accomplishing change in the order of things, however it would enable him to understand and 
interpret what is going on (Iskander, 2008). Finally, the other objectivist dimension 
(functionalism) which has the regulation perspective explains why notable organisational 
issues occur and offers recommendations set within the present structure of the organisational 
situation (Saunders et al., 2007). 
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6.4 DATA COLLECTION METHODS 
Existing studies have recently attempted to adopt both quantitative and qualitative approaches 
within the context of a single research study to overcome the potential bias of a single-method 
approach. The primary feature of adopting multiple methods in the same study is to enable 
triangulation to take a place (Kamel, 2006). A number of studies suggest that the use of 
multiple methods in Social Science is an important matter; for example, Rudestam and 
Newton (2000, p. 45) and Hussey and Hussey (1997, p.74) suggest that it is a perfectly good 
choice to use both quantitative and qualitative methods for collecting data. Likewise, Denzin 
(1978) highlights that adopting various methodologies in the study of the same phenomenon 
is necessary if the conclusions are the same and leads to increased validity and reliability 
compared to using a single methodological approach. 
 
In the same vein, Burgess (2001) suggests that research methods that do not apply sampling, 
observation and interviews are narrow and inadequate. In general, the main distinction 
between quantitative and qualitative methods is not of quality but of procedure as Saunders et 
al. (2007) observed. In other words, quantitative method uses measurements whereas 
qualitative method reflects perspectives on knowledge and research objectives.       
 
The concept of triangulation was developed by Denzin (1970) who suggested that employing 
various methodologies and various techniques in one study would certainly enhance the 
credibility of research by presenting further ways of generating evidence in support of key 
claims. Denzin (1978), Easterby-Smith et al. (1991), Hussey and Hussey (1997) and Seale 
(1999) divided triangulation into four types as follows: data triangulation, in which data are 
collected at different points in time and from various sources;  methodological triangulation 
where both quantitative and qualitative methods are adopted; investigator triangulation, which 
is related to data being collected independently by different researchers on the same 
phenomenon and their results being compared to diminish personal biases; theory 
triangulation, which is associated with a theory being taken from one discipline and adopted. 
  
Existing studies have presented a limited insight into earnings management practices and the 
role of internal/external corporate governance in reducing them. Therefore, based on the 
objectives of this research, this study adopts both data and methodological triangulations to 
increase confidence in the findings obtained if the findings of all different methods agree. 
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In other words, both quantitative and qualitative methods have been adopted in order to 
enhance data quality and in an endeavour to fill the gap in the literature. Specifically, the 
quantitative method has enabled this study to examine the theory with a large sample size, 
whereas the qualitative method has enabled it to provide insight into the phenomenon being 
examined and obtain an in-depth understanding of the research problems.  
 
To achieve that, this study will collect secondary data and primary data concerning the 
phenomenon of earnings management and internal/external corporate governance in Saudi 
Arabia. Regarding the quantitative approach, the questionnaire aims to provide better 
understanding the different aspects of earnings management practices which is mainly used to 
explore the motivations and techniques of earnings management in Saudi Arabia by obtaining 
the perceptions of respondents.  
 
On the other hand, the relationships between corporate governance, external audit factors, and 
earnings management are primarily tested using database; the questionnaire survey is adopted 
for corroboration. In terms of qualitative approach, semi-structured interviews are used to 
provide a better understanding of the research questions, confirming and elaborating on the 
questionnaire survey and secondary data findings and supporting the hypotheses 
development.  
 
 
6.4.1 Data Collection Problems in Saudi Arabia 
Saudi Arabia is characterised as having different social, economic, cultural and religious 
aspects which considerably affect the conducting of social studies. During the undertaking of 
this research some problems arose which should be noted as follows:  
 
1- In comparison with developed countries, the access to data in Saudi Arabia seems 
difficult due to a number of obstacles such as mandatory permission which is required.  
2- Although there is published data in the Saudi market website, the availability of data is 
generally sparse, therefore it was necessary to obtain it from companies, which was a 
time-consuming process. 
3- All secondary data including dependent and independent variables was mainly hand-
collected from annual reports which required a great deal of time and accuracy.    
4- The researcher needed to be very active to collect the data since a less active 
researcher would find difficulty in finishing the data collection on schedule.  
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5- In general, most respondents in Saudi Arabia place less importance on research. 
6- Some respondents seemed to finish answering the questionnaire as quickly as possible 
without paying attention to the terms they chose.  
7- Many respondents attempted to avoid the researcher for interviews which would be 
considered as an investigation.  
8- Saudi Arabia is a big country and the headquarters of companies are distributed 
between different cities, which meant the researcher had to travel from city to city.  
9- Access to members of boards of directors and sub-committees was very difficult as 
they do not stay in the same place. Therefore, the researcher used the contact number 
for respondents provided by management.   
 
The above issues were taken into account when designing the data collection methods and 
choosing the sampling and groups of participants. The following section presents more details 
in respect of the research methods used in this study.         
    
6.4.2 Quantitative Method 
Quantitative methodology, based on the positivist philosophy, is concerned with counting and 
measuring aspects of the social world and its structure and processes; theoretical background 
establishes the standards of the approach of the social sciences over a long time (Sarantakos, 
1994). This approach normally has a logical structure in which theories identify the issues to 
enable the researcher to address sets of hypotheses derived from general theories (Bryman, 
2004).   
 
One type of quantitative method is a survey technique that is usually related to the deductive 
approach and provides information on what people conceive or report (Neuman, 2000). The 
following section provides more details regarding the questionnaire survey, including design, 
questionnaire questions, sample selection and analysis procedures.           
 
6.4.2.1 Questionnaire survey 
Questionnaires are generally used for descriptive or explanatory research conducted using 
attitude and opinion questionnaires and questionnaires regarding organisational practices 
(Saunders et al., 2007). In other words, the questionnaire enables a study to identify and 
describe the variability in various phenomena.  
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The questionnaire survey is better when used together with other methods, such as in-depth 
interviews, to identify specific attitudes (Jankowicz, 2004). On the other hand, the 
questionnaire is more appropriate for Saudi respondents since they feel freer to express their 
opinions without fear of being identified (Falgi, 2009). As mentioned earlier, the 
questionnaire survey mainly answered the research questions related to the motivations and 
techniques of earnings management; however, at the same time it was employed as a support 
for the secondary data since using one method may not be sufficient to accomplish the study’s 
objectives.  
 
According to Saunders et al, (2007) there are two types of questionnaire: self-administrated 
and interviewer-administrated (See figure 6.4). The self-administrated questionnaire is 
divided into three types: internet-mediated questionnaire, postal questionnaire and delivery-
collection questionnaire; the interviewer-administrated questionnaire is divided into two 
types: telephone questionnaire and structured interview.  
 
For the purpose of this research, self-administered questionnaires were employed for a 
number of reasons; it is more appropriate for Saudi respondents, cheaper than other methods, 
easier for distribution, easier for respondents to complete, and the anonymity encourages 
respondents to complete the questionnaire leading to an increased response rate. Finally, this 
type of questionnaire is utilized extensively in surveys. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Saunders et al., 2003, p. 282 
 
 
                                                                         Source:  Saunders et al, (2007) (P.357). 
 
 
  
Questionnaire
ee 
Self-administered Interviewer-administered 
  
       Postal 
questionnaire 
 
Delivery and 
collection of 
questionnaire 
 
Telephone  
questionnaire 
 
Structured 
interview 
Internet-
mediated  
questionnaire 
 
                                               Figure (6.4) Types of Questionnaire 
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Although most questionnaires were delivered by hand to each respondent and collected later, 
a number of them were emailed to respondents and returned by email. Since some 
respondents may not understand how to answer the questions or may not be certain of the 
meaning of some of the questions or be unfamiliar with the questionnaire tool, these methods 
of questionnaires enabled the researcher to ensure that each question was answered correctly 
by clarifying any points of confusion and explaining the questionnaire to respondents.   
 
Despite the aforementioned advantages, the self-administrated questionnaire has been 
criticised by some researchers such as Neuman (2000) and Sekaran (1992) who claim that it is 
not suitable for covering a wide geographical area and that anonymity cannot be guaranteed in 
some cases. Moreover, as they highlighted, this type of questionnaire provides little 
opportunity for the researcher to elicit more information when respondents provide 
incomplete answers. Finally, pre-coded questions can bias results toward the researcher’s 
rather than the participant’s way of looking things. Of course, no tool is without limitations 
that need to be considered to maintain the quality of the study; therefore, semi-structured 
interviews were adopted to diminish the limitations of the questionnaire in this study.        
 
6.4.2.1.1 Design of the questionnaire 
As indicated in the literature review, a large number of studies have investigated earnings 
management motivations and techniques employing various methodologies. However, those 
concentrating on collecting data from questionnaire survey and interviews are few. Two of the 
objectives of this thesis are to find out what are the motivations for Saudi managers for 
manipulating earnings and if they are, what are the frequent techniques used for this 
manipulation. Accordingly, the hypotheses for the study are formulated as follows:  
H1: There is a significant difference among respondents regarding earnings management 
motivations in Saudi Arabia.  .  
H2: There is a significant difference among respondents regarding earnings management 
techniques in Saudi Arabia.  .  
In order to achieve the objectives of this research, the questionnaire was designed to elicit the 
perceptions of respondents regarding the research topic. The questionnaire attached in the 
appendix (See page 298) consists of four sections as follows:  
 
1- General information  
2- A set of questions related to the motivations and techniques of earnings management. 
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3- A set of questions related to the role of internal corporate governance characteristics in 
mitigating earnings management and one question regarding the concentration of 
ownership structure.   
4- A set of questions related to the role of external audit factors in reducing earnings 
management. 
 
Furthermore, in order to increase the response rate, the questionnaire was accompanied by a 
cover letter from the Business School (Durham University) and Taif University
1
 requesting 
the recipient to participate in the survey, and confirming the confidentiality of any 
information provided by them. The content of the questionnaire for each section is set out as 
follows: 
 General Information: This section attempts to obtain demographical information 
from respondents (position, working experience, educational level and major). 
Demographical information will be helpful for the researcher to justify various 
perceptions among groups. 
 
 
 Motivations and Techniques of Earnings Management:  
This section attempts to elicit respondents’ perceptions of motivations and techniques 
for Saudi companies engaging in earnings management. Specifically, this section 
consists of two parts: the first part includes a set of motivations for engaging earnings 
management derived from prior studies while the second part includes a list of 
techniques used to manage earnings management, also derived from prior studies. 
Generally, the questions present potential motivations for earnings management as 
identified by previous studies. These motivations include increasing remuneration 
(Aljifri, 2007; Baker et al., 2000), increasing share price (Bergstresser and Philippon 
2006; Louis and Sun), reporting a reasonable profit and avoiding loss (Markarian et al 
2008; Roychowdhury, 2006), fulfilling the stock market’s expectations (Coppens and 
Peek 2005), reducing buyout compensation (Kamel and Elbanna, 2010), retaining 
stable dividends (Daniel et al. 2007) and one question associated with the Saudi 
environment is to reduce Zakat. The questions related to the techniques of 
manipulation include inventory, receivable accounts, depreciation accounts, various 
expenses, revenue (Nigrini et al 2005), cash flow, reserves, sales of assets, of internal 
transactions related to business combination and capitalising (Kamel and Elbanna 
2010; Markarian et al 2008).  
                                                             
1 The researcher is a member of the academic staff at Taif University which is a Saudi University.    
 116 
 
 
 Internal Corporate Governance and Ownership Concentration: 
Third section attempts to elicit respondents’ perceptions of the role of internal 
corporate governance in reducing earnings management including board 
characteristics, audit committee characteristics, remuneration and nomination, and 
ownership concentration as well as the existence of members of the royal family on 
the board. Prior studies (Muth and Donaldson, 1998; Person 2006; Abdul Rahman and 
Ali 2006; Xie et al. 2003; Sarkar et al. 2006; Ebrahim, 2007; Benkel et al. 2006 and 
Uzun et al. 2004) found statistically contradictory findings which motivated this study 
to elicit the respondents’ perceptions regarding the effect of internal corporate 
governance and ownership concentration on earnings management practices.   
  
 External Audit Factors: 
Forth section attempts to elicit respondents’ perceptions of the role of external audit in 
reducing earnings management including contracting with a firm which has high 
independence and a good reputation, contracting with a local firm affiliated with the 
BIG4, contracting with a specialist auditor in the industry, a short auditor tenure with a 
company, issuing deterrent punishments, issuing stricter auditing standards and 
accounting legislations. Prior studies (Chen et al., 2005; Dye, 1993; Mayhew and 
Wilkins, 2003; Carcello and Nagy, 2004; Simnett et al., 2000; DeAngelo, 1981 and 
Mautz and Sharaf, 1961) found statistically contradictory findings, motivating this 
study to elicit the respondents’ perceptions regarding the effect of external audit on 
earnings management practices.   
  
In general, questions can be classified into two categories: open-ended questions that provide 
flexible formulation of responses and closed or pre-coded questions requesting respondents to 
click or choose one fixed answer with which they agree most. This study used closed or pre-
coded questions in the questionnaire since this type usually gains a good response rate in 
Saudi Arabia. Moreover, all the questions in this study have been measured by adopting the 
five-point Likert scale used extensively in social science research, ranging from 5 = strongly 
agree, 4 = agree, 3 = neutral, 2 = disagree, 1 = strongly disagree (Saunders et al., 2000). The 
Likert scale measures opinions, beliefs, and attitudes by showing varying degrees of 
agreement with, or endorsement of, a statement (DeVellis, 2003). Finally, the questionnaire 
questions were translated back-to-back, into Arabic and then back into English to overcome 
any translation issues and to confirm that all questions conveyed the same meaning to all 
respondents.  
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6.4.2.1.2 Piloting the questionnaire and assessment of validity 
Shortcomings in questionnaires may arise for different reasons, for example unstructured 
formulation, unclear language, illogical, omitted or unsuitable questions, and difficulty in 
answering them, which may lead to unwillingness to reply, missing data, and low response 
rates (Pornuptham, 2006). Validity is defined as ability to provide findings that are consistent 
with theoretical or conceptual values (DeVellis, 2003). Therefore, the questionnaire was 
validated by applying a pilot study that was not a pre-test, which was undertaken to provide 
relevant questions and to enhance specific areas that may not be explicit by obtaining astute 
feedback. For this purpose, twenty questionnaires were distributed to academic staff in Saudi 
Arabia and Durham Business School, external auditors, and audit committees respectively 
which is conceived to be sufficient according to Fink, (1995) who suggests that a minimum 
number of 10 is acceptable for a pilot study. During the pilot study, astute feedback and 
comments were mostly related to the language, omitting and adding some terms such as Zakat 
and Tax, whereas a number of them viewed the questionnaire as comprehensively and 
extensively covering the research questions. According to Burgess (2001) a pilot study 
enables researchers to perform a trial analysis sample that leads to enhanced test for the 
analysis process, the questionnaires of the pilot study are reviewed and examined and will 
provide similar findings to the results analysis.  
             
6.4.2.1.3 Sample Selection Criteria 
Respondent selection   
Participants were divided into four groups: members of boards of directors, members of sub-
committees, auditors, and academic accountants (See Table 6.2 next page). The primary 
criteria in the selection of specific groups of respondents were that all the groups should have 
adequate experience in their careers and they should be aware of earnings management 
practices. Moreover, these groups have the right and the means to monitor companies, which 
makes them intrinsically effective and gives them vital responsibility for the integrity of 
financial reporting and the accountability of management. In addition, they are considered as 
the cornerstone of monitoring mechanisms. It is worth pointing out that although the 
academics have limited features compared to the other groups in terms of responsibilities and 
monitoring, they are concerned with complicated issues and considered to be experts who 
provide a different perspective. In other words, as Dechow and Skinner (2000) indicate, 
academics’ perceptions of earnings management are generally different from those of 
practitioners and regulators who often see earnings management as pervasive and problematic 
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Sample Size  
The first phase in administering a questioner survey is to determine the sampling frame for the 
possible participants. However, because of limited time and resources as well as the difficulty 
of identifying the whole population, the research employs a judgement sampling selecting 
only individuals that met pre-determined criteria. In other words, Study population is limited 
by having many obstacles that may affect the selecting a type of sample, including:   
1- Corporate governance mechanisms in Saudi Arabia are at a preliminary phase, 
therefore people who are interested in this area are limited.   
2-  Earnings management is considered to be a complicated topic, hence the participants 
should be well-educated. 
3-  There is a difficulty in specifying the whole population of this research. 
4- There is limited time and resources in respect of this topic.  
  
Accordingly, judgemental sampling, which is similar to snowball sampling, is used in this 
study, as respondents are selected by the researcher on the strength of their experience of the 
phenomenon under study (Hussey and Hussey (1997). Sekamn (1992) suggests that 
judgement sampling is recommended for use when a limited category of people have the 
required information, while Neuman (2000) states that when we select our sample and want to 
obtain deep understanding, judgemental sampling is appropriate. Moreover, snowball 
sampling was employed by asking respondents to distribute the questionnaire to their 
colleagues.   
 
5.4.2.1.4 Questionnaire distribution 
In total 280 questionnaires were distributed in two batches by email and by hand. Of the 280 
distributed questionnaires only 124 were used in the analysis, with a response rate of 44.2%.  
Comparatively, previous research such as that of Kamel (2006) observed that the Middle East 
seems to have a low response rate for questionnaires, varying from 30% to 50%. Importantly, 
the non-respondent rate of 54% does not differ significantly from the respondent rate 
confirming that the findings are reliable, valid, and unbiased  
    Table (6.2) the Distribution of Respondents of Questionnaire Survey   
The percentage 
of response 
rate 
Received Ques. Issued Ques. Groups 
Overall 
Percent 
Number and 
percent 
percent Number 
 
44.2% 
 
(30% -50%) 
Average  
18.5 % 23/32% 25 % 70 Members of boards of directors 
19.3 % 24/34.2% 25 % 70 Members of sub-committees 
33.1 % 41/58% 25 % 70 Auditors 
29.1 % 36/51.4% 25 % 70 Accounting academics  
100 % 124 100 % 280 Total  
 119 
 
6.4.2.1.5 Reliability and correlation analysis 
Reliability is a crucial issue in psychological measurement that can be defined as a measuring 
instrument which gives rise to variable errors, that is errors that lead inconsistently between 
observations either via any one-measurement procedure or each time a given variable is 
measured by the same instrument (Frankfort and Nachmias, 2000; DeVellis, 2003). In other 
words, the concept of reliability expresses the consistency that reveals the degree of consistent 
measurement across different items of instrument. Numerous methods have been employed to 
measure reliability comprising the test re-test, split half, and Cronbach's Alpha; however, one 
of the most commonly-employed consistencies is Cronbach’s Alpha.  Black (1999) and 
Oppenheim (1992) suggest that Cronbach’s Alpha is the optimum indicator for internal 
consistency of instruments which do not have right-wrong (binary) marking schemes, and 
may hence be utilised for both suitable questions and questionnaires adopting scales such as 
the Likert Scale. 
 
Although the reliability (consistency) is significant matter with non-probability sampling,  this 
research applies Cronbach’s Alpha as a measurement of consistency as it seems to be less 
biased and more appropriate than other methods and gives a more accurate statistical finding 
(DeVellis, 2003). Although most studies suggest that the Alpha coefficient should be 0.8 or 
above, Nunnally and Bernstein (1994) suggest that the Alpha coefficient should be 0.7 or 
above, which is now the standard. The Alpha coefficient was over 0.7 for all tests indicating 
that all data is reliable. Also, correlated items were higher than 0.3 suggesting a good 
indicator (Field, 2005).  
 
6.4.2.1.6 Statistical methods of questionnaire analysis    
It is widespread knowledge that parametric and non-parametric testing are methods of data 
analysis for any study. However, choosing a parametric method is subject to critical 
assumptions that should be met before conducting the analysis. Balian (1982) highlights that 
using parametric testing is subject to numerous assumptions that should be provided as 
follows: assumption of normality which requires that data should be normally distributed. 
Assumption of homogeneity requires that the variance or standard deviation of dependent 
variables should be equal, whereas the assumption of continuous form of the dependent 
variables assumes that because of nominal and ordinal dependent variables, parametric testing 
cannot be applied.  
 
Generally, parametric testing is more powerful if all assumptions are provided and variables 
under analysis are subject to interval scales (Siegel, 1956). However, if no previous 
 120 
 
assumptions are provided non-parametric testing is an optimum choice. Siegel, (1956) 
suggests that non-parametric testing remains the alternative test where previous assumptions 
are not applied to data. Given that the analysis of normality for all questions using 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk test reveal that the P.value was less than 5% and the 
test of homogeneity of variance using the Levene test was also less than 5% (See appendix 
pages 288 to 291), non-parametric tests were used in this study to analyse the data. 
Furthermore, Newbold et al. (2003) suggest that non-parametric testing is more suitable for 
the questionnaire survey because the data involved is mainly nominal and ordinal data without 
the assumption of population normality. Accordingly, the primary statistical techniques 
applied in this part of the research were as follows: 
 
1- Descriptive Statistics of data comprise frequencies and percentages for responses and 
overall mean scores, standard deviations, and ranking for respondents according to 
level of agreement for each group of questions. Moreover, mean group is used in order 
to understand respondents’ perceptions for different questions.    
2- Kruskal-Wallis is a non-parametric test adopted to test the differences between 
respondents’ perceptions (board of directors, sub-committees, external auditors, and 
academic staff). 
 
3- Mann-Whitney Test is helpful in comparing two sample means on a continuous 
measure to specify whether two population means significantly differ.  
 
Moreover,  ANOVA one way testing is used to determine the differences between two 
analyses (parametric and non-parametric tests) and for sensitivity analysis.  
 
6.4.2.2 Secondary data analysis 
Secondary data are useful not only for finding out information to answer research questions, 
but also for providing a better understanding of and explaining research problems (Ghauri and 
Gronhaug, 2010). There are numerous advantages of using secondary data such as easy 
availability and saving time and money, however it is very important that secondary data 
should be consistent with research objectives (Bryman and Bell, 2004). Secondary data can be 
collected from government reports, annual reports, or different sources. In terms of data 
quality, a number of scholars, including Ghauri and Gronhaug (2010), suggest that secondary 
data is an important method and if they are available to answer research questions, there is no 
need to collect primary data. 
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6.4.2.2.1 Hypotheses development 
The third objective of this study is to investigate the role of internal and external corporate 
governance in constraining earnings management after exploring and eliciting respondents’ 
perceptions. In other words, this study aims to establish the relationship between internal 
corporate governance (boards of directors, sub-committees characteristics), ownership 
structure, external audit factors and earnings management. To achieve that, the third primary 
research question will be divided as follows:     
 
 
1- What is the relationship between internal corporate governance mechanisms and 
earnings management?  
    
Agency theory anticipates that boards will enhance the integrity of their financial reporting 
through monitoring management (Peasnell et al, 2005). On the other hand, institutional theory 
views these mechanisms as practices or regulations as a result of coercion from legislators 
who impose certain practices in order to improve organizational effectiveness or as result of 
imitation. Prior literature has investigated the relationship between board characteristics and 
earnings management. For example, Persons (2006) and Abdul Rahman and Ali (2006) found 
that firms with smaller boards are related to low earnings management. Moreover, Xie et al. 
(2003) and Sarkar et al. (2006) confirm that frequency of board meetings is associated with 
reduced levels of earnings management. On the other hand, agency theory expects that the 
presence of independent members on boards of directors will enhance boards' ability to 
monitor management (Young, 2008). According to the research, Ebrahim (2007); Benkel et 
al. (2006); Uzun et al. (2004) and Persons (2006) reveal that the proportion of independent 
board members is related to reduced levels of earnings management. Additionally, agency 
theory suggests that high insider ownership provides better corporate governance structure 
which leads to a high quality in financial reporting (Sanchez and Meca, 2005). Warfield et al. 
(1995) present evidence that managerial shareholding has a negative relationship with 
earnings management. Furthermore, Sarkar et al. (2006) find that earnings management is 
higher when the chair of the board also holds the CEO position. Interestingly, Saudi royal 
family members mainly serve on boards as managerial members; therefore they may monitor 
the management closely, thereby decreasing possible mismanagement and wrongdoing. In 
contrast, several studies failed to find a relationship, such as Ebrahim (2007) and Abdul 
Rahman and Ali (2006).  
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The principle cause of earnings manipulation ensues from managers seeking to increase their 
compensation and private benefit by revealing false earnings by manipulating shareholders’ 
expenses. However, serious problems may arise when insiders serve on remuneration 
committees as this can lead to more interference in the design of the committee structure. Xie 
et al. (2003) found that compensation committees may affect the market’s perception of 
golden parachute adoption. Also, concerns increased in particular when CEOs or executives 
served on remuneration committees as this led to agency problems between management and 
shareholders (Anderson and Bizjak, 2003). In Saudi Arabia, nomination and remuneration 
committees are integrated and designed to review the terms and conditions of employment of 
the management and board of directors. Perhaps the existence of a CEO or executive serving 
on nomination and remuneration committees might be an incentive to act opportunistically by 
obtaining high levels of compensation. Some prior studies mention the role of such 
committees; for example, Xie et al. (2003) observe that executive committees might not play 
a direct role, whereas audit or finance committees might have a more direct impact on 
controlling earnings management. Laux's (2008) implication is that there is a relationship 
between the structure of board committees and earnings management. In addition, Sun et al. 
(2009) suggest that intelligent compensation committees are capable of generating strong 
monitoring which leads to preventing management from controlling earnings management. 
Petra and Dorata (2008) suggest that independent directors of remuneration committees are 
better able to accomplish their duties objectively. Moreover, Dahya and McConnell (2007) 
also found that more outside directors sitting on committees leads to better performance as a 
result of independence. 
   
Moreover, agency theory considers that the role of the audit committee is to monitor and 
oversee the integrity of financial reporting. Much emphasis has been placed on the fact that 
the audit committee’s role prevents fraudulent accounting statements (Klein, 2002b). This 
study selects several characteristics which can affect its role in preventing firms from 
manipulating earnings management consistent with prior studies. Several studies such as Lin 
et al. (2006) and Yang and Krishan (2005) have found that there is a negative association 
between the size of the audit committee and the occurrence of earnings restatements. Extant 
research conducted by  Lin et al. (2006); Abbott et al. (2003); Ebrahim (2007) and Xie et al. 
(2003) observes that there is a negative association between the activity levels of audit 
committees and the occurrence of restatements. Moreover, Yang and Krishnan (2005); Abbott 
et al. (2003); Bedard et al. (2004) and DeZoort and Salterio (2001) imply that a significant 
negative relationship exists between an audit committee that includes at least one member 
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with financial expertise and earnings management. According to the research, Bedard et al. 
(2004); Abbott et al. (2004); Ebrahim et al. (2007) and Xie et al. (2003) emphasise that 
independent audit committees can reduce the occurrence of earnings management. Based on 
the above discussion, the following hypotheses have been developed: 
 
H1: There is a negative relationship between board size and earnings management.    
H2: There is a negative relationship between board meetings and earnings management.   
H3: There is a negative relationship between outside directors on the board and earnings management. 
H4: There is a negative relationship between the existence of royal family members on the board of 
directors and earnings management 
H5: There is a negative relationship between non-duality and earnings management.  
H6: There is a negative relationship between the existence of a nomination and remuneration committee 
and earnings management.            
H7: There is a negative relationship between nomination and remuneration committee independence 
and earnings management 
H8: There is a negative relationship between audit committee size and earnings management. 
H9: There is a negative relationship between audit committee meetings and earnings management. 
H10: There is a negative relationship between audit committee independence and earnings management. 
H11: There is a negative relationship between financial expertise and earnings management. 
 
2- What is the relationship between ownership structure and earnings management? 
 
Saudi listed companies are characterised as having important family, blockholder, and state-
owners who commonly sit on boards of directors. Accordingly, the current research addresses 
the hypotheses in terms of ownership structure, based on the theory that ownership 
concentration might mitigate agency problems leading to reduced agency costs by aligning 
the interests of controlling owners with those of the company (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Agency theory may be suitable for developed countries; however, ownership structure theory 
is probably appropriate for developing countries in terms of explaining firms’ agency costs, 
where family ownership is highly concentrated (Pornuptham, 2006). This theory explains the 
proportion of equity held among relevant parties (i.e. outside shareholders, debtholders, and 
managers) and is associated with the extent and direction of EM (Dempsey et al., 1993). 
   
Recent studies have echoed some evidence regarding the effect of ownership concentration on 
earnings management. For example, the majority of empirical research concludes a positive 
association between insider ownership and earnings management (Habbash, 2010). Moreover, 
a large number of empirical studies, such as those conducted by Yu, (2008); Osma and 
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Noguer (2007); Charitou et al. (2007); Park and Shin (2004); and Rajgopal and 
Venkatachalam (1998), indicate that institutional ownership negatively affects earnings 
management. Unlike other ownership, Bozec et al. (2002) argue that there is no relationship 
between state-ownership and performance and suggest that it is not a question of who owns 
the firm, but the goals pursued by firm. Based on the above discussion, the following 
hypotheses have been developed: 
     
H12: There is a negative relationship between board managerial ownership and earnings          
management.    
H13: There is a negative relationship between Institutional ownership and earnings management.    
H14: There is a negative relationship between governmental ownership and earnings management.    
H15: There is a negative relationship between family ownership and earnings management 
H16: There is a negative relationship between blockholder ownership and earnings management.    
 
3- What is the relationship between external audit factors and earnings management?  
 
An external audit is an important instrument for shareholders to ensure the transparency and 
credibility of financial reporting. Audit services may not ensure that falsified materials have 
been detected; however, the amount of manipulation discovered depends on the quality of 
audit services. In addition, the quality of audit services depends on the experience of the 
auditor, his knowledge of the industry, and his/her independence. Such knowledge and 
experience will help the auditor to diagnose the complex issues in specific industries. 
Generally, the role of the external auditor has long been discussed in the literature and the 
accumulated evidence is rather mixed. In other words, prior studies such as DeAngelo (1981); 
Hoitash et al (2007); Chen et al. (2005); Dye (1993); Mayhew and Wilkins (2003); Carcello 
and Nagy (2004); Simnett et al. (2000); and Geiger and Raghundan (2002) have shown 
different findings regarding the role of the external auditor on constraining earnings 
management. Therefore, this study adds to the literature by addressing these hypotheses: 
    
H17: There is a negative relationship between  a BIG4 auditor and earnings management.    
H18: There is a negative relationship between a specialist auditor and earnings management. 
H19: There is a negative relationship between an unqualified opinion report and earnings 
management.  
H20: There is a positive relationship between timeliness and earnings management.                                      
H21: There is a relationship between auditor change and earnings management. 
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6.4.2.2.2 Measurements of the dependant variable (earnings management) 
The literature review chapter shed light on the development of discretionary accruals as a 
measure (proxy) for earnings management by providing prior key research that presents and 
enhances this measure and more recent suggested amendments for this proxy. Generally, a 
large number of recent earnings management studies have applied mainly discretionary 
accruals as a proxy for earnings management and have adopted various models to isolate 
discretionary accruals within the total accruals (Dechow et al., 1995). This study uses 
discretionary accruals that calculate the difference between actual and expected accruals as a 
measure for earnings management. Consistent with empirical studies from recent 
contemporary literature in earnings management, namely Abdul Rhaman and Ali, (2006), 
Klein (2002), Xie et al. (2003), and Peasnell et al. (2000b), the present study adopts the cross-
sectional modified Jones model (1995) presented by Dechow et al. (1995).  
 
1- Modified Jones Model (1995)  
Adding the change in receivables to the Jones model (1991) constitutes a new development of 
earnings management measure suggested by a study conducted by Dechow et al. (1995) that 
examines numerous models for detecting earnings management. The argument of this study is 
that management may engage in earnings management via discretionary revenues by timing 
the recording of these revenues, such as recording them at the year-end when the cash has not 
yet been collected. In this case, any increase in receivables that are supposed to be 
discretionary will certainly influence the total accruals. As a result, Dechow et al. (1995) 
conclude that the change in receivables should be deducted from the aggregate change in 
revenues when calculating the non-discretionary accruals utilising the Jones model (1991). 
This new proxy for earning management is the modified Jones model (1995).      
 
This measure has acquired widespread support among accounting literature which has 
concluded that the modified-Jones model is the most powerful model than the Jones model at 
detecting cases of revenue manipulations; it posits that earnings management gives rise to all 
change in credit sales in the event period since manipulation of credit sales recognition might 
be more straightforward than that of cash flow (Aljifri, 2007). Additionally, it differs from the 
Jones model (1991) solely by adjusting for the change in receivables in the event period since 
this method assumes that there is no systematic management. Based on this discussion, this 
study uses the modified Jones model (1995) developed by Dechow et al. (1995) as a measure 
for earnings management as presented below: 
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     TA t /A t -1 = ά1 (1 / A t -1) + ά2 (Δ REVt / A t -1   - Δ REC it) / TA t -1 + ά3 (PPE t / TA t -1) + ε t                       
Total Accruals     =                 Non- Discretionary Accruals          +      Discretionary Accruals 
(CFO Approach)                                                                                                Residual of Regression  
 
Where:  
TA it       = total accruals in year t; 
At it            = total assets in year t-1; 
ARev it   = revenues in year t less revenues in year t- 1; 
AREC it  = net receivables in year t less net receivables in year t-1; 
PPE it        = gross property plant and equipment in year t; 
ε it            = error term in year t, and 
ά1,ά2 2,ά3 = firm-specific parameters. 
 
 
Moreover, this research adopts the cash flow approach to calculate total accruals (TAC) 
which is considered as more efficient than the balance sheet approach (Collins and Hribar, 
2002).  Hence, TAC is the difference between income before extraordinary items,  
discontinued operations (NI) and net cash flow from operating activities (CFO) as follows (1): 
TACit     =   NI it – CFO it  
Where: 
- NI it      = is the earnings before extraordinary items of firm i in year t,  
- CFO it = is the net cash flow from operating activities of firm i in year t, 
 
2- The Jones Model (1991) 
In addition to applying the modified Jones model of estimating earnings management, this 
study also adopts the alternative proxy for earnings management using the Jones model 
(1991). This model provides a new and potentially more influential way of estimating 
earnings management. Aljifri, (2007) states that “Looking at the Jones model, it is clear that 
the idea of using two variables (DREV and PPE) to control for changes in non-discretionary 
accruals makes this model potentially more accurate for an analysis of earnings 
manipulations”. A large number of studies use the Jones model as a proxy for earnings 
management, including Subramanyam (1996b) and Bartov et al. (2001) Therefore, this 
measure is presented below:   
TA t /A t -1 = ά1 (1 / A t -1) + ά2 (Δ REVt / A t -1 ) + ά3 (PPE t / TA t -1) + ε t 
Total Accruals     =      Non-Discretionary Accruals     +     Discretionary Accruals  
                                                                                              Residual of Regression (EM)  
 
It is worth pointing out that although the previous measures are used as a proxy for earnings 
management by prior studies, they are still complicated due to the difficulty of measuring 
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discretionary and non-discretionary accruals. In others words, Aljifri (2007) suggests that 
these measures are complicated by the difficulty of measuring discretionary and non-
discretionary accruals. In addition, there is a potentiality that other factors not tested in these 
studies may have effect on accounting choices. 
 
Overall, the modified Jones and Jones models are used in this study since they are considered 
as the most powerful for detecting earning management. Moreover, the cross-sectional 
method is used in this research since most previous studies suggest that cross-sectional Jones 
and the cross-sectional modified Jones models perform better than their time-series at 
detecting earnings management. 
 
It is worth recalling that the current study would have adapted Kothari et al. (2005) which is a 
powerful measurement for detecting earnings management used by a large number of prior 
researches. However, during the calculation of earnings management according to this 
measure, some issues occurred. For example, the value of earnings management for many 
industries has a minus sign that indicates the exclusion of some industries that will reduce the 
sample size or a shift toward another proxy for EM. The reason for industries obtaining a 
minus signs is that some companies originally had negative ROA reflected in the equation 
including ROA as part of it. 
 
6.4.2.2.3 Measurements of the independent variables and model specifications.  
The literature review chapter discussed the role of internal/external corporate governance 
characteristics on earnings management in depth. In addition, the previous section briefly 
presented a summarised debate regarding the role of independent variables (internal and 
external corporate governance) on reducing earnings management, together with development 
of the hypotheses in a theoretical way. This section will present the measures of independent 
variables including internal and external corporate governance characteristics that have been 
derived from the prior literature and acquire widespread consensus as proxies as well as 
presenting model specifications. The rationale behind the selection of these variables is that 
there is consensus in the accounting literature that these variables express the role of internal 
and external corporate governance. 
 
This study contains two models to examine the research hypotheses regarding secondary data. 
Although EM is a dependent variable in each model, there are numerous factors which 
support separation. Initial results imply a high correlation coefficient between audit 
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committee characteristic and board of directors on the one hand, and audit committee and 
remuneration & nomination committee on the other that constitutes more than 77%. This 
problem is not surprising since many studies such as Xie et al. (2003) have found a 
correlation and suggest the separation of audit committee and board characteristic into two 
models. More examples can be seen in Ramsay et al. (2006), Benkel et al. (2006) and Klein 
(2002a). Although this correlation can be resolved by omitting the collinear variables from 
regression (Baum, 2006), omitting may affect some important characteristics or damage 
others related to the board of directors or sub-committees, etc; thus, separation may be better 
than omission as recommended by Xie et al.(2003).  
                               
Another justification for division is that research conducted by Rediker and Sith (1995) 
Carcello et al. (2002), Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), Rediker and Sith (1995); and Boo and 
Sharma (2008) suggests that different characteristics of corporate governance may be 
substituted for one another. For example, Carcello et al. (2002), who examine the relationship 
between corporate governance and audit quality, replaced the board of directors’ attributes 
with audit committees’ attributes (i.e. size, frequency of meetings and expertise). 
Accordingly, in order to avoid the potential substitution issue that may occur between boards 
of directors’ attributes and audit committees’ attributes, this research adopts a separate model 
for each set of attributes. This enables the study to investigate the influence of audit 
committees on earnings management separately from the influence of board composition. 
 
Statistically, it is argued that increasing the number of variables in a model might have the 
impact of reducing the power of the model. During conducting stepwise, it is found that the 
existence of audit committee characteristics in the same model as board composition 
decreases the level of R2 which leads to including the audit committee in a separate model.  
Finally, most studies that investigate the role of audit committees and external auditing on the 
one hand and earnings management on the other, such as Lin et al. (2006), Rainsbury et al. 
(2009) and Baxter and Cotter (2009) do not include board characteristics due to the 
interaction between the audit committee and external auditing. 
               
1- First model specifications 
The first model aims to investigate the effect of board characteristics and ownership structure 
on earnings management. As mentioned above, audit committee characteristics are eliminated 
from the first model for the above reasons. Therefore, details for all variables in the first  
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All measures of independent variables are derived from the prior literature, namely: Abdul 
Rahman and Ali (2006), Klein (2002), Xie et al. (2003), Peasnell et al. (2001), Sarkar et al. 
(2006; 2007), Benkel et al. (2006), Uzun et al. (2004), Habbash, (2010) and Persons (2006). 
Table 6.3 presents all definitions of independent variables and their measures for the first 
model. 
 
          Table (6.3) Definition and Measures for Independent Variables for First Model 
Symbol Variable name Descriptions and measures 
OUTSIDE Directors’ independence The ratio of number of outside directors (non-executive) to total members 
BSIZE 
BRDMEET 
Board size 
Board meetings 
The total number of members on the board 
The number of meetings per year held by board of directors      
RFAMILY Royal family members 
 
A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the board of directors includes at least 
one of the royal family members. 
Non-Dual 
 
RNEXIST 
 
RNIDP 
 
FAMOWN 
 
INSTOWN 
STATEOWN 
MANAGOWN 
 
BLOCKOWN 
 
             
         
           
Non-Duality 
 
Remuneration and nomination 
committee existence  
Remuneration and nomination 
committee independence  
Family ownership 
 
Institutional ownership 
State-owned  
Managerial ownership  
 
Blockholder ownership 
 
 
Note: 
A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the CEO and chair of board have separate 
roles, otherwise 0; 
A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the this committee exists on the 
company, otherwise 0; 
A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the CEO does not sit on this committee 
otherwise 0; following study by Klein (2002b). 
The percentage of total shares held by family 
 
The average percentage of shares outstanding owned by institutional investors                                           
The percentage of total shares held by government  
The percentage of total shares held by executive directors divided by the total number 
of shares                            
A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm has an external stockholder 
owning 10% or more of the outstanding shares, and zero otherwise. 
 
  DAC=  discretionary accruals estimated by the modified Jones (1995)                                                        
       
 
 
2- Second model specifications 
The second model aims to investigate the effect of audit committee characteristics and 
external audit factors on earnings management. As is seen from the second model, ownership 
structure is placed again in the second model as a control variable since ownership structure is 
a very important variable that should be taken into account for each model. In other words, 
Chan et al. (2007) who test agency theory stress that ownership structure plays an important 
role in affecting audit quality that should be taken into account. Therefore, details for all 
variables in the second model and their measures are presented below: 
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       Table (6.4) Definition and Measures for Independent Variables for the Second Model 
Symbol Variable name Descriptions and measures 
ACINDEP Audit committee 
independence 
The ratio of independent non-executive directors in the audit committee to 
total committee members 
ACSIZE 
ACMEET 
Audit committee size 
Audit committee meetings 
The total number of members on the audit committee 
The number of meetings per year held by the audit committee       
ACEXPERT 
 
AUDSPEC 
BIG4 
 
AUDOPIN 
TIMELIENSS 
 
AUDSWITCH 
 
FAMOWN 
INSTOWN 
STATEOWN 
 
 
MANAGOWN 
 
BLOCKOWN 
 
 
Financial expertise   
 
Specialised auditor 
BIG auditors 
 
Auditor opinion  
Audit delay  
 
Auditor change 
 
Family ownership 
Institutional ownership 
State-owned  
 
 
Managerial ownership 
 
Blockholder ownership 
 
Note: 
 
A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if at least one independent 
financial expert sits on the audit committee, and zero otherwise. 
A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm is audited by a 
specialised auditor, and zero otherwise. (Proxy based on market share). 
A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a company is audited by 
BIG4 
A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if auditor issued unqualified 
report in this year, and zero otherwise. 
(LOG) The number of days from fiscal year end to audit report date 
A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if auditor is changed, and zero 
otherwise. 
The percentage of total shares held by family 
The average percentage of shares outstanding owned by institutional 
investors                                           
The percentage of total shares held by government 
The percentage of total shares held by executive directors divided by the 
total number of shares                            
A dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the firm has an external 
stockholder owning 10% or more of the outstanding shares, and zero 
otherwise.  
 
  DAC=  discretionary accruals estimated by the modified Jones (1995)                                                        
 
 
All measures of independent variables are also derived from the prior literature, namely: 
Abdul Rahman and Ali, (2006), Klein (2002), Xie et al. (2003), Lin et al. (2006), Yang and 
Krishan (2005), Abbott et al. (2003), Ebrahim (2007), DeZoort and Salterio (2001), Sarkar et 
al. (2006; 2007), Benkel et al. (2006), Uzun et al. (2004), Habbash, (2010) and Persons 
(2006). Table 6.4 presents all definitions of dependent variables and their measures for the 
second model. 
 
6.4.2.2.4 The control variables and their measurements   
In addition to the independent variables mentioned previously, a number of control variables 
are comprised in this research to control for firms’ characteristics that may affect the extent of 
earning management. These variables are considered to be fundamental for ensuring that the 
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tests concentrate more accurately on the differences created by variations in corporate 
governance. In other words, as this study aims to specify whether there is a relation between 
both internal corporate governance attributes and external corporate governance and the 
incidence of earning management, it is essential that other factors that affect earnings 
management should also be controlled. Logically, it is not possible to control for numerous 
incentives to manage earnings management behaviour, such as management style, integrity 
and corporate culture, since they are difficult to measure (Archambeault, 2002). However, the 
discussion in the literature review chapter shows that some variables are frequently used as 
control variables. For example, Dechow et al. (1995) show many controls variables that 
provide useful information should be used when testing earnings management. 
 
These variables contains firm size, firm performance, leverage, firm growth, cash flow from 
operations which are considered individually, along with the method of measurement for each 
variable; however, apart from a few studies, no prediction is made for the coefficient sign 
(Habbash, 2010). Hence, this section presents the control variables for the influence of 
potential confounding factors (Bartov et al., 2000) in the two models that have been found to 
be associated with earnings management by prior studies.      
 
1- Firm size (Size) 
A number of studies have presented evidence suggesting that large firm size may be 
an incentive for managers to engage in earnings management (Pincus and Rajgopal, 
2002); however, from a different perspective Becker et al. (1998) suggest that large 
firms have less motivation for earnings management since they are subjected to closer 
monitoring by investors and financial analysts. This study assumes that large firms 
have less motivation for earnings management in Saudi Arabia.                                      
 
2- Leverage (LEVG)  
Numerous studies such as Elayan et al. (2008) use leverage as a measure for debt 
covenant violations that represent the debt structure of a firm. Most studies argue that 
highly leveraged companies are less likely to be involved in wrongdoings, such as 
earnings management. Generally, leverage is considered to be positively related to 
earnings management practice, as understating liabilities or overstating assets might be 
utilised to prevent debt covenant violations (Habbash, 2010). However, some studies 
such as Becker et al. (1998) (1994) found that leverage is negatively associated with 
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the absolute value of discretionary accruals. This study assumes that leverage is 
positively associated with earnings management.                                                             
                                                           
3- Firm Performance (ROA) 
Consistent with the majority of previous studies in both earnings management and 
corporate governance research, this study will control for firms’ performance. A 
number of studies, such as Kothari et al. (2005) and Carter et al. (2003), indicate that 
not using ROA as a control variable in earnings management research may lead to an 
invalidated model and suggest that ROA is a beneficial measure in explaining a firm’s 
value. According to the prediction of the majority of prior studies such as Abdul 
Rhanman and Ali (2006), this study assumes that ROA is positively related to earnings 
management.                                                                                                                      
                                     
4- Cash Flows from Operating Activities (CFO) 
To capture performance differences across firms in various industries and to control 
for the influence of economic activity on earnings management, this study controls for 
the influence of cash flows from operating prior studies such as Habbash, (2010) 
which suggests that CFO is used to control for the association between abnormal 
accruals and operating cash flows. Becker et al. (1998) state that the manipulation of 
earnings management is less likely to occur when a company has a strong operating 
cash flow performance. Likewise, Dechow et al. (1995) emphasise that the magnitude 
of discretionary accruals is influenced by CFO in more cases. Therefore, this study 
assumes that cash flows are negatively associated with earnings management.               
 
5- Complexity (Complex) 
Although the number of subsidiaries as a measure of complexity is used by a few 
studies, the new research conducted by Dyreng et al. (2010) indicates that earnings 
management is found to be less when a firm has subsidiary operations in foreign 
countries that have a strong rule of law.                                                                           
 
In addition to previous control variables and following prior studies, BIG4 auditor is used as 
control variables in first model while OUTSIDE is used as control variable in second model 
while ownership structure are used as control variables in second model. Table 6.6 present all 
definition of control variables and their measures.  
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                              Table (6.5) the measures of main control variables 
Symbol Variable name Descriptions and measures 
SIZE Firm size  The natural logarithm of total assets at year-end. 
LEVG  
ROA 
Leverage 
Performance 
Total long-term debt divided by total assets 
Net income divided by the total assets at the beginning of the year       
CFO 
COMPLEX 
Cash Flow 
Complexity  
 
 
 
Cash flows from operating activities divided by beginning of period total assets. 
A dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the company has a subsidiary; 
otherwise 0.                                                                       
 
In the same vein, all measures of control variables are also derived from prior literature 
namely Abdul Rahman and Ali, (2006), Klein (2002b), Xie et al. (2003), Lin et al. (2006), 
Yang and Krishan (2005), Abbott et al. (2003), Ebrahim (2007), DeZoort and Salterio (2001), 
Habbash, (2010), Sarkar et al. (2006), Benkel et al. (2006). 
  
6.4.2.2.5 Data Sources, Sample Selection Criteria  
The sample size of the study consists of all Saudi companies as the entire population of the 
Saudi Stock Exchange. However, the study sample is subjected to the following criteria: 
 
1- The study covers the financial period between December 2006 and December 2009. The 
rationale for using this as the study period is summarised in the following points: (a) the 
reforms to Saudi Arabia’s environment commenced at the beginning of 2006. (b) The 
implementation of the best practice of corporate governance mechanisms was embarked 
upon in 2006. (c) The financial crisis witnessed by the Saudi Stock Exchange was in 
2007 to 2008. 
2- Because financial and insurance companies apply (IFRS), they  were excluded since they 
have specific practices and operations. Prior studies such as Chen et al. (2005); Habbash, 
(2010); Peasnell et al., (2000) suggest that financial and insurance companies have an 
incentive to apply different accounting practices leading to difficulty in capturing 
management’s opportunistic manipulations. 
3- The main sources of secondary data collected from the Saudi Market website.       
4- The data, which was mainly hand-collected from annual reports of listed companies, 
includes two categories: dependent and independent variables as well as control variables 
making this task viable since there is no DataStream in Saudi Arabia.  
5- Missing data not found on site was collected by the researcher from companies’ 
headquarters. 
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             Table: (6.6) Description of Data Selection Process for Study Period 
. 
Description 2006 2007 2008 2009 Pooled 
 
Initial sample (All companies)  
 
88 
 
122 
 
134 
 
144 
 
488 
Excluded:  - - - - - 
Financial companies            (11) (11) (11) (11) (44) 
Insurance companies (6) (15) (22) (30) (73) 
Missing annual reports  (5) (2) (2) (3) (12) 
Missing corporate governance data (1) (2) (4) (3) (10) 
Outliers  (2) (4) (3) (3) (12) 
Final sample for first model    
Missing audit report 
Final sample for second model        
64 
(1) 
63 
88 
(1) 
87 
92 
(1) 
91 
93 
(0) 
93 
337 
(3) 
334 
 
Table 6.6 presents a description of the study sample with an explanation of the exclusion of 
items such as financial/insurance companies, missing data, and outliers. More clearly, extreme 
outliers are identified from the sample then eliminated because inclusion of extreme values 
may distort the research analysis and the interpretation of the research results. However, 
companies that have extreme values for earnings management are not removed from the 
sample as outliers since these are probably the observations constituting large negative 
accruals or large positive accruals, which may actually explain management discretion.  
         
Moreover, because of the lack of disclosure, many companies are excluded since missing 
corporate governance variables are found that lead to downsizing the study sample so the final 
usable sample is 337 firms for the first model and 334 for the second model. Following prior 
research (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Subramanyam, 1996a), in order to avoid the results 
being biased, industry groups with less than six observations are integrated with other 
industries, taking into account the characteristics for each industry.  
 
Finally, Table 6.7 provides information regarding the sample in terms of industries. As is 
shown in the table, petrochemical, agriculture & food, industrial investment, and building & 
construction are the largest industries. 
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Table: (6.7) Original Distribution of the Sample Relative to Industry 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.4.2.2.6 The processes of secondary data analysis   
This section aims to illustrate the statistical methods adopted for secondary data analysis. As 
mentioned earlier, the statistical methods for analysing data are divided into two types: 
parametric and non-parametric. As a whole, the method used is determined by the nature and 
characteristics of the study data. Numerous scholars such as Balian (1982), Gujarati, (2003), 
Berenson et al. (2009) suggest some important assumptions that should be met before 
applying parametric tests. These assumptions are presented as follows: assumption of 
normality, which requires that data should be normally distributed, assumption of 
homogeneity which requires that the variance or standard deviation of dependent variables 
should be equal, the assumption of independence from error, which assumes that no harmful 
coloration exists between variables, and finally the assumption of linearity, which suggests 
that the relationship between variables is linear. 
 
The previous assumptions, necessary for applying parametric testing, are more powerful if all 
assumptions provided and variables under analysis are subjected to interval scales (Siegel, 
1956). However, if no previous assumptions are provided, non-parametric testing is an 
optimum choice. Siegel, (1956) and Judge et al. (1985) suggest that non-parametric testing 
remains the alternative test where previous assumptions are not applied to the data. As a result 
of the measurement of data on an interval scale, the normality and homogeneity of variance 
are not required by the non- parametric method.  
Industry group         First Model                                    Second Model 
Number  Percentage Number Percentage 
Petrochemical  41 0.12 41 0.12 
Cement  31 0.09 31 0.09 
Retail  28 0.08 28 0.08 
Energy & Utilities  8 0.02 8 0.02 
Agriculture & Food   54 0.16 54 0.16 
Telecommunication  11 0.03 11 0.03 
Multi- investment  27 0.08 27 0.08 
Industrial Investment  38 0.11 36 0.10 
Building & Construction  39 0.12 39 0.12 
Real Estate Development  24 0.07 23 0.06 
Transport 16 0.04 16 0.04 
Media and Publishing  12 0.03 12 0.03 
Hotels and Tourism  8 0.02 8 0.02 
Total  337 100% 334 100% 
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Previous assumptions of the parametric tests are tested in Chapter Seven applying Skewness-
Kurtosis to verify the normality assumption. The results indicate using non-parametric tests 
that are an appropriate method which do not require the measurement of data on an interval 
scale and do not require data to meet the previous assumption.  In addition, this research uses 
correlation coefficient and variance inflation factor (VIF) tests to verify multicollinearity 
since numerous studies such as Hair et al. (1998) and Kennedy (2008) highlight that a VIF of 
more than 10 points rules out harmful multicollinearity. The findings in Chapter Seven 
indicate that there is no harmful correlation between variables. In terms of heteroskedasticity, 
this study uses Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Wesberg tests to explore the variance between variables 
and the findings indicate that the data suffers from heteroskedasticity. Finally, the residuals 
versus the independent variable values are also plotted utilising STATA 9 and results show 
that the relationship between the dependent and independents variables is linear.   
  
The above tests are applied to examine the data against the OLS assumptions; non-parametric 
test are used in this research to analyse the data since the data of this study did not meet the 
conditions required for parametric tests, particularly in terms of normality and 
heteroskedasticity. In other words, in addition to the OLS estimate being inefficient in cases 
of violation of normality (Greene, 2007), standard errors may be biased and inconsistent 
which could lead to results also being biased and not in line with the real state (Baltagi, 2001; 
Greene, 2007). However, where coefficient is constant over time, the adopting of pooled 
regression, which is an appropriate way to examine the sensitivity of the results to alternative 
specifications (Beaver, 1998), is more efficient since it provides greater flexibility in 
modelling differences in specific behaviour of the sample (Greene, 2007). Another 
justification for using GLS is the important assumption of homoscedasticity and no serial 
correlation in pooled OLS (Beaver, 1998). 
 
Therefore, GLS estimation (random effect) panel regression over the four-year test period was 
used in this study. This method allowed the study to test for variations among cross-sectional 
units simultaneously with variations within individual units over time (Baum, 2006). It 
supposes that regression parameters are not dissimilar between various cross-sectional units 
and do not change over time, which reinforces the reliability of the coefficient estimates.  
 
According to (Baltagi, 2001) there are two basic methods: fixed effect and random effect that 
can be applied to determine the relationship within or between each cross-section. Fixed 
effect presupposes that the individual constant is a group-specific constant term in the 
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regression model; however, random effect method presupposes that the constant is a group-
specific disturbance similar to the error term, apart from each group (Greene, 2007). 
Generally, there is a mutual relationship between the efficiency of random effect method and 
the reliability of the fixed effect method and the primary assumption of choosing the random-
effect estimation is that the unobserved heterogeneity should not be correlated with 
independent variables (Greene, 2007).            
                        
The Hausman Test (1978) is a common test used to check for strict exogeneity in social 
sciences (if an explanatory variable is exogenous when the relationship between continuous 
variables is tested). This test is used to determine which previous methods (fixed or random 
effect) can be adopted. The Hausman test differs from random and fixed effect methods by 
verifying the correlation between the X variables and the individual random effects εi. In 
others words, fixed effect should be applied in case of occurred correlation, random effect 
should be applied. Hence, this study follows McKnight and Weir (2009) who use the 
Hausman test to verify these assumptions and to test the appropriateness of using the random-
effect estimation. The insignificant findings gained from the Hausman test for both models 
indicates that Prob>chi2 is higher than 5% showing that the assumptions for the fixed effect 
estimation are violated and random effect should be applied. 
 
It is worth noting that even though the use of stepwise regression has been criticised by many 
scholars due to some problems such as incorrect degrees of freedom (Whitaker, 1997), it is 
still used to reveal the reliability of a model via the strength of    in order to reach the 
appropriate model (Berenson et al., 2009). Generally, the current study used the stepwise 
forward regression (Gujarati and Porter, 2009), commonly employed to determine the 
appropriate model by eliminating variables conceived to downsize the value of   .  As a 
whole, the results of stepwise regression do not support the exclusion of any variables in both 
models since all variables contributed to increase the value of   . (See pages 294 and 295 in 
the appendix for the result of use of stepwise test).           
  
According to the previous discussions, the primary statistical techniques applied in this part of 
the research were as follows: 
 
1- Descriptive statistic comprises the analysis of the overall mean scores, standard 
deviation, median, minimum, and maximum for each individual variable.  
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2- In addition to univariate means difference test (the analysis of one variable at a time), 
Mann Whitney test and T-test for each variable applied.  
3- (Multivariate analysis) Non-parametric GLS (Random-effect) panel regression test 
was applied.  
4- Numerous sensitivity analyses were presented such as using parametric testing.  
 
6.4.3 Qualitative Method 
Adopting qualitative and quantitative methods in a single topic has become a common 
approach for studies, since one approach used alone may not provide accurate findings. For 
example, Kamel, (2006) suggests that the questionnaire suffers from the inability to obtain 
perceptions from respondents; therefore conducting interviews will amplify and complement 
the questionnaire survey. Van Maanen (1983) defines qualitative methods as “a type of 
interpretive techniques that search to explain, decode, translate and otherwise come to terms 
with meaning, not the frequency of certain more or less naturally happening phenomena in the 
social world”.  In general, qualitative data can be gained via a diversity of research methods 
and formats. In other words, there are many different types of qualitative method such as 
interviews, observations, ethnography and case studies which can be applied to collect data. 
However, interviews are the most frequently used among these techniques due to the features 
that they contain.  
           
Accordingly, this research has adopted qualitative techniques to diminish the potentiality of 
errors and present greater insight into the different aspects of earnings management practices 
on one hand, and the role of internal and external corporate governance in mitigating 
aggressive earnings management on the other. More clearly, in addition to the questionnaire 
survey and secondary data as quantitative methods, semi-structured interviews are applied as 
a type of qualitative method.  
 
6.4.3.1 Semi-structured interviews  
The interview survey, which is one of the most comprehensively applied approaches of data 
collection in social sciences, helps the researcher to gather validity and consistency that are 
relevant to research questions (Saunders et al. 2007). In addition, interviews are deemed to be 
an appropriate technique in certain cases such as those which involve complicated and highly 
confidential information or when the required information cannot be collected by other 
techniques (Hussey and Hussey 1997). However, unlike other qualitative techniques, the 
researcher should possess the skill to be able to obtain the answers from the interviewee and 
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provide support without introducing bias (Kamel, 2006). As well as the advantages, 
interviews are subjected to some limitations such as validity. What is more, they are more 
costly and time consuming than other methods such as questionnaires. (Hussey and Hussey, 
1997).                           
        
Various types of interview have been presented by many scholars according to typology. For 
example, Healey, (1991) divides interview surveys into non-standardised and standardised, 
whereas Saunders (2007) divides them into structured interviews, semi-structured interviews 
and unstructured interviews. Among these types the semi-structured interview is the most 
popular approach in accounting and finance and provides a deep understanding of social 
phenomena (Bence et al. 1995; Hussey and Hussey, 1997). According to this method the 
researcher has a list of themes and questions that may vary from one interview to another 
which creates more flexibility than other methods. In other words, semi-structured interviews 
allow the researcher to ask astute and varied questions which arise during the interviews and 
to discuss them. At the same time they offer the interviewees the opportunity to express their 
opinions clearly according to their experiences and knowledge (Saunders et al. 2007). Unlike 
other interview types, the semi-structured interview method is capable of exploring the 
uncovered problems in prearranged questions or to obtain rich astute information related to 
the research topic (Berg, 2007). Bryman and Bell, (2003) suggest that semi-structured 
interviews are important for explaining and understanding events, patterns, and forms of 
behaviour as well as providing a more accurate picture of respondents’ positions.  
 
In accordance with the above discussion, this study employed the semi-structured interview 
method as second step after questionnaire in order to deepen the understanding of the 
motivations for and techniques of earnings management and the role of internal and external 
corporate governance in mitigating earnings management as a supplementary tool to reinforce 
the findings of the questionnaire survey and secondary data. 
 
6.4.3.1.1 Semi-structured interview questions  
Initially, eight questions were formulated to obtain an understanding of the previous 
objectives. These questions mainly focus on the motivations and techniques of earnings 
management and the role of internal and external corporate governance in mitigating earnings 
management. However, the aim of these questions is to uncover the issues that have not been 
explored by the questionnaire survey in order to provide rich information. These questions 
were mainly derived from prior studies and the Saudi environment to cover most issues 
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regarding the research topic and were typically asked of each interviewee in a systematic and 
consistent order. Interestingly, interviewees were allowed to answer freely to discover far 
beyond their answers in order to prepare new questions. In terms of validity, academic staff in 
Durham Business School and Uumm Al-Qura University in Saudi Arabia reviewed all the 
questions and provided some comments which were taken into account. (See page 304 in the 
appendix). 
  
6.4.3.1.2 Respondents to interviews and sample selection criteria. 
Semi-structured interviews were undertaken with fifteen individuals drawn from four groups 
(See Table 6.8). The interviews have the same limitations as questionnaires because they have 
predetermined specific categories of answers, and thus the interviewee is not free to provide 
additional information. Therefore, this research was actuated by the theme of theoretical 
sampling presented by Glaser and Strauss (1967). One justifiable reason for non-probability 
sampling techniques including theoretical sampling ensue from the theme that research 
‘‘process is one of ‘discovery’ rather than the testing of hypotheses’’ (Denscombe, 2007). 
This is, semi-structured interviews are employed in order to obtain more understanding 
in study’s phenomenon rather testing the hypotheses. The theoretical sampling approach 
requires an adequate sample regarding certain questions and choosing respondents according 
to the priority of their theoretical basis for their inclusion rather than a statistical one. 
Therefore, a particular number of respondents is important to accomplish the objectives of 
study. Following Kamel and Elbanna, (2010) who applied this approach, the interview survey 
sample was subjected to a number of criteria as follows:      
1- The interviewees should be from respondents who participated in the questionnaire 
survey.  
2- The interviewees should have adequate experience and knowledge regarding the 
research topic. 
3- The interviewees should be willing to be interviewed. 
Accordingly, the names of respondents of questioners survey, who have a capability to 
interview, were taken during questionnaire survey.       
 
6.4.3.1.3 The process of conducting the interview surveys and analysis. 
As mentioned above, semi-structured interviews were conducted with fifteen individuals 
drawn from four groups (boards of directors, sub-committees, external auditors, and 
accounting academic staff). In other words, 17 respondents were selected from four groups 
and one member of a Zakat and Tax department. Two interviewees (member of sub-
committee and academic staff) were excluded since they did not provide beneficial 
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information in this study; hence, in total 15 interviews were conducted and were of benefit to 
this study. (See Table 6.8 ).  
 
Three trips were conducted to three main cities in Saudi Arabia to collect the data: Jeddah, 
Riyadh, and Dammam. Semi- structured interviews were conducted using two methods: face-
to-face and by phone with each interview lasting approximately 30 minutes. Each interview 
began with an explanation of the objective of the study and the importance of such research in 
Saudi Arabia. It is worth noting here that some interviewees in developing countries do not 
like to have their opinions tape-recorded or they are worried if notes are taken by devices 
during the interview as it appears like an interrogation to them. 
 
   Table (6.8) Information from respondents’ interviews 
Experience of 
position (Years)   
Type of organisation Position Number of 
interviews 
15 University of Taif Academic  1 
2 King Khalid University Academic  1 
20 King Abdulaziz University Academic  1 
22 Al-Baha Develpment Chairperson 1 
15 Hloany Company M. board of directors 1 
13 Yanbu Cement Company M. board of directors 1 
2 KPMG Auditor   1 
16 Ernst & Young Manager of Auditing 
team   
1 
9 Saudi Accounting Auditor 1 
6 Deloitte Auditor 1 
7 Ernst& Young Auditor 1 
14 Al-Baha Develpment M-Sub-committee 1 
12 Al-Baha Develpment M-Sub-committee 1 
3 Agricultural company M-Sub-committee 1 
8 Zakat and Tax department  M-Sub-committee 1 
   15 
 
              For this reason note-taking was applied for all interviewees and for the same reason this 
research included only 15 interviews. Although there are different types of program for 
analysing interviews, this study only includes 15 interviews and the data were manageable, 
hence the amount of data was coded as well as being analysed manually. Ghauri and 
Gronhaug (2010) suggests that using the program of analysing qualitative data is useful when 
there is a large quantity of data requiring coding, annotation, and linking. Overall, the findings 
of the analysis of interviews are presented in Chapter Six together with the results of the 
questionnaire survey. 
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6.5 SUMMARY   
This chapter began with a discussion on research methodology and research paradigm. The 
adopted methodology is justified by the objectivist (realism) ontological position and positive 
epistemology. Therefore, the hypothetic-deductive approach (examining theory) seems to be 
the appropriate approach for this study. According to this methodology, this study adopts both 
data and methodological triangulations to increase confidence in the findings obtained if the 
findings of all different methods agree. One important way of attempting to understand 
earnings management practices and corporate governance mechanisms at a preliminary phase, 
and of  external auditing, is to combine a qualitative with a quantitative method, as is 
implemented in this research. Additionally, quantitative and qualitative methods are not only 
meaningful for obtaining an accurate image of the nature of an issue, but also for providing a 
deeper understanding of a phenomenon (Cooper and Schindler, 2003). For example, 
Filatotchev and Nakajim (2010) suggest that understanding corporate governance depends on 
a variety of sources such as combining a statistical study based on a survey or published 
information with semi-structured interviews. 
 
Thus, both quantitative and qualitative methods were adopted in order to enhance data quality 
and to endeavour to fill the gap in the literature. To be precise, the quantitative method 
enabled this study to examine the theory with a large sample size; however, the qualitative 
method enabled it to provide insight into the phenomenon being examined and to obtain an 
in-depth understanding of the research problems. However, since our sample is quite small, 
the results cannot be generalised to the research population as whole. Moreover, this chapter 
justifies the choice of each approach and presents details of three instruments employed in 
this research (questionnaire, secondary data and semi-structured interviews) in terms of 
design, sample selection criteria, analysis procedures. Generally, Kruskal-Wallis and GLS as 
parametric test are used in the questionnaire and secondary data survey respectively since the 
data did not meet parametric test conditions. However, the amount of data obtained from 
semi-structured interview was coded as well as being analysed manually. 
  
Table (6.9) Summary of Data Collection and Analysis 
Data Collect Methods Sample Size Choosing Sample Method Process of analysis 
Questionnaire survey 124 Judgmental sampling + 
snowball 
Kruskal-Wallis and  
Mann-Whitney Test 
Interviews Survey 15 Theoretical sampling approach Manual analyse. 
Secondary Data First Model 
 (337)  
Second Model (334) 
Whole population 
Excluding: Missing data+ 
Financial and insurance 
companies    
Logistic Regression- 
GLS- Cross-Sectional 
(Panel and Pooled Data) 
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Chapter Seven: 
ANALYSIS OF QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY AND RESULTS OF SEMI-
STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS  
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
Since members of boards of directors, sub-committee members, and external auditors are a 
cornerstone of monitoring mechanisms, their perceptions could have remarkable implications 
for the purpose of the current research. As mentioned previously, the primary purpose of this 
study is twofold. The first goal is to highlight new evidence concerning earnings management 
motivations and techniques in Saudi Arabia. Secondly, it contributes to the existing literature 
by investigating to what extent earnings management practices can be affected by key features 
of internal corporate governance mechanisms, ownership structure and external audit factors.  
 
 
Accordingly, the main thrust of this chapter is to provide the overall results given from both a 
questionnaire survey and semi-structured interviews. The remainder of this chapter is 
organised as follows: Section 7.2 outlines a descriptive analysis of general aspects of 
respondents, particularly, in terms of their characteristics. Section 7.3 describes the results of 
the questionnaire and interviews with respect to motivations and techniques for earnings 
management. Section 7.4 offers the results of questions concerning the effect of corporate 
governance mechanisms on earnings management. Sections 7.5 and 7.6 show the effect of 
ownership structure and the role of external audit factors on constraining earnings 
management practices in mitigating EM respectively. Section 7.7 reveals the importance of 
issuing more regulations and Section 7.8 provides the concluding discussion. 
 
7.2 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF RESPONDENTS 
7.2.1 Descriptive Statistics of Respondents' Demographic Information (Questionnaire)                                  
Table 7.1 (See page 144), provides descriptive statistics as classified by position, which is 
mainly used to examine the differences between the groups, whereas work experience, 
educational level, and major are presented in Table 7.2 to provide additional information for 
each group to assist in interpreting the findings. The analysis displayed in Table 7.1 relates to 
the number of respondents in each group and their percentage. In general, the questionnaires 
were personally distributed to the four groups equally, and the process lasted for about three 
months. In total 280 questionnaires were distributed in two batches by email and by hand. Of 
the 280 distributed questionnaires, only 124 were used in the analysis, with a response rate of 
44.2%.  
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The basic result, shown in Table 7.1, illustrates that the auditors group represents the highest 
percentage of questionnaires answered, which constitutes 33.1% of usable responses, 
whereas, the academic staff group, in second place, make up approximately 29.1% of 
responses. However, the responses of the groups of members of boards of directors and sub-
committee members are much lower - 18.5%, and 19.3% respectively - than those of the other 
groups. 
 
This result is consistent with the expectations as access to auditors and academic staff is 
somewhat easier than to other groups and they are more familiar with modern subjects such as 
current study. Moreover, members of boards of directors and sub-committee members 
practise their duties part-time, so it is difficult to meet them at a particular time which led to 
the their responses being lower in comparison with other groups. 
 
 
Table (7.1) the Distribution of Respondents of Questionnaire Survey   
The 
percentage of 
Response 
Rate 
Received Ques. Issued Ques. Groups 
Overall 
Percent 
Number and 
percent 
percent Number 
 
44.2% 
 
(30% -50%) 
Average  
18.5 % 32% 23 25 % 70 Members of boards of directors 
19.3 % 34.2% 24 25 % 70 Members of sub-committees 
33.1 % 58% 41 25 % 70 Auditors 
29.1 % 51.4% 36 25 % 70 Accounting academics  
100 % 124 100 % 280 Total  
 
 
 
 
According to work experience, the figures in Table 7.2 (panel1) (See page 146) show that less 
than a third of respondents (29%) had more than 15 years work experience in the field, which 
was the highest percentage for length of working experience. In addition, 28% of respondents 
had work experience of between 10 to 15 years. Those with work experience of between 5-10 
years made up 23%, while the respondents with work experience of between 1-5 years and 
less than a year represented the lowest percentage of respondents at 13% and 7%, 
respectively. In comparison, Table 7.2 (panel1) also shows that the sub-committee members 
and academic staff had more work experience in their positions gaining 41% and 38% 
respectively. These findings are consistent with expectations since these groups usually retain 
their positions for a long time as a result of the nature of their work and the shortage of 
candidates in their subject. In contrast, the members of boards of directors and auditors had 
less work experience, 22%, and 17% respectively, in their positions compared to the other 
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groups. In general, the findings indicate that more than half of respondents from the members 
of boards of directors, sub-committee members, and academic staff - 74%, 58% and 52% 
respectively - had work experience of more than ten years. However, the auditors group, at 
44%, had the lowest percentage of working experience of the groups. The study’s results are 
also consistent with those of Kamel, (2006) which showed that the academic staff have more 
experience in the field of earnings management practice because their position requires 
experience. 
 
The respondents were also questioned about their educational level. As indicated in Table 7.2 
(See page 146) (panel 2) the majority of respondents (39%) held a PhD, 38% held a BA, 
18.5% held a Master’s degree and 4% held other qualifications such as a diploma. As for the 
members of boards of directors, 48% replied that their most recent and highest educational 
level was BA, 39% a Master’s degree, 13% a PhD, and 4% diploma. The diplomas consisted 
of diplomas in Business Administration, Finance, and Business Banking. Moreover, more 
than half (66%) of the auditors held a BA, 20% held a Masters degree, 7% held a PhD, and a 
similar percentage held a diploma in accounting or finance. In contrast with the members of 
boards of directors, auditors, and sub-committee members, the largest percentage among 
respondents (100%) of academics held a PhD since their job would essentially require them to 
gain a higher level of education. Finally, 38% of the members of sub-committees held a BA 
degree, 25% held Master’s degree, 29% held a PhD and 8% held other qualifications such as a 
Diploma. 
 
With regard to majors, as shown in panel 3, 77% of respondents majored in accounting fields. 
In other words, the majority (86%) of the academic staff, 88% of the auditors, and 79% of the 
sub-committee members had an accounting background, whereas the largest percentage of the 
members of boards of directors had Bus-Administration Certificates. 
 
In summary, the majority of respondents have beneficial experience as 80% of them have at 
least five years work experience, while the academics and members of sub-committees had 
the longest working experience of the groups. Moreover, the respondents were well educated 
since all of them had at least a BA degree. According to background, the majority (77%) of 
respondents possessed an accounting background. Hence, the demographic information 
suggests that the perceptions of respondents would be astute and reflect credibility and 
confidence in the findings. 
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Table (7.2) Analysis Revealing the Duration of Employment of Respondents Participating in 
Questionnaire Survey      
Panel (1)  
Total Accounting 
academic 
Auditors Sub-committees Boards of 
Directors 
The length of 
experience    
% N percent Number percent Number percent Number percent Number 
7% 8 0 0 10 %  4 8 % 2 9 % 2 Less than one year 
13% 16 11 % 4 19 % 8 17 % 4 0 0 1- 5 years    
23% 29 13 % 5 27 % 11 17 % 4 39 % 9 5- 10 years   
28% 35 36 % 13 27 % 11 17 % 4 30 % 7 10-15 years    
29% 36 38 % 14 17 % 7 41 % 10 22 % 5 More than 15 years 
100 124 100 36 100 41 100 24 100 23 Total     
Panel (2)  
Total Accounting 
academic 
Auditors Sub-committees Boards of 
Directors 
Education Level  
% N percent Number percent Number percent Number percent Number 
38% 47 0 0 66% 27 38% 9 48% 11 BA 
18.5% 23 0 0 20% 8 25% 6 39% 9 Master 
39.5% 49 100 36 7% 3 29% 7 13% 3 PhD  
4% 5 0 0 7% 3 8% 2 0 0 Others 
100 124 100 36 100 41 100 24 100 23 Total     
Panel (3) 
Total Accounting 
academic 
Auditors Sub-committees Boards of 
Directors 
Major 
% N percent Number percent Number percent Number percent Number 
77% 95 86% 31 88% 36 79% 19 39% 9 Accounting  
11% 14 11% 4 5% 2 17% 4 17% 4 Finance 
10% 13 3% 1 2% 1 4% 1 44% 10 Bus-Administration  
2% 2 0 0 5% 2 0 0 0 0 Others 
100 124 100% 36 100% 41 100% 24 100% 23 Total     
           
 
7.2.2 Descriptive Statistics of Respondents' Information (Semi-Structured Interview)  
              The semi-structured interview, as a qualitative approach, focuses on ideas not covered by the 
questionnaire, and is a complementary source to the primary data. For the current research 
this consisted of fifteen individual interviews. Providing demographic information for 
interviewees is useful because it enables the researcher to interpret and compare the findings. 
In this respect, Table 7.3 (See page 147) presents the sample of semi-structured interviews 
conducted during fieldwork. Generally, the semi-structured interviews were undertaken with 
15 individual interviewees using two methods - face-to face and by phone - with each 
interview lasting approximately 30 minutes. As mentioned earlier, the main objective of 
conducting these interviews was to obtain more understanding and gain a variety of opinions 
on earnings management practices, external auditing, and corporate governance mechanisms 
in Saudi Arabia. According to Table 7.3, two members of boards of directors, four sub-
committee members, three auditors, and three academic staff interviewed had gained work 
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experience on average of ten years. A chairman, manager of an audit team and member of the 
Zakat and tax department were also interviewed. The table also provides information in terms 
of the positions of interviewees who work in different organizations.  
 
Table (7.3) Analysis Revealing the Duration of Employment of Respondents 
Participating in the Semi-Structured Interview      
Experience of 
position (Years)   
Type of organisation Position Number of 
interviews 
15 University of Taif Academic  1 
2 King Khalid University Academic  1 
20 King Abdulaziz University Academic  1 
22 Al-Baha Develpment Chairperson 1 
15 Hloany Company M. board of directors 1 
13 Yanbu Cement Company M. board of directors 1 
2 KPMG Auditor   1 
16 Ernst & Young Manager of Auditing 
team   
1 
9 Saudi Accounting Auditor 1 
6 Deloitte Auditor 1 
7 Ernst& Young Auditor 1 
14 Al-Baha Develpment M-Sub-committee 1 
12 Al-Baha Develpment M-Sub-committee 1 
3 Agricultural company M-Sub-committee 1 
8 Zakat and Tax department  M-Sub-committee 1 
   15 
  
 
 
7.3 EARNINGS MANAGEMENT PRACTICES   
            It is recognised that, based on agency theory, the issues related to the separation between 
ownership and management might lead managers to collude against owners to increase their own 
personal wealth (Abdul Rahman and Ali, 2006). In this instance, “under general accepted 
accounting principles (GAAP), managers have discretion in reporting earnings” (Othman and 
Zeghal, 2006) therefore, they might employ various methods to report earnings for different 
incentives. Hence, the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting categorises 
earnings management practices as an illegal activity and a serious action which will mislead 
financial-statement users (Merchant and Rockness, 1994). This section contributes to the 
previous research on earnings management by providing evidence from a developing country, 
Saudi Arabia, which has received little attention to date.  
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          7.3.1 Do Saudi Managers Engage in the Manipulation of Earnings? 
Saudi accounting academics have recently expressed many concerns about the integrity of 
financial reporting which did not reflect the spillovers of a global financial crisis. A typical 
example of these concerns can be seen in the following statement:  
 
“The global financial crisis has affected the whole world. However, we 
have not seen any effect on financial reporting in Saudi Arabia such as 
the revenues or value of assets. This might raise the question and 
increase the concerns about the integrity of financial reporting and to 
what extent the figures presented by companies express the reality of 
financial statements” 
 
Another topic covered by the Saudi and Arab media related to the size of Saudi Market losses 
caused by Saudi listed companies’ bankruptcy and financial scandals
2
. Although this crisis 
might not have been related directly to earnings management practices there has been, to date, 
no investigation into this issue or into the size of losses incurred by small shareholders who 
were the primary victim. In this regard the chairperson attempted to explain how this issue 
could establish earnings management practices in Saudi Arabia:   
 
“With regard to recent financial scandals, the Saudi Market was 
transformed from a share market to a gambling market and the 
investors transformed to gamblers. This action creates opportunists 
representing the managers of Saudi listed companies who tend to 
manipulate earnings to increase share prices or manipulation of 
figures that be used by investors to attract a large number of them”   
         
            Previous academic research such as that of Shubita and Shubita (2010) and Jaggi and Lee 
(2002) suggests that managers tend to manipulate earnings by increasing income during hard 
times and decreasing it in good times. During interviews, an auditor was asked about this action 
in Saudi Arabia. He commented that: 
“From my experience, I think our clients tend to engage in earnings 
management by income-increasing rather than income-decreasing. By 
this action, they will obtain more benefits such as compensation or a 
bank loan rather than decrease. However, income-decreasing might be 
used in rare cases”  
   
                                                             
2 There was panic selling on the Saudi Stock Exchange which crashed  from 21000 points to 6000 points,  as 
prices fell to new point lows   
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            On the other hand, all interviewees were concerned that the integrity of financial reporting 
suffers from a lack of disclosure and transparency which leads investors to make incorrect 
decisions. Allegations were made by interviewees that one crucial indication of manipulation of 
earnings is non-compliance with full-disclosure and hiding important information leading to 
misleading investment decisions that could damage the Saudi economy. During the interview 
survey, one academic researcher argued that:  
 
“Recent academic research concluded that Saudi financial reporting 
suffers from a lack of disclosure and transparency which harms its 
integrity and credibility. This leads us to suspect that the manipulation 
of figures is one of the reasons for non-compliance with full-disclosure 
and other regulations”    
 
            In conclusion, the objective of this section is to elicit the perceptions of participants as to 
whether Saudi managers tend to manipulate earnings as well as to investigate the integrity of 
financial reporting. Based on the semi-structured interviews, the results indicate that although 
all participants to a certain extent believed that financial reporting reflects the real status of 
Saudi companies, they suspected that it might involve manipulation. As can be seen from 
Figure 7.2 (See page 150) the majority (86%) of them believed that Saudi managers have the 
incentive to manipulate earnings in order to achieve their objectives. 
  
Figure (7.1) The perceptions of interviewees according to the integrity of financial reporting 
in Saudi Arabia 
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      Figure (7.2) the perceptions of interviewees according to whether or not they think Saudi 
managers manage reported earnings 
 
          7.3.2 Why Saudi Managers Manipulate Earnings (Motivations)  
            Earnings management is the changing of reported earnings figures by management to affect 
contractual outcomes that rely on reported accounting figures (Schipper, 1989). More recently, 
this issue has been discussed in the literature, which has shown contradictory findings, in order 
to show various types of earnings management manipulation and provide productive results.  
           Therefore, the purpose of this section is to increase the understanding of perceptions with regard 
to motivations of earnings management practices in Saudi Arabia and to contribute to the 
literature by investigating Saudi managers’ incentives for earnings management. Moreover, this 
section in the questionnaire will not only answer the research question concerning earnings 
management motivations, but it might also help the research by employing the appropriate 
model of calculating earnings management used in the secondary data. Perez and Hemmen 
(2010) suggest that future research should consider motives for earnings management to 
estimate discretionary accruals. To accomplish this objective, this section begins by 
determining the fundamental questions regarding the motivations for earnings management that 
have been derived from prior research. The review of these questions considers the main body 
of literature on the subject of motivations for earnings management and identifies the key 
reasons why companies manipulate earnings. 
.        The findings of this questionnaire are analysed to provide an indication of the motivations 
of Saudi managers for manipulating. Preliminary results in Figure 7.3 and Table 7.4 (pages 
155 and 156) show that in general a number of questions related to earnings management 
practices in Saudi Arabia are conceived as being strong catalysts for manipulation by a wide 
range of respondents. More than three-quarters (80%) of questionnaire respondents, including 
0
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all groups, strongly agreed or agreed with four potential reasons for manipulation in Saudi 
Arabia (i.e., ‘to increase the amount of remuneration; to report a reasonable profit and avoid 
loss; to obtain a bank loan; to increase share price’. This was reflected in overall means for 
each incentive (4.21, 4.09, 4.14, and 4.13 respectively). In addition, the semi-structured 
interviews support the findings of the questionnaire by drawing attention to the above-
mentioned motivations as key reasons for manipulating earnings. During the interviews, a 
manager of the audit team suggested that the desire to increase share price ranked third and 
obtaining a bank loan was ranked in terms of incentives for manipulating earnings. He 
remarked that: 
 
           “In my opinion, a number of managers might manipulate earnings since they 
would accomplish a higher share price and obtain a bank loan. These 
incentives are the most important in my view. Others reasons, which are minor 
and do not have much effect, are to fulfil the stock market’s expectations and 
to increase the confidence of investors” 
  
           Moreover, as can be observed from the chairperson’s view below, consistent with the 
questionnaire results, one incentive for earnings management by Saudi managers could be to 
increase their wealth. This perception is also consistent with that reported by prior studies such 
as  Abdul Rahman and Ali (2006) which stated that the issues related to the separation between 
ownership and management might lead managers to collude against owners to increase their 
own personal wealth. He commented as follows: 
 
           “From my experience, most managers of Saudi listed companies aim to 
increase their wealth by gaining stock options, high remuneration, and 
bonuses because in this way they will give themselves security; also most Saudi 
companies face great pressure from the Saudi capital market to correct their 
financial statuses, which leads them to manipulate….” 
 
To overcome these issues, he suggested that: 
 
 
           “The CEO should be selected carefully because his opportunistic behaviour 
would influence that of other senior-managers. Moreover, communication 
between management, boards of directors, and its committees is a key to 
success. In other words, when a lack of communication exists, it causes 
potential problems by increasing the likelihood of manipulating” 
 
 
            Previous suggestions and comments are consistent with prior studies such as that of Jackson 
and Pitman (2001) who indicate that when the CEO is effective, other managers tend to behave 
in the correct way to increase the benefits to shareholders. Moreover, Perez and Hemmen 
(2010) suggest that market pressure might create a level of earnings management among 
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companies. On the other hand, according to the questionnaire, Zakat was not ranked among the 
top-four motivations; auditors and academics drew attention to this issue by remarking that: 
 
           “Numerous Saudi listed companies commit manipulation because they want to 
reduce the amount of Zakat determined by the Zakat and Tax department. This 
issue cannot be generalized to be the key reason for manipulation or be applied 
to all listed companies, but it is still a potential reason for manipulating in 
Saudi Arabia”   
 
 
 
            Further to this, a member of the Zakat and Tax Department argued that:  
       
           “Manipulation of earnings to reduce the amount of Zakat might occur in the 
private sector rather than the public sector. However, we have seen a few cases 
of listed companies manipulating the amount of Zakat. These cases might 
occur more in companies dominated by high ownership concentration. Our 
role is to mitigate the conflict between companies and the Department of Zakat 
and Income Tax by verifying the assessment made by the Department and the 
amount of Zakat shown by a company”   
  
   
The Kruskal-Wallis analysis of respondents’ perceptions in Table 7.5 (Page 157),  reveals that 
there are significant differences in perceptions with regard to “increasing the amount of Zakat 
and Tax”, “increasing the amount of remuneration”, “increasing share price”, “reducing 
buyout compensation” and “retaining stable performance”. Statistically, there are differences 
in perceptions between the groups with respect to increasing the amount of Zakat. As is 
shown in Table 7.6 (See page 158), overall mean of auditors (3.60) was the highest of the 
groups. More than 70% of auditors and 60% of academics saw reducing Zakat as incentive for 
manipulating earnings. In contrast, a greater percentage of members of boards of directors and 
sub-committee members viewed that the reduction of Zakat is not motivation for 
manipulation. It is expected that the academics and auditors would be more aware of this as a 
result of their function. For example, auditors observe this issue in practice during auditing, 
and academics contribute to alleviate the dispute between Saudi listed companies and the 
Zakat and Tax Department by their active participation in first instance committees. 
 
The majority (93%) of the members of boards of directors, 82% of the members of sub-
committees and 86% of the academic staff strongly agreed or agreed that firms attempt to 
increase the amount of remuneration, while the auditors showed a lower level of agreement 
(78%). As can be observed from Table 7.5 (See page 157), Mann-Whitney indicates that the 
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auditors’ response differs from the other groups and this was reflected in the overall mean for 
each group (4.56, 4.1, 4.3, and 3.92 respectively). This result can be interpreted as follows:  
members of boards of directors and members of sub-committees are much closer to 
management than the auditors, notably in respect of their job security. In addition, the 
academic staff are more aware of this than the auditors due to their wide knowledge of this 
issue because of their connection with modern research. 
 
It can also be seen from Table 7.6 (See page 158), regarding ‘to increase share price’ that 
there is a significant difference between all four groups. The result of this difference is 
presented in Table 6.9 which shows that the overall means of the auditors (4.49) and the 
academic staff (4.52) was higher than those of the members of boards directors (3.68) and 
sub-committee members (3.95).  It could be that the auditors and the academics might have 
more knowledge of several features of this motivation than the members of boards of 
directors and the sub-committee members. This result is consistent with (Pornupatham, 2006) 
who found that ‘to increase share price’ was the most important reason for manipulating 
earnings in Thailand according to auditors’ views. 
 
In relation to the reason that resulted in significant differences among four groups - “to reduce 
buyout compensation”, the members of sub-committees viewed reducing buyout as an 
important reason for manipulating earnings (mean = 4.37) compared to the other groups 
whereas, the lowest level of agreement for this reason was by the auditors (mean = 3.02). 
 
Finally, for the motivation “to retain stable performance”, table 7.5 (page 157) reveals a 
significant difference between the groups. This can be observed from the findings that the 
majority of the members of boards of directors agreed that a reason to retain stable 
performance was a potential incentive compared to the other groups. Overall means for each 
group based on the level of agreement were: members of boards of directors 4.30, auditors 
3.43, academics 3.22, members of sub-committees 2.95. According to this result, the members 
of boards of directors perceived this incentive as a very strong potential reason since they are 
aware of the importance of stable performance to management.  
 
To sum up, the objective of this section was to shed light on the potential motivations for 
manipulating earnings in Saudi-listed companies. The results show that the four main 
incentives for Saudi managers to manage earnings are “to increase the amount of 
remuneration”, “to report a reasonable profit and avoid loss”, “to obtain a bank loan” and “to 
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increase share price”. The present findings seem to be consistent with prior studies such as 
Baker et al. (2003); Bergstresser and Philippon (2006); Latridis and Kadorinis (2009); 
Roychowdhury (2006); Louis and Sun (2008); Kamel and Elbanna (2010). 
 
 
 155 
 
                                         Figure (7.3) Overall results of respondents’ perceptions of earnings management motivations in Saudi Arabia 
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                                Table (7.4) Descriptive statistics of Respondents’ Perceptions about the Motivations of Earnings Management in Saudi Arabia  
 
 
 Level of agreement (percentage)    
     Total 
Mean score 
 
    
 
   Rank  
 
Standard 
Deviation 
 
 
Corrected  
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach's α 
(alpha) 
(Consistency) 
Questions     1 2 3  4   5  
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.701 
 
1-To reduce the amount of Zakat  13.5 11.7 40.1 19.4 15.3       3.02       11     1.08      .312 
2- To increase  the amount of remuneration           0 10.5   4 38.7 46.8      4.21       1    .941 .485 
3- To retain stable dividends     10 16.1 28.9 25.6 19.4       3.50        8    .719 .440 
4- To report a reasonable profit and avoid 
    loss  
   0 5.6 19.4 34.7 40.3      4.09       4    .905 .501 
5- To increase the confidence of investors  12.8 18.9 22.4 16.3 21.6      3.74                  5     702 .512 
6- To obtain a bank loan     4 9.7  7.3 40.2 40.5      4.14       2    1.07 .401 
7- To increase share price   2.4 9.7 7.3 33.1 46.6      4.13       3    1.06 .533 
8- To obtain position and reputation in  
     the business market  
   18 18.9 21.5 22.1 26.8       3. 63        6    .690 .513 
9- To reduce buyout compensation    8 22.6 21 40.3 15.3      3.46       9     1.03 .343 
10- To fulfil the stock market’s expectations    3.2 15.3 20.2 48.4 12.9      3.52       7     1.00 .324 
11- To retain stable performance    2.4 22.6 16.1 45 13.9      3.44       10       1.05 .393 
1-strongly disagree 2- disagree  3-neutral 4- agree  5- strongly agree 
Likert Scale 
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Table (7.5) Non- Parametric Test (Kruskal-Wallis) versus Parametric Test ANOVA one-way 
 
 Kruskal-Wallis  
Non-Parametric Test P. value Sig 
ANOVA one way 
Parametric Test  P.value Sig 
Questions                            Less than 0.05                               Less than 0.05 
1- To reduce the amount of Zakat       *** *** 
2- To increase the amount of remuneration        *** *** 
3- To retain stable dividends   - - 
4- To report a reasonable profit and avoid loss  - - 
5- To increase the confidence of investors  - - 
6- To obtain a bank loan  - - 
7- To increase share price *** *** 
8- To obtain position and reputation in the  
    business market 
- - 
9- To reduce buyout compensation  *** *** 
10- To fulfil the stock market’s expectations  - - 
1`- To retain stable performance  *** *** 
*p < 0.05   **P < 0.01  *** P < 0.001 
Note: Using ANOVA one way is an additional or secondary test to verify the results   
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Table (7.6) Descriptive Statistics of Means for Each Groups and Multiple Comparison Test  
 
 Mean  Mann-Whitney Test – Post Hoc test 
Questions  Board of directors Sub-Committee Auditor Academic Board of director 
     (Sig) with 
Sub-Committee 
       (Sig) with 
Auditor 
(Sig) with 
Academic 
( Sig) with 
1- To reduce the amount of Zakat  2.41 2.70 3.60  3.40 Auditor  
Academic 
Auditor  
         Academic 
Board of director 
Sub-committee 
Board of director 
Sub-committee 
2- To increase the amount of remuneration        4.56 4.1 3.92  4.3 Auditor 
 
     Academic 
   Board of director 
Auditor 
3- To retain stable dividends             3.42          3.51 3.46  3.63                 No significant differences among groups 
4- To report a reasonable profit and avoid 
     loss  
4.08 4.08 4.02 4.20 No significant differences among groups 
5- To increase the confidence of investors            3.71 3.69 3.81 3.77 No significant differences among groups 
6- To obtain a bank loan  4.17          4.11 4.02 4.13 No significant differences among groups 
7- To increase share price 3.68 3.95 4.49 4.52       Auditor 
     Academic  
   Academic 
     Auditor     
Board of directors 
  Sub-committees 
  Sub-committees  
Board of directors      
8- To obtain position and reputation in the  
     business market 
3.61 3.55 3.67 3.72                  No significant differences among groups 
9- To reduce buyout compensation  3.30 4.37 3.02 3.47 Sub-committee Board of director 
          Auditors        
        Academic  
    Academic 
Sub-committee 
 
    Auditors 
Sub-committee 
 
10- To fulfil the stock market’s expectations  3.39 3.91 3.39 3.50 No significant differences among groups 
11- To retain stable performance  4.30 2.95 3.43 3.22 Sub-committee 
       Auditors    
      Academic           
 
Board of directors       Board of directors Board of directors 
*p < 0.05   **P < 0.01  *** P < 0.001 
                                                                               Note: Using Post-Hoc is an additional or secondary test to verify the results   
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7.4  How do Saudi Managers Manipulate Earnings? (Techniques) 
Manipulation of figures has recently become an increasingly serious issue in financial reporting. In 
addition, it is widely conceived by the business community that executives might engage in 
earnings management using various techniques (Rutledge, 1995). In this instance, executives can 
intervene by changing how they interpret financial accounting standards and figures or by 
transactions as a way of changing financial reporting (Healy and Whalen, 1999). However, the 
techniques used by managers to manipulate earnings are still considerably ambiguous in different 
developing countries such as Saudi Arabia. Thus, respondents’ perceptions of the frequency of use 
of such techniques have been shown in this section to identify the various techniques used to 
manipulate earnings in Saudi listed companies. 
 
In section 2 (part 2), participants in the questionnaire survey were given a number of potential 
techniques that might be used to manage earnings. These techniques, taking into consideration the 
Saudi environment, were mainly derived from previous literature which has been discussed earlier. 
In addition, a number of participants were interviewed individually to obtain a better understanding 
of the likelihood of using specific techniques for manipulating in Saudi listed companies.  
  
Overall, Figure 7.5 and Table 7.7 (pages 163 and 164)  indicate how the four groups who responded 
in the current research expressed their opinions on the level of agreement to each of ten statements 
developed for this research related to earnings management techniques. It can be seen from Figure 
7.5 and Table 7.7 that the majority (80%) of all four groups of respondents agreed or strongly 
agreed with seven techniques which they believed were used frequently. These techniques were 
reflected in overall mean for each technique as follows: (i.e., manipulation of the provision of 
inventory (4.07); manipulation of the amount of receivable accounts (4.04); manipulation of the 
amount of depreciation accounts (4.09); manipulation of amount of expenses (4.07); manipulation 
fn sales of assets (4.10); manipulation of internal transactions (4.10); and capitalising rather than 
expensing expenditure (4.01). These findings are consistent with prior literature such as Kamel and 
Elbanna, (2010); Markarian et al (2008); Nigrini et al, (2005).    
 
It is worthwhile noting that Table 7.8 (See page 165) shows a significant difference between the 
groups who cited ‘manipulation of the provision of inventory’, and ‘manipulation of the amount of 
depreciation accounts’. For instance, more than 80% of the sub-committee members, auditors, and 
academics recognized that manipulation of inventory figures occurred frequently; however, there 
was a lower level of agreement by the members of boards of directors (76%). It can be noted that 
the members of sub-committee, auditors, and academics are more sophisticated than the members 
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of boards of directors in accounting methods, and this might be used to manipulate inventory 
figures. The result of the Mann-Whitney test, with regard to manipulation of amount of 
depreciation, indicates that more than 85% of the members of boards of directors and academics 
identified this technique frequently compared to the other groups who viewed that this technique is 
not used frequently. In this case, Dechow and Skinner (2000) suggest that accounting academics are 
different from practitioners in terms of their perceptions concerning earnings management.                                 
 
Additionally, as can be seen from Figure 7.5 and Table 7.7 (See pages 163 and 164), the remaining 
techniques (i.e., manipulation of the amount of revenue; manipulation of the amount of cash flow; 
manipulation of the amount of reserves) received a moderate level of agreement from all four 
groups as frequently-used techniques. It is also important to note that the Mann-Whitney test shows 
a significant difference between the four groups of respondents regarding the manipulation of 
amount of revenue and manipulation of cash flow. As we see from Table 7.9 there was a moderate 
level of agreement between the members of boards of directors (3.4) and the academics (3.46) 
regarding manipulation of revenue. However, the majority of the sub-committee members (4.11) 
and the auditors (4.12) perceived manipulation of revenue figures to be used frequently. This is 
because of the specialized role performed by sub-committee members and auditors regarding 
financial activities that might enable them to obtain more experience and knowledge of the 
techniques of earnings management than those in the others groups. Finally, with regard to 
manipulation of cash flow, the majority of the members of boards of directors and academics agreed 
or strongly agreed that cash flow is a method used frequently for manipulating. However, the 
auditors and sub-committee members were of the opinion that this method was not used frequently 
for manipulating.  
    
Investigation with the interview participants indicates additional evidence and information with 
regard to earnings management techniques in Saudi Arabia. For instance, one interviewee from 
among the academics expressed his concerns about Saudi accounting standards. He commented: 
 
“From my experience, Saudi managers might exploit the flexibility of Saudi 
accounting standards to manipulate earnings for their benefit. For example, the 
methods of evaluation of inventory and allowances or the ways of capitalizing 
expenses gives managers the opportunity to manipulate earnings. Therefore, 
international accounting standards should be applied similar to financial 
companies that are committed to these standards” 
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The collapse of Enron induced a large number of accounting academics to investigate the 
company’s status. One such investigation was presented by Nigrini et al. (2005) who found that 
Enron’s reports showed a type of earnings management technique used by managers representing 
manipulation of revenue. Moreover, Kamel and Elbanna (2010), found that the techniques of 
capitalizing rather than expensing expenditure and overestimating are the most frequently used to 
engage in earnings management in Egypt. In this case, a member of the audit committee and an 
auditor emphasised that:  
 
“In Saudi Arabia, managers frequently use many techniques for manipulating 
earnings. From our experience, manipulation of revenue figures, general 
expenses, and capitalizing rather than expensing expenditure are the most 
common techniques used frequently in Saudi companies”    
 
In the same vein, the various accounting methods or the companies’ structure related to size and 
ownership might provide a tremendous opportunity for earnings management. For example, 
Noronha et al., (2008) found that size and ownership structure are effective factors in earnings 
management. In this regards, interestingly, one of the audit committee members and one academic, 
raised the following important issue. 
 
In my opinion, earnings management techniques are subject to several factors 
such as the size of company, nature of industry, and ownership structure. These 
factors might affect, directly or indirectly, a type of earnings management 
technique. Additionally, incentives for manipulating earnings determine the 
techniques used. For example, if the company tends to manipulate the amount of 
Zakat, I think the manipulation would be on working capital since the Zakat is 
calculated based on capital working” 
 
  
In conclusion, this section aims to investigate the potential techniques of earnings management used 
in Saudi listed companies. To conduct this investigation, a number of questions were addressed in 
the questionnaire and semi-structured interviews to ascertain the techniques which might be used 
frequently. The findings indicate that only seven statements relating to earnings management 
received support from respondents as techniques of earnings management in Saudi companies. 
Additionally, the interviews supported the questionnaire findings which are consistent with prior 
studies such as (Kamel and Elbanna, (2010); Markarian et al. (2008); Nigrini et al., (2005).  
     
Moreover, the interviews indicate interesting points that might affect earnings management 
techniques in Saudi Arabia such as company size, nature of industry and ownership structure. This 
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is not surprising because Noronha et al. (2008) indicate that earnings management motivations and 
techniques are affected by the size and form of ownership of firms. Moreover, the flexibility of 
Saudi accounting standards might be a way of enabling Saudi managers to manipulate earnings.  
 
The following diagram illustrates the findings regarding earnings management incentives and 
techniques in Saudi Arabia.       
 
 
             Figure (7.4) the most common earnings management motivations and techniques in 
                                                                Saudi Arabia  
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                                    Figure (7.5) Overall results of respondents’ perceptions of earnings management techniques in Saudi Arabia 
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                                        Table (7.7) Respondents’ perceptions of techniques frequently used to manipulate earnings in Saudi Arabia 
 
 Level of agreement (percentage)    
     Total 
Mean score 
 
 
 
   Rank 
 
Standard 
Deviation 
 
 
Corrected  
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
α (alpha) 
(Consistency) 
Questions     1 2 3  4   5  
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.774 
 
1- Manipulation  of the provision of inventory  0 14.5 6.5 55.6 29.6    4.07        4      .828 .390 
2- Manipulation of the amount of receivable  
    Accounts 
0 14.5 6.5 39.7 39.3    4.04        5      1.02 .303 
3- Manipulation of the amount of depreciation 
     accounts    
0 12.1 8.1 42.7 72.1    4.09        3      .914 .424 
4- Manipulation  of the amount of various expenses   
   (such as development costs, maintenance expenses) 
0 12.1 8.1 42.7 37.1    4.07        4     .969 .420 
5- Manipulation  of the amount of loan interest  This item, after conducting pilot study, is removed to meet the research criteria 
6- Manipulation of the amount of revenue 8 21.0 5.6 46.0 26,6    3.76        7     1.09 .528 
7- Manipulation  of the amount of cash flow   2.4 25 22.6 37.9 12.1    3.75        8     1.05 .423 
8- Manipulation  of the amount of reserves    0 12.9 10.5 59.7 16.9    3.80        6      .871 .390 
9- Manipulation  on sales of assets   0 3.2 12.9 54 29.8    4.10        2     .741 .557 
10- Manipulation  of internal transactions  
      related to  business combination 
8 13.7 7.3 39.5 38.7    4.01        9     1.04 .557 
11- Capitalising rather than expensing expenditure 0 9.7 1.6 54.8 33.9    4.12       1     .855 .511 
1-strongly disagree 2- disagree  3-neutral 4- agree  5- strongly agree 
Likert Scale 
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Table (7.8) Non- Parametric Test (Kruskal-Wallis) versus one-way Parametric Test ANOVA  
 
 Kruskal-Wallis  
Non-Parametric Test P. value Sig 
ANOVA one way 
Parametric Test  P.value Sig 
Questions                            Less than 0.05                               Less than 0.05 
1- Manipulation  of the provision of inventory  **      ** 
2- Manipulation of the amount of receivable accounts   
3- Manipulation of the amount of depreciation accounts  *** *** 
4- Manipulation  of the amount of  various expenses 
   (such as development costs,  maintenance expenses) 
  
5- Manipulation of the amount of revenue *** *** 
6- Manipulation  of the amount of cash flow   *** *** 
7- Manipulation  of the amount of reserves      
8- Manipulation  on sales of assets     
9- Manipulation  of internal transactions related to   
      business combination 
  
10- Capitalising rather than expensing expenditure   
*p < 0.05   **P < 0.01  *** P < 0.001 
Note: One-way ANOVA is an additional or secondary test to verify the results   
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Table (7.9) Descriptive statistics of overall means for each group and multiple comparison test  
 
 Mean  Mann-Whitney Test – Post Hoc test 
Questions  Board of directors Sub-Committee Auditor Academic Board of director 
     (Sig) with 
Sub-Committee 
       (Sig) with 
Auditor 
(Sig) with 
Academic 
( Sig) with 
1- Manipulation  of the provision of  
      inventory  
3.82 4.29 4.39   4.00        Auditor 
   Sub-Committee 
Board of director 
 
Board of director 
 
 
2- Manipulation of the amount of receivable  
    accounts 
3.96 4.22 4.17   3.94   No significant differences among groups 
3- Manipulation of the amount of  
      depreciation  accounts 
          4.33          3.82 3.87   4.36          Auditor 
   Sub-Committee 
Board of director 
   Academic 
Board of director 
   Academic 
         Auditor 
   Sub-Committee 
4- Manipulation  of the amount of  various 
     expenses (such as development costs, and 
      maintenance expenses) 
4.06 4.24 4.06   4.10               No significant differences among groups 
5- Manipulation of the amount of revenue 3.41          4.11 4.12  3.46        Auditor 
   Sub-Committee         
Board of director 
  Academic 
Board of director 
   Academic 
       Auditor 
   Sub-Committee 
6- Manipulation  of the amount of cash flow   4.01 3.33 3.62  4.06        Auditor 
   Sub-Committee 
 
Board of director 
   Academic 
 
Board of director 
   Academic 
 
       Auditor 
Sub-Committee 
 
7- Manipulation  of the amount of reserves    4.13 3.79 3.61  3.86               No significant differences among groups 
8- Manipulation  on sales of assets   4.23 4.04 4.10  4.16               No significant differences among groups 
9- Manipulation  of internal transactions 
      related to  business combination 
4.20 3.97  4.07  4.11               No significant differences among groups 
10- Capitalising rather than expensing 
       expenditure 
4.00 4.50 4.20  4.07               No significant differences among groups 
*p < 0.05   **P < 0.01  *** P < 0.001 
                                                                               Note: Using Post-Hoc is an additional or secondary test to verify the results   
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7.4 Do Internal Corporate Governance Mechanisms Remedy Earnings 
      Management in Saudi Arabia?   
         
As concluded in the previous section the motivations for Saudi managers to manipulate reporting of 
earnings may be affected by different objectives related to their external contract, management 
compensation and capital market motivations. Thus, it is essential for a company to establish 
effective mechanisms such as corporate governance to protect the rights of investors in obtaining 
true and fair financial information. As mentioned previously, the Saudi Capital Market Authority 
has issued corporate governance regulations as guiding principles for all Saudi listed companies; 
however, in 2010 most regulations became mandatory.   
 
Since the implementation of corporate governance in Saudi Arabia is still at a very preliminary 
phase the benefits need to be understood in order to successfully constrain unlawful activities 
relating to earnings management. This section attempts to elicit the opinions of respondents who are 
familiar with this issue, on the role of internal corporate governance mechanisms for deterring 
earnings management. Hence, a number of questions were posed in the questionnaire and 
interviews derived from prior research related to the role of corporate governance mechanisms that 
may remedy earnings management. Corporate governance in Saudi Arabia was viewed by many of 
the participants as a new concept that needs more time for the new regulations to be assimilated. In 
this regard, a member of boards of directors stated that:  
 
“The concept of corporate governance is a new concept within the Saudi 
environment that was not discussed in advance with the legislator. Corporate 
governance is at a very important stage in the Saudi Market; however, the Saudi 
legislator should have given background information and discussed the concept 
with Saudi companies before its implementation since that would have provided 
homogenous implementation. Most companies believe that they perform well so 
they do need corporate governance or more regulation because they do not know 
about the main objectives for corporate governance”  
 
       
On the other hand, other groups as proponents saw that internal corporate governance mechanisms 
are not a new concept and there is no complicated idea or mystery associated with their 
implementation because the Saudi Capital Market Authority translated the terms of corporate 
governance into Arabic and all companies were invited to ask about anything they did not 
understand. During the interviews, one of the academic staff stated: 
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 “In my view, corporate governance is not a new concept as claimed. Corporate 
governance is a modification or arrangement of previous roles such as that of the 
audit committee that were established previously. Thus, the new concept is not 
acceptable at all. All companies should be adapted via the understanding of 
objectives of implementation and the advantages that can be achieved”       
                              
 
7.4.1 The role of the board of directors and its effect on earnings management:                                                       
This section focuses on interviewees’ perceptions and the results of the questionnaire on the role 
played by boards in constraining earnings management. Firstly, interviewees indicated a key point 
related to frequency of board meetings and board size. For instance, one member of the boards of 
directors expressed his opinion on how frequent meetings and board size may affect earnings 
management. He stated that:           
  
“Successful boards of directors should meet frequently to discuss the important 
issues. Some boards of directors meet just four times annually to endorse the 
quarterly financial statements and they are not really aware of their duties towards 
shareholders. Moreover, a large board of directors is better than a small one since 
it has variety of experiences which is helpful in reaching wise decisions” 
 
On the other hand, agency theory expects that the presence of independent members on boards of 
directors will enhance the boards' ability to monitor management (Young, 2008). Institutional 
theory views these mechanisms as practices or regulations as a result of coercion from legislators 
who impose certain practices in order to improve organizational effectiveness or as a result of 
imitation. The Saudi Capital Market Authority mandates that the majority of members of a board of 
directors should be non-executive. According to the research, Ebrahim (2007), Benkel et al. (2006), 
Uzun et al. (2004) and Persons (2006) show that the proportion of independent board members is 
related to reduced levels of earnings management. One audit committee member expressed his 
opinion by indicating that:  
 
“I think most Saudi listed companies comply with regulations which require that 
the majority of members of boards of directors should be non-executive. This 
action will safeguard the rights of investors and give more protection to minority 
shareholders. However, in my view, the key issue related to the independence of 
members should be given attention because more independence will provide more 
protection”   
 169 
 
With regard to the previous statement, participants stressed a crucial point that might impair the 
independence of boards leading to increased earnings management. This point relates to the 
procedure of the appointment of board members that is affected by cultural factors. A member of 
the sub-committees emphasised that:   
 
“Because of the nature of the culture of Saudi society, the appointment of a 
member of a board of directors is effected by nepotism which plays a significant 
role in the selection of members, whether to a board of directors or to sub-
committees. This behaviour is expected to considerably impair a board’s 
independence which leads to increased risks in a company” 
 
  
Although  the culture and religious framework may play a substantial role of internal corporate 
governance, this study does not aim to examine causality, but rather the association between 
earnings management and attributes of monitoring mechanisms.       
 
Additionally, agency theory suggests that high insider ownership provides better corporate 
governance structure, which leads to a high quality of financial reporting (Sanchez and Meca, 
2005). Warfield et al. (1995) present evidence that managerial shareholding has a negative 
relationship with earnings management. Moreover, because of a lack of disclosure regarding the 
shares held by board members, particularly by independent members or outside directors, the 
investigation regarding this issue was extended by interviewing a member of a board and an 
academic who stated that: 
  
 “Recently Saudi regulations mandate that each member of a board of directors 
should hold at least 1000 shares. This action might encourage members to protect 
their benefits as shareholders by monitoring management. They will also be very 
keen to obtain high earnings and grow their shares via improving performance” 
 
 
From another perspective, and relating to board ownership on the one hand and board independence 
on the other hand, one of the academic staff stated that:  
 
       “Most shareholders holding a high proportion of shares use their power to 
appoint their relatives as outside directors on boards of directors as a kind of 
delegation that results in an expropriation of rights of minority shareholders 
of getting a board with high independence”   
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It is worthwhile noting that the Saudi Capital Market Authority has recently issued the following 
resolution:  
 
                3 “Amending the definition of “Independent Member” in paragraph (b) of Article 2 of these 
Regulations to include as infringements of independence the ownership of 5% or more 
of the company or its group by the member of the Board of Directors or a representative 
of a legal entity which owns 5% or more of the company or its group. The amendments 
shall be applied on companies that apply for listing on the Saudi Stock Exchange 
(Tadawul) from the date of its publication. And will be applied on companies listed on 
the Exchange upon the appointment of any member of board, starting from the date 
1/1/2011” 
 
 
Regarding another characteristic of internal corporate governance, Sarkar et al. (2006) found that 
earnings management is higher when the chair of the board also holds the CEO position. Therefore, 
Saudi regulations prohibit conjoining the position of chairman of board of directors with any other 
executive position in the company. The interviewer discussed this issue with a participant who is 
chairman of an agriculture company. He suggested that:  
 
“In my opinion, the separation between the position of chairman and CEO is an 
important matter in protecting shareholders, but it is not really applied in all 
companies. The separation is applied in appearance but not real fact. In most 
companies the CEO has a close relationship with the chairman that impairs 
accountability” 
          . 
To overcome previous issue, CEO should not have any a close relationship or strong friendship with 
chairman which may impair accountability.  
   
Interestingly, there may be situations where several people are more powerful than others, so that 
those who have greater power influence the behaviour of the others to get things done (Clark, 
2004). Moreover, the diversity of a board of directors enhances the effectiveness of the board’s 
actions, increasing the performance and productivity of the company, which leads to increased 
profitability and shareholder value. Under agency theory, a more diverse board is likely to monitor 
the management because board diversity increases board independence. Carter et al. (2003a) found 
a positive relationship between the percentage of ethnic minority directors and performance. Cater 
et al. (2007) also stress that diverse board composition seems to generate value for shareholders. In 
Saudi Arabia, many members of the royal family are appointed as members of boards of directors; 
                                                             
3  This resolution was issued on 16-3-2010 while the fieldwork was being conducted.   
 171 
 
thus, the presence of royal family members might increase the firm’s value because having royal 
family members sitting on boards as owners, they expose the firm to a competitive environment, 
which leads to improved performance in addition to the business benefits through informal 
nextworks. Saudi listed companies are dominated by royal family members who mainly serve on 
the board of directors as managerial members; therefore, they may monitor the management 
closely, thereby decreasing possible mismanagement and wrongdoing. In this regard, a member of 
the academic staff said that:  
 
“I do not think that the existence of royal family members might constrain 
earnings management. However, the integration and variety of the board in terms 
of experience and qualifications leads to enhance board activities that would 
enable them to monitor the executives” 
 
 
In section 3, questionnaire respondents were given a number of board characteristics that might 
constrain earnings management. These characteristics were mainly derived from the previous 
literature as discussed earlier. According to the questionnaire, as shown in Figure 7.6 and Table 
7.10 (pages 178 and 179), the majority of respondents highlighted six actions of corporate 
governance related to boards of directors. More than 80% of respondents viewed that frequent 
meetings, large board size, high proportion of outside directors and the separation between the 
position of chairperson and CEO are key characteristics of boards of directors in constraining 
earnings management. However, the existence of royal family members on the board did not 
receive agreement as a possible factor in constraining earnings management. It is worthwhile noting 
that apart from the separation between functions of chairperson and CEO, there is no significant 
difference between the groups regarding others characteristics. As the auditors group and the sub-
committees have more experience than the other groups, they believed separation to be more 
effective in constraining earnings management than other groups. The findings can be reflected in 
means scores of more than (4) for five characteristics of boards of directors.  
 
7.4.2 The role of the audit committee and its impact on earnings management:                                                         
In the interviews, participants were asked how audit committee size and frequency of meetings can 
influence earnings management in Saudi Arabia. A member of the academic staff viewed that:  
 
“In theory, audit committees in Saudi listed companies should play a significant role 
in protecting the rights of investors against any wrongdoings but, in practice audit 
 172 
 
committees do not perform the role required properly. For example, from my 
experience in research, there is no active communication between these committees 
and auditors, and most of these committees are established in compliance with 
Saudi regulations”  
 
 
Moreover, an audit team manager believed that communication between auditors and audit 
committees would contribute to reducing information asymmetry and solve a large number of issues 
related to financial reporting. Several issues which might occur because of the lack of 
communication between external auditors and audit committees have been identified in the 
following comments presented by external auditor:   
 
“I do not rely on the audit committee. I have never met a member of the audit 
committee and I have never been invited by them to discuss the main issues. I 
always meet the top-manager or financial manager in the company. I think 
members of audit committees do not behave toward their role, as they should, so 
they will not constrain any wrongdoings” 
   
The previous statements suggest that the framework of the audit committee’s role seems to be 
evident and well-organized in theory; however, practically it is not successful and effective since 
most members of audit committees do not perform their role properly. These comments led this 
researcher to interview a member of an audit committee to ascertain the reasons for the weak role of 
audit committees in Saudi listed companies. He stated that:   
              
                   “I agree that the role of audit committee is ineffective. From my experience, this 
issue arises because: 1- Our recompense is inadequate to encourage us to 
perform our duties, as we should. 2- Most members of audit committees in 
Saudi listed companies are part-time which does not enable them to perform 
their duties properly.3- We do not feel that we are responsible toward 
shareholders and the culture affects us in doing things as management wants, 
otherwise we will be dismissed” 
 
 
To overcome this issue, he suggested that:  
“I think audit committees members should feel responsible for their duties by 
making them issue a report attached with the financial report clarifying their 
responsibilities for the integrity of financial reporting. In addition, all 
members should be full-time and obtain beneficial recompense”           
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Moreover, Yang and Krishnan (2005); Abbott et al. (2003); Bedard et al. (2004) and DeZoort and 
Salterio (2001) imply that a significant negative relationship exists between an audit committee that 
includes at least one member with financial expertise and earnings management. In Saudi Arabia, 
corporate governance regulations mandate that audit committees should include at least one 
member with financial expertise. During the interviews, a member of the boards of directors was 
interviewed to explore his opinion on this matter. He viewed that:  
       
“The existence of a financial expert as a member of the audit committee is 
very important. Their financial expertise would add valuable effect by 
increasing the understanding of complicated issues and help other members to 
take beneficial decisions practically in difficult times. However, most 
companies select the expert according to “a known person is better than an 
unknown one” since they aim to keep their business confidential which leads 
them to ignore efficiency and experience”      
  
According to the research, Bedard et al. (2004), Abbott et al. (2004), Ebrahim et al. (2007) and Xie 
et al. (2003) emphasise that independent audit committees can reduce the occurrence of earnings 
management. Thus, Saudi corporate governance regulations mandate that all members of audit 
committees should be independent. One member of the audit committees viewed that:  
                          
                     “Independence is a very important characteristics in audit committees, 
however in my view most audit committees in Saudi listed companies are less 
independent since most members are appointed on audit committees by 
nepotism, not for their experience or education. Moreover, independence can 
be impaired by the increase of fear of dismissal” 
 
 
As can be seen in Figure 7.6 (See page 178), the analysis of the questionnaire survey reveals that 
over three-quarters of respondents agreed or strongly agreed that the following characteristics are 
useful in avoiding earnings management: frequent meetings by audit committees (86%), high 
proportion of outside directors (89%) and the existence of financial experts (93%). However, just 
less than half (45%) of respondents did not agree that a small audit committee might be effective in 
reducing earnings management. It is important to note that, as shown in Table 7.11 (See page 180), 
there is significant difference between the groups regarding three characteristics: frequent meetings, 
audit committee size, expertise. Firstly, as indicated in Table 7.12 (See page181) the majority of 
members of boards of directors (86.5%), sub-committee members (95%) and academic staff (89%) 
agreed or strongly agreed that frequent meeting of audit committees is likely to constrain earnings 
management. However, because of the lack of their experience in this field there was lower 
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agreement by the auditors group (79%) in respect of this characteristic. Secondly, with regards to 
audit committee size, although most respondents perceived that a small audit committee would not 
be effective in reducing earnings management and this was reflected in an overall mean score of 
only 2.88, the sub-committee group believed that a small audit committee is more effective than a 
large one. This view is consistent with the idea that a small audit committee might reach a 
beneficial decision more easily than a large committee. Finally, as can be seen in Tables 7.10 and 
7.12 (Pages 179 and 181), although the majority of members of boards of directors (93%), sub-
committee members (90%), and auditors (89%) agreed or strongly agreed that the existence of 
financial expertise is a good way of constraining earnings management, the academics showed 
greater agreement (98%) reflected in their overall mean score (4.88).  
 
7.4.3 Nomination and remuneration committees: 
In this section, the study attempts to elicit the respondents’ views on the effectiveness of 
remuneration and nomination committee characteristics on earnings management. Overall, the 
majority of respondents showed a low level of agreement compared to audit committee 
characteristics as effective in the prevention of earnings management. This is reflected in overall 
mean scores in Table 7.10 for each characteristic as follows: Frequent meetings (3.58), small 
committee size (2.94) and the proportion of outside directors (3.67). However, a level of 
disagreement occurred by respondents about the existence of CEOs on remuneration and 
nomination committees (2.44). During the interviews one of the members of the boards of directors 
declared that:     
       
“Remuneration and nomination committees have been established recently by all 
listed companies. Despite the importance of their role, I think these committees 
need more time to be effective. In my view, these committees might not play a 
crucial role in mitigating earnings management practices. However, they might 
have an indirect role by improving the role of the board of directors by nominating 
qualified members that will be reflected on others committees such as the audit 
committee” 
 
 
One of the academic staff expressed his concerns regarding the CEO being a member of 
remuneration and nomination committee as possibly impairing its independence as follows: 
 
“The existence of the CEO as chair of the remuneration and nomination 
committee might impair its independence by imposing his suggestions of selecting 
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board members or in relation to payment. In the case of board members attempting 
to satisfy the CEO, the board of directors may be destroyed”  
 
 
6.6 Does Ownership Concentration Mitigate Earnings Management in  
        Saudi Arabia?   
   
Figure 7.6 (See page 178) reports the analysis of respondents’ opinions related to ownership 
concentration and earnings management. Almost three-quarters of respondents (71%) agreed that 
controlling shareholders might constrain earnings management. This result represents a lower 
percentage than others questions and this was reflected in the overall mean score (3.58).  Moreover, 
Table 7.11 (See page 180) indicates that there is no difference between the groups regarding 
ownership structure.  
 
Family ownership sometimes reaches 95% of a company’s capital as revealed in the secondary data. 
However, as has been shown by the secondary data, well-known families in Saudi Arabia own 
approximately 13% of Saudi listed companies’ capital. An interview with a member of a board of 
directors indicated the likelihood of capability of family ownership in constraining earnings 
management in companies because they are concerned with earnings. He expressed his opinion as 
follows:   
                           “In my view, family shareholders are concerned with earnings, and they 
might realise the number of risks in the company. They have an overall 
image of the company and know what is going wrong. Moreover, they are 
very mindful of the company’s reputation. For example, the most 
successful companies are dominated by family ownership Such as X and 
Y”  
 
 
From a different perspective, one academic’s opinion presented a pessimistic view regarding family 
ownership concentration. He stated that: 
 
                          “Groups of families dominate a large number of Saudi companies which 
is highly risky. Because we do not have more protection in the Saudi 
Market, family concentration might increase earnings management as a 
type of expropriation of the rights of other shareholders”     
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Comments provided by members of boards of directors and academics are consistent with two 
opposing arguments. Jaggi et al (2009) argue that family control via ownership might be healthy 
because they will be effective on the board in limiting management’s ability to manipulate; 
however, in countries that have a lack of protection for investors, family ownership may be less 
effective and lead managers to manipulate earnings.  
  
As indicated in the secondary data, state-ownership sometimes reaches 83% of a company’s capital 
and the Saudi government dominates, on average, 8% of companies’ capital. One sub-committee 
member, also an academic, expressed his opinion in respect of the effect of state ownership on 
earnings management.   
   
                           “Most companies in which the governments hold more shares are 
subjected to rigorous monitoring, whether by BIG 4 auditor or by 
government, so state-owned companies are considered safer in terms of 
investment; therefore manipulation should be less than in other 
companies”     
 
The third type of ownership structure which can exist in the Saudi market is institutional. 
Institutional ownership sometimes reaches 75% of a company’s capital as the secondary data 
revealed. The interviewees suggested possible explanations for the effect of institutional ownership 
on earnings management.  A member of the academic staff, who said it had a potential effect, stated 
that:      
 
 
“We should differentiate between long-term and short-term institutional 
investors. Long-term institutional investors have an incentive to mitigate 
opportunistic behaviour by monitoring management since they want to 
protect their benefits and improve performance. However, short-term 
institutional investors have objectives for short-term investment, so they 
might not pay attention to opportunistic behaviour, which could lead to 
increased earnings management” 
 
        
Previous comments made by a member of sub-committee are consistent with Koh’s (2003) result. 
He found that there is a positive relationship between earnings management and the percentage of 
short-term institutional ownership and a negative relationship in long-term institutional ownership. 
Generally, in short-term ownership, the investor might be motivated to manipulate earnings 
management; however this motivation might be restricted in long-term ownership. 
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In summary, the possible conflict of interests between controlling shareholders and minority might 
be motivation of earnings management in Saudi Arabia since ownership structure is the primary 
determinant of agency cost. There is moderate agreement among respondents, lower than in the 
responses to other questions, about the effectiveness of ownership concentration on earnings 
management practices in Saudi Arabia. However, the type of ownership structure might have a 
different effect on earnings management. For example, the interviews reveal that state ownership 
companies are safer in terms of manipulation because of entrenchment. In relation to institutional 
ownership, and family ownership, two views have been presented according the nature of 
investment.  
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           Figure (7.6) Overall result of respondents’ perceptions of the effect of CG and ownership structure on constraining EM 
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                                                                         Table (7.10) Respondents’ Perceptions of the role CG on constraining EM  
 
 
 
Level of agreement (percentage)    
     Total 
Mean score 
 
 
 
   Rank 
 
Standard 
Deviation 
 
 
Corrected  
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach's α 
(alpha) 
(Consistency) 
Questions     1 2 3  4   5  
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.780 
 
1- Frequent meetings of board of directors    8.1 4   3 51.8 33.1       4.13         5     .726 .392 
2- Small size of board of directors    4.6 40.5  22 24 8.3      2.79        11        .981 .354 
3-  High proportion of outside directors on board of directors 10.1 4.4   3 45 37.5       4.05 7      .651 .596 
4- High proportion of shares owned by board of  directors    0 10.7 3.2 49.8 36.3      4.10         6      .873 .587 
5- Existence of royal family members on the board of directors 
7.6 58.6 10.2 17.2 5.6        2.25  14       .951 .054 
6- Separation between functions of CEO and chair of board        8 1.6   8 37.9 58.9      4.52         2     .680   .335 
7- Frequent meetings of audit committee        0  6.5 1.6 50 41.9      4.27         4     .789  .473 
8- Small size of audit committee (no more than 3)    4 51.6 15.3 24.2 4.8       2.74 12      1.02 .303 
9-  High proportion of outside directors on audit  committee    8 5.6 3.2 27.4 62.9       4.45 3      .868 .310 
10- Sufficient expertise in accounting, auditing  
       and/or finance  on audit committee    
   0   8  4 25.8 69.4       4.63 1      .602 .278 
11- Frequent meetings of remuneration and  
       Nomination committee. 
  0 27.4  9.8  45 17       3.58 9       1.07 .337 
12 - Small size of remuneration and nomination  
                   
 1.1 40  29 24.2 5.6       2.94 10      .939 .412 
13-  High proportion of outside directors on 
       remuneration and nomination committee 
  0 16.9 8.1 56.5 18.5       3.67 8      .946 .414 
14- CEO should not serve on  remuneration and 
       nomination committee 
15.3  46 17  21 0       2.44        13     .990 .529 
15- High proportion of family, institutional, or governmental  
        ownership   
3.2 15.3 9.7 63.7 8.1       3.58         9     .995 .346 
1-strongly disagree 2- disagree  3-neutral 4- agree  5- strongly agree 
Likert Scale 
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Table (7.11) Non- Parametric Test (Kruskal-Wallis) versus one-way Parametric Test ANOVA  
 
 Kruskal-Wallis  
Non-Parametric Test P. value Sig 
ANOVA one way 
Parametric Test  P.value Sig 
Questions                            Less than 0.05                               Less than 0.05 
1- Frequent meetings of board of directors      
2- Small size of board of directors      
3-  High proportion of outside directors on board of directors   
4- High proportion of shares owned by board of  directors   
5- Existence of royal family members on the board of directors   
6- Separation between functions of CEO and  chair of board     * * 
7- Frequent meetings audit committee     * * 
8- Small size of audit committee (no more than 3) ** ** 
9-  High proportion of outside directors on audit  committee   
10- Sufficient expertise in accounting, auditing  
       and/or finance  on audit committee    
* * 
11- Frequent meetings of remuneration and  
       Nomination committee. 
*** *** 
12 - Small size of remuneration and nomination  
                   
*** *** 
13-  High proportion of outside directors on 
       remuneration and nomination committee 
*** *** 
14- CEO should not serve on  remuneration and 
       nomination committee 
*** *** 
15- - High proportion of family, institutional, or governmental  
        ownership   
  
*p < 0.05   **P < 0.01  *** P < 0.001 
Note: Using ANOVA one way is an additional or secondary test to verify the results   
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                                                 Table (7.12)  Descriptive statistics of means for each groups and multiple comparison test 
 Mean  Mann-Whitney Test – Post Hoc test 
Questions  Board of directors Sub-Committee Auditor Academic Board of director 
     (Sig) with 
Sub-Committee 
       (Sig) with 
Auditor 
(Sig) with 
Academic 
( Sig) with 
1- Frequent meetings of board of directors    4.39      4.20  4.02 4.03            No significant differences among groups 
2- Small size of board of directors    2.51       3.04 2.97 2.70            No significant differences among groups 
3-  High proportion of outside directors on board of directors       4.00 4.11 3.97 4.12            No significant differences among groups 
4- High proportion of shares owned by board of  directors 4.11 4.12 4.00 4.20            No significant differences among groups 
5- Existence of royal family members on the board of directors 2.30 2.22 2.31 2.20            No significant differences among groups 
6- Separation between functions of CEO and chair of board      4.26 4.79 4.39 4.66 Sub-Committee 
Academic 
Board of director 
      Auditor 
 Sub-Committee Board of director 
 
7- Frequent meetings of audit committee     4.34 4.41 3.97 4.47       Auditor Sub-Committee 
Academic 
Auditor 
8- Small size of audit committee (no more than 3) 2.47 3.33 2.41 2.88 Sub-Committee Board of director 
     Auditor 
 Sub-Committee 
   Academic 
Auditor 
9-  High proportion of outside directors on audit  committee 4.74 4.50 4.48 4.81           No significant differences among groups 
10- Sufficient expertise in accounting, auditing  
       and/or finance  on audit committee    
4.65 4.50 4.48 4.88  Academic Academic 
 
Sub-Committee 
Auditor 
11- Frequent meetings of remuneration and  
       Nomination committee. 
3.90 4.29 2.90 3.60 Auditor Board of director 
Auditor 
Academic 
Academic 
Sub-Committee 
Auditor 
Sub-Committee 
12 - Small size of remuneration and nomination  
                   
2.69       3.91 2.43 3.02  Sub-Committee Board of director 
Auditor 
Academic 
Academic 
Sub-Committee 
Sub-Committee 
Auditor 
 
13-  High proportion of outside directors on 
       remuneration and nomination committee 
4.00       3.87 2.97 4.43 Auditor 
 
Academic 
Auditor 
Board of director 
Academic 
Sub-Committee 
Auditor 
14- CEO should serve on  remuneration and 
       nomination committee 
2.39       2.90 1.82 2.44 Auditor Auditor Board of director 
Academic- Sub-Com 
Auditor 
 
15- High proportion of family, institutional, or governmental  
        ownership   
3.70       3.87 3.13 3.61            No significant differences among groups 
*p < 0.05   **P < 0.01  *** P < 0.001 
                                                                               Note: Using Post-Hoc is an additional or secondary test to verify the results   
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 7.6 Do External Audit Factors Affect Earnings Management? 
In Saudi Arabia, the regulators' concern is that manipulation of earnings management is 
attributed to lower audit quality that might contribute to providing non-transparent information 
thereby misleading the shareholders in their decision-making (Saudi Accounting Journal, 
2008). As a whole, the role of corporate governance on constraining earnings management has 
been discussed previously as a safeguard and the main focus of this section is to shed light on 
the role of the external audit as a safeguard in constraining earnings management. For this 
purpose, many effective factors related to external audit of constraining earnings management 
were prepared and presented in Section 4 of the questionnaire and interviews based on the 
ongoing debate in accounting literature. 
 
           7.6.1 Brand Name (BIG4) 
As shown in Figure 7.7 (See page 186), approximately 91.8% of respondents agreed or strongly 
agreed with contracting firms that high independence and a good reputation will mitigate 
earnings management practices because of their ability to detect earnings management 
practices. Moreover, more than 80% of respondents perceived that contracting a local firm 
affiliated with BIG4 would reduce the occurrence of earnings management. However, among 
this support, as indicated by Table 7.14 (See page 188), there is significant difference between 
groups regarding contracting a local firm affiliated with BIG4. Although the majority (94.4%) 
of the academics and 87.4% of the sub-committee members agreed or strongly agreed that 
contracting a local firm affiliated with BIG4 would constrain earnings management, lower 
agreement was shown by the members of boards of directors (66%) and the auditors (77%).   
  
           This is consistent with the expectations; members of boards of directors are very keen to give 
local auditors the opportunity to prove their quality and skills in the Saudi audit market with the 
aim of Saudi recruitment. On the other hand, and because of competition, Saudi audit firms 
would confirm that their quality and performance are as good as those of BIG4.  
 
During the interviews, previous aspects provided by BIG4 were discussed with participants 
suggesting that BIG4 is adequately independent and provides good quality. However, some 
reservations were raised regarding the Saudi audit market. One of these reservations was 
presented by the manager of an audit team who viewed that:      
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“The Saudi audit market faces serious issues that might affect audit quality. 
These issues can be summarized as follow: 1- the monopoly of audit services 
by a small number of audit firms. 2- Illegal competition between audit firms. 
3- Audit service fees decrease. These issues reduce the audit quality in the 
Saudi market that might lead to increased information asymmetry” 
 
 
 
            One member of a board of directors stated that:          
 
“In my opinion, BIG4 do not necessarily provide a high audit quality 
particularly in the Saudi market. We saw a typical example in the Andersen 
and Enron case; so Saudi firms should be given more opportunities 
enhancing and devolving the Saudi audit market by merging small audit 
firms with big firms”      
 
           The previous view is consistent with the view of Francis (2004) that it is not always the case 
that BIG4 firms provide high audit quality; failure can and does occur.  
 
          7.6.2 Specialist Auditors   
Approximately 25% of Saudi listed companies practise their business in a complex field such 
as petrochemical and multi-investment industries that need a specialist auditor to provide high 
audit quality. In this regards, the results presented in Figure 7.7 and Table 7.13 (See pages 
186 and 187) reveal that the majority (87%) of respondents agreed or strongly agreed that 
contracting with a specialist auditor who understands the client’s business and industry is an 
effective method to reduce earnings management.  However, as shown in Table 7.14 (See 
page188), there is a significant difference between groups regarding this statement. Over 80% 
of members of sub-committees and auditors agreed that contracting with a specialist auditor 
would reduce earnings management, whereas academics and members of boards of directors 
showed a higher level (94% and 90% respectively) of agreement. This was reflected in overall 
mean scores for each group as follows: academics, 4.72; members of board of directors, 4.52; 
members of sub-committees, 4.29 and auditors, 4.02. There are several explanations for this 
result. Since members of boards of directors and academic staff are not practitioners, they 
understand the importance of specialization of industry. By contrast, sub-committees 
members and auditors, as practitioners, might not give much importance to specialization in 
constraining earnings management compared to the other groups. Overall, contracting 
specialist auditors was ranked the second most important factor in detecting earnings 
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management. Prior findings were consistent with the following opinion of one academic in 
Saudi Arabia:  
   
“Understanding clients’ industry and business is essential in order to 
determine the potential risks that lead to detecting earning 
management. In my view, an auditor with an inadequate knowledge 
and low experience in industry is very risky since he will not identify 
the risky area in a company that encourages management to commit 
fraud”               
  
   
           7.6.3 Auditor Tenure  
In Saudi Arabia, agreement has recently been reached that auditor tenure with a client should 
be no more than five years. As shown in figure 7.7 (See page 186), approximately 86% of 
respondents agreed or strongly agreed that shorter tenure would increase the auditor’s 
independence, thus enabling him to detect earnings management, and this was reflected in the 
overall mean score (4.30).  However, as indicated by Table 7.14 (See page 188), there is 
significant difference between the groups regarding audit tenure. Even though the majority 
(93.2%) of the academics, 87.8% of the members of boards of directors and 85% of the 
members of sub-committees agreed with the notion that shorter tenure for auditors enables 
them to constrain earnings management, there was a lower agreement level provided by the 
auditors (79%). The view of the auditors might be consistent with the second notion that 
suggests that lengthy auditor tenure might provide depth of understanding to the auditor 
enabling him to detect earnings management. In Thailand, Pornupatham (2006) found that the 
majority of external auditors (92%) agreed that lengthy tenure might help them to identify 
risks to clients. Earlier results were reflected in the overall mean scores as follows: academics, 
4.66; members of boards of directors, 4.39; members of sub-committees, 4.25 and auditors, 
3.97. The results of the questionnaire are consistent with the views of one academic who 
suggested that:  
 
“Recent regulations regarding auditor tenure contributes to enhancing 
auditor independence that will be reflected in audit quality. In my view, two 
to four years is an adequate period for auditors to understand a client’s 
business and identify areas of risk that will lead them to detect earnings 
management. However, more than five years might make the auditor more 
lenient since the relationship will be affected by the culture”               
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Earlier results obtained from the questionnaires and interviews with regard to the 
effectiveness of auditor tenure and earnings management is consistent with the prominent 
notion that suggests lengthy tenure would affect the auditor’s independence leading to lower 
audit quality. 
 
7.7 Issuing Deterrent Punishments and Stricter Auditing Standards and Accounting 
      Legislations 
 
           Recently, official Saudi organizations such as the Ministry of Commerce & Industry, Saudi 
Capital Market Authority, and Saudi Organization for Certified Public Accounting have 
begun to impose fines on companies that do not commit to full-disclosure. Moreover, a 
number of auditing firms have been punished by being forbidden to practise audit services for 
a while as they have violated professional standards of auditing. These actions might enhance 
audit quality as well as the integrity of financial reporting, leading to a reduction in 
information asymmetry. On the other hand, attention must be paid to accounting and auditing 
standards to reinforce the transparency of financial reporting and enhance the audit quality 
alike.        
 
           Figure7.7 and Table 7.13 (See page 186 and 187) indicate that whereas over just 80% of 
respondents agreed that the issuing of stricter auditing and accounting standards contribute to 
deterring earnings management, approximately 88% of them also agreed with the issuing of 
deterrent punishments against offenders. During the interviews, a member of the boards of 
director suggested that developing audit standards should be the first step toward enhancing 
audit quality. He stated that:       
  
“If we wish to constrain earning management or any wrongdoings, we 
should enhance external auditing by developing its standards and other 
standards related to the auditing profession” 
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                                     Figure (7.7) Overall result of respondents’ perceptions about the effectiveness of external audit factors on constraining EM 
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                                                     Table (7.13) Respondents’ Perceptions of the Role of External  Audit Factors on Constraining EM  
 
 Level of agreement (percentage)    
     Total 
Mean score 
 
 
 
   Rank 
 
Standard 
Deviation 
 
 
Corrected  
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
α (alpha) 
(Consistency) 
Questions     1 2 3  4   5  
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.814 
 
1- Contracting with a firm which has high 
   independence and  good reputation  
0   0 3 33.1 64.5         4.59         1     .632 .533 
2- Contracting with a local firm affiliated with 
     BIG4 
0   23 3 47 51         4.10            5     1.08 .388 
3-  Contracting with a specialist auditor in industry  0  3.2 5.6 41.2 49.5   4.37 2     .737 .680 
4- Short auditor tenure with a company    0  2.4 4 54 39.5         4.30         3     .664 .673 
5- Issuing stricter auditing standards and accounting 
    legislations   
1.6  6.5 2.4 64.5 25         4.04         6     .824 .584 
6- Issuing deterrent punishments 0 4 8 66.9 28.2         4.19         4     .646 .632 
1-strongly disagree 2- disagree  3-neutral 4- agree  5- strongly agree 
Likert Scale 
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Table (7.14) Non- Parametric Test (Kruskal-Wallis) versus one-way Parametric Test ANOVA  
 
 
 Kruskal-Wallis  
Non-Parametric Test P. value Sig 
One-way ANOVA  
Parametric Test  P.value Sig 
Questions                            Less than 0.05                               Less than 0.05 
1- Contracting with a firm which has high 
   independence and  good reputation  
  
2- Contracting with a local firm affiliated with 
     BIG4 
** ** 
3-  Contracting with a specialist auditor in industry  ***                                *** 
4- Short auditor tenure with a company    ***                                *** 
5- Issuing stricter auditing standards and accounting 
    legislations   
*                                  * 
6- Issuing deterrent punishments   
*p < 0.05   **P < 0.01  *** P < 0.001 
Note: Using one way ANOVA is an additional or secondary test to verify the results   
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Table (7.15) Descriptive statistics of means for each groups and multiple comparison test 
 
 
 
 Mean  Mann-Whitney Test – Post Hoc test 
Questions  Boards of directors Sub-Committees Auditors Academics Boards of directors 
     (Sig) with 
Sub-Committees 
       (Sig) with 
Auditors 
(Sig) with 
Academics 
( Sig) with 
1- Contracting with a firm which has high 
   independence and  good reputation  
4.60      4.58 4.49 4.60     
 
2- Contracting with a local firm affiliated with 
     BIG4 
          3.34       4.37  3.87  4.72    Academic  
Sub-committee 
Boards of directors     Academic  Board of directors 
     Academics 
3-  Contracting with a specialist auditor in industry        4.52       4.29 4.02  4.72    Auditor  Academic  Board of directors 
     Academics 
Sub-committee 
     Auditors  
4- Short auditor tenure with a company    4.39 4.25 3.97  4.66   Auditor Academic Boards of directors 
     Academic 
   Auditors 
Sub-committee 
5- Issuing stricter auditing standards and accounting 
    legislations   
4.11 4.16 3.73  4.37     
6- Issuing deterrent punishments 4.22 4.20 4.02  4.43     Academic  Auditor 
*p < 0.05   **P < 0.01  *** P < 0.001 
                                                                               Note: Using Post-Hoc is an additional or secondary test to verify the results   
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          7.8 Conclusions 
As mentioned earlier, the purpose of this study is twofold. The first goal is to illustrate 
additional evidence in terms of earnings management motivations and techniques in Saudi 
Arabia. Secondly, it contributes to the literature by investigating to what extent earnings 
management practices can be affected by a key feature of internal and external corporate 
governance mechanisms. For the former, 124 useable responses to the questionnaire and 15 
semi-structured interviews conducted with members of boards of directors, sub-committee 
members and external auditors were obtained. The questions in the questionnaire and the 
interviews were aimed at eliciting the respondents’ views on the objectives of current study.  
 
In doing so, the assumptions of the current study can be attributed to four factors: 
1- The existence of earnings management practice and its motivations in Saudi listed 
companies to manage earnings management. 
2- The potentiality of using various techniques to engage in financial reporting manipulation. 
3-  The presence of good internal and external corporate governance mechanisms to reduce 
the practice of earnings management.  
      
The findings indicate that the primary reasons for manipulating earnings in Saudi Arabia are: 
“to increase the amount of remuneration”; “to report a reasonable profit and avoid loss”; “to 
obtain a bank loan”;” to increase share prices”.  Over three-quarters (80%) of questionnaire 
respondents from all the groups agreed or strongly agreed with the fourth factor as a reason for 
manipulation in Saudi Arabia. More interestingly, with regards to earnings management 
techniques, the results of the current research suggest that earnings management is largely 
committed by “manipulation of the provision of inventory”; “manipulation of the amount of 
receivable accounts”; “manipulation of the amount of depreciation accounts”; “manipulation of 
amount of expenses”; “manipulation on sales of assets”; “manipulation of internal 
transactions”; and “capitalising rather than expensing expenditure”. The majority (80%) of all 
four groups of respondents agreed or strongly agreed with seven techniques that are used 
frequently. Previous findings are consistent with agency theory that the issues related to the 
separation between ownership and management might lead managers to collude against owners 
to increase their own personal wealth thus, opportunities are given for managers to practice 
their discretion regarding business in order to achieve many objectives. Moreover, institutional 
theory may justify earnings management practices in Saudi Arabia since more pressure from 
the legislator leads Saudi companies to manipulate earnings.    
 191 
 
Moreover, the findings reveal consensus among respondents on the effectiveness of good 
internal corporate governance mechanisms in mitigating earnings management practice. In 
addition 80% of respondents viewed, that information asymmetry is widely expected to be 
mitigated by the following actions: 
1- Frequent meetings by boards of directors. 
2- Large board size. 
3- High proportion of outside directors on boards of directors. 
4- High proportion of shares held by boards of directors. 
5- The separation between the functions of the CEO and the chair of boards. 
6- Frequent meetings of audit committees. 
7- Large audit committee size. 
8- High proportion of outside directors on audit committees. 
9- Sufficient financial expertise on audit committees. 
10-  CEO should not serve on remuneration and nomination committees 
 
Previous perceptions are consistent with agency theory that an internal corporate governance 
including board of directors and sub-committees plays a significant role in enhancing financial 
reporting. However, interview surveys reveal many concerns regarding the role of corporate 
governance such as independence, nepotism, ineffective role of audit committee, weakened 
communication with external audit, less responsibility toward shareholders. This may be 
explained by institutional theory which views that these mechanisms as practices or regulations 
as a result of coercion from legislators who impose certain practices in order to improve 
organizational effectiveness or as result of imitation. Moreover, ownership concentration gain 
moderate support as monitoring mechanism in constraining earnings management in Saudi 
Arabia.                                                                                                                                              
                                                                                                    
On the other hand, over 80% of respondents viewed that contracting with BIG4 auditors that 
have a good reputation and high audit quality with short auditor tenure and specialist auditors 
contributes to reducing earnings management. This is also consistent with agency theory that 
recognises auditing as one of the main monitoring mechanisms for regulating conflicts of 
interest and cutting agency costs. Finally, the majority of them were of the opinion that issuing 
stricter accounting and auditing standards with deterrent punishment might also constrain 
earnings management. However, interviews have revealed underlying issues regarding external 
auditing that can be summarised as follows: A reduction in audit fees in order to attract more 
clients, illegal competition between audit firms, monopoly of audit services by some audit 
firms, violation of auditing standards by some audit firms 
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Chapter Eight 
SECONDARY DATA ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter provided the analysis and findings obtained from the questionnaire 
survey and semi-structured interviews that primarily aimed to answer the research questions 
concerning the potential incentives and techniques of earnings management in Saudi Arabia. 
In addition, the questionnaire survey and semi-structured interviews presented respondents’ 
perceptions of the role of internal corporate governance mechanisms, ownership structure, and 
external auditing in mitigating earnings management. This chapter illustrates the decisive 
analysis and findings obtained from secondary data. The primary purpose of this chapter is to 
answer the research question regarding the impact of internal corporate governance, 
ownership structure and external audit factors on earnings management.  
Based on the above discussion, two empirical research models were adopted to test the 21 
hypotheses summarised in the methodology chapter (See pages 123 and 124). In order to 
perform the analysis of the data, the Modified-Jones Model, and a vast array of explanatory 
variables of external audit factors, ownership structure and  internal corporate governance 
mechanisms were used. Also, control variables such as firm size, financial leverage, 
performance, operating cash flow, and complexity were included in the models. Therefore, 
this chapter is organised as follows: Section 8.2 presents the development of the variables for 
discretionary accruals. Section 8.3 provides and discusses the descriptive statistics, and 
univariate analysis. Section 8.4 explains the correlation matrix. Section 8.5 outlines and 
argues the findings of the examination of the hypotheses. Section 8.6 provides and discusses 
additional analysis and the robustness checks.  Section 8.7 provides a concluding discussion.  
  
8.2 EARNINGS MANAGEMENT (DAC) 
As mentioned in the methodology chapter, the current study employs discretionary accruals as 
a measure of earnings management (See page 125). Discretionary accruals (DAC), used in the 
current study, are calculated as the difference between total accruals and non-discretionary 
accruals, where discretionary accruals are estimated utilizing the modified Jones model 
(1995) developed by Dechow et al. (1995). The modified-Jones model is the most important 
model, which posits that earnings management gives rise to all change in credit sales in the 
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event period since manipulation of credit sales recognition might be more straightforward 
than that of cash flow (Dechow et al. 1995). Additionally, it differs from the Jones model 
(1991) solely by adjusting for the change in receivables in the event period since this method 
assumes that there is no systematic management. Absolute discretionary accruals are applied 
as the magnitude of the deviation of reported earnings rather than the direction of earnings 
management. Table 8.1 provides the descriptive statistics for the estimated coefficients of the 
earnings management model during the period 2006-2009 allocated for the current study.  
In order to estimate, coefficients (ά1,ά2,ά3 respectively) are designed in the above model, an 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with no intercept is applied to estimate the equation 
for a specific event period. Moreover, to calculate discretionary accruals, the difference 
between total accruals and non-discretionary accruals is calculated. The estimation of total 
accruals covers 13 industries over four financial years. 
 
Table (8.1) Summary Statistics of Earnings Management Model Coefficients 
Variables Mean  Median Max Min 
Total assets  (000)  78.6 630.6 175000 -195000 
Sales (revenue) 0.282 0.069 4.765 -1.317 
PPE -0.067 -0.033 0.141 -0.418 
 
Since it is important to differentiate between discretionary and non-discretionary accruals, the 
statistical properties of the model’s coefficients outlined in Table 8.1 indicate that the sign of 
property, plant, and equipment (PPE) variable is negative (-0.067). This is consistent with 
expectations since it constitutes income-decreasing (i.e., depreciation and amortisation 
expense). However, the sign of the change in sales (revenues) is positive due the fact that the 
change in revenue is different from the change of (PPE), which may result in income-
increasing or income-decreasing.    
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Dechow et al. (1995) argue that the modified-Jones model is more effective than its standard 
version at detecting revenue-based manipulation. In addition, as a calculation of earnings 
management, the modified Jones model (1995) has an explanatory power of 38%, (average 
of   ) and is significant at the level of 1%. Hence, it seems that the model is well-developed 
and results in accurate calculation for separating total accruals into their discretionary and 
non-discretionary components.       
8.3 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND UNIVARIATE ANALYSES 
This section illustrates descriptive statistics and univariate analyses for all observations 
containing mean, median, minimum, maximum, skewness, and kurtosis for each model 
separately. However, control variables for the two models will be discussed together. For 
analytic purpose, all variables were divided based on the level of discretionary accruals into 
low and high discretionary accruals according to the firm’s level of discretionary accruals that 
is lower or higher than the yearly cross-sectional median. The rationale behind dividing 
companies into two groups according to high EM and low EM is to enable the current study to 
have more insight regarding to what extent corporate governance mechanisms and external 
auditing may be effective and it is additionally anticipated that extra information will be 
presented with regard to companies’ characteristics such as size, leverage, and growth. 
The following section attempts to interpret and discuss the results obtained from descriptive 
statistics and the univariate tests for both models. Additionally, descriptive statistics according 
to sample years is provided in the appendix in Tables 9 and 10 (See pages 290 and 291).  It is 
worth mentioning that a non-parametric test (Mann Whitney test) is used as the primary test 
since the data did not meet parametric test conditions; however, the parametric test (t-test) is 
also applied as a means of robustness.  
8.3.1 Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Analyses for the First Model 
8.3.1.1 Discretionary accruals  
As indicated in Table 8.2 (See page 198) outlining general descriptive statistics concerned 
with the first model’s variables, the magnitude of value of DAC has approximately the value 
of 0.103, while the minimum value reaches (0). The findings are consistent with Kao and 
Chen (2004) who found that DAC has a value of about 0.10. However, Klein (2002) shows 
that the mean of absolute DAC is higher than 0.11 for US companies compared to the finding 
of Othman and Zeghal (2006) who found that DAC is closer to 0.06 and 0.03 among 
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Canadian and French companies. In devolving countries such as Malaysia, Abdul Rahman 
and Ali (2006) found the value of DAC of companies has a small mean value of 0.04. 
Discretionary accruals are undoubtedly important, according to assumptions, since they 
constitute managers’ discretion over accruals. 
8.3.1.2 Board of directors’ characteristics  
Table 8.2 indicates (See page 198) a high mean representation of outside directors on the 
board (66.9%). These findings emphasise the high compliance rate by Saudi companies with 
corporate governance mechanisms that recommend that the majority of members of aboard of 
director should be non-executive. This compliance was reflected in the magnitude of DAC 
that is negatively related to the percentage of outside directors on the board as reported in 
Table 8.2 This result is consistent with that found by Klein (2002b), Xie et al. (2003), 
Peasnell et al. (2005), Davidson et al. (2005), Benkel et al. (2006), and Dimitropoulos and 
Asteriou (2010) where outside directors were found to be negatively related to earnings 
management. 
Interestingly, no firms exist which have fewer than four board members. Table 8.2 (See page 
198) shows that the average board size consists of about eight members (mean = 8.22). In 
comparison, board size in Saudi Arabia seems to be larger than that in Malaysian firms (e.g., 
mean size of about five reported by Abdul Rahaman and Ali, 2006) but is slightly smaller 
than firms in the UK and US where boards consist of about 9 and 11 respectively Bhagat and 
Black, 2002; Habbash, 2010). These findings also confirm that Saudi companies comply with 
recommendations of the code of corporate governance that state that each company should 
specify the number of members on the board of directors, provided that that number is not less 
than three and not more than eleven. As indicated in Table 8.2, firms with low discretionary 
accruals display higher means of board size than firms with a high level of discretionary 
accruals. The majority of the previous studies such as Peasnell et al., (2000a); Bedard et al.,( 
2004); Xie et al., (2003); Yu, (2008) argue that larger boards are strongly associated with 
lower levels of earnings management.  
In relation to another characteristic, Saudi companies have recently announced the number of 
board meetings in the proxy statement, and the current study uses this as a measure of board 
activity. As indicated in Table 8.2, the average number of board meetings is about four (mean 
= 4.5). Board meetings in Saudi Arabia appear to be less frequent than board meetings in US 
firms e.g., mean meeting of about seven according to Uzun et al (2004) and more than six in 
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Malaysian firms according to Rahaman and Ali, (2006). The results shown in Table 8.2 reveal 
that discretionary accruals are not significantly associated with board meetings.     
Even though the Saudi corporate governance Code prohibits combining the position of the 
chairman of the board of directors with any other executive position in the company, 
approximately, 76% of Saudi companies separate the position of the chairman of the board of 
directors from CEO function as opposed to only 34% of companies which have duality. 
However, the univariate analysis does not reveal any significant relationship between non-
duality and DAC.  
Interestingly, the study sample implies that the Saudi royal family dominates approximately 
45.9% of boards of directors in Saudi firms. This result is not surprising since they originally 
held political positions or traded in investment. However, contrary to this study’s hypothesis, 
the results show that there is a positive relationship between the existence of royal family 
members on the board and earnings management. This result is inconsistent with previous 
expectations which assumed that royal family members might have mitigated earnings 
management. As indicated in Table 8.2, in the low EM the percentage of royal family is about 
40%, increasing to 49% in high EM. A potential justification may be that most royal family 
members are insider owners and the majority of previous research highlights a positive 
association between insider ownership and earnings management (Habbash, 2010).  
 
8.3.1.3 Remuneration & nomination committee compositions      
According to Table 8.2 (See page 198), Saudi listed companies have gradually established 
that remuneration & nomination committees were not a mandatory regulation. Even though 
this research finds a high commitment by formation of these committees (a mean of 0.87), it 
finds no support for the hypothesis that the existence of these committees reduces the level of 
earnings management. It has been found that there is negative relationship between the 
independence of the remuneration & nomination committee and the level of earnings 
management. 
8.3.1.4 Ownership structure for the first model.     
In relation to ownership structures, the study sample shows that Saudi listed companies have a 
mean managerial ownership of 17.9%, a mean institutional ownership of 14.3%, a mean 
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family ownership of 13.2%, and a mean state-ownership of 8.8%, with 67.4% of the research 
sample obtaining at least one external blockholder whose stake exceeds 10%.    
Contrary to this study’s hypothesis, managerial ownership and family ownership are slightly 
higher in the high earnings management group, with significant difference as indicated in 
Table 8.2. These findings are consistent with previous research such as Peasnell et al. (2005), 
and Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) who present evidence that the use of DAC is more 
pronounced in firms with a high managerial ownership, more specifically where the CEO’s 
potential total compensation is closely tied to the value of stock and option holdings.  In terms 
of family ownership, and according to a second view suggested by Jaggi et al. (2009), in 
countries that have weak investor protection, earnings management is higher where family 
ownership concentration is higher.  
However, consistent with previous assumptions, blockholder ownership is slightly higher in 
the low earnings management group, but no significant difference is reported. This result is 
consistent with Zhong et al. (2007) who suggest that large blockholders mainly adopt a long-
term strategy and, hence, they need to control managers to obtain more advantages from their 
equity ownership. In terms of state-ownership and institutional ownership, they are slightly 
higher in the high earnings management group, but no significant difference is also reported. 
Yen et al., (2007) argue that companies with state-ownership have a tendency to manage 
earnings.  
Chapter Seven  
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Table (8.2) Pooled Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Test for First Model  
                                                  Full Sample Low EM High EM T-test 
Mann Whitney 
test 
Variables Mean Min Max Median 
Standard 
Deviation Skewness Kurtosis Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Mean 
Standard 
Deviation t-value Prob. z-value Prob. 
DAC 0.103 0.000 0.782 0.062 0.140 2.958 13.399 0.021 0.020 0.186 0.159 14.140 *** 16.966 *** 
OUTSIDE 0.669 0.450 0.791 0.771 0.471 -0.717 1.513 0.714 0.453 0.634 0.483 -1.578 * -1.562 * 
BRDSIZE 8.213 4.000 12.000 8.000 1.730 2.958 2.649 8.510 1.749 7.984 1.684 -2.785 *** -2.554 *** 
BRDMEET 4.533 2.000 9.000 4.000 1.826 0.246 3.127 4.544 1.848 4.524 1.815 -0.103  -0.295  
RFAMILY 0.459 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.499 0.166 1.028 0.408 0.493 0.497 0.501 1.637 ** 1.630 * 
Non-DUAL 0.766 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.424 -1.258 2.584 0.769 0.423 0.764 0.425 -0.093  -0.093  
RNEXIST 0.870 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.337 -2.198 5.831 0.871 0.337 0.869 0.338 -0.044  -0.044  
RNIDP 0.397 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.490 0.423 1.179 0.443 0.498 0.358 0.481 -1.613 * -1.614 * 
FAMOWN 0.132 0.000 0.950 0.080 0.210 1.802 5.687 0.110 0.194 0.149 0.220 1.710 * 1.481  
INSTOWN 0.143 0.000 0.750 0.110 0.198 1.276 3.443 0.141 0.202 0.145 0.196 0.213  0.242  
STATEOWN 0.088 0.000 0.830 0.070 0.187 2.546 8.774 0.083 0.202 0.096 0.174  0.621  0.789  
MANGOWN 0.179 0.000 0.890 0.079 0.211 1.512 4.594 0.154 0.190 0.198 0.225 1.932 ** 1.834 * 
BLOCKOWN 0.674 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.419 -1.307 2.708 0.712 0.392 0.643 0.438 -1.521  -1.498  
BIG4 0.608 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.489 -0.441 1.195 0.628 0.494 0.582 0.486 0.485  0.485  
LEVG 0.087 0.000 0.596 0.019 0.138 1.869 5.772 0.088 0.144 0.087 0.133 -0.023  1.054  
ROA 0.069 -0.137 0.299 0.058 0.087 0.482 3.433 0.056 0.082 0.081 0.091 2.815 *** 3.139 *** 
CFO 0.086 -0.199 0.361 0.067 0.105 0.329 3.243 0.066 0.085 0.105 0.118 3.655 *** 4.076 *** 
SIZE 9.239 7.869 11.473 9.186 0.709 0.677 3.486 9.335 0.736 9.153 0.673 -2.459 ** -2.201 ** 
COMPLEX 0.443 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.497 0.231 1.053 0.415 0.494 0.471 0.500 1.117  1.117  
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8.3.2 Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Analyses for the Second Model 
8.3.2.1 Discretionary accruals  
Table 8.3 (See page 203) shows general descriptive statistic concerning second model 
variables. As is seen from the figures, the magnitude of value of DAC has approximately the 
value of 0.10, while the minimum value reaches (0). The findings are consistent with Kao and 
Chen (2004) who found that DAC has an approximate value of 0.10.  However, Klien (2002) 
found that the mean of absolute DAC is higher than 0.11 for US companies compared to the 
findings of Othman and Zeghal (2006) that DAC is closer to 0.06 and 0.03 among Canadian 
and French companies respectively. In devolving countries such as Malaysia, Abdul Rahman 
and Ali (2006) found that the value of DAC of companies has a small mean value of 0.04 
.  
8.3.2.2 Audit committee characteristics  
Table 8.3 (See page 203) provides the descriptive statistics of variables relative to audit 
committee characteristics. On average, 89.9% of audit committee members are outside 
directors and audit committee members hold approximately three meetings a year; that is 
smaller than the US firms of 4.53 documented by Xie et al (2003) and larger than Malaysian 
firms (2.8) reported by Iskandar and Saleh, (2009). Whereas audit committee size averages 
3.1 which is similar to the UK firms which average 3.58 and Malaysian firm which average 3,  
as reported by Habbash (2010); Iskandar and Saleh, (2009), and 66.9% of Saudi firms have an 
audit committee possessing at least one financial expertise. 
As expected, audit committee size and the existence of financial expertise are related to low 
levels of discretionary accruals. These results are significant in univariate tests and consistent 
with prior findings by Yang and Krishnan (2005), who report that audit committee size is 
negatively associated with earnings management. Moreover, Bedard et al. (2004) report that 
aggressive earnings management is negatively related to financial expertise of audit 
committee members.  
However, contrary to this study’s hypothesis, no significant relation has been detected in 
univariate tests with regard to audit committee meetings and the percentage of outside 
directors. Interestingly, the number of audit committee meetings is larger in the low earnings 
management level group than in the other group while, high percentage of outside directors is 
associated with high earnings management. 
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8.3.2.3 External audit factors  
Table 8.3 (See page 203) also presents a summary of the descriptive statistics in terms of audit 
quality factors. It shows that 60.8% of the sample firms deal with BIG4 audit firms as 
opposed to only 38.2% which deal with non-BIG4 public accounting firms as their auditors. 
While no significant difference is found, the percentage of BIG4 is slightly higher in the low 
earnings management group. This is consistent with the interview survey which concluded 
that audit quality faces a hard time since many factors such as monopoly of audit services in 
some audit firms and illegal competition between audit firms are rather effective.  
In the second model, Table 8.3 (See page 203) indicates that only 36.6% of the sample firms 
dealing with a specialised auditor measured by market share and SPEAUD means do not 
differ significantly regarding earnings management level.      
In terms of the type of auditor report, Table 8.3 (See page 203) also shows that only 84.7% of 
the sample firms have a clear opinion (unqualified report) as opposed to only 15.3.% of 
companies with a qualified report. AUDOPIN variable shows a significant negative 
relationship with earnings management. Moreover, the study sample indicates that 23.3% of 
Saudi firms change their audit firms as opposed to only 76.7% of companies which keep the 
same audit firm for a long time. With no significant indicator, the percentage of change in 
auditor is higher in low earnings management. On average, Saudi companies take 
approximately 42 days to issue their report audit after the end of the fiscal year, which is 
shorter than Malaysian listed companies that need, on average, 116 days according to Che-
Ahmad and Abidin (2008). This duration does not give any indication to the relationship with 
earnings management.   
         
8.3.2.4 Ownership structure     
As indicated in Table 8.3 (See page 203), this study also includes ownership concentration as 
control variables in the second model. The study sample shows that Saudi listed companies 
have a mean managerial ownership of 17.9%, a mean institutional ownership of 14.3%, a 
mean family ownership of 13.2% and a mean state-ownership of 8.8%, with 67.4% of the 
research sample obtaining at least one external blockholder whose stake exceeds 10%.   
Contrary to this study’s hypothesis, managerial ownership and family ownership are slightly 
higher in the high earnings management group, with a significant difference as indicated in 
Table 8.3. A possible explanation is presented by Chen et al. (2006) who suggest that agency 
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problems might exist not only between owners and management but also between the 
controlling ownership group and other stockholders. These findings are consistent with 
previous research such as Peasnell et al. (2005), and Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) who 
present evidence that the use of DAC is more pronounced in firms with a high managerial 
ownership, more specifically where the CEO’s potential total compensation is closely tied to 
the value of stock and option holdings.  In terms of family ownership, and according to a 
second view suggested by Jaggi et al., (2009), in countries that have a weak investor 
protection, earnings management is higher where family ownership concentration is higher.  
However, consistent with previous assumptions, blockholder ownership is slightly higher in 
the low earnings management group, but no significant difference is reported. This result is 
consistent with Zhong et al. (2007) who suggest that large blockholders mainly adopt a long-
term strategy and, hence, they need to control managers to obtain more advantages from their 
equity ownership. Moreover, state-ownership is slightly higher in the high earnings 
management group, but no significant difference is reported. Overall, the results of the effect 
of ownership structure for the two models obtained from descriptive statistics and univariate 
analysis are similar.  
In summary, the previous sections discuss the descriptive statistics and univariate analysis for 
the second models. The univariate analysis shows only negatively significant relationship 
between audit committee size and financial expertise and earnings management. As with the 
first model, family and managerial ownership are significantly associated with earnings 
management. However, blockholders are found to be negatively associated with earnings 
management but insignificant. The following section will discuss the control variables for 
both models. 
8.3.3 Control Variables for Both Models:   
In this section, the current study discusses the control variables for the two models. Like prior 
studies, the current study controls for the influence of potential confounding factors (Bartove 
et al., 2000) by comprising variables in the two models that have been found to be associated 
with earnings management. As is shown in both table 8.2 and 8.3, among the control 
variables, only ROA, CFO, and size are found to be significantly related to DAC. The average 
ROA is 6.9%, with a maximum of 29.9% and a minimum of -13.7%, while the average CFO 
is 8.6% with maximum of 36.1% and minimum of  -19.9%. Moreover, the average size is 
9.23% with a maximum of 11.4% and a minimum of 7.8%. In terms of audit firm and 
 202 
 
complexity, more than half of Saudi companies are audited by Big 4 audit firms and the 
percentage of study samples that have subsidiaries is 44.3%.    
In comparison, with regard to ROA and CFO, the univariate analysis regression in Tables 8.2 
and 8.3 (See page 198 and 203) show a positive relation between ROA, CFO and earnings 
management. This is not surprising since Abdul Rahman and Ali, (2006) obtained the same 
results in Malaysia, concluding that ROA and CFO have more incentive to engage earnings 
management. Bukit and Iskander (2009) found that there is positive relationship between 
surplus cash flow and earnings management. In terms of firm size, a number of studies such 
as Becker et al. (1998) suggest that large firms have less motivation to manage earnings since 
they are subjected to more monitoring by investors and financial analyst.   
Moreover, the average leverage of sample firms is 8.8%, with a maximum of 59% and a 
minimum of 0%, with no significant difference found. However, firms with high slightly 
discretionary accruals appear to have high leverage. Finally, as indicated in Table 8.2, with no 
significant difference, the study sample shows that firms with a high percentage of subsidiary 
seem to engage in earnings management. 
In conclusion, this section outlines the descriptive statistics and univariate analyses for both 
models that aim to show the effect of corporate governance, audit quality factors, and 
ownership structure on earnings management. Since the control variables for the two models 
have the same descriptive statistic, they have been discussed together in this section. Univariate 
analysis indicates that some characteristics of boards of directors, such as outside directors, and 
board size are significantly and negatively associated with earnings management. Also, audit 
committee size and financial expertise are negatively associated with earnings management. 
Surprisingly, the existence of royal family members on boards is positively related to earnings 
management. Moreover, family and managerial ownership are found to be significantly 
positive regarding earnings management. Among audit quality factors, only auditor opinion is 
found to be negatively associated with earnings management.                                       .
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Table (8.3)  Pooled Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Test for Second Model  
                                                  Full Sample Low EM High EM T-test 
Mann Whitney 
test 
Variables Mean Min Max Median 
Standard 
Deviation Skewness Kurtosis Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Mean 
Standard 
Deviation t-value Prob. z-value Prob. 
DAC 0.10 0.000 0.782 0.062 0.140 2.958 13.399 0.021 0.020 0.186 0.159 14.140 *** 16.966 
    
*** 
ACINDEP 0.899 0.441 1.000 1.000 0.301 -2.656 8.053 0.898 0.304 0.901 0.300   0.077  -0.078  
ACSIZE 3.121 2.000 6.000 3.000 0.751 -0.286 6.570 3.238 0.686 3.031 0.787 -2.574 *** -2.229 ** 
ACMEET 3.251 0.000 13.000 3.000 2.173 0.664 3.918 3.320 2.218 3.199 2.143 -0.504  -0.327  
ACEXPERT 0.669 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.471 -0.717 1.513 0.721 0.450 0.628 0.485 -1.818 * -1.795 * 
BIG4 0.608 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.489 -0.441 1.195 0.628 0.494 0.582 0.486 -0.655  -0.657  
AUDSPEC 0.366 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.482 0.557 1.311 0.371 0.479 0.357 0.486 -0.485  -0.485  
AUDOPIN 0.847 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.361 -1.924 4.700 0.885 0.320 0.817 0.388 -1.778 * -1.730 * 
TIMELINESS 1.578 0.778 2.255 1.653 0.227 -0.688 4.226 1.572 0.228 1.583 0.226 0.421  0.858  
AUDSWITCH 0.233 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.423 1.263 2.595 0.243 0.430 0.225 0.419 -0.389  -0.391  
OUTSIDE 0.669 0.450 0.791 0.771 0.471 -0.717 1.513 0.714 0.453 0.634 0.483 -1.578 * -1.562 * 
FAMOWN 0.132 0.000 0.950 0.080 0.210 1.802 5.687 0.110 0.194 0.149 0.220 1.710  1.481  
INSTOWN 0.143 0.000 0.750 0. 110 0.198 1.276 3.443 0.141 0.202 0.145 0.196 0.213  0.242  
MANGOWN 0.179 0.000 0.890 0.079 0.211 1.512 4.594 0.154 0.190 0.198 0.225 1.932 ** 1.834 * 
STATEOWN 0.088 0.000 0.830 0.070 0.187 2.546 8.774 0.083 0.202 0.096 0.174  0.621  0.789  
BLOCKOWN 0.774 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.419 -1.307 2.708 0.712 0.392 0.643 0.438 -1.521  -1.498  
LEVG 0.087 0.000 0.596 0.019 0.138 1.869 5.772 0.088 0.144 0.087 0.133 -0.023  1.054  
ROA 0.069 -0.137 0.299 0.058 0.087 0.482 3.433 0.056 0.082 0.081 0.091 2.815 *** 3.139 *** 
CFO 0.086 -0.199 0.361 0.067 0.105 0.329 3.243 0.066 0.085 0.105 0.118 3.655 *** 4.076 *** 
SIZE 9.239 7.869 11.473 9.186 0.709 0.677 3.486 9.335 0.736 9.153 0.673 -2.459 ** -2.201 ** 
COMPLEX 0.443 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.497 0.231 1.053 0.415 0.494 0.471 0.500 1.117  1.117  
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8.4 CORRELATION MATRIX 
  
This section illustrates the correlation between variables of corporate governance, the external 
audit, and control variables by using the Pearson and Spearman tests (See Tables 8.4 in page 
205 and 8.5 in page 207) for Pearson and appendix pages 294 and 295 for Spearman). A 
correlation coefficient analysis is important in order to test the relationship between dependent 
and independent variables (Rahman and Ali, 2006). Tables 8.4 and 8.5 present the correlation 
coefficients that are checked for the presence of high collinearity for the two models. Following 
prior studies, this section aims to provide information concerning collinearity among variables 
in empirical models.  
  
8.4.1 First Model Correlation Coefficients 
 
As indicated in Table 8.4 (See page 205), discretionary accruals (DAC) of modified Jones 
models are negatively correlated with outside directors, board size However, discretionary 
accruals (DAC) of modified Jones models are positively correlated with ROA, CFO. The 
Pearson correlations in Table 8.4 also indicate a significant association between cash flow 
(CFO) and return on assets (ROA) that constitute 0.64. Additionally, there is correlation 
between size and state-owned variables at a level of 0.50. Overall, collinearity does not seem to 
cause concern regarding the interpretation of regression coefficients of the independent 
variables in this model since this correlation, was anticipated, as reported by previous studies, 
such as that of Rahman and Ali (2006) who found higher collinearity (67%) but considered this 
collinearity to be harmless. 
 
In conclusion, the correlations matrix in Table 8.4 shows that there is no multicollinearity 
because none of the variables correlates above 0.8 or 0.9. A number of previous studies such as 
Hair et al. (1995); Gujarati (2003) and Abdul Rahman (2006) suggest 0.8 as the beginning at 
which multicollinearity concerns may harm the regression analysis. Furthermore, Variance 
Inflation Factor (VIF) tests were conducted and these are illustrated in Table 8.6, which shows 
that there is no variance inflation greater than 10, confirming that collinearity is not an issue in 
this research. 
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Table (8.4) Pearson  correlations coefficients for First Model 
* denote significance at the 0.05 level 
 DAC OUTSIDE BRDSIZE BRDMEET RFAMILY DUAL RNEXIST RNIDP FAMOWN INSTOWN STATEOWN MANGOWN BLOCKOWN BIG4 LEVG ROA CFO SIZE COMPLE 
DAC 1.000                   
OUTSIDE -0.1438* 1.000                  
BRDSIZE -0.2060* 0.1559* 1.000                 
BRDMEET -0.103 0.2573* 0.1509* 1.000                
RFAMILY 0.113* 0.042 -0.052 -0.070 1.000               
DUAL -0.042 0.2944* -0.1545* 0.012 -0.011 1.000              
RNEXIST -0.039 -0.011 0.058 -0.099 0.056 -0.068 1.000             
RNIDP -0.071 -0.2036* 0.1083* -0.2382* -0.014 -0.3414* 0.1687* 1.000            
FAMOWN 0.090 -0.045 -0.032 -0.067 0.064 -0.1624* 0.1320* 0.090 1.000           
INSTOWN 0.036 -0.107 0.020 -0.095 -0.087 -0.075 0.083 0.2267* 0.2239* 1.000          
STATEOWN 0.058 0.2486* 0.088 0.4215* 0.1122* 0.1883* -0.2841* -0.2441* -0.2170* -0.2560* 1.000         
MANGOWN 0.097 -0.089 -0.018 -0.030 0.047 -0.1635* 0.1526* 0.1189* 0.2668* 0.1340* -0.096 1.000        
BLOCKOWN -0.043 -0.033 0.1485* -0.049 -0.059 -0.1635* 0.1075* 0.1839* 0.2720* 0.3899* -0.3539* 0.2432* 1.000       
BIG4 -0.054 0.1406* 0.2080* 0.1389* 0.1457* -0.016 0.012 0.068 0.1832* 0.2478* 0.1297* 0.1707* 0.2055* 1.000      
LEVG -0.045 0.1155* 0.040 0.066 -0.065 0.077 -0.002 0.023 -0.004 0.2100* 0.063 -0.035 0.1540* 0.2351* 1.000     
ROA 0.1475* 0.084 0.060 0.089 0.2448* -0.1119* 0.1887* 0.1283* 0.1308* 0.054 0.1293* 0.2234* 0.008 0.078 -0.1255* 1.000    
CFO 0.2107* 0.026 0.015 0.055 0.1794* -0.1100* 0.096 0.1453* 0.089 0.015 0.2203* 0.1324* -0.103 0.010 -0.067 0.6436* 1.000   
SIZE -0.1072* 0.2597* 0.3534* 0.3095* 0.098 0.053 -0.106 -0.013 0.070 0.1871* 0.5000* -0.058 0.1342* 0.3975* 0.4927* 0.004 0.059 1.000  
COMPLEX 0.037 -0.042 0.052 0.011 0.1319* 0.002 0.065 0.087 0.1713* 0.078 -0.011 0.1442* 0.074 0.2346* 0.1309* 0.091 -0.045 0.1333* 1.000 
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8.4.2 Second Model Correlation Coefficients 
As illustrated in Table 8.5 (See page 207), audit committee size, financial expertise are 
negatively correlated to discretionary accruals (DAC) measured by modified Jones. However, 
ROA and CFO are positively related to discretionary accruals (DAC).  In addition, it is 
obvious that there is no harmful correlation between the independent variables in the second 
model. As indicated, collinearity does not seem to cause concern in the interpretation of 
regression coefficients of the independent variables in the second model. The Pearson 
correlations in Table 8.5 show significant association between cash flow (CFO) and return on 
assets (ROA) that constitutes 0.64. Additionally, there is also positive correlation between 
size and state-owned variables at a level of 0.50.  
Multicollinearity occurs when one or more independent variable are related to one another. 
Statistically, the correlation matrix in Table 8.5 indicates that no harmful multicollinearity is 
concerned because none of the variables correlate above 0.8 or 0.9. A more recent instance in 
which evidence of earnings management studies have been found is that of Gujarati (2003); 
Abdul Rahman and Ali (2006) who suggest 0.8 as the beginning at which multicollinearity 
concerns may harm the regression analysis.  
Table 8.6 (See page 208) indicates that VIF for all variables are below 10, showing that 
multicollinearity is not a serious problem. The mean of VIF for each model is 1.59 and 1.60 
respectively. Gujarati (2003); Abdul Rahman and Ali, (2006) confirm that there is no concern 
with a variance inflation factor less than 10. Therefore, multicollinearity does not constitute 
an issue in either of the two models. 
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Table (8.5) Pearson  correlations coefficients for second model 
 * denote significance at the 0.05 level 
 DAC ACINDEP ACSIZS ACMEET 
ACEXP
ERT BIG4 AUDSPEC 
AUDOPI
N REPTIME AUDSWITCH BRDINDP 
FAMOW
N 
INSTOW
N 
MANGOW
N 
STATEO
WN 
BLOCK
OWN LEVG ROA CFO SIZE complex 
DAC  -.051                    
ACINDEP -0.055  .039                   
ACSIZE -0.1313* 0.041                    
ACMEET -0.100 0.1203* 0.2958*                   
ACEXPERT -0.1212* 0.3288* 0.3318* 0.3423*                  
BIG4 -0.054 0.033 0.1868* 0.1101* 0.1406*                 
AUDSPEC -0.060 -0.072 -0.025 0.042 0.027 0.5726*                
AUDOPIN -0.091 0.021 0.2002* 0.1212* 0.1179* -0.007 -0.051               
REPTIME 0.052 0.012 -0.063 -0.034 -0.066 0.076 -0.049 -0.2299*              
AUDSWITCH -0.051 0.069 -0.052 -0.022 0.032 -0.1573* -0.1434* 0.022 0.007             
BRDINDP -0.1438* 0.078 0.2564* 0.1945* 0.3457* 0.1406* 0.040 0.031 0.005 0.018            
FAMOWN 0.090 -0.030 0.041 0.028 -0.051 0.1832* 0.103 -0.023 0.086 -0.1404* -0.045           
INSTOWN 0.036 -0.033 -0.020 -0.1284* -0.066 0.2478* 0.1918* 0.1624* 0.058 -0.106 -0.107 0.2239*          
MANGOWN 0.097 -0.081 -0.082 0.005 -0.042 0.1707* 0.091 0.064 0.089 -0.099 -0.089 0.2668* 0.1340*         
STATEOWN 0.058 0.048 0.1161* 0.2267* 0.2139* 0.1297* 0.088 0.1455* 0.064 0.001 0.2486* -0.2170* -0.2560* -0.096        
BLOCKOWN -0.043 -0.086 0.1344* -0.085 0.012 0.2055* 0.1292* 0.1637* -0.023 -0.105 -0.033 0.2720* 0.3899* 0.2432* -0.3539*       
LEVG -0.045 0.083 0.076 -0.030 0.2124* 0.2351* 0.2273* 0.091 -0.1771* 0.001 0.1155* -0.004 0.2100* -0.035 0.063 0.1540*      
ROA 0.1475* -0.027 0.059 0.007 -0.041 0.078 -0.046 0.2203* -0.097 -0.092 0.084 0.1308* 0.054 0.2234* 0.1293* 0.008 -0.1255*     
CFO 0.2107* -0.070 0.022 0.049 -0.055 0.010 -0.090 0.1494* -0.053 -0.012 0.026 0.089 0.015 0.1324* 0.2203* -0.103 -0.067 
0.6436
*    
SIZE -0.1072* 0.042 0.3340* 0.1626* 0.2947* 0.3975* 0.3503* 0.1808* -0.006 -0.064 0.2597* 0.070 0.1871* -0.058 0.5000* 0.1342* 0.4927* 0.004 0.059   
COMPLEX 
 0.037 0.059 0.077 -0.005 0.072 0.2346* 0.035 -0.010 0.1900* -0.099 -0.042 0.1713* 0.078 0.1442* -0.011 0.074 0.1309* 0.091 -0.045 
0.1333
*  
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                                                       Table (8.6) VIF Test Results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8.5 MULTIVARIATE ANALYSES (HYPOTHESES TESTS) 
The previous section discussed the results highlighting descriptive statistic and univariate 
analysis. This section attempts to discuss an appropriate regression analysis and justifications for 
selecting relevant methods for testing. It commences with an analysis of the first model, 
followed by the findings for the second model. The findings related to control variables for both 
models will be discussed together because they indicate similar findings.  
  
First Model 
  
Second Model 
Variable VIF 1/VIF Variable VIF 1/VIF 
SIZE 3.110 0.322 SIZE 3.010 0.332 
STATEOWN 2.710 0.370 STATEOWN 2.400 0.416 
ROA 1.980 0.504 ROA 1.980 0.504 
CFO 1.890 0.529 BIG4 1.910 0.523 
LEVG 1.620 0.619 CFO 1.900 0.527 
BLOCKOWN 1.570 0.638 LEVG 1.740 0.575 
INSTOWN 1.460 0.686 AUDSPEC 1.740 0.576 
BRDMEET 1.400 0.716 BLOCKOWN 1.600 0.625 
BIG4 1.390 0.717 ACEXPERT 1.540 0.648 
BRDSIZE 1.370 0.731 INSTOWN 1.480 0.676 
RNIDP 1.360 0.735 ACSIZE 1.460 0.683 
DUAL 1.350 0.741 AUDOPIN 1.310 0.762 
BRDINDP 1.310 0.764 FAMOWN 1.300 0.771 
FAMOWN 1.300 0.770 ACMEET 1.280 0.783 
MANGOWN 1.250 0.802 BRDINDP 1.280 0.783 
RFAMILY 1.200 0.830 MANGOWN 1.260 0.792 
RNEXIST 1.190 0.841 REPTIME 1.250 0.798 
COMPLEX 1.150 0.866 COMPLEX 1.230 0.814 
    ACINDEP 1.180 0.849 
   AUDSWITCH 1.080 0.930 
Mean VIF 1.590   Mean VIF 1.600  
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8.5.1 Relevant Method for Regression   
This research employs regression analysis, which is considered the most common technique of 
multivariate analysis, in order to test the study’s hypotheses by examining the effect of multi 
variables on earnings management as a dependent variable. Multiple regression is an appropriate 
approach in this research as well as ordinary least squares (OLS) regression subjected to many 
conditions, which is both a relevant and powerful technique, particularly when the model 
includes both dummy and continuous variables (Hutchinson and Sofroniou, 1999).  
In relation to standard skewness and kurtosis and as indicated in Tables 8.2 and 8.3 (See page 
198 and 203), data is not normally distributed. This is due that fact that the value of both 
skewness and kurtosis for some variables indicates high values. Previous studies such as Abdul 
Rahman and Ali, (2006) suggest that data can be normally distributed if standard skewness is 
within ±1.96 and standard kurtosis is ± 2 or ± 3 according to Haniffa and Hudib, (2006). Since 
most variables exceed the range of ± 2, relevant methods are used and some of the variables are 
still not normally distributed.           
Moreover, prior research uses the Hausman (1978) specification test, to check for strict 
exogeneity, as a helpful means of selecting between random effect and fixed effect. In statistics, 
a fixed effects model is a statistical model that represents the observed quantities in terms of 
explanatory variables that are dealt as if the quantities were non-random however, random 
effects models in which either all or some of the explanatory variables are dealt as if they arise 
from the random causes. The result of the Hausman test shows insignificant finding as Chi-2 
result is higher than 5% for both models which led the current study to use random effect.  
Although the parametric test, is a powerful method, requiring rigorous assumptions such as 
normality and homogeneity (Balian, 1982), a non-parametric test does not require the previous 
conditions, following the free-distribution method, and does not require the measurement of data.  
on an interval scale (Zhang and Liu, 2009). According to the previous discussion, non-
parametric statistical techniques should be applied as an alternative to parametric techniques, 
since some assumptions such as normality were not fulfilled (see page 136).  
In summary, a multiple regression analysis is used to gauge the explanatory power on 
independent variables against dependent variable (DAC). Additionally, study data is not 
normally distributed, thus a non-parametric test is used to analyse the data as well as employing 
GLS instead of OLS regression adopted as a multivariate test technique. Moreover, Cross-
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Sectional Panel Data is applied for main findings; however, Pooled Data is used as sensitivity 
analysis.  
8.5.2 Findings and Discussion of the First Model 
The first model aims to examine the relationship between board of directors’ characteristics and 
ownership structure as independent variables with earnings management. Hence, GLS regression 
of discretionary accruals on board characteristics and ownership structure is presented in Table 
8.7. Based on the statistical analysis shown in the same table, the adjusted    value for the 
model is 14.48%. In comparison, Abdul Rahman and Ali, (2006) find the adjusted    value for 
the model is 12.8 per cent and suggest that the low value of the adjusted    for the model might 
be referred to the variation in the level of earnings management. Likewise, Iskandar and Saleh 
(2009) suggest that the low value of    is common in studies examining corporate governance 
characteristics. The constant is negative and highly significant at p<0.005. Stepwise, also 
presented in the following section, is a procedure for statistical model selection.   
   
8.5.2.1 Stepwise regression test for the first model  
Even though the use of stepwise regression has been criticised by many scholars due to some 
problems such as incorrect degrees of freedom (Whitaker, 1997), it is still used to reveal the 
reliability of a model via the strength of    in order to reach the appropriate model (Berenson et 
al., 2009). Generally, the current study uses stepwise forward regression, commonly employed  
(Gujarati and Porter, 2009) to determine the appropriate model by eliminating variables 
conceived to downsize the value of   . As a whole, the results of stepwise regression do not 
support the exclusion of any variables in the first model since all variables contributed to 
increase the value of   .  (See pages 292 and 293).           
8.5.2.2 Board of directors’ characteristics  
8.5.2.2.1 Outside directors (OUTSIDE)  
Agency theory expects that the presence of independent members on boards of directors will 
enhance boards' ability to monitor management (Young, 2008). In contrast to that, institutional 
theory expects these mechanisms as practices or regulations as a result of coercion from 
legislators who impose certain practices in order to improve organizational effectiveness or as a 
result of imitation. This study hypothesizes that there is a negative relationship between the 
proportion of outside directors on the board and earnings management. The findings support this 
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assumption and the result obtained from the first model in Table 8.7 (See page 217) shows that 
there is a negative and significant association (coefficient = -0.029 and p> 0.10) between the 
proportion of outside directors on the board and the indicator of earnings management. 
Generally, this finding is consistent with that of Klein (2002), Xie et al. (2003), Peasnell et al. 
(2005), Davidson et al. (2005), Benkel et al. (2006), and Dimitropoulos and Asteriou (2010) in 
which outside directors are shown to be negatively related to earnings management. 
However, the former finding is different from that of many studies carried out, notably in Asia, 
such as Malaysia (Abdul Rahman and Ali, 2006), Indonesia (Siregar and Utama, 2008) and 
Hong Kong  (Jaggi et al., 2009), where no significant relationship was detected between outside 
directors and earnings management. In Saudi Arabia, perhaps the high percentage of compliance 
that reaches 0.66% outside directors on the board justifies the association compared to Abdul 
Rahman and Ali, et al., 2006) who found that only 0.38 % of the board were outside directors. 
Moreover, the culture and corporate governance practices are different dimensions that may 
distinguish the Saudi Arabian environment from that of the aforementioned countries. On top of 
that, the finding is consistent with agency theory projection that the presence of independent 
members on boards of directors will enhance the board’s ability to monitor management    
8.5.2.2.2 Board size (BRDSIZE)  
Board size is considered another effective factor in board characteristics that may have an 
influence on earnings management. This research shows that board size is significantly and 
negatively associated with earnings management (coefficient =-0.012 and p<.0.05). This finding 
is consistent with the idea that larger boards are more effective in controlling the aggressive 
actions of top management (Zahra and Pearce, 1989). This result is also supported by prior 
studies such as Peasnell et al. (2005), Chtourou et al. (2001), Xie et al. (2003) and Yu (2008) 
which suggest that board size is strongly and negatively related to lower levels of earnings 
management.   
On the other hand, numerous studies carried out on Asian markets such as Taiwan, Malaysia, 
and Indonesia conclude a significant positive relationship between board size and level of 
earnings management. For example Abdul Rahman and Ali, (2006) and Kao and Chen (2004) 
found that board size is positively associated with earnings management. Although Saudi Arabia 
is comparable to these countries as developing countries, the Saudi board does not necessarily 
have the same characteristics as the Asian market due to of a number of factors such as the 
differences in culture and corporate governance practice as well as having different political and 
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economic aims. Moreover, Saudi board size seems to larger than Asian boards that make it to be 
more active and diligent.    
8.5.2.2.3 Board meetings (BRDMEET) 
              The number of board meetings is an indication of the board’s activity in urgent business or 
notable circumstances that make management feel shareholders are there. Generally, few studies 
pay heed to board meetings as a key characteristic of the board of directors. For example, Xie et 
al. (2003) and Sarkar et al. (2006) confirm that frequency of board meetings is associated with 
reduced levels of earnings management. Consistent with this study’s assumption, the coefficient 
of board meetings are significant and negatively related to earnings management as reported in 
Table 8.7 (coefficient = -0.010 and p<0.05) (See page 217). Although the average number of 
board meetings, of about 4.5 times, with a minimum 2, and maximum 9, represents low activity 
compared to previous studies, it might be adequate to monitor needs in Saudi Arabia. 
 
8.5.2.2.4 Royal family members (RFAMILY) 
The current study assumes that the proportion of royal family members on the board is 
negatively associated with the level of earnings management. Inconsistent with this study’s 
assumption, the coefficients of this relation are significant and positive (coefficient = 0.018 and 
p<.0.05). A plausible justification of this result is that most royal family members might be 
insider owners and the majority of previous research highlights a positive association between 
insider ownership and earnings management (Habbash, 2010). This finding is not consistent with 
agency theory which expects that managerial ownership may reduce agency cost.  
 
8.5.2.2.5 Non-duality (Non-DUAL) 
Concerning the separation between the role of CEO and chairperson, there is a negative 
relationship between non-duality and the level of earnings management, but it is not significant 
thus rejects H5. This finding is inconsistent with previous research such as Sarkar et al. (2006) 
who found that earnings management is higher when the chair of the board also holds the CEO 
position, but is consistent with results obtained by Abdul Rahman and Ali, (2006)’ that could not 
detect a relationship. 
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8.5.2.2.6 Existence of a remuneration and nomination committee   
Inconsistent with hypothesis 6, there is no significant relationship between earnings management 
and the existence of a remuneration and nomination committee (coefficient= -0.011 and p> 
0.10). A possible explanation may be that this committee is new in Saudi Arabia and it needs 
more time to become effective. Prior studies such as Xie et al. (2003) found that compensation 
committees may affect the market’s perception of golden parachute adoption. Also, concerns 
increased in particular when CEOs or executives served on remuneration committees as this led 
to agency problems between management and shareholders (Anderson and Bizjak, 2003). 
       
8.5.2.2.7 Remuneration and nomination committee independence   
As discussed earlier, concerns increase in particular when the CEO or executives serve on 
nomination and remuneration committees as this leads to agency problems between management 
and shareholders (Anderson and Bizjak, 2003). Regarding remuneration and nomination 
committee independence, there is a significant and negative relationship between the 
independence of a nomination and remuneration committee and the level of earnings 
management (coefficient = -0.041 and p<0.05). These findings also reinforce theoretical 
arguments in previous research that remuneration and nomination committees can play a key role 
in enhancing board members' independence and mitigating the influence of management (Jensen, 
1993; Xie et al. (2003); Dahya and McConnell, (2007).   
However, this finding is inconsistent with that of Klein (2002) that concluded that there is no 
relationship between the presence of the CEO on the nomination committee and the incidence of 
earnings management. The dissimilarity between the result of the current study and Klein 
(2002b) may be due to the fact that Saudi Arabia’s regulations integrate the role of the 
remuneration and nomination committee in one role which results in this committee being more 
active and effective. 
In summary, from the results, it is found that the board has a significant effect on earnings 
management practice carried out by the company. In other words, from the seven board 
characteristics: outside directors, board meetings, board size, non-duality, royal family member, 
remuneration, nomination committee existence, and independence, only outside directors, board 
meetings, board size, remuneration and nomination committee independence have significant 
and negative relationship in terms of earnings management. In Saudi Arabia, the formation of a 
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board of directors has been the primary focus of companies and plays a vital role in improving 
the performance or preventing potential wrongdoings.  
8.5.2.3 Ownership structure 
The previous studies added to the literature by addressing different findings regarding the effect 
of ownership concentration on earnings management. The current research addresses the 
hypotheses in terms of ownership structure, based on the theory that ownership concentration 
might mitigate agency problems leading to reduced agency cost by aligning the interests of 
controlling owners with those of the company (Ang et al., 2000). This section discusses the 
finding in respect of the impact of ownership structure on earnings management in Saudi Arabia. 
 
8.5.2.3.1 Managerial ownership (MANGOWN)  
Agency theory suggests that high insider ownership provides better corporate governance 
structure, which leads to a high quality of financial reporting (Sanchez and Meca, 2005). 
However, the majority of empirical research concludes a positive association between insider 
ownership and earnings management (Habbash, 2010). A potential justification for the positive 
relationship suggested by Ang et al., (2000) is that insiders might attempt to protect their benefits 
by manipulating earnings to conceal the corporate performance from outsiders.  
The regression analysis shows that the coefficient on MANGOWN is positive, but insignificant 
(coefficient = -0.025 and p> 0.10). This result is inconsistent with the study’s expectation in H12 
that assumes a negative association between insider ownership and the level of earnings 
management. These results are not surprising since a number of empirical studies such as 
Peasnell, et al (2005); Laux and Laux, (2009) did not find an effect of managerial ownership on 
earnings management.  
  
8.5.2.3.2 Institutional investors’ ownership (INSTOWN) 
Prior studies highlight that institutional investors pay attention to the long-term value of stocks 
(Bushee, 1998). Empirical studies also show that institutional investors are more intelligent and 
have beneficial access to financial reporting (El-Gazzar, 1998; Bartov et al., 2001).  Hence, 
institutional ownership in a firm plays a vital role in preventing wrongdoings by offering an extra 
monitoring mechanism in the financial information process.  
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A large number of empirical studies, such as those conducted by Yu, (2008); Osma and Noguer 
(2007); Charitou et al. (2007); Park and Shin (2004); and Rajgopal and Venkatachalam (1998), 
indicate that institutional ownership negatively affects earnings management. However, the 
findings of the current study do not reinforce this stream of research since INSTOWN is detected 
to be insignificantly positive in the testing of this model.   
These findings are similar to those of a study carried out by Peasnell et al. (2000b) and Peasnell 
et al. (2005) who claim that there is no relationship between earnings management and 
institutional investors. A possible explanation for this result may be that most Saudi institutional 
investors are short-term investors since the lack of protection leads to not providing adequate 
monitoring. Another potential justification for the dissimilarity between the results of this 
research and those of previous studies is that Saudi institutional investors do not have the same 
characteristics, such as culture and experience, as British institutional investors, American 
institutional investors, or European institutional investors that make them monitoring 
mechanisms.  
 
8.5.2.3.3 Family ownership (FAMOWN) 
There is a heated debate among studies concerning the effect of family control by ownership. 
Two different views have emerged as a result of this dichotomy. The first view argues that a 
founding family that has a long-term interest in the firm will constrain the capability of managers 
to manipulate earnings. However, opponents of this view argue that family control may lead to 
expropriation of the minority shareholders’ interests (Jaggi et al., 2009). The findings of the 
current study reveal that there is a positive but insignificant relationship between family 
ownership and discretionary accruals. The insignificant positive coefficient of family control 
does not reinforce this (H15) study’s hypothesis. Thus, the current study does not support the 
view that a high proportion of family ownership constrains earnings management.   
The results of the study are inconsistent with previous research conducted by Jaggi et al., (2009) 
who looked at Hong Kong firms, or Anderson et al, (2004) and Ali et al., (2007) who argue that 
a concentration of family ownership affects firms’ performance and earning quality, but it is 
consistent with that of Yen et al. (2007) who found that family control tends to manage earnings 
downwards. On top of that, a possible explanation for the previous result shown by Jaggi et al., 
(2009) is that in developing countries, where controlling family ownership is widespread, the 
protection of minority shareholders is weaker and financial reporting is less transparent which 
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causes the use of earnings management as mean of maximizing the private benefit of the 
majority of shareholders.  
 
8.5.2.3.4 State-Ownership (STATEOWN)   
Although there is a shortage of studies on the effect of state-ownership on earnings management, 
the current study adapts the theme of the agency theory to suggest that lower opportunistic 
earnings management is associated with the existence of large shareholders (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Hypothesis (H14) expects that the proportion of state-ownership 
(STATEOWN) is negatively associated with earnings management. The coefficient on 
STATEOWN is positive and significant (coefficient = 0.155 and p< 0.05). 
The former result is consistent with previous studies such as Chen et al. (2006) and Firth, (2007) 
which use data from China, and suggest that no type of ownership structure, even state-
ownership has any effect in constraining earnings management. Extending this study, Bozec et 
al. (2002) argue that there is no relationship between state-ownership and performance and 
suggest that it is not a question of who owns the firm, but the goals pursued by the firm. 
However, the finding is soundly consistent with that of Yen et al., (2007) who found that 
Chinese companies with state-ownership tend to manage their earnings upwards.  
    
8.5.2.3.5 Blockholder Ownership (BLOCKOWN) 
Inconsistent with hypothesis (H16) that assumes a negative relationship between blockholder 
ownership and discretionary accruals, there seems to be a relationship between earnings 
management and blockholder ownership, but it is not significant. This is inconsistent with the 
assumption that blockholders benefit the firm by aligning the interests of shareholders and 
directors. Jensen and Meckling (1976), who develop the agency theory, highlight that lower 
opportunistic earnings management is associated with the existence of large shareholders. 
Therefore, the result of this current research does not support the assumption propagated by the 
agency theory in mitigating agency problems, and particularly in reducing earnings management. 
It is not surprising that no significant effect result was obtained, since numerous studies, such as 
those of Park and Shin, (2004); Abdul Rahman and Ali, (2006) were unable to detect any effect 
of the blockholder in constraining opportunistic earnings management. Moreover, a positive 
relationship between blockholder ownership and earnings management has been found by many 
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empirical studies, including Zhong et al. (2007) and Habbash, (2010), which conclude that 
earnings management is increased by large blockholder ownership. 
Overall, the effect of ownership concentration, managerial ownership, family control, 
institutional ownership, state-ownership, and blockholder ownership is found to be less likely to 
mitigate earnings management in Saudi Arabia. This result is consistent with a study conducted 
by Chen et al. (2006) in China that found that all types of ownership structure have no effect on 
fraud. Managerial ownership and family ownership are significant in the univariate analysis of 
earnings management; however the significance of these variables disappears in the multivariate 
analysis.  
Table (8.7) Multivariate Analyses for the First Model 
Notes:  indicate significant at *** 0.001, ** 0.05, * 0.10 
 
 
First Model Main Regression (GLS) 
DAC Exp Signe Coef. z P>z 
Board Composition 
OUTSIDE - -.0297 -1.69 *  
BRDSIZE - -0.012 -2.330 ** 
BRDMEET - -0.010 -2.150 ** 
RFAMILY -  0.018 1.340 ** 
Non-DUAL - -0.022 -1.060  
RNEXIST - -0.012 -0.490  
RNIDP - -0.041 -2.330 ** 
Ownership Structures 
MANGOWN -     0.026 0.660  
INSTOWN -  0.060 1.330  
FAMOWN -  0.053 1.310  
STATEOWN - 0.155 2.360 ** 
BLOCKOWN - 0.008 0.360  
Control Variables 
BIG4 - - 0.001 -0.040  
LEVG - -0.001 -0.010  
ROA +  0.021 0.180  
CFO -  0.243  2.540  
SIZE + -0.028 -1.520 ** 
COMPLEX -  0.008 0.520  
_cons  -0.520 -3.520 *** 
Adj    Within 0.637    
Adj    Overall 14.48%    
Wald chi2 47.87***    
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8.5.3 Findings and Discussion of the Second Model 
The previous model aimed to examine the relationship between discretionary accruals as a 
dependent variable, on the one hand, and board of directors’ characteristics, and ownership 
structure, on the other. This section presents the findings and provides a discussion concerning 
the second model which examines the relationship between discretionary accruals as an indicator 
of earnings management, audit committee characteristics and external audit factors. Thus, GLS 
regression results are shown in Table 8.8 (See page 226) which shows that the adjusted 
    gained in this model is comparable with the study conducted by Abdul Rahman and Ali, 
(2006) which finds that adjusted    is about 12.8 and justifies that the low value of adjusted 
   is attributed to the variation in the level of earnings management. Moreover, other studies 
conducted by Frankel et al. (2002), and Dimitropoulos and Asteriou (2010) report approximately 
the same level of adjusted   . The constant is negative and highly significant at (p<0.01). 
8.5.3.1 Stepwise regression test for the second model  
Even though the use of stepwise regression has been criticised by many scholars due to some 
problems such as incorrect degrees of freedom (Whitaker, 1997), it is still used to reveal the 
reliability of the model via the strength of   , in order to reach to appropriate model (Berenson et 
al., 2009). Generally, the current study uses stepwise forward regression, commonly employed to 
determine the appropriate model by eliminating variables conceived to downsize the value of    
(Gujarati and Porter, 2009). As a whole, the results of stepwise regression do not support 
excluding any variables in the second model since all variables contribute to increase the value 
of   .  (See page: 293 in the appendix for the result of the use of the stepwise test).   
         
8.5.3.2 Audit committee characteristics   
8.5.3.2.1 Audit committee independence (ACINDEP) 
The current study assumes that audit committee independence (ACINDEP) will be negatively 
associated with the level of earnings management. As predicted, a negative association between 
(ACINDEP) and the empirical indicator of earnings management was found but it is not 
significant. Prior studies have generally shown that audit committee independence is not only 
negatively related to earnings management (Klein, 2002; Bedard et al., 2004; Bradbury (2006); 
Piot and Janin, 2007), but that it is also positively associated with the quality of financial 
reporting (Felo et al.2003. Even though there is global acceptance of the idea that that audit 
committee independence helps to constrain earnings management, this result is consistent with 
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the study conducted by Abdul Rahman and Ali (2006) which looked at 97 Malaysian firms and 
found no significant association between earnings management and independent audit 
committees. Moreover, Yang and Krishnan (2005), using a sample of 896 firms, reported that 
there is no significant association between audit committee independence and quarterly 
discretionary accrual. Likewise, Peasnell et al. (2005) did not show sufficient evidence of the 
impact of audit committee on constraining earnings management.    
 
8.5.3.2.2 Audit committee size (ACSIZE)  
The test for hypothesis (H8) concerning the relationship between the size of the audit committee 
(ACSIZE) and the level of discretionary accruals indicates an insignificant relationship. This 
finding could support the theme that larger audit committees do not necessarily enhance the 
quality of financial reporting (Habbash, 2010). 
This finding is inconsistent with previous studies that showed that audit committee size is 
another important element in audit committee characteristics. For example, a study conducted by 
Yang and Krishnan, (2005) concluded that larger audit committees are related to lower quarterly 
earnings management. Likewise, as indicated by a study conducted by Lin et al. (2006) larger 
audit committees are related to fewer earnings restatements and the findings of a study presented 
by Felo et al. (2003) reports that larger audit committees enhance financial reporting quality. 
These findings are similar to those of Xie et al. (2003), Abbott et al. (2004), Bedard et al.(2004), 
Davidson et al. (2005) and Baxter and Cotter (2009) which showed no significant relationship 
between audit committee size and the level of earnings management.  
  
8.5.3.2.3 Audit Committee Meetings (ACMEET) 
Even though the current study posits that there is a relationship between audit committee 
meetings and earnings management, no significant relationship is found between audit 
committee meetings (ACMEET) and the level of discretionary accruals. 
This finding is not surprising since most studies which have investigated the association between 
earnings management and audit committee meetings have found that no relationship exists. 
These findings are consistent with the study by Davidson et al. (2005) which claims an 
insignificant relationship between the number of audit committee meetings and earnings 
management.  Moreover, the study conducted by Abdul Rahman and Ali et al. (2006) could not 
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find sufficient evidence for a negative relationship between earnings management and the 
frequency of audit committee meetings. Likewise, Baxter and Cotter (2009) who used two 
measures of earnings quality, found no relationship between earnings management and the 
frequency of audit committee meetings. 
One possible explanation of this (ACMEET) is provided by Habbash (2010) who states that 
audit committee meetings may not be a beneficial proxy of the audit committee’s diligence and 
activity; this reflects earlier comments in this and other research that neither board meetings nor 
NEDs’ private meetings show a significant effect on earnings management. Moreover, Spira 
(1999) claims that audit committee meetings are largely ineffective in enhancing financial 
reporting since the meetings are largely ceremonial. 
 
8.5.3.2.4 Audit Committee Financial Expertise (ACEXPERT) 
The current study also posits that audit committee expertise (ACEXPERT) is negatively 
associated with the level of discretionary accruals. Even though the univariate analysis reports a 
significant relationship, multivariate analysis shows no significant relationship.  
These findings do not support the recommendations of the Saudi Corporate Governance Code 
(2006) that audit committees should comprise at least one member with relevant financial 
experience in order to effectively control the financial reporting process. Hence, the findings 
could not reinforce the idea that audit committees that comprise at least one member with 
accounting or financial expertise are likely to dissuade managers from manipulating the earnings 
numbers in financial reporting.  
Numerous studies such as those of Song and Windram (2004); Choi et al. (2004); Park and Shin 
(2004); Carcello et al. (2006); Chen (2007) and Baxter and Cotter (2009) suggest that financial 
literacy is a key determinant of the audit committee’s effectiveness. However, a few studies are 
consistent with the results of the current study, (Abdul Rahman and Ali et al. 2006; Yang and 
Krishnan, 2005) which found no significant association between audit committee expertise and 
level of earnings management.  
In summary, the current study finds that there is no relationship between audit committee 
characteristics and earnings management. In other words, a Saudi audit committee is less likely 
to dissuade management from manipulating earnings figures in their annual report. Thus, the 
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prediction made about a good audit committee mitigating opportunistic earnings management 
activity was found to be inaccurate in Saudi Arabia.   
A plausible interpretation for the insignificant relationship between audit committee 
characteristics and earnings management may be attributed to institutional theory, focusing on 
the processes and systems by which theme acquire collective meaning and legitimisation, 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) suggest that companies might adopt practices or regulations as a 
result of coercion come from a legislator who imposes some practices by force in order to 
improve organizational effectiveness. However, there is no prediction that the adoption of these 
regulations will improve organizational effectiveness. 
 
8.5.3.3 External Audit Factors 
Worldwide, recent financial scandals have increased the question of whether external auditing is 
effective in constraining earnings management and the wave of audit failure in the Capital 
Market has also increased concerns about audit quality (Velury, 2003). The separation of 
management and control may create a catalyst for managers to increase their own personal 
wealth and not act in owners’ interest. Therefore, managers might manipulate the figures used by 
shareholders to monitor management performance. External auditing is an important instrument 
for shareholders to ensure the transparency and credibility of financial reporting. Table 8.8 (See 
page 226) presents the results of the impact of external audit factors on earnings management.  
  
8.5.3.2 1 Auditor size (Big4) 
Companies that select Big4 auditors will make management change its behaviour to align its 
interests with shareholders' interests. Hypothesis (H17) anticipates that BIG4 auditors are 
negatively associated with the level of discretionary accruals. The finding indicates that there is 
no significant relationship found between BIG4 auditors and earnings management, thus the 
hypothesis is rejected.  
Empirically, a large number of studies have provided evidence for the use of auditor size as a 
proxy for audit quality. These include DeAngelo (1981); Hoitash et al (2007); Chen et al. (2005) 
and Dye (1993) who confirm that large auditors will be more accurate because they have greater 
wealth that is exposed to risk in case of any litigation. Moreover, Healy and Lys (1986); Lennox 
(1999) and Colbert and Murray (1999) suggest that the variations between Big8 (now Big4) and 
non-Big audit firms lie in differences in specialization of services and in reputation.    
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However, the result of the current study is consistent with Abdul Rahman and Ali et al. (2006) 
who found no significant relationship between Big5 (now Big4) and earnings management. Also, 
a study by Piot and Janin (2007) states that the presence of a Big5 auditors makes no difference 
regarding earnings management activities. Likewise, Kanagaretnam et al. (2010) found that 
auditor type has no effect on income-decreasing. In Saudi Arabia, a plausible explanation for the 
insignificant relationship between Big4 auditors and earnings management may be based on 
Francis (2004)’s argument which suggests that Big4 audits are not necessarily always superior 
since cases of audit failure by Big4 can and do occur. He also suggests that a counter-argument 
is that the large accounting firms are not the best; they just have more resources which enable 
them to fight litigation and regulators. Moreover, Lowensohn et al., (2007) raise the question 
concerning audit firm size and audit quality and highlight that although Big5 auditors often used 
as proxy of audit quality in prior studies, are not uniformly related to increased perceived audit 
quality. Likewise, Beasley and Kathy (2000) argue that specialization is considered to be a key 
factor in audit quality but not auditor size. 
 
8.5.3.2.2 Specialised auditors (AUDSPEC) 
The current study presumes that auditor industry specialisation is negatively associated with the 
level of earnings management. This result is inconsistent with evidence which suggests that 
auditor industry specialisation is negatively associated with discretionary accruals (Krishnan, 
2003; Zhou and Elder, 2002; Almutairi, 2009) but positively related to financial reporting 
(Balsam et al., 2003; Bloomfield and Shackman, 2008; Gul et al., 2009).  
In contrast, a study by Johl et al. (2007) found no significant relationship between auditor 
industry specialisation and abnormal accruals. Moreover, Chen et al. (2005), apart from the non-
executive proportion, found no relationship between audit committee characteristics and 
specialist auditor. Interestingly, Carcello and Nagy (2004) document that there is no relationship 
between industry specialization and fraud for larger clients. 
 
8.5.3.2.3 Auditor opinion (AUDOPIN)  
  
Types of audit opinion also can be used as proxy for audit quality. DeAngelo, (1981) suggests 
that audit opinion is an independent verification of manager-prepared financial reports provided 
by auditors. One of the hypotheses addressed, concerning the impact of audit quality on earnings 
management is that auditor opinion is negatively associated with the level of discretionary 
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accruals. As expected, AUDOPIN (Coff.=-0.050, z= -2.110, p<0.10) shows a negative 
significant association with the level of discretionary accruals. Auditor opinion is measured 
based on unqualified report (clean opinion), which is considered to be more sophisticated and 
has been used extensively in the prior research.  
In Saudi Arabia, the auditor issues an unqualified report when they consider the audited financial 
statements provide a true and fair view in line with the financial reporting framework. However, 
the auditor will issue a modified report depending on the circumstances and the effect of 
materiality. 
The result is consistent with prior studies that investigated audit qualifications, auditor opinion 
and discretionary accruals. For instance, Chen et al. (2001) demonstrate that management's 
propensity to manipulate earnings is positively associated with modified audit opinions reported 
by auditors. Also, a study by Bradshaw et al. (2001) indicates that there is a relationship between 
firms with any type of audit opinion and working capital accruals. Likewise, a study by Johl et 
al. (2007) shows that companies showing unqualified audit opinion are likely to receive low 
levels of discretionary accruals. A study by Herbohn and Ragunathan (2008) found that there is a 
negative relationship between accruals and opinion modifications. However, Butler et al. (2004) 
contend that there is no evidence linking a modified audit report to discretionary accruals or 
earnings management level.  
    
8.5.3.2.4 Timeliness (TIMELINESS) 
Timeliness is measured by the number of days from end of the fiscal year to audit the report 
date; an inordinate period, which is defined as audit delay, reflects the quality of financial 
reporting by not presenting timely information to shareholders. The current study assumes that 
an inordinate (long) period between the end of the fiscal year and the audit report leads to high 
earnings management. It is found that there is a positive, but not significant, relationship between 
the number of days from the fiscal year to the audit report date.  
Previous studies such as Givoly and Palmon (1982); Kross and Schroeder, (1984) and Chambers 
and Penman, (1984) argue that audit delay is a key determinant of timeliness in earnings 
announcement, which in turn, influences the market’s reaction to earnings announcement. 
Additionally, Knechel and Payne (2001) report that inordinate delay in reporting may be related 
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to lower quality information. Likewise, Mohd-Sulaiman, (2008) views that Malaysian fraudulent 
financial reporting is associated with audit delay.    
The result of the current study is inconsistent with prior research. One possible explanation for 
the insignificant result may be associated with the weak role of the audit committee in Saudi 
Arabia. In others words, Afify (2009) suggests that the voluntary establishment of the audit 
committee reduces audit delay in Egypt. Theoretically, the role of the audit committee is to 
mitigate the conflict between external auditor and management leading to reducing the lengthy 
period and increasing the quality of the external audit. Mohamad-Naimi et al. (2010) using 628 
annual reports for the year ending 2002 suggests that active and larger audit committees shorten 
audit delay.            
 
8.5.3.2.4 Change in auditor (AUDSWITCH) 
Change in auditor has been paid considerable attention by both regulators and academics. The 
regulators’ concern has increased since management might change auditor for opportunistic 
reasons which will enable them to accomplish their objective. Theoretically, Francis and Wilson 
(1988) argue, agency costs may sometimes lead to a decision to switch auditor and be affected 
by different factors. DeFond and Jiambalvo (1993) state that most cases of auditor change result 
in disagreement when the auditor insists on applying specific accounting methods. Kluger and 
Shields (1991) also views that managers attempt to change auditor to delay or suppress the 
announcement of unfavourable information. They conclude that most companies that have 
financial problems have changed auditors to obtain a more cooperative auditor. Johnson et al. 
(2002) provide evidence of lower audit quality (larger abnormal accruals) in the following three 
years engagements after auditor changes. Wallace (2005) finds that auditor changes frequently 
occur around restatements.       
Previous studies suggest that changing auditors signifies a lower-quality audit and a greater 
likelihood of earnings management (Habbash, 2010). Following a study by DeFond and 
Subramanyam (1998), this current study predicts a significant relationship between the 
occurrence of earnings management and auditor change by indicating a dummy variable taking 
the value of one of the auditor which changed during the period of a sample. The result in Table 
8.8 indicates that there is no relationship between the level of discretionary accruals and auditor 
change.  
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This result is consistent with studies conducted by DeFond and Subramanyam (1998) and 
Davidson et al. (2006) which concluded that there is no evidence of pervasive income-increasing 
earnings management and auditor change in their sample firms. 
In summary, in Saudi Arabia, a lower audit quality might be attributed to a weak role performed 
by the audit committee, as concluded previously. Importantly, the performance of Big4 might be 
different in Saudi Arabia than in developed countries since all Big4 auditors are affiliated to 
local auditors so as not to be faced with rigorous litigation in case of failure of the audit in 
protecting shareholders’ interests. This is due to the fact that most devolving countries have a 
lack of protection for investors and a volume of litigation, that is resolved privately, compared to 
developed countries which might not be a deterrent. In addition, the reputation, in case of failure, 
will be attributed to the local auditor rather than to the Big4 auditor. Francis (2004) states that 
“we do not know if the US evidence on audit quality generalizes to audits in other countries that 
have different legal systems and particularly to non-common-law countries with weaker investor 
protection and less ability to sue auditors for negligence and misconduct”. Finally, the nature of 
culture may increase companies’ threats to dismiss auditors and their encouragement in opinion 
shopping affect auditors independence and audit quality as reported by Al-Thenaian and Al-
Angari (2010).  
8.5.3.3 Ownership Structure    
As mentioned previously, current research addresses the hypotheses in terms of ownership 
structure based on the theory that ownership concentration might mitigate agency problems 
leading to reducing agency cost by aligning the interests of controlling owners with those of the 
company (Ang et al., 2000). In the second model, ownership structure is used as a control 
variable and the result shows that family ownership is significantly (coefficient = 0.076 and 
p<0.10) and positively related with the earnings management indicator. On top of that, state-
ownership, is consistent with the same result as the first model; it seems to be positive and 
significant with earnings management. However, in comparison with the first model, 
institutional, blockholder, and managerial ownership are still positive and insignificant with 
earnings management.  The findings generally indicate that discretionary accruals as proxy for 
earnings management is not negatively and significantly related to ownership concentration. The 
results suggest that the presence of managerial, state-owned, family, blockholder, and 
institutional ownership might not effectively monitor the management to avoid opportunistic 
behaviour of the management including earnings management in Saudi Arabia.  
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Table (8.8) Multivariate Analyses for the Second Model 
Notes:  indicate significant at *** 0.001, ** 0.05, * 0.10 
Second Model Main Regression (GLS) 
DAC Exp Signe Coef. z P>z 
Audit committee influence 
ACINDEP - -0.011 -0.410  
ACSIZE - -0.003 -0.230  
ACMEET - -0.004 -1.020  
ACEXPERT - -0.001 -0.050  
Eternal audit factors 
BIG4 -  -0.017 -0.95  
AUDSPEC - -0.011 -0.540  
AUDOPIN - -0.050 -2.110 * 
TIMELINESS - - 0.000 -0.010  
AUDSWITCH - -0.012 -0.640  
Control variables 
FAMOWN - 0.076 1.850 * 
INSTOWN - 0.072 1.540  
MANGOWN - 0.013 0.320  
STATEOWN - 0.202 3.240 *** 
BLOCKOWN - 0.010 0.420  
BRDINDP - -0.031 -1.690 * 
LEVG - 0.048 0.070  
ROA +  0.024 0.120  
CFO -  0.247 0.097  
SIZE +  -0.045 -0.018 * 
COMPLEX -  0.006 0.017  
_cons - 0.565 3.510 *** 
Adj    between 0.63    
Adj   .   overall  12.6%    
Wald chi2 43..11***    
It should be noted that despite using a large set of variables in both models, there was a lack of 
significant results due to the weakening role of corporate governance and external audit in 
preventing financial reporting from earnings management in Saudi Arabia. As mentioned in the 
previous chapter, the interview survey shows inherent issues in the Saudi market which restrict 
the role of monitoring mechanisms. Moreover, ‘institutional theory’ provides a plausible 
explanation as it views these mechanisms as practices or regulations resulting from coercion by 
legislators who impose certain practices in order to improve organizational effectiveness or as a 
result of imitation. Further discussion on this is provided in the next chapter. 
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8.5.3.5 Control Variables: Results and Discussion for Both Models 
In regression, the current study seeks to control for other factors that could be expected to affect 
the level of discretionary accruals. This section presents the findings for the control for the 
influence of potential confounding factors (Bartove et al., 2000) by comprising variables in the 
two models that have been found to be associated with earnings management. The control 
variables in the two models have been introduced together because they are the same control 
variables and they show somewhat similar findings.  
Among the control variables, only SIZE is statistically significant in both models as well as 
BRDINDP in the second model, while LEVG, ROA, CFO, BIG4 and COMPLEX do not show 
any statistically significant differences in either model.  
 
8.5.3.5.1 Firm size (SIZE)  
Several studies present evidence suggesting that large firm size may be an incentive for 
managers to engage in earnings management (Pincus and Rajgopal, 2002); however, from a 
different perspective Becker et al. (1998) suggest that large firms have less motivation for 
earnings management since they are subjected to closer monitoring by investors and financial 
analysts. Consistent with the findings of prior studies such as Becker et al. (1998); Abdul 
Rahman and Ali, (2006) and Xie et al. (2003), SIZE is found to have a significant negative 
relationship with earnings management in both models at level 0.10 and 0.05. This reinforces the 
theory that smaller firms that are subjected to less monitoring by investors and regulators are 
more inclined to manipulate earnings. 
 
8.5.3.5.2 Leverage (LEVG) 
Numerous studies such as Elayan et al. (2008) use leverage as a measure for debt covenant 
violations that represent the debt structure of a firm. Most studies argue that highly leveraged 
companies are less likely to be involved in wrongdoings, such as earnings management. In both 
models, LEVG exhibits an insignificant relationship with earnings management, which is 
consistent with the finding of Jiang et al. (2008) who highlight that leverage changes may have 
various effects on earnings management. Similar to the results of the current study, Abdul 
Rahman and Ali, (2006) found the leverage is insignificant to earnings management. 
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8.5.3.5.3Firm performance (ROA)  
The findings for ROA present similar results for the influence of performance on the earnings 
management indicator in both models. An insignificant positive relationship is found which 
reinforces the suggestion of Abdul Rahman and Ali, (2006); Kothari et al. (2005) and Habbash, 
(2010) that accounting discretions that do not control for the effect of performance are often mis-
specified.  
8.5.3.5.4 Cash flow from operations (CFO) 
The result shows that CFO is insignificantly positively related to the earnings management 
indicator.  This finding is consistent with the study by Abdul Rahman and Ali, (2006) which 
found no relationship between CFO and the level of earnings management, while Bukit and 
Iskander (2009) found that there is a positive relationship between surplus cash flow and 
earnings management.   
 
8.5.3.5.5 Complexity (COMPLEX) 
The number of subsidiaries measures complexity expressing firm complicity. No significant 
relationship is found between COMPLEX and the level of discretionary accruals in both models. 
Previous studies such as Chen et al (2005) argue that the more complex the firm’s operation, the 
greater the need for good audit quality. Moreover, Simunic (1980) suggests that audit quality is 
sensitive to risky conditions such as client size and complexity. In relation to fraud, Dyreng  et 
al. (2010) found earnings management to be less when a firm has subsidiary operations in 
foreign countries that have a strong rule of law.   
 
8.6  ADDITIONAL ANALYSES AND ROBUSTNESS  
Several further tests were performed to ascertain the credibility of the primary findings. The first 
set of tests, comprising the main results, was reported by the main model with alternative proxy 
or model for earnings management. Moreover, in accordance with prior studies, the signed 
earnings management test was conducted as an additional test that focused on upwards and 
downwards earnings management. On top of that, the type of industry in which the company 
belongs may also drive the association between discretionary accruals as proxy for earnings 
management, on the one hand, and corporate governance and the external audit factors, on the 
other; thus, conducting analysis according to industry is useful to the findings. Finally, 
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parametric test (OLS) or fixed effect and pooled test are conducted as robustness checks for the 
findings.  
   
8.6.1 Alternative measurement of earnings management 
Consistent with prior studies (Xie et a,. 2003; Peasnell et al. 2001 and Abdul Rahman and Ali, 
2006), the modified Jones model (1995) is used in this study as the main proxy for earnings 
management.  In addition to applying the modified Jones model (1995) of estimating DAC using 
Cash flow approach, this study also applies the Jones  model (1991) as an alternative 
measurement of earnings management. One influential way of measuring earnings management 
is discretionary accruals which has been considered by a large number of studies (e.g., Healy, 
1985; DeAngelo, 1986; Jones, 1991; Dechow et al., 1995). Measurement of earnings 
management has been improved dramatically in response to a fruitful research presented by 
studies that use different approaches to estimate accruals such as balance sheet and cash flow 
(Aljifri, 2007). 
As mentioned earlier in the literature review chapter, prior studies have concluded that managers 
practise their discretion over accruals items to engage earnings management; therefore, it is 
widely conceived that discretionary accruals solely reflect earnings management practices.  The 
Jones model (1991) presents efficient methods to estimate non-discretionary accruals that 
include a plant, property and equipment variables to control any change in non-discretionary 
accruals. Using two variables (REV and PPE) to control for changes in non-discretionary 
accruals makes this model more accurate for earnings management practice (Aljifri, 2007). The 
following section will present the findings according to alternative proxy (Jones, 1991) for 
earnings management. 
           
1- First model results using the Jones model (1991) 
Table 8.9 (See page:232) shows the GLS regression of the Jones model on board composition 
and ownership structure variables. The adjusted    obtained in this model is comparable with 
prior studies such as Yang et al., (2005); Xie et al., (2003); Iskander and Seleh, (2009). The 
constant is negative and highly significant at p<0.001.  
The results shown in Table 8.9 using the Jones model (1991) are fairly consistent with the main 
test; (OUTSIDE) is negative and significant (β= -0.034, z= -1.400, p<0.05), concluding that, as 
the number of outside directors in a firm increases, the level of earnings management decreases. 
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The results also indicate that board size (BRDSIZE) and board meetings (BRDMEET) shows a 
significant negative relationship with the level of earnings management at level p<0.001). 
Moreover, number of members of the royal family on the board (RFAMILY) is found to be 
positively associated with the level of earnings management as the same level of (P)value 
compared to the modified Jones model. Among nomination and remuneration committee 
characteristics, only independence is found to be negatively associated with discretionary 
accruals at level p<0.05) as the modified Jones previously reported. 
Consistent with the main test, apart from state-ownership being positively related to earnings 
management at level p<0.05), no type of ownership structure is found to be associated with 
earnings management. The findings suggest that no type of ownership structure in Saudi Arabia 
has been effective as a monitoring mechanism. Arguably, the insignificant relationship between 
ownership structure and earnings management concluded in this research point out that 
concentrated ownership is not as effective as propagated by agency theories in constraining 
agency problems found by prior studies.         
As the main results indicate, among the control variables, only size is found to be significantly 
related to DAC as the modified Jones reported. This reinforces the theory that smaller firms that 
are subject to less monitoring are more likely to engage in earnings management.   
  
2- Second model results using the Jones Model (1991) 
Table 8.9 (See page 232) also shows the GLS regression of the Jones Model on audit committee 
characteristics  and external audit. The adjusted    in this model seems to be comparable with 
prior studies conducted by Osama and Niguer, (2007); Yang et al., (2005); Xie et al., (2003); 
Iskander and Seleh, (2009) and the constant is negative and highly significant at p<0.001. 
Consistent with the primary findings, there is no significant relationship between audit 
committee characteristics and the level of earnings management detected. The findings suggest 
that outside directors on audit committees in Saudi Arabia have not been effective in carrying out 
their monitoring functions. In terms of audit quality factors, consistent with the main test, the 
coefficient on auditor opinion (AUDOPIN) is negative and significant (β=-0.048, z=1.500, 
p<0.10), concluding that, as the accurate opinion presented by auditor express the level of 
earnings management. Consistent with primary results and in respect of other external audit 
factors, the second model using the Jones (1991) method does not show any significant findings.  
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Additionally, consistent with the main test, the results also show a significant and positive 
relationship between family ownership structure and the level of earnings management at level 
(p<0.05). In terms of state-ownership, it is found to be positively associated with the level of 
earnings management at level (p<0.001). However, other types of ownership structure are found 
not to be associated with earnings management. Arguably, the insignificant and positive 
relationship between ownership structure and earnings management concluded in this research 
suggests that concentrated ownership is not as effective as propagated by agency theories in 
constraining agency problems found by prior studies.         
In terms of the control variables, similar to the main results concluded by Modified Jones (1995), 
only size is found to be significant and negative with earnings management. As mentioned 
previously, this reinforces the theory that smaller firms that are subject to less monitoring are 
more likely to engage in earnings management.           
Overall, the findings of this analysis are fairly consistent with the main results obtained from the 
modified Jones model (1995). Generally, applying an attentive proxy for earnings management 
has been a common approach among prior studies. For example, Osama and Niguer, (2007) 
applied different proxies for earnings management studying the effect of board composition and 
their committees on earnings management. Thus, applying alternative proxy aims to provide 
more accurate findings concerning the impact of external and internal corporate governance on 
earnings management. It is worth noting that some results obtained from the Jones model 
provide strong significance for numerous variables that were less significant in the modified 
Jones models. This is not surprising, since most studies which use different proxies for earnings 
management have different significance of (P).value and sometimes in findings.                     
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Table (8.9) The Finding by applying Jones Model (1991)  Notes:  indicate significant at (*** 0.001, ** 0.05, * 0.10) 
First Model Second Model 
DAC - Exp Signe Coef. z P>z DAC+ Exp Signe Coef. z P>z 
BRDINDP - -0.034 -1.400 ** ACINDEP - -0.034 -0.930 
 BRDSIZE - -0.017 -2.480 *** ACSIZE - -0.004 -0.220  
BRDMEET - -0.013 -1.940 *** ACMEET - -0.005 -1.030  
RFAMILY - 0.013 01.58 ** ACEXPERT - -0.004 -0.160 
 DUAL - -0.029 -1.070  AUDSPEC - -0.014 -0.510  
RNEXIST - -0.016 -0.500 
 
AUDOPIN - -0.048 -1.500 * 
RNIDP - -0.040 -1.680 ** TIMELINESS - -0.035 -0.700 
 FAMOWN - 0.091 1.660 
 
AUDSWITCH - -0.023 -0.940  
INSTOWN - .002 0.040 
 
FAMOWN - 0.124 2.240 ** 
STATEOWN - 0.061 0.990 ** MANGOWN - 0.005 0.090  
MANGOWN - 0.192 2.170  INSTOWN - 0.095 1.500  
BLOCKOWN - 0.025 0.820  STATEOWN - 0.074 1.890 *** 
BIG4 - -0.013 -0.550  BLOCKOWN - -0.019 -0.620 
 LEVG - 0.007 0.080  BIG4 - -0.065 -0.680  
ROA + -0.012 -0.080 
 
LEVG - -0.138 -0.850  
CFO - 0.328 2.540 
 
ROA + 0.358 2.720  
SIZE + -0.031 -1.260 ** CFO - 0.064 2.540  
COMPLEX - -0.034 0.040  SIZE + -0.064 -2.540 ** 
 
 
  
 COMPLEX - 0.005 0.230  
_cons 0.614 0.200 3.070 *** _cons  0.251 4.420 *** 
  Adj   .   14% R2.=  0.66   Adj    .   13.1% R2.=  0.64 
 Wald chi2 47.21***   Wald chi2 44.14*** 
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8.6.2 Signed Earnings Management Test 
Prior research such as Gul et al. (2006); Habbash, (2010); Ashbaugh et al. (2003) attempt to 
divide the earnings management sample into positive (income-increasing) discretionary 
accruals and negative (income-decreasing) discretionary accruals. The rationale of this 
division lies in exploring potential different discretions used by managers to engage earnings 
management. What is more, this division presents additional evidence on whether or not there 
is any differential association between the internal and external corporate governance 
variables and they use a measure of discretionary accruals, conditional on income-increasing 
or income-decreasing accruals. Thus, this section presents regression analysis for two models 
according to positive and negative earnings management. 
 
1- The first model results of signed earnings management test 
The GLS estimate of both income-increasing and income-decreasing discretionary 
accruals on board characteristics and ownership structures is shown in Table 8.10 (See 
page 235). The adjusted     obtained in the first model is consistent with previous studies 
such as Frankel et al. (2002); Habbash, (2010); Ashbaugh et al. (2003) and 
Dimitropoulos and Asteriou (2010). The constant is negative and significant at level 
p<0.001 and p<0.05, respectively. 
Consistent with the primary test findings for the absolute value of discretionary accruals, 
both the positive earnings management and negative earnings management models show 
a negative coefficient on board characteristics, particularly BRDINP, BRDSIZE, and 
BRDMEET. These results can be interpreted as follows: BRDINP is more effective in 
reducing earnings management concerned with income-decreasing and BRDSIZE is 
effective in constraining income-increasing; however, BRDMEET is more effective in 
constraining both income-decreasing and income-increasing.    
Interestingly, RFAMILY is found to be positively related to income-increasing (positive 
earnings management). This result signifies that royal family members contribute to 
engaging in earnings management to obtain high compensation by increasing income and 
show good performance in their firms.   
 234 
 
Table 8.10 also implies that nomination & remuneration committees’ independence is 
more effective in constraining income-decreasing (negative earnings management). This 
is not surprising since income-decreasing will not benefit the members of this committee 
notably in relation to compensation. Consistent with the main results, however, Non- 
DUAL and RNEXIST do not show any effect in either positive or negative earnings 
management.   
In relation to ownership structure, interesting findings are shown in Table 8.10. Even 
though institutional ownership does not demonstrate any effect in the main results, it is 
found to be positively related to income-decreasing. This could support the view that the 
majority of ownership might collude with management to expropriate the interests for a 
minority of shareholders. STATOWN shows positive significant relationship with 
income-decreasing. This result is consistent with the study conducted by Yu et al. (2007) 
who found that Chinese government companies tend to manage their earnings 
downwards. This may be attributed to that companies that Saudi government own large 
shares tend to manipulate earnings downward to change dividend policy or reduce Zakat.      
Among the control variables, only cash flow is found to be positively associated with 
income-decreasing; however, other control variables do not show any effect as can be 
seen from Table 8.10. Surprisingly, in the main result and in both the modified Jones 
model (1995) and the Jones model (1991), size show a significant relationship with 
earnings management; however, in this case, it is found to be an ineffective variable in 
both positive and negative earnings management.                  
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                Table (8.10) First Model Signed Earnings Management Test Notes:  indicate significant at *** 0.001, ** 0.05, * 0.10 
Negative Earnings Management (Decreasing) Positive Earnings Management (Increasing) 
DAC - Exp Signe Coef. z P>z DAC+ Coef. z P>z 
BRDINDP - -0.058 -2.140 ** BRDINDP -0.010 -0.420 
 BRDSIZE - -0.006 -0.840  BRDSIZE -0.011 -1.550 * 
BRDMEET - -0.012 -1.520 * BRDMEET -0.010 -1.590 * 
RFAMILY - -0.017 -0.650  RFAMILY 0.000 1.490  * 
DUAL - -0.032 -1.070  DUAL -0.001 -0.030  
RNEXIST - -0.045 -1.200 
 
RNEXIST 0.000 0.010 
 RNIDP - -0.078 -2.720 *** RNIDP -0.013 -0.580 
 FAMOWN - 0.049 0.830 
 
FAMOWN 0.076 1.330  
INSTOWN - 0.171 2.430 ** INSTOWN -0.047 -0.740 
 STATEOWN - 0.219 2.210 ** STATEOWN 0.071 0.820  
MANGOWN - 0.004 0.070  MANGOWN 0.021 0.340  
BLOCKOWN - 0.025 0.730  BLOCKOWN 0.010 0.340  
BIG4 - -0.010 -0.390  BIG4 0.013 0.570 
 LEVG ? 0.005 0.050  LEVG 0.012 0.130  
ROA ? 0.075 0.430 
 
ROA -0.042 -0.250  
CFO ? 0.315 2.380 *** CFO 0.201 1.400  
SIZE ? -0.039 -1.420  SIZE -0.022 -0.870  
COMPLEX ? 0.020 0.800 
 
COMPLEX 0.000 -0.020 
 _cons  0.638 2.950 *** _cons 0.405 1.970 ** 
Number of observation 177 Number of observation 160 
  Adj   .    23% Adj   .           15% 
 Wald chi2 49.21*** Wald chi2 30.14*** 
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2- The second model results of signed earnings management test 
The GLS estimate of both income-increasing and income-decreasing discretionary accruals 
on audit committee characteristics and external audit factors for the second model is shown 
in Table 8.11(See page 238). The adjusted     obtained in the second model is consistent 
with prior research such as Frankel et al. (2002); Habbash, (2010); Ashbaugh et al. (2003) 
and Dimitropoulos and Asteriou (2010). The constant is negative and highly significant at 
p<0.001 and p<0.05, respectively. 
With respect to the audit committee’s characteristics, it is interesting that income increasing 
earnings management is significantly associated with audit committee size (ACSIZE) and 
meetings (ACMEET) at p.value=0.10. However, this effect disappears against income 
decreasing earnings management. This is inconsistent with the claim by prior studies such as 
Habbash (2010) that audit committees are generally more effective in reducing downward 
earnings management.  Consistent with the main results, ACINDEP and ACXPERT have no 
effect in either direction of earnings manipulation.  
Regarding external audit factors and consistent with primary findings, income decreasing 
earnings management is found to be significantly associated with auditor opinion 
(AUDOPIN). This is not surprising since auditor opinion plays a vital role in integrity of 
financial reporting. Becker et al., (1998) observe that clients of brand name auditors are 
associated with income-decreasing discretionary accruals. However, Big4, AUDSPEC, 
AUDSPEC TIMELENESS, and AUDSWITCH have no effect in either direction on 
earnings manipulation as reported in main findings. 
As concluded in the main findings, Table 8.11 shows that income increasing earnings 
management is found to be positively associated with family ownership (FAMOWN). 
However, institutional (INSTOWN) and state ownership (STATEOWN) are found to be 
positively associated with negative earnings management. Blockholder (BLOCKOWN) and 
managerial ownership (MANGOWN) show no significant relationship with negative or 
positive discretionary accruals.  
Among the control variables, SIZE, and CFO are found to be significantly associated with 
income-decreasing earnings management. This result supports claims in prior research that 
higher discretionary accruals are associated with smaller sized firms, since small firms are 
less likely to have effective monitoring. Moreover, Bukit and Iskander (2009) suggest that 
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there is a positive relationship between surplus cash flow and earnings management. In 
relation to board independence (BRDINDP), the result shows that BRDINDP is negatively 
related to income decreasing earnings management.  
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    Table (8.11) Second Model Signed Earnings Management Test  Notes:  indicate significant at *** 0.001, ** 0.05, * 0.10 
Negative Earnings Management (Decreasing)                      Positive Earnings Management (Increasing)  
DAC - Exp Signe Coef. z P>z DAC+ Coef. z P>z 
ACINDEP - -0.014 0.340 
 
ACINDEP -0.002 -0.050 
 ACSIZE - -0.012 0.660  ACSIZE -0.026 -1.490 * 
ACMEET - -0.004 0.650  ACMEET -0.008 -1.570 * 
ACEXPERT - -0.010 -0.310  ACEXPERT -0.012 -0.480 
 BIG4 - -0.036 -1.100  BIG4 0.023 0.810  
AUDSPEC - -0.003 -0.080 
 
AUDSPEC -0.024 -0.850 
 AUDOPIN - -0.078 -2.180 *** AUDOPIN -0.022 -0.690 
 TIMELINESS - 0.028 0.540 
 
TIMELINESS -0.007 -0.120  
AUDSWITCH - -0.006 -0.240 
 
AUDSWITCH -0.027 -1.010 
 BRDINDP - -0.066 -2.410 *** BRDINDP 0.003 0.130  
FAMOWN - 0.057 0.930  FAMOWN 0.078 1.410 * 
INSTOWN - 0.183 2.570 *** INSTOWN 0.032 0.490  
MANGOWN - 0.016 0.280  MANGOWN 0.035 0.550 
 STATEOWN - 0.324 3.370 *** STATEOWN 0.085 1.050  
BLOCKOWN - 0.044 1.140 
 
BLOCKOWN -0.009 -0.320  
LEVG ? 0.130 1.240 
 
LEVG -0.001 -0.010  
ROA ? 0.084 0.470  ROA -0.023 -0.140  
CFO ? 0.272 2.040 ** CFO 0.123 0.830 
 SIZE ? -0.070 -2.570 *** SIZE -0.019 -0.780 
 COMPLEX ? 0.012 0.460 
 
COMPLEX -0.009 -0.420  
_cons  0.681 2.920 *** _cons 0.412 1.860 ** 
Number of observation  174 Number of observation 160 
  Adj      21% Adj      12.10% 
 Wald chi2 41.06***  Wald chi2 28.13*** 
 239 
 
8.6.2 Analysis of Findings According to Industry 
This test is performed for additional analysis and to ascertain the credibility of the main 
findings. The type of industry to which a company belongs may also drive the association 
between discretionary accruals as proxy for earnings management on the one hand and 
internal/external corporate governance on the other. The rationale of conducting industry 
analysis is to investigate this potential problem of whether or not this study’s findings would 
differ based on industry type.   
As mentioned earlier in the methodology chapter, many industries are represented by fewer 
than six companies and are integrated to other industries and the nature of those industries have 
been taken in consideration during the integration. Based on this integration, five industries are 
involved as follows: Building, Industrial Investment, Food, Retail, and Regulated.  
 
1-  Descriptive statistics according to industry 
Tables 8.12, 8.13, and 8.14 (See pages 241, 242, and 243 respectively) provide the descriptive 
statistics for the variables in the two models according to industry. As is seen from the figures, 
the magnitude of value of DAC has reached the maximum value of 0.22 in the Transport, 
Media & Publishing sectors, while minimum value reaches the value of 0.06 in the 
Petrochemical and Real Estate sectors.  
In terms of board characteristics, the Petrochemical, Telecommunication and Energy sectors 
generally seem to have active boards of directors compared to other industries; however, royal 
family members are concentrated in the media sector (100%) and cement sector (87%), while 
they are not interested in being members of boards of directors in the hotel and energy sectors.     
Audit committee characteristics are fairly similar between industries; however, most industries 
with fully independent audit committees can be confined to three industries: 
telecommunications, agriculture, and petrochemicals. Additionally, the role of the audit 
committee seems to be weak in the hotels sector according to the characteristics.     
According to ownership structure, Saudi families prefer to invest in the multi-investment 
(23.7%), and retail (23.6%) sectors rather than other investments, while the Saudi government 
invests considerably in the energy (42%), and telecommunication (38%) sectors. Institutional 
investors are interested in different types of investment which are concentrated in 
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telecommunications (21%), publishing (29%), petrochemicals (23%), and retail (19%) whereas 
blockholder ownership dominates most industries.  
Regarding external audit factors, all firms in the publishing and telecommunication sectors and 
88% of the firms belonging to the petrochemical sector deal with Big4 audit firms. Specialist 
auditors are used considerably by the publishing (70%) and telecommunication sectors (55%). 
Audit change frequently occurs in the multi-investment sector (42%). Unqualified opinion is 
commonly given for firms belonging to the real estate sector (100%). The media and publishing 
sector is considered the industry most likely to issue its financial reports behind schedule.  
Among the control variables, the cement sector has the highest percentage of performance 
(19%) while the telecommunications sector involves the largest companies in the Saudi Market. 
The petrochemical sector seems to take more risks rather than other industries since it has 
approximately 27% of financial leverage, while the building & construction and media & publishing 
sectors are the industries which have most subsidiaries (70% and 100% respectively).           
 
2-  The findings for the first model relative to industry 
Table 8.15 (See page245) presents the findings of regression analysis relative to industry for 
the first model. Consistent with the main results, it is found that outside directors, board size, 
and board meetings are negatively associated with earnings management in all industries. 
Additionally, nomination and remuneration independence is effective in constraining earnings 
management as the main results indicated. This result reinforces the idea posited by agency 
theory which expects that boards will enhance the integrity of their financial reporting via 
monitoring management (Peasnell et al., 2005).     
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           Table (8.12) Descriptive Statistics according to Industry 
 
       Variable 
TELC.IT TRANSPORT HOTEL&TOURISOM 
Men Med SD Men Med SD Men Med SD 
DAC 0.100 0.016 0.222 0.225 0.091 0.269 0.176 0.150 0.136 
BRDSIZE 9.333 9.000 0.500 7.875 8.500 1.544 8.750 9.000 0.463 
BRDMEET 5.111 6.000 2.369 5.313 5.000 2.938 3.375 4.000 1.685 
MANGOWN 0.009 0.010 0.009 0.123 0.060 0.198 0.230 0.230 0.160 
OUTSIDE 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.500 0.500 0.516 0.500 0.500 0.535 
RFAMLY 0.667 1.000 0.500 0.250 0.000 0.447 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Non-DUAL 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.500 0.500 0.516 1.000 1.000 0.000 
ACSIZE 3.444 3.000 0.527 2.938 3.000 0.998 2.000 3.000 1.690 
ACMEET 3.444 2.000 3.432 3.750 3.500 3.396 1.125 1.000 1.246 
ACINDEP 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.813 1.000 0.403 0.375 0.000 0.518 
ACEXPERT 0.556 1.000 0.527 0.625 1.000 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.535 
RENEXIST 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.750 1.000 0.447 0.625 1.000 0.518 
RNIDP 0.600 1.000 0.516 0.750 1.000 0.447 0.125 0.000 0.354 
FAMOWN 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.158 0.000 0.282 0.000 0.000 0.000 
INSTOWN 0.213 0.380 0.202 0.098 0.000 0.174 0.000 0.000 0.000 
STATEOWN 0.380 0.050 0.427 0.108 0.075 0.121 0.116 0.116 0.123 
BLOCKOWN 0.556 1.000 0.527 0.500 0.500 0.516 0.500 0.500 0.535 
AUDOPIN 0.667 1.000 0.500 0.875 1.000 0.342 0.500 0.500 0.535 
REPTIME 1.606 1.699 0.200 1.550 1.523 0.195 1.664 1.648 0.066 
BIG4 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.438 0.000 0.512 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AUDITSWITH 0.222 0.000 0.441 0.438 0.000 0.512 0.125 0.000 0.354 
LEVG 0.127 0.095 0.143 0.121 0.072 0.139 0.015 0.011 0.017 
ROA 0.063 0.074 0.106 0.070 0.062 0.054 0.037 0.029 0.089 
CFO 0.128 0.120 0.106 0.130 0.108 0.132 0.038 0.020 0.120 
SIZE 10.588 10.467 0.283 9.084 9.060 0.605 8.564 8.553 0.708 
COMPLEX 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.250 0.000 0.447 0.500 0.500 0.535 
AUDSPEC 0.556 1.000 0.527 0.125 0.000 0.342 0.375 0.000 0.518 
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 Table (8.13) Descriptive Statistics According to Industry  
 
Variable 
ACRI-FOOD BULDING& 
CONSTRUCTION 
CEMENT ENERGY&UTLITIES INDUSTRIAL 
INVESTMENT 
Men Med SD Men Med SD Men Med SD Men Med SD Men Med SD 
DAC 0.114 0.085 0.120 0.101 0.089 0.099 0.094 0.099 0.056 0.055 0.039 0.053 0.090 0.029 0.165 
BRDSIZE 7.288 7.000 1.696 8.372 9.000 1.254 9.250 9.000 1.741 9.125 9.000 0.835 7.514 7.000 1.644 
BRDMEET 4.115 4.000 1.916 4.605 5.000 1.664 5.375 5.000 1.338 7.625 8.000 1.506 4.432 4.000 1.094 
MANGOWN 0.167 0.070 0.168 0.246 0.170 0.239 0.265 0.150 0.280 0.014 0.009 0.014 0.150 0.055 0.231 
OUTSIDE 0.654 1.000 0.480 0.605 1.000 0.495 0.781 1.000 0.420 0.750 1.000 0.463 0.757 1.000 0.435 
RFAMLY 0.519 1.000 0.505 0.442 0.000 0.502 0.875 1.000 0.336 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.459 0.000 0.505 
DUAL 0.923 1.000 0.269 0.814 1.000 0.394 0.750 1.000 0.440 0.500 0.500 0.535 0.919 1.000 0.277 
ACSIZE 2.981 3.000 0.700 3.233 3.000 0.841 3.188 3.000 0.644 3.625 4.000 0.518 3.108 3.000 0.658 
ACMEET 3.654 3.000 2.308 3.442 4.000 1.906 3.375 4.000 1.561 5.125 6.000 1.642 2.622 3.000 1.497 
ACINDEP 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.907 1.000 0.294 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.625 1.000 0.518 0.865 1.000 0.347 
ACEXPERT 0.731 1.000 0.448 0.558 1.000 0.502 0.875 1.000 0.336 0.500 0.500 0.535 0.703 1.000 0.463 
RENEXIST 0.904 1.000 0.298 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.946 1.000 0.229 
RNIDP 0.352 0.000 0.482 0.476 0.000 0.505 0.375 0.000 0.492 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.400 0.000 0.496 
FAMOWN 0.180 0.050 0.256 0.166 0.140 0.191 0.037 0.000 0.099 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.135 0.000 0.247 
INSTOWN 0.112 0.000 0.195 0.189 0.140 0.200 0.013 0.000 0.034 0.035 0.035 0.037 0.179 0.145 0.201 
STATEOWN 0.055 0.000 0.117 0.015 0.000 0.055 0.229 0.174 0.184 0.425 0.425 0.337 0.049 0.000 0.150 
BLOCKOWN 0.692 1.000 0.466 0.841 1.000 0.370 0.625 1.000 0.492 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.838 1.000 0.374 
AUDOPIN 0.865 1.000 0.345 0.886 1.000 0.321 0.938 1.000 0.246 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.919 1.000 0.277 
REPTIME 1.653 1.703 0.256 1.606 1.672 0.176 1.503 1.484 0.211 1.658 1.672 0.068 1.489 1.568 0.207 
BIG4 0.442 0.000 0.502 0.636 1.000 0.487 0.719 1.000 0.457 0.375 0.000 0.518 0.459 0.000 0.505 
AUDITSWITH 0.423 0.000 0.499 0.136 0.000 0.347 0.188 0.000 0.397 0.250 0.000 0.463 0.135 0.000 0.347 
LEVG 0.046 0.000 0.095 0.076 0.048 0.093 0.061 0.047 0.075 0.021 0.014 0.026 0.041 0.006 0.072 
ROA 0.039 0.034 0.091 0.090 0.089 0.070 0.194 0.195 0.059 0.037 0.011 0.056 0.082 0.087 0.057 
CFO 0.086 0.074 0.104 0.069 0.057 0.093 0.219 0.219 0.067 0.103 0.127 0.069 0.087 0.082 0.082 
SIZE 8.833 8.721 0.574 9.114 9.098 0.353 9.398 9.403 0.157 10.14 10.139 1.083 8.929 8.946 0.545 
COMPLEX 0.411 0.000 0.496 0.708 1.000 0.459 0.250 0.000 0.440 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.438 0.000 0.501 
AUDSPEC 0.154 0.000 0.364 0.295 0.000 0.462 0.281 0.000 0.457 0.375 0.000 0.518 0.243 0.000 0.435 
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                                                                       Table (8.14) Descriptive statistics according to industry 
 
Variable 
MIDIA & 
PUPLISHING 
MULTI-
INVESTMENT 
PETROCHEMICAL REAL ESTATE& DEV RETAIL 
Men Med SD Men Med SD Men Med SD Men Med SD Men Med SD 
DAC 0.221 0.162 0.227 0.118 0.065 0.154 0.069 0.029 0.118 0.068 0.028 0.094 0.080 0.056 0.090 
BRDSIZE 8.200 8.000 2.573 7.556 8.000 1.649 8.622 9.000 1.762 9.375 9.000 1.245 7.815 7.000 1.777 
BRDMEET 4.100 3.500 1.287 3.852 4.000 1.537 4.267 4.000 1.452 5.042 6.000 2.116 3.963 4.000 1.698 
MANGOWN 0.353 0.260 0.235 0.115 0.070 0.163 0.073 0.042 0.084 0.206 0.165 0.148 0.306 0.240 0.255 
OUTSIDE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.704 1.000 0.465 0.733 1.000 0.447 0.792 1.000 0.415 0.556 1.000 0.506 
RFAMLY 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.704 1.000 0.465 0.222 0.000 0.420 0.333 0.000 0.482 0.259 0.000 0.447 
DUAL 0.400 0.000 0.516 0.444 0.000 0.506 0.911 1.000 0.288 0.792 1.000 0.415 0.481 0.000 0.509 
ACSIZE 3.000 3.000 0.000 2.889 3.000 0.751 3.267 3.000 0.495 3.458 3.000 0.779 3.074 3.000 0.550 
ACMEET 3.300 1.000 4.596 2.481 2.000 2.007 2.733 3.000 1.421 4.375 4.000 2.060 3.222 4.000 1.761 
ACINDEP 0.900 1.000 0.316 0.963 1.000 0.192 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.833 1.000 0.381 0.704 1.000 0.465 
ACEXPERT 0.200 0.000 0.422 0.556 1.000 0.506 0.933 1.000 0.252 0.708 1.000 0.464 0.407 0.000 0.501 
RENEXIST 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.852 1.000 0.362 0.778 1.000 0.420 0.708 1.000 0.464 0.963 1.000 0.192 
RNIDP 0.200 0.000 0.422 0.296 0.000 0.465 0.313 0.000 0.468 0.120 0.000 0.332 0.857 1.000 0.356 
FAMOWN 0.095 0.060 0.088 0.237 0.132 0.301 0.083 0.000 0.146 0.081 0.000 0.103 0.236 0.210 0.193 
INSTOWN 0.290 0.300 0.290 0.094 0.000 0.176 0.230 0.149 0.239 0.194 0.160 0.174 0.122 0.075 0.174 
STATEOWN 0.016 0.000 0.025 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.102 0.000 0.213 0.126 0.000 0.237 0.000 0.000 0.000 
BLOCKOWN 0.909 1.000 0.302 0.704 1.000 0.465 0.911 1.000 0.288 0.833 1.000 0.381 0.889 1.000 0.320 
AUDOPIN 0.800 1.000 0.422 0.370 0.000 0.492 0.889 1.000 0.318 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.926 1.000 0.267 
REPTIME 1.745 1.698 0.148 1.668 1.699 0.210 1.489 1.556 0.253 1.506 1.623 0.269 1.610 1.623 0.205 
BIG4 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.630 1.000 0.492 0.889 1.000 0.318 0.542 1.000 0.509 0.593 1.000 0.501 
AUDITSWITH 0.100 0.000 0.316 0.259 0.000 0.447 0.156 0.000 0.367 0.333 0.000 0.482 0.185 0.000 0.396 
LEVG 0.008 0.002 0.011 0.095 0.000 0.137 0.271 0.292 0.198 0.033 0.000 0.091 0.024 0.000 0.047 
ROA 0.102 0.094 0.049 0.006 0.008 0.085 0.031 0.010 0.060 0.044 0.046 0.047 0.091 0.080 0.117 
CFO 0.072 0.076 0.082 0.025 0.020 0.064 0.039 0.023 0.082 0.060 0.044 0.089 0.108 0.112 0.132 
SIZE 8.928 8.971 0.356 9.092 8.882 0.844 9.931 9.775 0.621 9.680 9.557 0.343 8.733 8.842 0.332 
COMPLEX 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.571 1.000 0.504 0.536 1.000 0.503 0.286 0.000 0.460 0.313 0.000 0.471 
AUDSPEC 0.700 1.000 0.483 0.296 0.000 0.465 0.069 0.029 0.118 0.458 0.000 0.509 0.370 0.000 0.492 
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In terms of royal family members, the result shows a statistically positive and significant level 
of (P >0.10) with earnings management in all industries that leads us to conclude that the 
presence of royal family members on boards of directors increases earnings management.     
As Table 8.15 shows, inconsistent with the expectation, but consistent with the main result, 
state-ownership seems to increase earnings management in all industries. Overall, in relation 
to ownership structure, the results are not consistent with agency theory which suggests that 
lower opportunistic earnings management is associated with the existence of large 
shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), but they are consistent with results obtained by 
Chen et al. (2006) and Firth, (2007) using Chinese data, which suggests that no type of 
ownership structure, even state-ownership, has an effect on constraining earnings 
management.  
Among the control variables, apart from the building industry, the findings are consistent 
with the main results that indicate a negatively significant relationship (P>0.10) between 
firm size and earnings management. This result supports the study by Becker et al. 
(1998) who suggest that large firms have less motivation to manage earnings since they 
are subjected to more monitoring by investors and financial analyst. As concluded in the 
main results, none of the other variables seem be effective relative to industry.   
 
3-  Findings for the second model according to industry 
Table 8.16 (See page 247) reveals the findings of regression analysis relative to industry for 
the second model. As the table indicates, contrary to expectations all audit committee 
characteristics appear to be ineffective in constraining earnings management in all industries. 
These findings seem to show that there is no meaningful direct relationship between earnings 
management and the presence of an audit committee which has been suggested by prior 
studies such as (Klein, 2002) or that the audit committee’s role prevents fraudulent 
accounting statements as well as suggesting, according to agency theory, that the role of the 
audit committee is to monitor and oversee the integrity of financial reporting. 
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Table (8.15) Summary of Results for First Model Relative to Industry 
                            BUILDING INDUSTRIAL FOOD RETAIL REGULATED 
DAC Coef. z P>z Coef. z P>z Coef. z P>z Coef. z P>z Coef. z P>z 
Outside  -0.030 -1.650 * -0.029 -1.620 * -0.030 -1.650 * -0.030 -1.630 * -0.030 -1.650 * 
BRDSIZE -0.012 -2.300 ** -0.012 -2.350 *** -0.012 -2.380 *** -0.012 -2.310 ** -0.012 -2.330 ** 
BRDMEET -0.010 -2.140 ** -0.010 -2.180 ** -0.010 -2.170 ** -0.010 -2.150 ** -0.010 -2.150 ** 
RFAMILY 0.019 1.540 * 0.018 1.500 * 0.019 1.550 * 0.018 1.510 * 0.018 1.510 * 
Non-DUAL -0.023 -1.110  -0.020 -0.980 
 
-0.025 -1.220  -0.022 -1.080  -0.022 -1.090  
RNEXIST -0.011 -0.470  -0.011 -0.460 
 
-0.014 -0.600  -0.011 -0.460  -0.013 -0.520  
RNIDP -0.042 -2.350 *** -0.041 -2.290 ** -0.040 -2.260 ** -0.042 -2.340 *** -0.041 -2.310 ** 
FAMOWN 0.054 1.320  0.055 1.350 
 
0.056 1.380  0.052 1.290  0.051 1.250  
INSTOWN 0.061 1.350  0.058 1.290 
 
0.052 1.150  0.062 1.360  0.060 1.330  
STATEOWN 0.154 2.350 ** 0.155 2.380 *** -0.145 2.230 *** 0.155 2.370 ** 0.154 2.350 *** 
MANGOWN 0.025 0.640  0.024 0.610 
 
0.027 0.680  0.025 0.620  0.026 0.670  
BLOCKOWN 0.008 0.340  0.008 0.350 
 
0.008 0.350  0.008 0.350  0.008 0.370  
BIG4 -0.001 -0.060  -0.001 -0.070 
 
0.000 -0.010  -0.001 -0.070  -0.001 -0.040  
LEVG 0.000 0.000  -0.003 -0.040 
 
-0.008 -0.120  -0.001 -0.020  -0.003 -0.050  
ROA 0.024 0.200  0.030 0.250 
 
0.035 0.300  0.021 0.180  0.014 0.120  
CFO 0.243 2.530 
 
0.231 2.390 
 
0.219 2.290 *** 0.243 2.530 
 
0.245 2.550 
 SIZE -0.028 -1.520 -0.028 -1.510 * -0.023 -1.260 * -0.028 -1.520 * -0.027 -1.470 * 
COMPLEX 0.008 0.510  0.008 0.520 
 
0.007 0.430  0.008 0.490  0.008 0.470  
INDUSTRY -0.008 -0.460  -0.017 -1.110 
 
0.044 2.070 ** 0.008 0.380  -0.012 -0.450  
_cons -0.030 3.520 *** 0.524 3.550 *** 0.479 3.230 *** 0.519 3.510 *** 0.515 3.470 *** 
AdjR-2 14% 15.05% 15.08% 14.57% 14.77% 
Wald-Chi 54.95*** 56.14*** 59.73*** 54.87 *** 54.90*** 
Notes:  indicate significant at *** 0.001, ** 0.05, * 0.10 
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Contrary to studies examining the effect of external audit factors on earnings management, 
which found a significant relationship between external audit and earnings management, the 
findings according to industry seem to show that there is no meaningful direct relationship 
between the variables of external audit factors proposed by prior studies (Mohd-Sulaiman, 
2008; Krishnan, 2003 and DeAngelo 1981 and earnings management. Only auditor opinion is 
found to be negatively associated with earnings management.   
Regarding ownership structure, the result shows that family ownership is positively 
associated with the earnings management indicator in all industries. This result is 
consistent with the view that family control may lead to expropriating minority 
shareholders’ interests (Jaggi et al., 2009). Additionally, state-owned structure is found to 
be positively associated with earnings management in all industries in the second model. 
This result is not consistent with the assertion of the agency theory which proposes that 
lower opportunistic earnings management is associated with the existence of large 
shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Comes, 2000).  
Among the control variables, only size and BRDINDP are found to be significantly 
related to DAC. Also, CFO is shown to be significantly related to DAC in three 
industries. Additionally, board independence as a control variable seems to be 
significantly associated to DAC.     
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Notes:  indicate significant at *** 0.001, ** 0.05, * 0.10
 
Table (8.16)  Summary of Results for Second Model According to Industry 
 
                            BUILDING INDUSTRIAL FOOD RETAIL REGULATED 
DAC Coef. z P>z Coef. z P>z Coef. z P>z Coef. z P>z Coef. z P>z 
ACINDEP -0.013 -0.480  -0.009 -0.350  -0.012 -0.450  -0.011 -0.420  -0.011 -0.400  
ACSIZE -0.003 -0.210  -0.004 -0.290  -0.003 -0.250  -0.003 -0.230  -0.003 -0.220  
ACMEET -0.004 -1.040  -0.004 -1.080  -0.004 -1.060  -0.004 -1.030  -0.004 -0.990  
ACEXPERT -0.001 -0.040  0.001 0.070  -0.001 -0.050  0.000 -0.020  -0.001 -0.070  
BIG4 -0.011 -0.510  -0.009 -0.440  -0.008 -0.360  -0.011 -0.500  -0.010 -0.480  
AUDSPEC -0.011 -0.520  -0.013 -0.650  -0.015 -0.730  -0.011 -0.540  -0.011 -0.540  
AUDOPIN -0.050 -2.110 ** -0.050 -2.120 * -0.053 -2.230 ** -0.050 -2.100 ** -0.050 -2.110 ** 
Timeliness 0.001 0.040  -0.004 -0.110  -0.003 -0.080  0.000 -0.010  0.000 0.000  
AUDSWITCH -0.011 -0.590  -0.011 -0.620  -0.010 -0.520  -0.011 -0.620  -0.012 -0.640  
FAMOWN 0.076 1.870 * 0.077 1.890 ** 0.080 1.970 * 0.075 1.820 ** 0.074 1.810 * 
INSTOWN 0.072 1.550 * 0.071 1.530 * 0.064 1.380  0.073 1.560 * 0.072 1.540 * 
MANGOWN 0.013 0.310  0.011 0.270  0.015 0.360  0.012 0.300  0.013 0.330  
STATEOWN 0.200 3.210 ** 0.201 3.230 *** 0.193 3.110 *** 0.201 3.220 ** 0.201 3.220 *** 
BLOCKOWN 0.009 0.410  0.009 0.410  0.010 0.430  0.009 0.420  0.010 0.430  
BRDINDP -0.031 -1.700 * -0.030 -1.680 * -0.032 -1.770 * -0.031 -1.700 * -0.031 -1.700 * 
LEVG 0.049 0.700  0.041 0.590  0.039 0.560  0.046 0.650  0.046 0.660  
ROA 0.017 -0.140  0.017 -0.140  0.008 -0.070  0.024 -0.200  0.027 0.220  
CFO 0.245 2.520 ** 0.234 2.390 
 
0.221 2.270 ** 0.246 2.530 ** 0.248 2.540 
 
SIZE -0.045 -2.440 ** -0.044 -2.400 ** -0.039 -2.130 *8 -0.045 -2.430 *** -0.045 -2.400 *** 
COMPLEX 0.006 0.360  0.006 0.380  0.005 0.280  0.006 0.350  0.006 0.350  
Industry -0.010 -0.590  -0.020 -1.220  0.048 2.240 ** 0.007 0.300  -0.006 -0.230  
_cons 0.566 3.510 *** 0.572 3.550 *** 0.517 3.200 *** 0.563 3.490 *** 0.561 3.460 *** 
AdjR-2 12.77% 14.06% 13.09% 12.69% 12.68% 
Wald-Chi 45.66*** 51.89*** 46.98*** 45.37 *** 45.32*** 
 248 
 
8.6.4 Parametric Test (OLS), pooled test results, and non-linear test  
It is widespread practice to use non-parametric tests in earnings management. This current study 
employs a non-parametric test since the data did not meet parametric test conditions. As 
mentioned earlier, the assumptions of OLS regression were argued and GLS regression was 
considered to be more relevant for this research. Previous studies emphasise that the three 
assumptions of OLS tests (normality, homoscedasticity, and linearity) should be provided before 
using parametric tests.  Habbash, (2010) states that numerous studies assess the effect of samples 
with non-normal distributions and unequal variances on the values of parametric tests. The 
findings presented by him suggest that violation of these two assumptions generally has a slight 
effect on the values of these tests. On the other hand, many studies claim that parametric tests 
could be applied with ordinal variables because tests apply to numbers and not to what those 
numbers relate to (Wilcox, 1987).  
Table 8.17 (See page 250) presents the findings of the first and second models according to 
parametric tests. A number of studies (e.g. Peasnell et al., 2005; Davidson et al., 2005; Abdul 
Rahman and Ali, 2006; Benkel et al., 2006 and Jaggi et al., 2009) used the parametric test even 
though their data did not meet parametric test conditions and they noted that in their limitations.    
Homogeneity of variance of the residuals is a key assumption for OLS regression that plays a 
vital role in giving the model more credibility; therefore, any non-constant of variance of the 
residuals leads to heteroskedasticity. One appropriate method to treat heteroskedasticity is to 
adapt Robust Standard Errors that addresses the issue of errors that are not independent and 
identically distributed. Clearly, applying Robust Standard Errors cannot correct coefficient 
estimates provided by OLS, but they may change the standard errors and significance result.      
Generally, following Dimitropoulos and Asteriou (2010), as Table 8.17 shows a parametric test 
using Robust Standard Errors OLS with fixed effect used as a robustness check of the main 
findings for the two models. Statistically, apart from institutional ownership in the second model 
found to be significant with earnings management, there is no variation in results between the 
primary analysis adopting the non-parametric test and the findings of the parametric test for the 
two models. Additionally, R square value is found to be quite similar and the findings also show 
approximately the same level of significance and coefficients for most variables compared to the 
main results.  
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Another sensitivity analysis used in the current study is the pooled test. The primary tests apply a 
panel data test; thus, in order to check the sensitivity of findings a pooled test that assumes that 
all observations have taken place at the same time. This analysis uses a panel of a firm-level, 
fixed effects specification. Table 8.18 (See page 251) provides the findings of the pooled test. 
The findings are considerably similar to panel data-cross sectional.    
Finally, in regression analysis, there is a dependent variable and more independent variables that 
are related to it. The relation between them can be expressed by a linear equation, such as: y = a 
+ bx. The previous findings are expressed by linear regression; however; Table 8.19 (See page 
252) presents the findings according to non-linear regression between variables. Generally, the 
results do not reflect a significant indication for using non-linear regression which is quite 
similar to linear regression.    
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Table (8.17) Parametric Test (OLS) Regression 
First Model Second Model 
DAC Coef. t P>t DAC Coef. t P>t 
BRDINDP -0.030 -1.650 * ACINDEP -0.010 -0.380  
BRDSIZE -0.012 -2.290 ** ACSIZE -0.002 -0.160  
BRDMEET -0.010 -2.010 *** ACMEET -0.003 -0.770  
RFAMILY 0.019 1.540 * ACEXPERT -0.003 -0.140  
DUAL -0.021 -1.040  BIG4 -0.011 -0.510  
RNEXIST -0.006 -0.230  AUDSPEC -0.010 -0.470  
RNIDP -0.041 -2.320 * AUDOPIN -0.049 -2.040 ** 
FAMOWN 0.054 1.330  REPTIME -0.008 -0.220  
INSTOWN 0.063 1.390  AUDSWITCH -0.014 -0.750  
STATEOWN 0.154 2.350 *** BRDINDP -0.031 -1.680 * 
MANGOWN 0.029 0.730  FAMOWN 0.075 1.840 ** 
BLOCKOWN 0.007 0.330  INSTOWN 0.076 1.630 * 
BIG4 0.000 -0.020  MANGOWN 0.016 0.400  
LEVG 0.009 0.140  STATEOWN 0.200 3.210 *** 
ROA -0.016 -0.130  BLOCKOWN 0.009 0.410  
CFO 0.265 2.730  LEVG 0.054 0.770  
SIZE -0.028 -1.530 * ROA -0.063 -0.510  
COMPLEX 0.008 0.490  CFO 0.272 2.750  
_cons 0.511 3.450 *** SIZE -0.046 -2.480 *** 
 
COMPLEX 0.007 0.430  
_cons 0.577 3.570 *** 
Adj R-2 14.65% Adj R-2 12.58% 
F-statistics 35.31*** F-statistics 31.31*** 
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Table (8.18) Pooled Regression 
First Model Second Model 
DAC Coef. t P>t DAC Coef. t P>t 
OUTSIDE -0.030 0.018 * ACINDEP -0.011 0.015  
BRDSIZE -0.012 0.005 ** ACSIZE -0.003 0.004  
BRDMEET -0.010 0.006 *** ACMEET -0.004 0.020  
RFAMILY 0.019 0.015 * ACEXPERT -0.001 0.019  
DUAL -0.022 0.017  BIG4 -0.010 0.027  
RNEXIST -0.012 0.029  AUDSPEC -0.050 0.030  
RNIDP -0.041 0.016 * AUDOPIN -0.050 0.030 ** 
FAMOWN 0.053 0.042  TTIMELIENSS -0.012 0.017  
INSTOWN 0.060 0.040  AUDSWITCH -0.031 0.016  
STATEOWN 0.155 0.081 *** BRDINDP -0.031 0.016 * 
MANGOWN 0.026 0.042  FAMOWN 0.076 0.044 ** 
BLOCKOWN 0.008 0.022  INSTOWN 0.013 0.047 * 
BIG4 -0.001 0.018  MANGOWN 0.013 0.047  
LEVG -0.001 0.053  STATEOWN 0.010 0.022 *** 
ROA 0.021 0.165  BLOCKOWN -0.010 0.023  
CFO 0.243 0.159  LEVG 0.048 0.060  
SIZE -0.028 0.018 * ROA -0.024 0.175  
COMPLEX 0.008 0.016  CFO 0.247 0.162  
_cons 0.520 0.141 *** SIZE -0.045 0.018 *** 
 
COMPLEX 0.006 0.015  
_cons 0.565 0.155 *** 
Adj R-2 14.72% Adj R-2 12.67% 
F-statistics 40.30*** F-statistics 32.31*** 
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Table (8.19) Non-linear Analysis    
 
 
First Model Second Model 
DAC Coef. z P>z DAC Coef. z P>z 
OUTSIDE -0.032 -1.79 ** ACSIZE -0.0085 -0.68  
BRDSIZE -0.011 -2.16 ** ACMEET -0.004 -1.01  
BRDMEET 0.190 2.04 ** ACEXPERT -0.0071 -0.37  
RFAMILY -0.071 -0.43 * AUDSPEC -0.0111 -0.53  
DUAL -0.023 -1.14  ACINDEP -0.008 -0.32  
RNEXIST -0.012 -0.53  AUDOPIN -0.0449 -1.84 ** 
RNIDP -0.038 -2.14 ** TIMELIENSS -0.0003 -0.01  
FAMOWN 0.102 0.81  AUDSWITCH -0.01261 -0.68  
N.FAMOWN -0.038 -0.39  FAMOWN 0.080587 0.63 * 
INSTOWN -0.025 -0.18  N.FAMOWN -0.00597 -0.06  
N. INSTOWN 0.062 0.61  INSTOWN -0.00633 -0.04  
STATEOWN 0.207 1.41 ** N. INSTOWN 0.055894 0.52  
N. STATEOWN 0.035 0.34  STATEOWN 0.341251 2.47 ** 
MANGOWN 0.016 0.64  N. STATEOWN -0.11483 -1.14  
N. MANGOWN -0.149 -1.25  MANGOWN 0.146087 1.08  
BLOCKOWN 0.184 1.4  N. MANGOWN -0.11857 -0.96  
N.BLOCKOWN -0.193 -1.03   BLOCKOWN 0.241251 2.17  
BIG4 -0.001 -0.08  N.BLOCKOWN -0.21483 -1.24  
LEVG 0.004 0.07  BIG4 -0.01365 -0.63  
ROA 0.030 0.26  LEVG 0.044513 0.63  
CFO 0.230 2.38  ROA -0.03704 -0.31  
SIZE -0.03 -1.66 ** CFO 0.251571 2.57  
COMPLEX 0.010 0.63  SIZE -0.04591 -2.43 * 
_cons 0.562 3.69 *** COMPLEX 0.011116 0.64  
 _cons 0.582709 3.51 *** 
Adj R-2 14% Adj R-2 12% 
Wald-Chi 53.19*** Wald-Chi 45.66*** 
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         8.7 CONCLUSION    
The objective of this chapter has been to examine statistically the relationship between earnings 
management and internal/external corporate governance characteristics, mainly boards of directors, 
audit committees, audit quality factors, and ownership structure. The expectation of beneficial 
external and internal corporate governance practices constraining opportunistic earnings management 
activities was, to a large extent, found to be inaccurate in Saudi Arabia. All internal corporate 
governance variables apart from outside director, board size and board meetings examined in this 
research have no significant effect on earnings management. With the exception of auditor opinion, 
none of the audit quality factors and ownership structure affects earnings management. Moreover, 
ownership concentration was not effective in constraining earnings management. Accordingly, most 
findings are not consistent with agency theory’s prediction.      
One plausible explanation for the insignificant relationship may be that audit committees are less 
responsive to their duties and, indeed, less attentive to controlling needs. In respect of external audit 
factors, audit quality faces a hard time since many factors, such as monopoly of audit services by a 
few audit firms and illegal competition between audit firms are rather effective. Additionally, since 
there is weak investor protection in Saudi Arabia the concentration of ownership structure is less 
likely to be a monitoring mechanism. In addition to that, corporate governance mechanisms in Saudi 
Arabia are at a preliminary phase and there is a lack of knowledge of the importance of corporate 
governance; thus, corporate governance needs more time to be effective in the near future. 
Additionally, the concept of corporate governance in Saudi Arabia is still quite unclear.   
In terms of a theoretical explanation, the findings may be referred to institutional theory which 
predicts that companies might adopt practices or regulations as a result of coercion from a legislator 
who imposes some practices in order to improve organizational effectiveness. However, there is no 
prediction that the adoption of these regulations will improve organizational effectiveness.                   
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                                                      Chapter Nine: 
 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
   
 
9.1 INTRODUCTION   
The primary purpose of this thesis is twofold. Firstly, it aims to investigate the motivations and 
techniques of aggressive earnings management practices in Saudi Arabia. To achieve that, a 
questionnaire survey is used for primary data collection and semi structured interviews as support. 
Secondly, it aims to investigate the role of corporate governance and external audit on constraining 
manipulation or aggressive earnings management. Logistic regression is mainly used to conduct the 
investigation and questionnaire survey and semi-structured interviews are adopted as a 
supplementary tool in order to obtain a deep understanding of the phenomena. This thesis is 
expected to contribute to the existing literature by providing new evidence from a country 
characterized by a typical legal system, regulations, and environment.   
 
Accordingly, this thesis has provided a comprehensive view of prior studies that have discussed 
earnings management practices and the role of corporate governance, ownership structure and 
external audit factors  in constraining manipulation. Moreover, an overview of Saudi Arabia has 
been introduced to provide an understanding of the fundamental underlying issues in order to help 
the researcher to employ some determinants and measurements; then the focus of this research is to 
obtain an understanding regarding earnings management practices and the role of monitoring 
mechanisms in mitigating manipulation. The thesis also reviews the different theories that could 
provide a scientific base for controlling earnings management and offers a conceptual framework 
showing the relationship between monitoring mechanisms and aggressive earnings management. It 
employs agency theory as the main theory for its argument because agency theory is the most 
relevant theory to the research questions of this study. The literature related to the effectiveness of 
corporate governance on earnings management conceives that the board of directors is the apex of 
internal corporate governance and the main means of decreasing agency problems by aligning the 
interests of shareholders with managers’ interests. Additionally, agency theory predicts that the 
board of directors and its committees will enhance the integrity of their financial reporting through 
monitoring management. Moreover, internal corporate governance and external auditing as 
monitoring costs on one hand, and earnings management as residual costs, converge in agency cost. 
Moral hazard is caused by different factors such as firm size and its complexity which lead to 
difficulty in monitoring which in turn increases agency cost; thus, it plays a role, as a monitoring 
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mechanism, in reducing agency cost.  In terms of ownership structure, previous studies suggest that 
agency costs increase as firms move from a single owner/single manager ownership structure to 
more complicated ownership structures and suggest that agency costs are significantly higher when 
firms are not managed by owners. On the other hand, this thesis does not disregard institutional 
theory which has been helpful in interpreting some of the findings. Previous studies also suggest 
that using agency theory alone in the examination of duality and performance does not adequately 
explain the effect. Moreover, they confirm that institutional theory and agency theory are 
complementary approaches to corporate governance effectiveness; so, using both as a framework 
might be helpful in providing a deeper understanding of corporate governance and board functions.  
 
Regarding methodological process, this study will contribute to the literature by using combined 
methods (quantitative and qualitative) which may not have been adopted previously and will attempt 
to examine new characteristics of monitoring mechanisms.  
                         
Overall, this thesis has provided findings that draw attention to earnings management practices and 
the role of monitoring mechanisms in Saudi Arabia. Chapters Seven and Eight report the findings 
of the questionnaire, interviews survey, and secondary data analysis respectively and this chapter 
presents the summary of the findings and the conclusion. This chapter is organised as follows: 
section 9.2 provides a review of the findings. Section 9.3 outlines potential limitations, while 
section 9.4 gives the implications and suggests areas of future research. Finally, section 9.5 
provides areas for future research.   
   
9.2 REVIEW OF THE FINDINGS  
9.2.1 Questionnaire Survey and Semi-Structured Interview    
9.2.1.1 Earnings management practices 
9.2.1.1.1 Earnings management motivations 
The investigation into earnings management motivations in Saudi Arabia is the first of this study’s 
objectives. Accordingly, the following hypothesis is addressed: 
 
H1: There is a significant difference among respondents regarding earnings management 
motivations in Saudi Arabia.   
 
The findings of the questionnaire survey reveal that the above hypothesis is true, confirming that 
there is a significant difference among respondents regarding motivations for earnings management 
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in Saudi Arabia. The Kruskal-Wallis analysis of respondents’ perceptions reveals that there are 
significant differences in perceptions with regard to increasing the amount of Zakat, increasing the 
amount of remuneration, increasing share price, reducing buyout compensation and retaining stable 
performance. These statistically significant differences are outlined in the following table (9.1).  
  
Generally, the results show that there is a consensus (and hence on statistically significant 
differences) on the following four main incentives for Saudi managers to manage earnings: to 
increase the amount of remuneration, to report a reasonable profit and avoid loss, to obtain a bank 
loan and to increase share price. The present findings seem to be consistent with prior studies such 
as Baker et al. (2003); Bergstresser and Philippon (2006); Roychowdhury (2006); Louis and Sun 
(2008) and Kamel and Elbanna (2010). In addition, the interview survey supports the questionnaire 
survey’s findings. Interestingly, the interviews survey shows that ownership structure and company 
size may be crucial factors in determining the motivations in Saudi Arabia.    
 
Theoretically, previous motivations may be justified by agency theory, as an economic model of 
behaviour, which expects that, as long as the objectives of the principal and agent are aligned, the 
agent will attempt to maximize the objectives of the principal. However, when their objectives are 
conflicted, agency theory views that the agent will attempt to maximize his/her self-interest over the 
principal’s interests. According to institutional theory, earnings management incentives may be 
effected by formal or informal pressure, and the change created by organisations in order to model 
themselves on other organisations.   
 
 
Table: (9.1) The Significant Differences in Respondents’ Perceptions Regarding Motivations 
                   Motivation  Board of directors Sub-committee External auditor Academic Staff 
1- To increase the amount of Zakat       D. Agree    D. Agree   Moderate        Moderate 
2- To increase the amount of remuneration               Agree       Agree    Moderate         Agree 
3- To reduce buyout compensation      Moderate        S. Agree   Moderate        Moderate 
4- To retain stable performance       S. Agree  Do not agree   Moderate        Moderate 
5-To increase share price     Moderate    Moderate    S. Agree    S. Agree 
*S. Agree: strongly agree, Moderate: slightly agree, D. Agree: do not agree   
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9.2.1.1.2 Earnings management techniques 
The investigation into earnings management techniques in Saudi Arabia is the second of this 
study’s objectives. Accordingly, the following hypothesis is addressed: 
H2: There is a significant difference among respondents regarding earnings management 
techniques in Saudi Arabia.   
 
The findings of the questionnaire survey show that the above hypothesis is true and confirm that 
there is a significant difference among respondents regarding earnings management techniques in 
Saudi Arabia. The findings indicate that the majority (80%) of all four groups of respondents 
agreed or strongly agreed with seven techniques which they believed were used frequently. These 
techniques were reflected in overall mean for each technique as follows: manipulation of the 
provision of inventory (4.07); manipulation of the amount of receivable accounts (4.04); 
manipulation of the amount of depreciation accounts (4.09); manipulation of amount of 
expenses (4.07); manipulation of sales of assets (4.10); manipulation of internal transactions 
(4.10); and capitalising rather than expensing expenditure (4.01). These findings are consistent 
with prior literature such as Kamel and Elbanna, (2010); Markarian et al (2008); Nigrini et al 
(2005).  
 
In addition, the findings show a significant difference between the groups with regard to 
manipulation of the provision of inventory, manipulation of the amount of depreciation accounts, 
manipulation of the amount of revenue; manipulation of the amount of cash flow; manipulation of 
the amount of reserves. These differences are outlined in the following table (9.2).   
 
Table: (9.2) Significant Differences in Respondents’ Perceptions Regarding Techniques  
                   Motivation  Board of directors Sub-committee External auditor Academic Staff 
1- Manipulation  of the provision of  inventory 
      inventory 
      Moderate      Agree     S. Agree          Agree 
2- Manipulation of the amount of  depreciation 
    accounts 
       S. Agree      Moderate    Moderate         S. Agree 
3- Manipulation of the amount of revenue      Moderate       Agree        Agree       Moderate 
4- Manipulation  of the amount of cash flow         Agree    Moderate    Moderate          Agree 
*S. Agree: strongly agree, Moderate: slightly agree, D. Agree: do not agree   
 
Investigation with the interview participants indicates additional evidence and information with 
regard to earnings management techniques in Saudi Arabia. For instance, one interviewee from 
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among the academics expressed his concerns about Saudi accounting standards. Another 
interviewee suggested that the motivation for earnings management determines the technique. 
 
These findings are not surprising since agency theory predicts that a separation between ownership 
and management encourages managers (agents) to act in an opportunistic manner in order to 
increase their personal wealth at the expense of the owners (principal) of an organisation (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976). Therefore, prior studies indicate that the contract between agent and principal 
should comprise bonding and monitoring provisions that can be beneficial in reducing agency costs. 
Only positive accounting theory shows that discretionary accounting accrual choices have been 
employed as an instrument to manipulate earnings (Aljifri, 2007). 
 
9.2.1.2 Internal and external corporate governance  
9.2.1.2.1 Internal corporate governance  
Questionnaire respondents were shown a number of board characteristics that might constrain 
earnings management. These characteristics were mainly derived from the previous literature as 
discussed earlier. The findings indicate that more than 80% of the respondents viewed that frequent 
meetings, large board size, a high proportion of outside directors and separation between the 
position of chairperson and CEO are key characteristics of boards of directors in constraining 
earnings management. However, the existence of royal family members on the board was not seen 
as a possible factor in constraining earnings management.  
 
In terms of audit committee characteristics, the questionnaire survey reveals that over three-quarters 
of respondents agreed or strongly agreed that the following characteristics are useful in restricting 
earning management: frequent meetings by audit committees (86%), a high proportion of outside 
directors (89%) and the existence of financial experts (93%). However, less than half (45%) of 
respondents did not agree that a small audit committee might be effective in reducing earnings 
management. In relation to remuneration and nomination committee, the majority of respondents 
showed a low level of agreement compared to audit committee characteristics as being effective in 
the prevention of earnings management. In addition, the findings of respondents’ opinions related 
to ownership concentration and earnings showed that almost three-quarters of respondents (71%) 
agreed that controlling shareholders might constrain earnings management. However, this result 
represents a slightly lower percentage than others.  
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The Kruskal-Wallis analysis of respondents’ perceptions reveals that there are significant 
differences in perceptions with regard to the role of corporate governance in constraining earnings 
management. These differences are summarised in Table 9.3.     
  
Table 9.3 The Significant Differences in Respondents Perceptions Regarding Characteristics  
of Internal Corporate Governance 
                   Motivation  Board of directors Sub-committee External auditor Academic Staff 
1- Separation between functions of CEO and 
chair of board      
       Agree S. Agree     Agree    S. Agree 
2- Frequent meetings of audit committee            Agree Agree    moderate     S. Agree 
3- Small size of audit committee (no more than 3)      D. Agree Moderate     D. Agree    D. Agree 
4- Sufficient expertise in accounting, auditing  
       and/or finance on audit committee    
     S. Agree Agree     Agree      Agree 
5- Frequent meetings of remuneration and  
       nomination committee. 
    Moderate      Agree    D. Agree   Moderate 
6 - Small size of remuneration and nomination  
ttt  committeetttttttt  
     D. Agree    Moderate    D. Agree   Moderate 
7-  High proportion of outside directors on 
       remuneration and nomination committee 
       Agree    Moderate    D. agree    Agree 
8- CEO should serve on  remuneration and 
       nomination committee 
       D. Agree    D. Agree   S.D. Agree  D. Agree 
*S. Agree: strongly agree. Moderate: slightly agree. D. Agree: do not agree. S.D. Agree: Strongly do not agree.       
 
According to the interview survey, many issues have been raised that may impair the role of 
internal corporate governance in Saudi Arabia. These issues can be outlined as follows:  
1- Corporate governance is modern, a new concept in Saudi Arabia. 
2- There is nepotism in selecting members of boards of directors and other committees. 
3- Most members, whether on the board or committees, are unaware of their duties and 
responsibilities toward shareholders. 
4- There is weakness in communication between the audit committee and external auditors. 
5- The members of the audit committee feel no sense of legal responsibility toward 
shareholders.  
6- There are numerous issues that impair the independence of members that are affected by 
culture or habits. 
7- Although there is a legal separation between the function of CEO and chairman, there is still 
a strong relationship (friendship or blood relationship) between them that leads to an 
impairment of the role of chairman, notably in accountability.    
 
In addition, the concentration of ownership is perceived differently by interviewees, which suggests 
that concentrated ownership may be a monitoring mechanism in some companies but not in others.  
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9.2.1.2.2 External audit factors  
In relation to external audit factors, the majority of respondents (more than 80%) agreed and 
strongly agreed with many factors, such as: contracting a firm which has high independence and  
good reputation, contracting a local firm affiliated with Big4, contracting a specialist industry 
auditor, short auditor tenure with a company, issuing stricter auditing standards and accounting 
legislations, and issuing deterrent punishments that contribute to reducing earnings management 
practices. However, there are significant differences between respondents regarding some factors 
which are outlined in Table 9.4.  
 
Table 9.4: The significant Differences in Respondents’ Perceptions Regarding External Audit Factors 
                   Motivation  Board of directors Sub-committee External auditor Academic Staff 
1- Contracting a local firm affiliated with 
     the BIG4 
         Moderate        S. Agree     Moderate    S. Agree 
2-  Contracting a specialist auditor in industry      S. Agree        Agree     Agree    S. Agree 
3- Short auditor tenure with a company    Agree Agree    Moderate    S. Agree 
4-Issuing stricter auditing standards and accounting 
    legislations    
Agree Agree    Moderate       Agree 
         *S. Agree: strongly agree. Moderate: slightly agree. D. Agree: do not agree. S.D. Agree: Strongly do not agree.  
      
In the case of Saudi Arabia, interviews have revealed underlying issues regarding external auditing 
that can be summarised as follows:   
1- A reduction in audit fees in order to attract more clients. 
2- Illegal competition between audit firms.  
3- Monopoly of audit services by some audit firms.  
4- Violation of auditing standards by some audit firms.  
5- A lack of confidence in the performance of Saudi audit firms.   
 
Overall, the findings of the questionnaire survey are more or less consistent with agency theory and 
the link between the theory and findings on the one hand and the finding of the survey on the other 
will be discussed in detail in the section on secondary data. 
 
9.2.2 Secondary Data  
The objectives of the study are to examine:  
1-  The relationship between internal corporate governance characteristics, mainly the board of 
directors and sub-committees characteristics and earnings management practices. 
2- The relationship between ownership structure and earnings management practices.  
3- The relationship between external audit factors and earnings management practices.  
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The secondary data mainly attempts to answer the research questions in relation to the above 
objectives. The discussion of the findings is organised as follows:                                                        
 
9.2.2.1 The role of internal corporate governance                                                                             
9.2.2.1.1 Board characteristics                                                                                                           
The prediction made regarding board characteristics reducing opportunistic earnings management 
activity was found to be fairly accurate. In other words, most board characteristics (board size, 
frequency of board meetings, outside directors, remuneration and nomination independence) were 
found to be negatively associated with earnings management practice. These finding are consistent 
with agency theory prediction that boards will enhance the integrity of their financial reporting 
through monitoring management (Peasnell et al., 2005).  
     
On the other hand, the number of members of the royal family on the board was found to be 
positively associated with earnings management. A possible explanation for this positive 
relationship is that most members of the royal family are managerial owners and their percentage of 
shares are low; thus, most previous studies found a positive relationship between managerial 
ownership and earnings management. A study conducted by Warfield et al. (1995) found that 
earnings management is higher when managerial ownership is low. Also, most respondents in the 
questionnaire and interviews survey do not agree that the existence of members of the royal on the 
board family will mitigate earnings management. Thus, the study’s expectation is not found to be 
accurate.   
 
Table 9.5: Outline of Hypotheses and Findings according to Board Characteristics 
N Hypothesis Findings 
H1 There is a negative relationship between outside directors and EM Supported and significant at p < 0.10   
H2 
There is a negative relationship between board size and EM. 
 
Supported and significant at p < 0.05 
H3 The number of board meetings is negatively associated with EM. Supported and significant at p < 0.05 
H4 
There is a negative relationship between the existence of royal family  
  members on the board of directors and EM.   
 
Not supported and positive  at p < 0.05 
H5 
There is a negative relationship between non-duality and EM.  
 
Not supported 
H6 
There is a negative relationship between the existence of a 
nomination and remuneration committee and EM.            
Not supported 
H7 
There is a negative relationship between nomination and 
remuneration committee independence and EM. 
Supported and significant at p < 0.05 
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9.2.2.1.2 Audit committee attributes                                                                                                                     
The prediction made regarding audit committee characteristics reducing opportunistic earnings 
management practices was found to be inaccurate. None of the audit committee variables examined 
in this study have a significant association with earnings management. These finding are not 
consistent with agency theory, but a plausible explanation for the insignificant relationship between 
audit committee variables and earnings management may be based on institutional theory. This 
theory suggests that companies might adopt practices or regulations as a result of coercion from a 
legislator who imposes some practices by force in order to improve organizational effectiveness. 
However, there is no prediction that the adoption of these regulations will improve organizational 
effectiveness. Another possible explanation suggested by the interviews survey is that audit 
committees are seen as ineffective in discharging their monitoring duties due to many reasons such 
as: nepotism in selecting members, low independence, lack of awareness of legal responsibilities 
toward shareholders, low payment and working part time.  
 
Table 9.6: Outline of Hypotheses and Findings Regarding Audit Committee 
 N Hypothesis Findings 
H8 
There is a negative relationship between audit committee size and earnings 
management. 
Not supported 
H9 
There is a negative relationship between audit committee meetings and earnings 
management. 
Not supported 
H10 
There is a negative relationship between audit committee independence and earnings 
management. 
Not supported 
H11 
There is a negative relationship between financial expertise and earnings management. 
Not supported 
 
 
 
9.2.2.2 Ownership structure 
The prediction made regarding ownership structure reducing opportunistic earnings management 
practices was found to be inaccurate. None of the types of ownership examined in this study 
showed a negative association with earnings management which is not consistent with agency 
theory. However, family ownership was found to be positively associated with earnings 
management. A plausible explanation could be offered by agency theory which suggests that 
majority of ownership might collude with management to expropriate the interests of a minority of 
shareholders. Moreover, state-ownership was found in both models to be positively associated with 
earnings management. In other words, signed earnings management findings indicate that state-
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owned companies tend to manage earnings by decreasing income. A plausible explanation for 
managing earnings downward is the wish to maintain stock price, avoid political cost or indirectly 
affect the amount of Zakat. Generally, a potential explanation for a weak role of ownership 
structure as a monitoring mechanism may be that the nature of ownership in developed countries 
differs from developing countries not only in the percentage but also in the characteristics such as 
experience, knowledge and other factors such as efficiency of market, and investor protection make 
the structure of ownership a monitoring mechanism; however, this may not be the case in 
developing countries. 
 
          Table 9.7: Outline of Hypotheses and Findings according to Ownership Structure  
N Hypothesis Findings 
H12 
H12: There is a negative relationship between board managerial ownership and EM.    
Not supported 
H13 
H13: There is a negative relationship between institutional ownership and earnings          
EM.    
Not supported 
H14 
H14: There is a negative relationship between governmental ownership and EM.    
Not supported 
H15 
H15: There is a negative relationship between family ownership and EM. 
Not supported 
H16 
H16: There is a negative relationship between blockholder ownership and EM 
Not supported 
 
 
9.2.2.3 External audit factors 
The prediction made regarding external audit factors (variables) reducing opportunistic earnings 
management practices was found to be inaccurate. None of the external audit variables examined in 
this study, except for auditor opinion, showed a significant association with earnings management. 
Previous findings are not consistent with agency theory; thus, a plausible explanation for the 
insignificant relationship between external audit variables and earnings management could be 
explained by the interview survey’s suggestions.  The interview survey revealed that the Saudi 
audit market has suffered from serious and inherent issues such as the reduction of audit fees, 
illegal competition between audit firms, the monopoly of audit services by a small number of audit 
firms and violation of auditing standards by some audit firms. All these issues will undoubtedly 
impair audit quality in Saudi Arabia. 
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Theoretically, institutional theory may justify the role of external audit as compulsory regulation 
that imposed by regulator to protect shareholders in Saudi Arabia. However , there is no prediction 
that the adoption of this regulation will improve organizational effectiveness. 
  
            Table 9.8: Outline of Hypotheses and Findings according to External Audit Factors  
N Hypothesis Findings 
H17 
H17: Firms with a BIG4 auditor are likely to be associated with low earnings management.    
Not supported 
H18 
H18: Firms with a specialist auditor are likely to be associated with low earnings 
management. 
Not supported 
H19 
H19: Firms with an unqualified opinion report are likely to be associated with low earnings          
management.  
Supported at p < 0.10   
H20 
H20: There is a positive relationship between timeliness and earnings management.                                      
Not supported 
H21 
H21: There is a relationship between auditor change and earnings management. 
Not supported 
 
 
 
9.3 IMPLICATIONS  
The aims of this thesis are to advance the earnings management practices research agenda by 
describing the motivations and techniques and to examine the corporate governance, external audit, 
and earnings management practices, and any relationship between them, in the context of Saudi 
Arabia. Fundamentally, the current study provides new evidence from a developing country that 
contributes to the existing literature on the effect of monitoring mechanisms on earnings 
management and on enhancing the quality of reported earnings in general. This section attempts to 
discuss the implications of the main findings for theory and practice. 
9.3.1 Implications for Theory   
Prior studies have documented the strong and consistent links between corporate governance and 
the quality of financial reporting, under agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), stakeholder 
and the resource-dependence theory (Undaysankar et al. 2003), managerial hegemony (Rahman and 
Ali, 2006), and institutional theory (DiMaggio and Powll, 1983, but the theories are not without 
contradictions. Agency theory has been a dominant approach in corporate governance and earnings 
management practices. Adequate monitoring or control mechanisms need to be established to 
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protect shareholders from management’s conflict of interest – so-called agency cost of modern 
capitalism is the most important implication for corporate governance and external audit stems 
from agency theory. Accordingly, normative recommendations provided by agency theory such as a 
majority of outside directors, independent directors, the positions of chairman and CEO should be 
held by different people or related to external audit such as independence. From a completely 
different perspective, institutional theory views these mechanisms as practices or regulations 
resulting from coercion by legislators who impose certain practices in order to improve 
organizational effectiveness, or as a result of imitation.       
In terms of earnings management practices associated with motivation and techniques, numerous 
theories have presented a clear justification for these practices such as positive theory (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1986), agency theory (Rahman and Ali, 2006), and institutional theory (DiMaggio and 
Powll, 1983). Both theories (agency and institutional theory) have been a focus in the investigation 
of earnings management practices. In other words, agency theory suggests that the issues related to 
the separation between ownership and management might lead managers to collude against owners 
to increase their own personal wealth (Rahman and Ali, 2006). However, institutional theory 
suggests that earnings management incentives may be affected by formal or informal pressure, and 
change may be created by an organisation in order to model itself on other organisations (Kury, 
2007).  
The use of two theories in our investigation in order to interpret the study’s findings has been 
employed due to the fact that Saudi Arabia has a different legal system and religious framework 
from other countries that could affect the practices of monitoring mechanisms such as internal 
corporate governance and external audit or the practices of earnings management. Moreover, it 
appears that the development of corporate governance is another intricate area associated with 
several factors such as regulation, culture, religion, ownership structure (Mallin, 2007).            
The findings reveal that that the four main incentives for Saudi managers to manage earnings are ‘to 
increase the amount of remuneration’ ‘to report a reasonable profit and avoid loss’, ‘to obtain a bank 
loan’ and ‘to increase share price’. The findings also indicate that only seven statements relating to 
earnings management that received support from respondents were techniques of earnings 
management in Saudi companies. Both agency theory and institutional theory may provide a 
sensible explanation for earnings management practices in Saudi Arabia. For example, to increase 
the amount of remuneration as motivation for earnings management could be interpreted by agency 
theory as suggesting that several factors, including job security or increasing personal wealth, may 
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be a catalyst for managers to manipulate reported earnings. In terms of others motivations such as 
‘to increase share price’, ‘report a reasonable profit and avoid loss’, and ‘obtain a bank loan’ these 
may be a result of the formal or informal pressure that comes from the regulator or society as 
suggested by institutional theory.             
Moreover, the expectation of beneficial corporate governance practices and external audit 
constraining opportunistic earnings management activities was to a large extent found to be 
inaccurate in Saudi Arabia. That is, no internal corporate governance variables, apart from outside 
director, board size and board meetings, examined in this research have any significant effect on 
earnings management. With the exception of auditor opinion, none of the external audit factors and 
ownership structure affects earnings management. Furthermore, the interview survey shows many 
issues and interesting findings related to previous investigations such as nepotism, illegal 
competition, and lack of independence. Generally, the findings are not consistent with agency 
theory that ownership concentration, audit committee, and external audit might mitigate agency 
problems leading to reduced agency cost by aligning the interests of controlling owners with those 
of the company. These findings can be interpreted in relation to the institutional theory that views 
these mechanisms as practices or regulations resulting from coercion by legislators who impose 
certain practices in order to improve organizational effectiveness, or as a result of imitation. 
Overall, this study provides theoretical validity by suggesting that institutional theory may be more 
appropriate than agency theory in describing the practices of corporate governance and external 
audit in developing countries such as Saudi Arabia. In terms of earnings management practices, 
institutional theory is a complementary theory for agency theory and other theories regarding why 
managers engage in earnings management. 
9.3.2 Professional Implications  
The findings could be useful to external auditors, regulators, and investors in their attempts to 
constrain the incidence of earnings management and enhance the quality of monitoring 
mechanisms. Accordingly, these findings have implications for regulators such as CMA attempting 
to increase the quality of financial reporting. In other words, regulators may satisfy investors by 
providing more effective legal action and imposing penalties on those who commit aggressive 
earnings management and encourage firms to comply with ethics standards by increasing their 
awareness of the importance of investor protection. Moreover, these findings may contribute to 
reducing earnings management practices by identifying motivations and techniques. Therefore, 
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CMA is called on to find solutions to mitigate the motivations and protect financial reporting from 
techniques used for managing earnings by developing national accounting standards or other 
regulations.  
The findings of this study are also useful for exploring which corporate governance attributes are 
likely to affect financial reporting quality. In addition, the findings could be helpful to improve and 
develop the Code of Corporate Governance Practices in Saudi Arabia by revising requirements and 
applying practical guidelines to maintain the actual and perceived independence of outside 
directors. Although the findings of the secondary data reveal good performance by members of 
boards of directors this could be because the board represents the main body of a company; 
however, the interview survey highlights many issues related to independence, responsibilities, and 
duties. Thus, action may be taken to enhance the skills and abilities of board members by 
organising training courses to define their responsibilities toward the integrity of financial reporting 
and increase their awareness of the importance of investor protection.   
In addition, the current findings reveal that audit committees play no effective role in monitoring 
the integrity of financial reporting; this may refer to some issues suggested by interviewees such as 
nepotism in selecting members, lack of independence, working part time, less compensation and 
unclear responsibilities. Thus, these findings also have implications for developing the role of audit 
committees in Saudi Arabia.  
Importantly, these findings show that external auditing also plays an ineffective role in monitoring 
the integrity of financial reporting; this may be due to many issues indicated by the interview 
survey such as illegal competition between audit firms, the reduction of audit fees, and the 
monopoly of audit services by a small number of audit firms. Therefore, the findings have 
beneficial implications for the development of the Saudi auditing and accounting profession by 
enhancing the auditor’s independence and competence and solving the issues that exist in the Saudi 
audit market.  
The findings demonstrate that there is no relationship between ownership structure and earnings 
management in Saudi Arabia. This may be due to a lack of awareness and a lack of insight of most 
investors in the Saudi market in terms of their role or perhaps to the fact that most investors in 
Saudi prefer short-term investment that does not require great attention. Thus, regulators can 
improve and enhance the awareness and skills of investors by holding business conferences, on one 
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hand, and at the same time increase the protection of investors in order to create a stable investment 
environment that leads to long-term investment and increases reassurances.     
Overall, this research contributes to the continuing debate on the feasibility of harmonising 
monitoring mechanisms around the globe. Theoretically in the literature review chapter, and 
empirically in the findings and discussion chapter, this thesis indicates that the efficiency of 
monitoring mechanisms differs from country to country, perhaps as a result of different macro and 
micro economic characteristics such as stock market regulations, disclosure requirements, firms’ 
ownership structures, culture and other factors.  
9.4 RECOMMENDATIONS 
According to findings presented by this study, it can be concluded that earnings management exists 
in Saudi Arabia and is expected to remain for the foreseeable future.  Accordingly, the regulator can 
only attempt to constrain it by, for instance, requiring companies to activate the role of internal 
corporate governance and audit firms by enhancing the audit quality. In general, the following 
recommendation may contribute to limiting the practices of earnings management and increase the 
quality of corporate governance and external audit.     
1- Develop the Code of Corporate Governance Practices in Saudi Arabia by revising 
requirements and applying practical guidelines to maintain the actual and perceived 
independence of outside directors.  
2- Increase the awareness of the concept of corporate governance mechanisms and its role in 
developing the Saudi economy and market.    
3- Eliminate obstacles and shortcomings associated with the implementation of internal 
corporate governance. 
4- Enable the CMA to oversee Saudi firms whose financial reporting involves aggressive 
earnings management or lacks legality by identifying earnings management practices.  
5- Accelerate the application of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in all listed 
companies in Saudi Arabia which would lead to enhancing the quality of financial reporting 
and reducing earnings management practices. 
6- Activate the role of audit committees by enhancing the skills and abilities of members by 
organizing training courses to define their responsibilities toward the integrity of financial 
reporting and increase their awareness of the importance of investor protection.   
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7- Increase the importance of having financial expertise on audit committees and of having 
independent members and compulsory communication with external auditors. 
8- Enhance the auditor’s independence and competence and solve the issues that exist in the 
Saudi audit mark. 
9-  Audit firms should acknowledge their legal responsibilities toward shareholders by 
increasing the skills and abilities of their audit teams to detect earnings management or any 
transaction which includes illegal action in financial reporting.   
10- Facilitate the vital role of SOCPA in developing the audit market by monitoring the 
performance of audit firms and holding practical courses in order to offer modern skills to 
the audit profession. 
11- Encourage SOCPA in exploring the issues in the audit market and introducing appropriate 
solutions. In addition, it is time for Saudi companies to disclose audit service fees and non-
audit service fees since this could contribute to resolving the issue of audit fees reduction.  
12- Improve and enhance the awareness and skills of investors by holding business conferences, 
on one hand, and at the same time increase the protection of investors in order to create a 
stable investment environment that leads to long-term investment and increases 
reassurances.     
 
9.5 LIMITATIONS  
Under systemic stages and qualified supervision, this thesis was undertaken taking into account that 
the objectives of the research were met and the research question were answered. However, there 
were certain limitations which may be faced by any study in social science. These study limitations 
are divided into two categories according to research methods.   
 
9.5.1 Questionnaire and interview survey  
Since this thesis was based on a small number of participants and respondents, caution should be 
applied as the results may be not generalised.  Only 15 interviews were conducted and 124 usable 
questionnaires were returned and analysed; as is normal when adopting such approaches this may 
not reflect the perspective of the entire population in Saudi Arabia regarding the study’s topic. 
Moreover, it is difficult to include all board of director and sub-committee members since they 
work part-time and do not stay in the same place for a company. Accordingly, this study has 
attempted to select a balanced number of respondents and participants for each group in order to 
 270 
 
ensure equal findings. Many participants and respondents were not involved in the study’s survey 
due to their lack of awareness and knowledge about corporate governance and earnings 
management. 
 
Furthermore, some interviewees in developing countries do not like to have their opinions tape-
recorded or they are worried if notes are taken during the interview as it appears like an 
interrogation to them; that is why this research included only 15 interviews. Also, the area of 
earnings management is a very sensitive topic related to manipulation, so respondents or 
participants may feel this study to be an indirect investigation which would make many of them 
very careful or hesitant when answering.         
 
Although attempts were made to explain the objectives of this research, another important 
limitation related to the questionnaire and semi-structured interview is that they could be deceptive 
in some cases as interviewees might not wish to reveal their incompetence in providing beneficial 
information or might not wish give a bad impression of their organisation which may lead them to 
provide “perfect” answers. Although the questionnaire employed in the study was not long, using a 
questionnaire may sometimes make some respondents bored, so they may provide random answers 
to finish quickly rather than thinking about their answers. Another limitation related to the 
qualitative method is that it can be impressionistic and subjective rather than based on reality or 
specific fact. The investigation of perceptions is limited to specific listed companies and does not 
involve financial and insurance companies which are characterized by having special practice and 
operations. Since Saudi Arabia is a large country, the investigation focuses on the main cities: 
Jeddah, Riyadh and Dammam which contain the headquarters of most Saudi companies.     
                
9.5.2 Secondary data  
Although this study uses the whole population in the Saudi market, some companies are excluded 
for a number of reasons: 
1-Companies which have a lack of disclosure regarding corporate governance or missing data. 
2-Companies which operate in the financial and insurance sectors since they have special practices and 
operations. 
Accordingly, the findings can not be generalised to all sectors in Saudi market however, the 
generalisation is possible in other sectors involved in this study.     
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In respect of dependent variables, using discretionary accrual models should be treated with caution 
since this model, as proxy for EM, has many limitations (see methodology chapter page 127). 
Moreover, the indicator of earnings management is often used as opportunistic rather than 
informative. 
In relation to independent variables, although there are many criticisms of the measurement of audit 
quality such as Big4 and specialist auditors, this study had no choice due to the lack of disclosure 
regarding audit fees, non-audit service fees, audit hours and other possible measurements. Indeed, 
the existing literature suggests that no better measures and previous measurement are used 
extensively in auditing research. Due to a lack of disclosure this study has ignored the short-term 
and long-term related to ownership structure.      
 
Some control variables affecting earnings management (corporate governance and external 
auditing) may not be involved in empirical models; however as the aim of this study is not to 
examine causality, but rather the association between earnings management and attributes of 
monitoring mechanisms, the effect of this limitation on the results may be considered to be of 
minor consequence. 
 
During collecting the data, differences were found in the numbers related to financial statements 
between the data shown on a company site and that shown in the Saudi market, so the study 
focused on the data shown in the Saudi market since it is more official and accurate.  
 
Finally, since corporate governance is modern regulation and is in its early phase, findings may not 
reflect its an effective role  in status quo properly.                
 
 
9.6 AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This study makes a considerable contribution to the exploration of earnings management practices 
in Saudi Arabia and the role of monitoring mechanisms in constraining these practices. However, 
there are several areas that have not been covered by this research which may useful for further 
study in Saudi Arabia. Thus, there are numerous possible ways in which the research study as a 
whole could be extended.  
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One possible avenue for future research is to examine the motivations and techniques by employing 
logistic regression in order to provide in-depth understanding of earnings management practices. 
Moreover, it is recommended that future studies specifically investigate earnings management by 
banks and financial institutions to obtain a better understanding of manipulation and the role of 
monitoring mechanisms, especially by those parties following IFRS. Despite not involving 
compulsory monitoring mechanisms, it might be worthwhile investigating earnings management 
practices in non-listed companies in Saudi Arabia in order to obtain a comprehensive 
understanding.  
 
Since corporate governance was in its early stages during the study period, future research is 
recommended to extend our research by examining the role of corporate governance in the coming 
years, particularly when most listed companies are fully compliant with the regulations and 
disclosure.  
 
Finally, investigation of the study topic might be extended to other Gulf countries such as Kuwait, 
Qatar, Bahrain, UAE, and other Arab countries that have similar characteristics to Saudi Arabia in 
order to provide more evidence of earnings management and monitoring mechanisms across 
economies.  
 
Although the research question regarding the role of internal corporate governance in constraining 
earnings management is mainly answered by database, questionnaires and interviews will be 
helpful particularly in discussing whether accrual-based models employed in the studies to compute 
earnings management are complicated by the difficulty of calculating discretionary and non-
discretionary accruals (Aljifri, 2007). Moreover, it is argued that where there is a lack of theory, it 
is difficult to ensure that all variables that influence manipulation or accounting choices are 
included in one model which means that the findings that obtained from earnings management may 
not be reliable and accurate (McNichols, 2000; Aljifri, 2007). Accordingly, the findings of the 
questionnaire and interview will contribute to reinforcing the findings obtained from the secondary 
data. 
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Table (1) Test of Normality for first group of questions  
Questions Kolmogorov-Smirnov Shapiro-Wilk 
1- To increase  the amount of Zakat  .000 .000 
2- To increase  the amount of remuneration  .000 .000 
3- To retain stable dividends .000 .000 
4-To report a reasonable profit and avoid  
    loss  
.000 .000 
5-To increase the confidence of investors  .000 .000 
6- To obtain a bank loan .000 .000 
7- To increase share price .000 .000 
8-To obtain position and reputation in the 
     business market 
.000 .000 
9- To reduce buyout compensation .000 .000 
10- To fulfil the stock market’s expectations  .000 .000 
11- To retain stable performance .000 .000 
 
 
Table (2) Test of Homogeneity of Variance for first groups of questions 
Questions Levene-Statistics 
 1- To increase  the amount of Zakat  .000 
2- To increase  the amount of remuneration  .001 
3- To retain stable dividends .02 
4-To report a reasonable profit and avoid  
    loss  
.75 
5-To increase the confidence of investors  .01 
6- To obtain a bank loan .001 
7- To increase share price .004 
8-To obtain position and reputation in the 
     business market 
.07 
9- To reduce buyout compensation .178 
10- To fulfil the stock market’s expectations  .436 
11- To retain stable performance .000 
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Table (3) Test of Normality for second group of questions 
Questions 
Kolmogorov-
Smirnov 
Shapiro-Wilk 
1- Manipulation  of the provision of inventory  .000 .000 
2- Manipulation of the amount of receivable  
    accounts 
.000 .000 
3- Manipulation of the amount of  accounts 
depreciation       
.000 .000 
4- Manipulation  of the amount of  various expense  
maintenance expenses)    (such as development costs 
   
.000 .000 
5- Manipulation of the amount of revenue .000 .000 
6- Manipulation  of the amount of cash flow   .000 .000 
7- Manipulation  of the amount of reserves    .000 .000 
8- Manipulation  on sales of assets   .000 .000 
9- Manipulation  of internal transactions  
      related to  business combination 
.000 .001 
10- Capitalizing rather than expensing 
       expenditure 
.000 .000 
 
 
Table (4) Test of Homogeneity of Variance for second groups of questions 
Questions Levene-Statistics 
1- Manipulation  of the provision of inventory  .265 
2- Manipulation of the amount of receivable  
    accounts 
.040 
3- Manipulation of the amount of  accounts 
depreciation       
.870 
4- Manipulation  of the amount of  various 
Expense (such as development costs, and  
maintenance expenses                                    
.040 
5- Manipulation of the amount of revenue .050 
6- Manipulation  of the amount of cash flow   .000 
7- Manipulation  of the amount of reserves    .040 
8- Manipulation  on sales of assets   .039 
9- Manipulation  of internal transactions  
      related to  business combination 
.001 
10- Capitalizing rather than expensing 
       expenditure 
.309 
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Table (5) Test of Normality for Third group of questions 
Questions 
Kolmogorov-
Smirnov 
Shapiro-Wilk 
1- Frequent meetings of board of directors                                                         
.000 .000 
2- Small size of board of directors                                                                        
.000 .000 
3-  High proportion of outside directors on board of directors 
.000 .000 
4- High proportion of shares owned by board of  directors 
.000 .000 
5- Existence of royal family members on the board of directors 
.000 .000 
6- Separation between functions of CEO and chair of board     
.000 .000 
7- Shorter CEO tenure                                                                                           
.000 .000 
8- Frequent meetings audit committee                                                                 
.000 .000 
9- Small size of audit committee (no more than 3)                                              
.000 .000 
10-  High proportion of outside directors on audit  committee 
.000 .000 
11- Sufficient expertise in accounting, auditing   and/or finance 
        and/or finance  on audit committee                       .000 .000 
12- Frequent meetings of remuneration and nomination committee                                                         
.000 .000 
13 - Small size of remuneration and nomination                                                 
                   .000 .000 
14-  High proportion of outside directors on remuneration and nomination  
        committee                                                                                                        .000 .000 
15- CEO should not serve on  remuneration and   
nomination committee                        
.000 .000 
16- - Ownership concentration 
.000 .000 
 
Table (6) Test of Homogeneity of Variance for Third groups of questions 
Questions Levene-Statistics 
1- Frequent meetings of board of directors                                                                     
.098 
2- Small size of board of directors                                                                                    
.005 
3-  High proportion of outside directors on board of directors 
.082 
4- High proportion of shares owned by board of  directors 
.044 
5- Existence of royal family members on the board of directors 
.001 
6- Separation between functions of CEO and chair of board     
.012 
7- Shorter CEO tenure                                                                                                      
.084 
8- Frequent meetings audit committee                                                                             
.017 
9- Small size of audit committee (no more than 3)                                                          
.179 
10-  High proportion of outside directors on audit  committee 
.015 
11- Sufficient expertise in accounting, auditing   and/or finance 
         and/or finance  on audit committee                                 .000 
12- Frequent meetings of remuneration and nomination committee                                                         
.000 
13 - Small size of remuneration and nomination                                                            
                   .758 
14-  High proportion of outside directors on remuneration and nomination  
        committee                                                                                                           .000 
15- CEO should not serve on  remuneration and   nomination committee                        
.000 
16- High proportion of family ownership                                                                        
.000 
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Table (7) Test of Normality for Forth group of questions 
Questions 
Kolmogorov-
Smirnov 
Shapiro-Wilk 
1- Contracting with a firm which has high 
   independence and  good reputation  
.000 .000 
2- Contracting with a local firm affiliated with 
     the BIG4 
.000 .000 
3-  Contracting with a specialist auditor in industry  
.000 .000 
4- Short auditor tenure with a company    
.000 .000 
5- Issuing stricter auditing standards and accounting 
    legislations   
.000 .000 
6- Issuing deterrent punishments 
.000 .000 
 
 
Table (8) Test of Homogeneity of Variance for Forth groups of questions 
Questions Levene-Statistics 
1- Contracting with a firm which has high 
   independence and  good reputation  
.000 
2- Contracting with a local firm affiliated with 
     the BIG4 
.384 
3-  Contracting with a specialist auditor in industry  
.000 
4- Short auditor tenure with a company    
.000 
5- Auditor should be changed after 5 years     
.000 
7- Issuing stricter auditing standards and accounting 
    legislations   
.349 
8- Issuing deterrent punishments 
.000 
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Table (9) Descriptive statistics according to largest industries 
Variable MIDIA & 
PUPLISHING 
MULTI-
INVESTMENT 
PETROCHEMICAL REAL ESTATE& DEV RETAIL 
mean P50 SD mean P50 SD mean P50 SD mean P50 SD mean P50 SD 
DAC 0.221 0.162 0.227 0.118 0.065 0.154 0.069 0.029 0.118 0.068 0.028 0.094 0.080 0.056 0.090 
BRDSIZE 8.200 8.000 2.573 7.556 8.000 1.649 8.622 9.000 1.762 9.375 9.000 1.245 7.815 7.000 1.777 
BRDMEET 4.100 3.500 1.287 3.852 4.000 1.537 4.267 4.000 1.452 5.042 6.000 2.116 3.963 4.000 1.698 
MANGOWN 0.353 0.260 0.235 0.115 0.070 0.163 0.073 0.042 0.084 0.206 0.165 0.148 0.306 0.240 0.255 
OUTSIDE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.704 1.000 0.465 0.733 1.000 0.447 0.792 1.000 0.415 0.556 1.000 0.506 
RFAMLY 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.704 1.000 0.465 0.222 0.000 0.420 0.333 0.000 0.482 0.259 0.000 0.447 
DUAL 0.400 0.000 0.516 0.444 0.000 0.506 0.911 1.000 0.288 0.792 1.000 0.415 0.481 0.000 0.509 
ACSIZE 3.000 3.000 0.000 2.889 3.000 0.751 3.267 3.000 0.495 3.458 3.000 0.779 3.074 3.000 0.550 
ACMEET 3.300 1.000 4.596 2.481 2.000 2.007 2.733 3.000 1.421 4.375 4.000 2.060 3.222 4.000 1.761 
ACINDEP 0.900 1.000 0.316 0.963 1.000 0.192 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.833 1.000 0.381 0.704 1.000 0.465 
ACEXPERT 0.200 0.000 0.422 0.556 1.000 0.506 0.933 1.000 0.252 0.708 1.000 0.464 0.407 0.000 0.501 
RENEXIST 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.852 1.000 0.362 0.778 1.000 0.420 0.708 1.000 0.464 0.963 1.000 0.192 
RNIDP 0.200 0.000 0.422 0.296 0.000 0.465 0.313 0.000 0.468 0.120 0.000 0.332 0.857 1.000 0.356 
FAMOWN 0.095 0.060 0.088 0.237 0.132 0.301 0.083 0.000 0.146 0.081 0.000 0.103 0.236 0.210 0.193 
INSTOWN 0.290 0.300 0.290 0.094 0.000 0.176 0.230 0.149 0.239 0.194 0.160 0.174 0.122 0.075 0.174 
STATEOWN 0.016 0.000 0.025 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.102 0.000 0.213 0.126 0.000 0.237 0.000 0.000 0.000 
BLOCKOWN 0.909 1.000 0.302 0.704 1.000 0.465 0.911 1.000 0.288 0.833 1.000 0.381 0.889 1.000 0.320 
AUDOPIN 0.800 1.000 0.422 0.370 0.000 0.492 0.889 1.000 0.318 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.926 1.000 0.267 
REPTIME 1.745 1.698 0.148 1.668 1.699 0.210 1.489 1.556 0.253 1.506 1.623 0.269 1.610 1.623 0.205 
BIG4 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.630 1.000 0.492 0.889 1.000 0.318 0.542 1.000 0.509 0.593 1.000 0.501 
AUDITSWITH 0.100 0.000 0.316 0.259 0.000 0.447 0.156 0.000 0.367 0.333 0.000 0.482 0.185 0.000 0.396 
LEVG 0.008 0.002 0.011 0.095 0.000 0.137 0.271 0.292 0.198 0.033 0.000 0.091 0.024 0.000 0.047 
ROA 0.102 0.094 0.049 0.006 0.008 0.085 0.031 0.010 0.060 0.044 0.046 0.047 0.091 0.080 0.117 
CFO 0.072 0.076 0.082 0.025 0.020 0.064 0.039 0.023 0.082 0.060 0.044 0.089 0.108 0.112 0.132 
SIZE 8.928 8.971 0.356 9.092 8.882 0.844 9.931 9.775 0.621 9.680 9.557 0.343 8.733 8.842 0.332 
COMPLEX 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.571 1.000 0.504 0.536 1.000 0.503 0.286 0.000 0.460 0.313 0.000 0.471 
AUDSPEC 0.700 1.000 0.483 0.296 0.000 0.465 0.069 0.029 0.118 0.458 0.000 0.509 0.370 0.000 0.492 
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Table (10) Descriptive statistics according to years 
Variable 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Mean Median SD mean Median SD Mean Median SD Mean Median SD 
DAC 0.098 0.034 0.149 0.097 0.064 0.140 0.120 0.058 0.165 0.097 0.081 0.096 
BRDSIZE 8.075 8.000 1.795 8.195 8.000 1.739 8.247 8.000 1.761 8.292 8.000 1.666 
BRDMEET 4.418 4.000 1.971 4.573 4.000 1.931 4.452 4.000 1.598 4.656 5.000 1.857 
MANGOWN 0.170 0.075 0.216 0.174 0.077 0.214 0.179 0.080 0.206 0.189 0.080 0.214 
OUTSIDE 0.657 1.000 0.478 0.683 1.000 0.468 0.667 1.000 0.474 0.667 1.000 0.474 
RFAMLY 0.507 1.000 0.504 0.463 0.000 0.502 0.441 0.000 0.499 0.438 0.000 0.499 
DUAL 0.776 1.000 0.420 0.732 1.000 0.446 0.774 1.000 0.420 0.781 1.000 0.416 
ACSIZE 3.015 3.000 0.807 3.134 3.000 0.750 3.108 3.000 0.800 3.198 3.000 0.659 
ACMEET 2.657 3.000 2.049 3.073 3.000 2.340 3.301 3.000 2.037 3.771 4.000 2.145 
ACINDEP 0.866 1.000 0.344 0.915 1.000 0.281 0.914 1.000 0.282 0.896 1.000 0.307 
ACEXPERT 0.627 1.000 0.487 0.659 1.000 0.477 0.688 1.000 0.466 0.688 1.000 0.466 
RENEXIST 0.776 1.000 0.420 0.866 1.000 0.343 0.882 1.000 0.325 0.927 1.000 0.261 
RNIDP 0.394 0.000 0.492 0.387 0.000 0.490 0.387 0.000 0.490 0.417 0.000 0.496 
FAMOWN 0.126 0.000 0.195 0.126 0.000 0.206 0.135 0.000 0.217 0.139 0.000 0.218 
INSTOWN 0.110 0.000 0.169 0.132 0.000 0.196 0.156 0.068 0.205 0.163 0.069 0.211 
STATEOWN 0.100 0.000 0.200 0.086 0.000 0.184 0.084 0.000 0.184 0.085 0.000 0.183 
BLOCKOWN 0.725 1.000 0.450 0.780 1.000 0.416 0.785 1.000 0.413 0.792 1.000 0.408 
AUDOPIN 0.853 1.000 0.357 0.878 1.000 0.329 0.785 1.000 0.413 0.875 1.000 0.332 
REPTIME 1.650 1.672 0.205 1.588 1.672 0.218 1.570 1.653 0.217 1.526 1.602 0.246 
BIG4 0.544 1.000 0.502 0.585 1.000 0.496 0.645 1.000 0.481 0.635 1.000 0.484 
AUDITSWITH 0.147 0.000 0.357 0.256 0.000 0.439 0.333 0.000 0.474 0.177 0.000 0.384 
LEVG 0.040 0.000 0.090 0.087 0.008 0.145 0.107 0.032 0.147 0.115 0.043 0.152 
ROA 0.071 0.055 0.095 0.079 0.061 0.081 0.068 0.066 0.090 0.057 0.042 0.082 
CFO 0.081 0.065 0.115 0.080 0.065 0.108 0.083 0.060 0.100 0.098 0.092 0.095 
SIZE 9.128 9.066 0.675 9.207 9.136 0.691 9.291 9.243 0.719 9.314 9.255 0.740 
COMPLEX 0.385 0.000 0.489 0.448 0.000 0.500 0.469 0.000 0.502 0.469 0.000 0.502 
AUDSPEC 0.279 0.000 0.452 0.341 0.000 0.477 0.398 0.000 0.492 0.417 0.000 0.496 
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Table (11) Stepwise Regression For First Model 
BRDINDP BRDSIZE BRDMEET RFAMILY DUAL MANGOWN RNEXT RNIDP FAMOWN INSTOWN 
STATEO
WN 
BLOCKO
WN BIG4 LEVG ROA CFO SIZE COMPLE  
 
.    
-.0436066                  0.02 
-0347652 -.055828                 .055 
-.0312092 -0151236 -038312                .0574 
-.03167798 -0150325 -/0316798 0.062558               .0579 
-.0270924 -.0157763 -.0386 .057580 -.0150098              .0596 
-.026229 -,01556 -037956 .047581 -.0108455 .0530976             .0655 
-.025772 -015274 -.042303 .053903 -0115489 .0580654 -0215602            .0680 
-.0279558 -.014435 -.062203 .039478 -0226585 .0630295 -.057487 -.0339245           0.079 
-.0285591 -.0285591 -0142076 .031542 -.0197676 .0536083 -0179378 -0339819 .0427585          .0826 
0.0281046 -.0142434 -..0059294 .039211 -0202825 .0523761 -.0181545 -.0354727 .03912293 .0187939         .0832 
-0321066 -.0148887 -.036725 -.003673 -.278725 .0491012 -.0005935 -.0338797 .0540864 .0384515 -.142424        .0.105 
-.0321066 -.O14888 -0108351 .037510 -.0280929 .0522135 -.0011528 -0335941 .056422 .0435665 -.1359083 -.0093136       0.106 
-.03108 -.03108 -0143318 .0019255 -.025711 .054944 -.001408 -.0329795 .0596068 .056068 -.1417351 -0076148 -.0119866      .0.107 
-0.0295307 -.0145916 -.0145916 .035021 -0264416 .509954 -.0006627 -.325309 .0570041 .0583455 -.0147192 -.0046029 -.0082013 -.069212     0.108 
-0.0337432 -0.014704 -.011338 .0111741 -.0236491 0.0364491 -0.010414 -0.0380568 0.0505617 0.0482236 -0.125620 -.0038437 -0064875 -470218 0.211895    .0.119 
-.0329002 -.0143992 -0143992 .0118471 -.0208001 .0355191 -.0116513 -.042621 .0437886 .043957 .0994368 -.0009734 -0030641 -.055078 .049345 .022791   0.138 
-.0306559 -.0116502 -.0102474 .078412 -.0208038 .027779 -.011486 -0406394 .0556131 .0595822 .1542602. .0075378 .0004587 .0010156 .026575 .235166 -.02750  0.1441 
-.0297 -0.012 -0.010 0.029 -0.022 0.026 -0.012 -0.012 0.053 0.060 -0.155 -0.008 - 0.001 -0.001 0.021 0.243 -0.028 0.008 0.1448 
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Table (12) Stepwise Regression For second Model 
ACSIZE ACMEET ACINDEP ACEPERT BIG$ ADOPIN AUDSWITCH 
TIMELIE
NSS FAMOWN INSTOWN STATEOWN 
BLOCKO
WN LEVEG ROA CFO SIZE COMPLE AUDSPEC MANGOWN BRDINDP   .    
-.0250474                    0.017 
-.0212915 -.004387                   0.0213 
-.0212432 -.0040516 -.0204042                  0.0231 
-0180697 -.0030333 -0112495 -.0201414                 0.0264 
-.0175046 -.002891 -.0112891 -.096645 -.005816                0.0267 
-.0154491 -.0027451 -.011514 -.087533 -.006778 -.0241543               .0303 
-0159134 -.002825 -.0028254 -.0178211 -.0094335 -.0235852 -.0197405              0.033 
-.0142267 -.0023414 -.013247 -.014494 -.0126438 -.0230826 -.0190004 .0216584             0.0347 
-.14632 -.014632 -.0025287 -0130252 -.0122951 -.0171772 -.0145872 .0174783 .062445            0.0368 
-.0143938 -.0022626 -.01297 -.011925 -.0188893 -.0253337 -.05082 .015082 0.5911335 .0186603           0.040 
-.0134325 -.0036413 -.106588 -.0181695 -.0287164 -.0385134 -.0131138 .0017337 .0825328 .0516636 -1283442          .0594 
-.01129323 -.0037566 -.0116778 -.0175511 -.0276842 -.0369433 -.0136433 -.0019333 . 0845761 .084576 .1222877 -.0082806         0.0629 
-.0132245 -.0042328 -.0104627 .0135335 -.024171 -.0126767 -.006431 -.0064341 .082075 .0651567 .127587 -.006223 -.067433        .0666 
-.0136366 -.0037977 -.0108508 -.0125366 -.0268366 -.0454884 -.0105369 .0022434 .0721904 .0590196 .1138661 -.005444 -0422368 .1704584       0.0708 
-.0133671 -.004267 -.0061611 -.00616 -0236871 -.0451282 -.0134405 .0029602 .0642701 .0525035 .0928119 -.000663 -.0478667 -.0141436 .245322      0.101 
-.0040623 -.0043558 -.0085046 -.0076655 -.0154857 -.0154856 -.0460352 -.0128187 .0052118 .0757989 .1949106 .0107543 .0484623 -.0359966 .2576261 -.04952     .1143 
-.004114 -.004114 -.00424 -.009193 -.0081376 -.467616 -.011938 -.0000917 .089468 .0789468 .0770491 .1979442 .011393 -0466221 .0267773 -.05324 0.0116173    .1159 
-.0052259 -00416267 -.0104861 -0084604 -0123752 -.0084604 -.0474438 -.0020883 .0792249 .0773701 .0792249 .196773 .0111404 -.046679 .02626136 -.048613 .0106566 -.00963   .1163 
-.0046567 -.004265 -.009577 -.008777 -.13172 -0123348 -.047988 .0762515 .077587 .0775827 .195859 .0092.1 .04446 -058057 .260881 -0475732 .0099199 -0099428 0.01766  .1170 
-0.011 -0.003 -0.004 -0.001 -0.017 -0.050 -0.012 - 0.000 0.076 0.072 -0.202 -0.010 0.048 -0.024 0.247 -0.045 0.006 -0.011 0.013 -0.031 .1267 
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Table (13)  Spearman  correlations coefficients for First Model 
* denote significance at the 0.05 level 
 DAC OUTSIDE BRDSIZE BRDMEET RFAMILY DUAL RNEXIST RNIDP FAMOWN INSTOWN STATEOWN MANGOWN BLOCKOWN BIG4 LEVG ROA CFO SIZE COMPLE 
DAC                    
OUTSIDE -0.1338*                   
BRDSIZE -0.1860* 0.1551*                  
BRDMEET -0.102 0.2471* 0.1507*                 
RFAMILY 0.013* 0.044 -0.051 -0.073                
DUAL -0.062 0.2794* -0.1411* 0.011 -0.014               
RNEXIST -0.041 -0.012 0.059 -0.0990 0.049 -0.062              
RNIDP -0.052 -0.2026* 0.1073* -0.2481* -0.011 -0.3314* 0.1411*             
FAMOWN 0.080 -0.041 -0.034 -0.068 0.067 -0.1622* 0.1332* 0.092            
INSTOWN 0.036 -0.090 0.025 -0.093 -0.085 -0.074 0.073 0.2144* 0.2356*           
STATEOWN 0.053 0.225* 0.087 0.4211* 0.1322* 0.1813* -0.2522* -0.2368* -0.1975* -0.2560*          
MANGOWN 0.091 -0.088 -0.019 -0.011 0.041 -0.1335* 0.1322* 0.1234* 0.2348* 0.1340* -0.0930         
BLOCKOWN -0.033 -0.031 0.1481* -0.046 -0.054 -0.1235* 0.1012* 0.1919* 0.2720* 0.3899* -0.3392* 0.2473*        
BIG4 -0.051 0.1305* 0.2070* 0.1389* 0.1257* -0.015 0.013 0.061 0.1832* 0.2374* 0.1198* 0.1705* 0.2055*       
LEVG -0.031 0.124* 0.041 0.061 -0.063 0.067 -0.012 0.028 -0.004 0.2298* 0.066 -0.029 0.1530* 0.2311*      
ROA 0.1371* 0.082 0.051 0.085 0.2428* -0.1123* 0.1565* 0.1365* 0.1308* 0.047 0.1283* 0.1931* 0.006 0.076 -0.1121*     
CFO 0.2217* 0.026 0.014 0.050 0.1594* -0.1000* 0.094 0.1244* 0.089 0.011 0.2403* 0.1111* -0.103 0.015 -0.05 0.6336*    
SIZE -0.097* 0.2598* 0.3364* 0.305* 0.068 0.054 -0.109 -0.011 0.070 0.1761* 0.5100* -0.055 0.1342* 0.3800* 0.4944* 0.002 0.051   
COMPLEX 0.042 -0.043 0.056 0.013 0.1119* 0.011 0.077 0.086 0.1713* 0.075 -0.012 0.1142* 0.071 0.2290* 0.1107* 0.081 
-
0.041 0.1210*  
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Table (14)  Spearman  correlations coefficients for second Model 
 DAC ACINDEP ACSIZS ACMEET 
ACEXP
ERT BIG4 AUDSPEC 
AUDOPI
N REPTIME AUDSWITCH BRDINDP 
FAMOW
N 
INSTOW
N 
MANGOW
N 
STATEO
WN 
BLOCK
OWN LEVG ROA CFO SIZE complex 
DAC                      
ACINDEP -0.0501                     
ACSIZE -0.1315* 0.042                    
ACMEET -0.101 0.1100* 0.2955*                   
ACEXPERT -0.1311* 0.3188* 0.3314* 0.3011*                  
BIG4 -0.057 0.0313 0.1654* 0.1200* 0.1461*                 
AUDSPEC -0.059 -0.071 -0.023 0.044 0.025 0.559*                
AUDOPIN -0.090 0.023 0.2011* 0.1214* 0.1100* -0.003 -0.053               
REPTIME 0.049 0.017 -0.061 -0.032 -0.067 0.074 -0.047 -0.22*              
AUDSWITCH -0.058 0.050 -0.053 -0.027 0.031 -0.1588* -0.1334* 0.020 0.006             
BRDINDP -0.1311* 0.076 0.2434* 0.2041* 0.3346* 0.141* 0.044 0.029 0.0070 0.019            
FAMOWN 0.091 -0.0310 0.044 0.027 -0.057 0.18* 0.1104 -0.020 0.084 -0.13* -0.043           
INSTOWN 0.037 -0.036 -0.019 -0.1334* -0.061 0.2341* 0.1818* 0.164* 0.057 -0..121 -0.105 0.2234*          
MANGOWN 0.091 -0.080 -0.077 0.003 -0.0420 0.1556* 0.071 0.0650 0.090 -0.089 -0.088 0.2600* 0.1241*         
STATEOWN 0.0580 0.041 0.1369* 0.1942* 0.2140* 0.1232* 0.055 0.13* 0.066 0.004 0.2381* -0.2098* -0.2455* -0.093        
BLOCKOWN -0.044 -0.087 0.1246* -0.083 0.010 0.2018* 0.1328* 0.15* -0.0230 -0.104 -0.031 0.2332* 0.3361* 0.2400* -0.3349*       
LEVG -0.039 0.081 0.075 -0.037 0.2236* 0.2351* 0.2065* 0.094 -0.1677* 0.006 0.1209* -0.006 0.2017* -0.031 0.065 0.140*      
ROA 0. 1233* -0.025 0.057 0.003 -0.049 0.076 -0.074 0.2011* -0.098 -0.094 0.082 0..1123* 0.052 0.2100* 0.1109* 0.007 -0.1244*     
CFO 0.2361* -0.068 0.021 0.050 -0.057 0.012 -0.096 0.1474* -0.052 -0.018 0.023 0.085 0.013 0.1324* 0.2389* -0.105 -0.065 
0.6336
*    
SIZE -0.1122* 0.044 0.3319* 0.1567* 0.3009* 0.3991* 0.3788* 0.1800* -0.007 -0.066 0.2400* 0.073 0.1771* -0.048 0.5011* 0.1242* 0.840* 0.001 0.054   
COMPLEX 
 0.035 0.053 0.071 -0.006 0.076 0.2246* 0.038 -0.011 0.1855* -0.098 -0.041 0.1500* 0.076 0.133* -0.012 0.073 0.1299* 0.089 -0.041 0.122*  
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Dear Sir:                                                                                       
I am a full time PhD student in the Accounting and Finance section of the Business 
School, university of Durham, United Kingdom. I am currently doing my PhD on the 
investigation of the role of monitoring mechanisms (corporate governance 
mechanisms and external auditing) in constraining earnings management as an 
empirical study in Saudi Arabia. The attached questionnaire, is a significant part of 
my PhD, is one of the important aims of this questionnaire is to provide empirical 
evidence on the quality of internal corporate governance mechanisms and external 
auditing as a safeguard against the manipulation of earnings management.  
 
I am hoping to carry out the questionnaires with you, as an experienced person in this 
area, to attain a clear image of the role of corporate governance mechanisms in order 
to identify what needs to be done to improve them. Therefore, I would be extremely 
grateful if you would contribute toward the successful result of this research, which 
will hopefully also lead to the improvement of the Saudi market, by completing this 
questionnaire.                   
  
Finally, I wish to confirm that the information and personal opinion that you provide 
will be treated as confidential. Please accept in advance my best regards and 
appreciation for your cooperation.                                                                
Yours Faithfully,,,,                                              
 
Salim alghamdi   
Tel: 0555695055 
Email: Lafy1393@hotmail.com  
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Section (1): General and Background Information                                        
This questionnaire consists of four sections. This section aims to collect general 
information about you, your position and your educational background.  Please 
answer by circling the appropriate number.                                                         
 
1-1 What is your position? Please select one 
Member of board directors Member of sub-committees   auditor Academic 
Staff 
1 2 3 5 
 
  
1-2 What is your total length of experience in this job?  
Less than 1 year 1-5 5-10 10-15 More than 15 years 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
1-3 What is your highest educational qualification?  
Bachelor Master PhD Other* 
2 3 4 5 
Please specify ......................................................................................... 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1-4    What was your major in your highest educational qualification?  
Accounting Finance Bus-Admin Economic Other* 
1 2 3 4 5 
Please specify ......................................................................................... 
 
 
Section(2):General perceptions of  the motivation of earnings management and 
techniques   
2.1 Numerous attempts have been made in accounting literature to detect the real 
reasons why companies tend to manipulate earnings management. Several causes are 
given below. In relation to the Saudi business environment, please indicate which of 
the following statements you agree and disagree with by circling the appropriate 
number on the following 5-point scale:                                               
Strongly 
Disagree 
(SD) 
Disagree 
(D) 
Do not Know 
( N) 
Agree 
(A) 
Strongly Agree 
(SA) 
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statement (SD) (D) (N) (A) (SA) 
1-To reduce the amount of Zkat      
2- To increase  the amount of remuneration             
3- To retain stable dividends        
4- To report a reasonable profit and avoid loss       
5- To increase the confidence of investors       
6- To obtain a bank loan       
7- To increase share price      
8- To obtain position and reputation in the business  
     market 
     
9- To reduce buyout compensation       
10- To fulfil the stock market’s expectations       
11- To retain stable performance       
 12- Others (s), please specify……………      
 
2.2 In previous accounting literature, there is agreement on various ways for 
managers to exert their judgement in specifying the amount of reported earnings. 
From your experience, to what extent do you agree with the following forms of 
earnings management in Saudi Arabia? Please indicate which of the following 
statements you agree and disagree with by circling the appropriate number on the 
following 5-point scale:  
                                                                                        
statement (SD) (D) (N) (A) (SA) 
1- Manipulation  of the provision of inventory       
2- Manipulation of the amount of receivable accounts      
3- Manipulation of the amount of depreciation  
    accounts 
     
4- Manipulation  of the amount of  various expenses 
  (such as development costs, maintenance expenses)       
     
5- Manipulation  of the amount of  loan interests       
6- Manipulation of the amount of revenue      
7- Manipulation  of the amount of cash flow        
8- Manipulation  of the amount of reserves         
9- Manipulation  on sales of assets        
10- Manipulation  of internal transactions related to 
       business combination       
     
11- Capitalising rather than expensing expenditures        
12- Other (s), please specify……………………….       
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Section(3): General perception of the role of internal corporate governance 
mechanisms in constraining earnings management.  
                                     
In accounting literature, a large number of studies found that corporate governance 
mechanisms constrain earnings management. Indicate to what extent you agree and 
disagree that the following actions can reduce earnings management by circling the 
appropriate number in the following 5-point scale:                       
statement (SD) (D) (N) (A) (SA) 
1- Frequent meetings of board of directors         
2- Small size of board of directors         
3-  High proportion of outside directors on board of  
     directors    
     
4- High proportion of shares owned by board of directors       
5- Existence of royal family members on the 
    board of directors 
     
6- Separation between functions of CEO and chair of board           
7- Shorter CEO tenure         
8- Frequent meetings audit committee          
9- Small size of audit committee (no more than 3)        
10-  High proportion of outside directors on audit  
        committee     
     
11- Sufficient expertise in accounting, auditing and/or finance 
      on audit committee     
     
12- Frequent meetings of remuneration and nomination 
      committee 
     
13 - Small size of remuneration and nomination committee          
14-  High proportion of outside directors on remuneration 
        and nomination committee 
     
15- CEO should not serve on  remuneration and nomination 
       committee  
     
16- Ownership concentration       
 
Section(4): General perceptions of the role of external auditing in constraining 
earnings management.  
                                                        
The following actions have been recommended by numerous studies to contribute to 
constraining earnings management. To what extent do you agree with the following 
actions? Please indicate which of the following actions you agree and disagree with 
by circling the appropriate number on the following 5-point scale:  
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statement 
(SD) (D) (N) (A) (SA) 
1- Contracting with a firm which has high independence and 
      good reputation       
     
2-  Contracting with a local firm affiliated with the BIG4      
3-  Contracting with a specialist auditor in industry          
4- Short auditor tenure with a company         
5- Issuing stricter auditing and accounting standards        
6- Issuing deterrent punishments       
7- Other (s), Please  specify……………………        
 
Thank you very much for your interest 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
     
   
 
.  
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Semi-Structured Interview Questions 
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1. Do you think the figures of reported earnings reflect the real image of the 
profitability of Saudi companies and why?  
 
  
2. Do you agree that Saudi managers tend to manipulate earnings in order to 
increase their own personal wealth?  If yes, could you provide an example of how 
manipulation can be made?  
 
 
3. What important actions would you recommend in order to constrain earnings 
management practices in Saudi Arabia?  Discuss the following actions:     
1- Issuing more accounting legislations  
2- Issuing stricter standards   
3- Issuing punishments as a deterrent 
4- Full commitment of  implementation of corporate governance mechanisms  
5- contracting with a BIG 4 auditor  or local firm affiliated with BIG4        
6- Contracting with a specialist auditor    
7- Retaining the auditor for long time   
8- Greater disclosure     
9- Other   
 
4. How do you evaluate the role of the board of directors in preventing wrongdoing 
and errors?  
 
 
 
5. How do you evaluate the role of the audit committee in preventing wrongdoing 
and errors?    
 
  
6.  How do you evaluate the role of the remuneration and nomination committee 
in preventing wrongdoing and errors?    
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7. How do you evaluate the role of external auditing in constraining wrongdoing 
and errors?     
 
 
8. How do you evaluate the role of ownership structure in preventing wrongdoing 
and errors?    
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  عن استقصاء قائمة
 
  "  المساهمة السعودية الشركات في الربحية دارةإ الحد من في الرقابه آليات دور "
 
 0102
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  803
 
 
 
:                                                                                      العزيز ألأخ المكرم
           
  .........                                                                              وبعد طيبة تحية
 قسم عمال،لأا دارةإ كلية -المتحدة بالمملكة درم بجامعة الدكتوراه طلاب أحد بأني علما   سعادتكم أحيط أن أود 
 والمراجعة الشركات حوكمة(  الرقابة آليات دور عن ببحث الحالي الوقت في وأقوم, والمالية المحاسبة
 من جزء الاستبانة هذه. السعودية العربية المملكة في تطبيقية كدراسة الربحية دارةإ الحد من في) الخارجية
تقييم مثل هذه الآليات التي أكتسبت موخرأ أهمية كبيره خاصة بعد الازمة  أهدافها من والتي الدكتواره رسالة
المالية العالمية، وكذلك حضيت بأهتمام كبير من وزارة التجارة السعودية والجهات ذات العلاقة.                 
                                                                                            .                              
                      
على  التعرف أجل من المجال هذا في خبرتكم أساس على معكم هذه الاستبانة بتنفيذ اقوم أن أمل على أنا وحقيقة  
 مساهمتكم حالة في لكم ممتن وساكون. جودتها وضمان آلياتها تحسين في المساهمة لنا يمكن حتى الدور هذا
                .                                 . السعودي السوق تطوير في تسهم قد التي الاستبانة هذه تعبئة في
                                                                                     
  بقبول وتفضلوا سري، بشكل الشخصية وأرائكم المعلومات مع التعامل سيتم أنه لكم أوكد أن أود أخيرا،
  .                                                                                            وتقديري شكري خالص
  
 
       الغامدي علي سالم
 moc.liamtoh@3931yfaL
  الطائف بجامعة التدريس هيئة عضو
 5505965550         
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 الجزءtالأول:tمعلوماتtعامةt
 تشمل منه المستقصى  عن عامة بيانات جمع إلى لاستقصاءا هذا من الأول الجزء يهدف٠اجزاء أربعة على الاستبانهه هذ تحتوي
  . المناسب الرقم باختيار الإجابة منكم أمل لذا الشخصية، الخبرة العلمية، والمؤهلات الوظيفة
                       
  tttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttماهيtوظيفتكtالحاليةt؟ttttttttt1-1
 دارةإعضو مجلس  عضو لجنة (مراجعة أو لجنة المكافآت) مراجع عضو هيئة تدريس
 1 2 3 4
 
  ماهيtمدةtخدمتكtفيtهذهtالوظيفةtt2-1
 أقل من سنة 1-1 11-1 11-11  سنة 11أكثر من 
 1 2 3 4 1
 
  tttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttماهيtمؤهلاتكtالتعليميةtالحاليةt؟ttttttt3t-1
 بكالوريوس ماجستير دكتواره أخرى
 2 3 4 1
                       أخرى من فضلك حدد...............................................................................................
 
  ماهوtالتخصصtالعلميtلهذاtالمؤهلtt؟tttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttt4t-1
 محاسبة مالية دارة أعمالإ اقتصاد أخرى
 1 2 3 4 1
                       حدد...............................................................................................أخرى من فضلك 
 
 الجزءtالثاني:tالتصورtالعامtعنtطرقtوأساليبtإدارةtالربحيةt
فيttالتحكمtلىإالشركاتttمديريالعديدtمنtالبحوثtالمحاسبيةtتوصلتtإلىtعددtمنtالأسبابtالتيtقدttتدفعtالعديدtمنtt1-2
.tبالنسبةtإلىtالبيئةtالسعودية،tالرجاءtمنكمtإبداءtرأيكمtالشخصيtعنtالحالاتtةالمنشورtلأرباحاالتقديرtالشخصيtلقيمةt
  tttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttالموضوعةtأدناه.
 لاtأوافقtبشدة لاtأوافق لاtأعلمt أوافقt أوافقtبشدة
 1 2 3 4 1
          
أوافقt
 بشدة
لاtأوافقt لاtأوافق لاtأعلم أوافقt
 الحالة بشدة
  تخفيض وعاء الزكاة  ل -1     
  تعظيم المكافأة التي تمنحها الشركة للإدارة التنفيذية ل -2     
  محافظة على استقرار التوزيعات النقدية لل -3     
  للتقرير عن أرباح مناسبة وتفادي الخسارة -4     
  لزيادة ثقة المستثمرين  -1     
  تسهيل الحصول على قرض من البنوكل -6     
  لزيادة سعر أسهم الشركة في السوق -7     
  تعزيز موقف وسمعة مديري الشركة للاحتفاظ بمناصبهمل -8     
  تأثير سلبا على أسعار الأسهم ثم الاستحواذ عليها  لل -9     
  سهم السعوديالالتلبية توقعات سوق  -11     
  للحصول على أداء مالي مستقر -11     
  (الرجاء ذكرها)أخرى  -21     
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لكيttيرينالتيtقدtتولدtبعضtالفرصttللمدtتكادtتجمعtالدراساتtالمحاسبيةtالسابقةtعنtتعددtالطرقtوالقياسtالمحاسبيtt2-2
tمكانيةإعلىtرباحtالمنشورة،tمنtخلالtخبرتكtالشخصيةtألىtأيtمدىtتوافقtلأايمارسواtالحكمtالشخصيtفيtالتأثيرtعلىtقيمةt
 tttt       .البيئةtالسعوديةفيttةالمنشوررباحtلأالتاليةtللتأثيرtعلىtأرقامtاستخدامtالطرقtا
  ttttttttttttttttttttt.tttttttttttttttttttttttttttttt
أوافقt
 بشدة
لاtأوافقt لاtأوافق لاtأعلم أوافقt
 الطريقة بشدة
  التحكم في قيمة المخزون  -1     
  التحكم في قيمة حسابات المدينون -2     
  التحكم في حسابات الاستهلاك  -3     
  التحكم في قيمة المصروفات المختلفة (مثل مصاريف البحوث -4     
  والتطوير ومصاريف الصيانة)    
  ض   التحكم في فوائد القرو -1     
  التحكم في قيمة المبيعات -6     
  التحكم في قيمة التدفقات النقدية-7     
  التحكم في قيمة الاحتياطيات  -8     
   بألاندماجالتحكم في العمليات الداخلية المتعلقة  -9     
                                                 المباعة صوللأا التحكم في قيمة -11     
  من الاعتراف بها لايرادية بدلاا ا رسمألة المصاريف -11     
  (الرجاء ذكرها)أخرى  -21     
 
 الجزءtالثالث:tالتصورtالعامtعنtدورtآلياتtحوكمةtالشركاتtفيtالحدtمنtإدارةtالربحية:
في التأثير عليها. في  المديريندارة الربحية وتحد من دور إ تحسنأشارت بأن آليات حوكمة الشركات  الأدبياتمن  مجموعةtt1-3
رباح لأفي ا يرينوالحد من التأثير الشخصي للمد دارة الربحيةإالتالية سوف تسهم في تحسين  لإجراءاتارأيكم الشخصي أي من 
 المنشورة.
أوافقt
 بشدة
لاtأوافقt لاtأوافق لاtأعلم أوافقt
  لإجراءا بشدة
  لاجتماعات بصفة دورية لأعضاء مجلس الإدارة اعقد  -1     
  لإدارةا صغر حجم مجلس -2     
   كافي من الأعضاء غير التنفيذيين في مجلس الإدارة وجود عدد  -3     
  في مجلس الإدارة سهملأاوجود عدد كافي من حاملي  -4     
  وجود أحد الأعضاء ذوي النفوذ  في مجلس الإدارة -1     
  الفصل بين مهام رئيس مجلس الإدارة وبين المدير -6     
  التنفيذي للشركة      
  خدمة المدير التنفيذي لفترة طويلة  عدم بقاء -7     
  عقد اجتماعات لجنة المراجعة بصفة دورية -8     
  صغر حجم لجنة المراجعة -9     
  وجود الأعضاء غير التنفيذيين في لجنة المراجعة    -11     
  وجود خبير مالي أو محاسبي في لجنة المراجعة -11     
  الترشيحات والمكافآت بصفة دوريةعقد اجتماعات لجنة  -21     
  صغر حجم لجنة الترشيحات والمكافآت  -31     
  وجود الأعضاء غير التنفيذيين في لجنة الترشيحات -41     
  والمكافآت        
  وجود المدير التنفيذي كعضو في لجنة الترشيحات والمكافآت  -11     
    للمساهمين  الملكية من مقبولة نسبة وجود  -61     
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 الجزءtالرابع:tالتصورtالعامtعنtدورtالمراجعةtالخارجيةttفيtالحدtمنtإدارةtالربحية:
نها أن تسهم في تحسين إدارة الربحية أتباع إجراءات معينة مرتبطة بجودة المراجعة من شاأوصت العديد من الدراسات أن   1-4
نها سوف تسهم في ألإجراءات التالية  ترى ا المنشورة. في رأيكم الشخصي أي منوالحد من التأثير الشخصي للمدراء في الأرباح 
                                                                                                                                                                                     دارة الربحية.إتحسين 
 
 
  .                                                                                                                                                             
                              
أوافقt
 بشدة
لاtأوافقt لاtأوافق لاtأعلم أوافقt
 بشدة
  لحالةا
  التعاقد مع مكاتب المراجعة التي تتمتع بالاستقلالية والسمعة -1     
  الحسنة   
  لأربعةاالمحلية التي تنتسب إلى المكاتب التعاقد من أحد مكاتب المراجعة  -2     
 )4GIB( لكبرىا     
  التعاقد مع مكتب مراجعة متخصص في مجال عمل الشركة   -3     
 4 بقاء المراجع مع الشركة لفترة طويلةعدم  -       
 5 صدارة معايير محاسبة و مراجعة أكثر تفصيلا وتشددا إ -     
 6-  صدارة عقوبات رادعة في حق المخالفينإ     
  أخرى (الرجاء ذكرها) -      
 
 ،،،متم،،دو شكرا على اهتمامكم
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